



PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EIGHTH
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
The University of Mysore
1932

Editor :
H. D. BHATTACHARYYA.

Printed and Published by—N C. GHOSH at the
TOWN ART PRESS 121-A Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.
1933.

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FOREWORD

It is a pleasure to know that we are able to publish the Proceedings of the Mysore Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress this year. The credit for the prompt publication is due to Mr. Haridas Bhattacharyya, our Joint Secretary, who is in charge of the Publication Section. In this connection it is my duty to refer to the help and support given to us by His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore, whose interest in philosophical matters is well known. Prof. A. R. Wadia and V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, the local Secretaries, deserve our deep thanks for the excellent arrangements which they made for the Congress at Mysore.

16th December, 1933.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

SPEECH OF HIS HIGHNESS.

SIR SRI KRISHNARAJENDRA WADIYAR BAHADUR

G. C. S. I., G. B. E.

Maharaja of Mysore.

**DELEGATES AND MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL
CONGRESS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,**

It is with great pleasure that I welcome to my Capital so distinguished a body of seekers after Truth, and wish you Godspeed in yours labours.

Although Mysore cannot attempt to rival great centres like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, or the holy city of Benares, yet she has some claims to be considered a suitable meeting-place for such a conference as yours. For one thing I feel that I am welcoming you to a land of philosophers. It was in Mysore that Srutakevali Bhadrabahu, leading the first migration of the Jains to the South, broke his journey and took up his abode. It was in Mysore again that Sankaracharya founded the premier Institution for the propagation of his philosophy. It was to Mysore that Ramanujacharya fled from the persecution of the Chola kings to preach his doctrines. It was here that Madhvacharya by his teaching gave an impetus to the Dwaita system. In Mysore again Veera-saivism has flourished for several centuries.

Mysore is also a storehouse of ancient philosophies. There are wonderful manuscript libraries in Sringeri and Sravanabel-gola. The Oriental Library in this city, has become famous through the discovery of the manuscript of the great Kautilya's *Arthasastra*, which has thrown a flood of light on a most important period of Indian History. It is our endeavour in our Sanskrit College, which has already been in existence for over half a century, to keep alive the philosophic heritage

of Bharatavarsha. Perhaps in these libraries there are still important, but undiscovered, gems of historic and philosophic lore, awaiting the labours of scholars like yourselves.

While we are thus loyal to the past, we also try to keep ourselves abreast of modern developments. Mysore has, as you are aware, been selected as the headquarters of the greatest scientific institute in India. She has also been the meeting place of many important conferences. Only four years ago the Student Christian Federation of the whole World met in this city, and last year the All-India Science Congress met at Bangalore. It is very fitting that this should be followed by a Congress of Philosophers.

We live in times when religion and philosophy alike are being put to the severest of tests. New items of knowledge and discoveries are following one on the heels of another at a pace, which to many appears to be fraught with grave danger, and there are not wanting those who declare that the very foundations of religion and philosophy are being undermined.

But I do not despair. Rather am I one of those who believe that philosophy is on the threshold of some great advance. History teaches us that philosophy is ever old and ever new, that it is re-moulded out of the crucible of thought of each generation as it passes. Did not Socrates, Plato and Aristotle themselves follow on the period of scepticism associated with the Sophists? In our own country the materialism of the Charvakas was but a prelude to the profound ethicism of Buddha. In modern Europe the destructive zeal of the prophets of the French Revolution coincided with the birth of the great idealistic systems of Kant and Hegel.

It is possibly a sign of the coming of another great advance that to-day there is increasing recognition of the inter-relation of the sciences, not only with one another, but

with the co-ordinated consideration of them all, which belongs to philosophy. When we see scientists like Bergson and William James, Whitehead and Eddington, and mathematicians like Bertrand Russell and Poincaré, impelled by the logic of facts to pass on from science to philosophy, have we not reason to hope that the next advance in thought will show a new quality ?

Nor is the need less great for a renaissance in religious thought. Religions are apt to be too closely associated with particular territorial boundaries. Philosophy is free from such associations ; but by its very nature it is confined to an aristocracy of learned men. But each can help the other. Philosophy can aid religion by inducing the clarity of thought which tends to purify it and to disperse the clouds that obscure the truth. Religion can aid philosophy by spreading abroad to the people at large the truths that philosophy has thus revealed. In the last resort the good and the true will meet in the God of religion, the Absolute of philosophy.

Philosophy has come to be looked upon as an abstruse subject, far removed from the stress and strain of life. But a philosophy that is remote from life forfeits all claim to our homage. It should give us a co-ordinated world-view which comprehends all the aspects of life including religion. Philosophy can justify its existence only by the creation of a broad-based standpoint for the study of arts as well as of sciences : physical, biological and social. The world to-day suffers from excessive specialisation and we are apt to miss the broad vistas of life because of our circumscribed outlook. It was not so long ago that politics and economics as well as the physical sciences were nourished by philosophy and grew up under its fostering care. They are now grown to manhood, and are apt to be somewhat contemptuous of their philosophic ancestry. None the less they need to-day the guiding counsel of philosophy. Our economic and our political difficulties point to the need for comprehensive thought, a

need which philosophy alone can hope to meet. And you all know that the highest art and literature of a people are the natural outcome of their philosophy. It evaluates all experience and thought and it is thus co-extensive with life.

Indian philosophic traditions are supremely rich, but they need to be vivified by the breath of life to-day. You gentlemen, by your knowledge of western thought as well as your inborn zest for our own philosophy, are in a position to reconcile the warring claims of narrow specialisation and broad-based culture. I trust that the Indian Philosophical Congress will play its part in the renaissance of philosophy which the highly distracted condition of the world demands to-day.

Delegates and Members of the Indian Philosophical Congress, I wish that your session may be marked by clarity of vision and may be productive of much fruitful thought and discussion, and that you may attain to Carlyle's definition of a philosopher as "he to whom the highest has descended, and the lowest has mounted up; who is the equal and kindly brother of all".

Presidential Address.

By

SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

YOUR HIGHNESS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I owe an explanation to the members of the Philosophical Congress for my presence here this evening, in this office. Two others who were previously selected for this eminent position are unable to be with us to-day for different reasons. Till the other day we were certain that Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyar, K.C.S.I., would be with us to give us his reflections on some of the ultimate questions of philosophy, reflections resulting from a life of varied interests and activities. Unfortunately ill-health prevents him from being with us to-day. We all wish that he would soon recover and be restored to his normal health. When the local Secretaries pressed me most vehemently to step into the Presidential office, I protested equally vehemently that I had my chance in 1927 Bombay session and there were several others more suitable for this office. I yielded only when your secretaries urged that it was the duty of the Chairman of the Executive to act as President, when such troubles arose. I am putting the demand in a more dignified way ; the actual words were not parliamentary, even for philosophers.

I am, however, delighted to be here for I cannot resist an invitation which brings me to Mysore, a place which is so dear to me in several ways. While philosophical studies are under a cloud in other parts of India and even departments of education are looking askance at them, here at any rate, they are growing strong. It will be impertinent for me to refer to His Highness's great love for it. I consider it a rare good fortune for this Congress to be opened by one, who is so well-known for his philosophical learning, religious earnestness and austere simplicity of life. Such a combination is rare among

any but it is unique among the princes of this land. For his presence here and his wise words we offer him our most cordial thanks.

I am sorry that one riper and older is not in my place to-day, for philosophy is not a matter of dialectics and intellectual jugglery but a product of life and meditation on it. It is common enough for philosophers who sport on the surface of life to possess the leisure and the capacity for technical discussions. What is rarer is the combination in one individual of knowledge and wisdom. It is only from those of deep thought and large experience that we can get a breadth and depth of understanding, a hold on essentials too often absent from the works of mere intellectuals. In our ancient scriptures it is laid down that philosophy is not a pursuit to which any one can take. It requires not only a sharp intellect but a detached spirit. Commenting on the first Brahma Sūtra, *athato brahmajigñāsa*, Vidyāranya observes : "He who possesses the four requisites, since release is not to be attained through works must enter on an inquiry into the Vedānta texts in order to obtain the intuition of Brahman, which is the means of release".¹ This view is not a peculiar idiosyncrasy of the follower of the Advaita Vedānta. It is the ancient tradition accepted by all systems. When the old sage Yājñavalkya gave up his all to seek the way of wisdom, he left his possessions to his two wives. Maitreyi refused the riches of the world with the remark, *yena na amṛitā syām kim tena kuryām ?* What shall I do with these by which I cannot gain life eternal ? Philosophical wisdom is possible only for those who have disciplined their whole nature and not merely those who have sharpened their intellectual powers. Wisdom is integral thinking, while knowledge is fractional thinking. While the latter

1. Tadevam sadhanacatuṣṭayasampannasya, karmabhir moksāsīdher moksasādhana brahmajñānāya Vedantavākya vicārah kartavya iti srutyarthah. *Vñ arañhaprameyasangraha* p. 6.

is more in evidence in science and mathematics, which can be understood by all who possess a trained intellect, the exercise of the former is demanded for an understanding of poetry and philosophy, art and literature.

In a recent book² I argued that integral thinking or intuitive understanding is responsible for the great insights of philosophy and it is not without reason that philosophy in India is conveyed by the term 'darśana' which literally means 'sight' or 'insight'. Philosophy as a darśana implies that the ultimate reality is something of which we are directly aware and is not a matter of speculative construction or logical syntheses.

While this view is regarded as true of the Indian philosophers who are theological in their outlook, it is said to be inappropriate to a thinker like Saṅkara, who does not lean on either dogmatic orthodoxy or emotional assurance. Such a contention is hardly fair.

The real is no mere aspiration unrealised and unrealisable but is the ultimate behind all appearances whatsoever. It is not something which has yet to be accomplished like the future deity of Alexander, but what is already there, ever present. For Hegel the Absolute is a construction epistemologically analogous to similar constructions in the world of knowledge. It is a hypothesis like that of the electron or the neutron. Saṅkara is definitely opposed to this view. For him the real is genuinely given in knowledge. He distinguishes between *puruṣatantra* and *vastutantra*, that which is constructed by the knower and that which is *given* to it. Philosophy is knowledge of being, *bhūtavastuviśaya*. It is the apprehension of being, an apprehension which has a distinct flavour of its own. It is more immediate than mediate, more direct than indirect. It has more in common with

2. An idealist view of Life. (Allen and Unwin 1932.)

perception than conception. It is pure immediate self-intuition and is utterly distinct from reflection or mediated thought. Commenting on the phrase *pratyakṣāvagamam*,³ Śaṅkara says—“*Pratyakṣeṇa sukhāder iva avagamo yasya tat pratyakṣāvagamam*”. In the view of Hegel, the Absolute is a rational synthesis transparent to the human intellect. There is no mystery in it which thought cannot disclose. Protests were uttered immediately. Schleiermacher and Lotze deny the adequacy of thought to comprehend the whole of reality without remainder and resort to considerations of value. Ritschl, after Kant, affirmed that religious faith is rooted in the practical side of our nature. Systems of voluntarism were the result.

Perception and inference are inadequate to the Absolute. The Real is a *vastu* but not in space and time ; nor is it a mere universal. Bradley correctly represents the teaching of Hegel when he observes. ‘For thought what is not relative is nothing.’⁴ The Being of Śaṅkara is one which suffers no second. Human thought is bound up with distinctions while the real is above all distinctions. Our linguistic symbols and logical concepts veil the Real and reduce it to an idol. The Kāṭha Upaniṣad says : “Not by speech, not by thought, not by sight, does one grasp him.” Śaṅkara tells us that Brahman cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.”⁵ The Absolute is a positive but unnameable being. It negates limitations, privations. The moment we apply logical concepts to it, we reduce

3. Rājavidyā rajaguhyam pavitram idam uttamam
Pratyakṣavagamam dharmyam susukham kartum avyayam.
B. G. IX. 2.

4. *Appearance and Reality* p. 30.

5. Thibaut's E. T. Vol. XXXIV p. 316.

it to a non-absolute, the determinate God. The Absolute is the ground of all possibilities including that of God. To know it we have to pass beyond God (Īśvara) into the silent real which precedes and is prior to all things. It is *ekam advitiyam nirviśesam, avikriyam*, opposed to all becoming, formless and fashionless. Simply because we characterise it by negative terms, it does not follow that it is non-being. It is neither being nor non-being as it is above both these. It is *sad asat tat param*.⁶ Śaṅkara recognised the possibility of directly apprehending the ultimate reality in a way which cannot be equated with either ordinary sense-perception or logical inference.

It is what he calls *aparokṣānubhūti*. It is not individual phantasy or illusion. It is unfortunate to characterise this view as mysticism and be done with it. Mysticism is a blanket term, a portmanteau expression which covers a miscellaneous host of ideas, occult visions, apparitions, trance and ecstasy, pious gushing, luminous vacancy, intoxicated erotism, a striving after the bliss of the bridal chamber. While Śaṅkara admits the value of the eightfold yoga, it is only as a means to *śamyagdarśana*, a perfect insight which is far removed from any kind of sentiment or feeling. Nor does he believe that this direct awareness of spiritual reality is a mystical insight or heavenly vision or special revelation. It is the normal experience of all who get to the depths of the soul. It is the possession of self as such and not of this or that special individual. Śaṅkara says, "The self is not capable of proof nor does it need any. It is self-proven (*svasiddha*). Itself inconceivable, it is the ground of every possibility of conceiving, of every thought, of every act of knowledge. Even he who denies it admits it." We may call it pure reason if we please, so long

6. B. G. XI. 37. Rūpādyabhāvaddhi nāyam arthah pratyakṣasya gocarah, lingādyabhāvācca nānumanādīnām. II. I. 11-5. B.

as we do not confuse it with either perception or inference in their ordinary significations.

The difference between Saṅkara and Hegel is just here. Logical reasoning by itself cannot lead to the apprehension of reality. Saṅkara admits 'On account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation'.⁷ Saṅkara has in view what Professor Taylor in his Gifford Lectures calls "the systematic ambiguity of epistemology". "There might prove to be alternative metaphysical interpretations of the given historical reality, all equally consistent with the only condition which the epistemologist can legitimately insist on, the condition that on any interpretation the real world must be capable of being progressively known as intelligence is steadily brought to bear on it."⁸ In other words, the last word on the structure of reality cannot be uttered by the epistemologist who leaves us with open alternatives. While it is disloyalty to reason to deny the known character of the world, it is not disloyalty to reason to note that it is something more than what is known of it. Kant, for example, held that there were alternative interpretations of the pattern of reality, all equally consistent with the legitimate claims of science. The world may be an assemblage of mindless forces or a commonwealth of free, progressive agents. When we accept the second we go beyond mere logic and take our stand on moral consciousness. It is possible that moral consciousness might leave open a number of alternatives, which insistence on the autonomous religious life might close up. In short, we are called upon to supplement logic by the facts of life, ethical as well as religious. Only then is logic complete. The unsuppressed aspirations of man's spirit are as much a part of the natural order as the suppressed

7. Na pratiṣṭhātva tarkāṇāṃ śakyam āśrayitum puruṣamativairūpyat. S. B. II. I. ii. Thibaut's E. T. S. B. E. Vol. XXXIV p. 315.

8. *The Faith of a Moralist* Vol. II. p. 378.

desires of psycho-analysis or the ordinary perceptions of mankind. In other words, we want a synoptic comprehension of all facts of life. *Samyagdarśanam* is not merely perfect vision but total vision.

While Śaṅkara admits that *sākṣātkāra* is a specific mode of apprehension distinct from ordinary perception or inference, he regards it as a species of knowledge and not of feeling or of desire. It is as much determined by the inward organ as perceptual or inferential knowledge is. If the latter is brought about by *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, even so is the former. Commenting on *Bhagavadgītā* VI. 20, Śaṅkara writes that the yogin, "Whose mind is restrained by the practice of yoga sees the self, the highest which is wholly spirit and essentially light by means of the purified inner organ".⁹ Here he differs from the view which is sometimes adopted by Bergson that intuition is a negation of intellect. For Śaṅkara, it is a fulfilment of it. Intuitive experience is the crown of intellectual knowledge. *Anubhavāvasānam brahmajñānam, anubhavārudham eva ca vidyūphalam*. Intuition is not a substitute for rational knowledge but a supplement to it. It is rational thought matured to inspiration. Intuitive insight while spontaneous does not arise except in the minds of those who are prepared for it by study of scripture and reflection. "Hearing from scriptural texts and reflecting with the help of arguments and meditation are the causes of the insight (into Brahman)."¹⁰

9. *Atmanā samādhīparīśuddhena antaḥkaraṇena ātmānam param caitanyam jyotiḥsvarūpam paśyan upalabhamanah.*

10. *Srotavyah Srutivākyaebhyo mantavyas copapattibhih juātvā ca satatam dhyaeya ete darśana hetavaḥ.*

Cp also

*Sarvavedāntavākyaṇām ācārya mukhataḥ priyāt
Vākyaṇugrāhakanyāyasilanam mananam bhavet
Nididhyāsanamaikāgryam sravaṇe manane pi ca.*

From the vividness of the experience arises emotional intensity but these accompaniments are not a guarantee of the truth of the object intuited. These intuitions, simply because they carry conviction to the seer, are not to be taken as true. Subjective certitude is different from logical certainty. The sense of assurance is present even when the object is imaginal and such unreal objects, so long as they are believed to be actual, evoke feelings and attitudes quite as intense and effective as those excited by real ones. The strength of assurance and the intensity of the experience are not a proof of the reality of the object experienced. Intuitions, sensuous as well as spiritual, require to be tested and criticised before they are accepted as valid. Questions of validity are not answered by the experiences themselves. Certitude is not certainty. Psychological objectivity is not ontological reality. While religion may be satisfied with the sense of convincedness, which is enough to foster spiritual life, philosophy is interested in finding out whether the object believed in is well-grounded or not. *Pramāṇair artha-parīkṣaṇam nyāyah.* Nyāya is knowing an object thoroughly by means of the pramānas.

What is intuited cannot be irrational. It cannot be in conflict with reason. What reason suggests as the truth, intuition reveals as the reality. The intuited truth that the self of man is eternally one with the supreme is the ultimate fact to which we are led by a rational ontology which establishes the unreality of multiplicity, division, manifoldness and separatedness. The unreality of the world is just its self-contradiction. It is said to be *avastu* since it is contrary to reason.^{1†} What is self-contradictory and yet actual cannot be real. The real is what is not self-contradic-

11. Cf. Anirvacanīyavādinām asmākam adhyāsasyāvastutva yuktivirodhayor iṣṭatvāt.

Vivaraṇāprameyasamgraha. P12-13.

tory. Reality cannot explain the possibility of mere appearance. Error can be dispelled but not explained, What is of its own nature irrational does not admit of explanation. Reason affirms the complete oneness and simplicity of the real. But reason by itself cannot disclose this truth. When once the beliefs arise through intuition or scripture, then logic can tell us whether they are valid or invalid. Śaṅkara uses the methods of proof and dialectic in the formulation of the absolutely inconceivable Absolute which escapes all definitions. Śaṅkara's samyagdarśana does not express itself in song or ritual but in a rational dialectic rather cold and stiff, when we compare it even with the mysteries of the Upanisads. Dialectics help us in proof but not in discovery. They point the way and reveal the defects of the rival views but they are dependent on given facts, *Pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumānām*. Reasoning is dependent on perception and testimony.¹² If reasoning is uncontrolled by facts, it is only reverie or imagination or tarka which is notoriously *apratīṣṭha*.

Even the scriptural texts are to be used with discrimination. We cannot interpret them arbitrarily. Blind acquiescence in authority is as unsound as a cheap rejection of it. A wise Greek has said ; "Not to know what was done in the world before we were born is always to remain a child". We must always begin as learners, accept something which we did not create. Even scripture is a means to the insight into the real¹³, and loses its point when enlightenment arises. "*Śruter apy abhāvaḥ prabodhe*"¹⁴.

It is obvious that Śaṅkara believes in a direct awareness of reality which is neither perceptual nor conceptual. Here he

12. I. I. I. N. S.

13. Brahmadarśanam uddiśya śravaṇavidhānetu. *Vivaranaprāmāyasaṅgraha* p. 4.

14. S. B. IV. 1. 3.

differs from Hegel but he also affirms that this direct awareness is through and through rational and in this he differs from Bergson.

To dis sever thought and intuition is to dismember the real and deny the eternal unity of life. The puzzles and paradoxes of philosophy are due to the fallacy of abstraction and if we are loyal to the great tradition of this land, we shall always use intellect in the interest of intuition and adopt what is called *anukūlatarka*.

The tragedy of our age is traceable to its excessive intellectuality. A narrowly intellectual life is lopsided. It revels in the abstract and the repetitive and believes that it is the real. Life is sacrificed to its appurtenances. To give to millions of men the electric light does not mean the development in them of clearer illumination. Cain, in Byron's poem, asks of Lucifer, the prince of the intellectuals, "Are you happy?" and the great intellectual says to him, "No, art thou?". Our civilisation is shadowed by a sense of defeat and depression. The typical characters of our age are represented by the Forsytes of England, the Babbitts of America and the Buddenbrooks of Germany, and small adventurers with no heroism about them. They do not know what to do, and so spend their time playing golf, cursing the weather, revising the prayer book and ruling empires, if they get a chance. Philosophy is dismissed as a narrowly intellectual affair dealing with proofs and evidences with the result that it has become negative and arid.

Our literature is critical and realistic. It deals with life as a formula or a pattern and not with men and women, their ardours and ecstasies, their strange possibilities and endless mysteries. Great literature ought to produce a sense of something inexplicable and overwhelming. It must 'tease us out of thought' with the pale light of another world and if the works of to-day do not possess such compelling or consecrating

power, it is because they are mainly intellectual. "Analysis kills spontaneity just as grain once it is ground into powder no longer springs and germinates", says Amiel. The true seers possess a different tone and temper, a spirit out of the common, touched with a light from beyond. When we read their writings, they quicken a like life in us and make us glow with the ardours of self-discovery.

In art, again, the greatest triumphs are of exact science. They are not the pyramids or the temples but the sky-scrapers which show a sense of mathematical law. The typical building of our age is the cinema hall, the square and solidly built picture place, full of noise, speed, talk, movement, a vivid contrast to the cathedral or the temple with its soaring arches, silence, serenity and peace. We teach drawing and painting in our schools to help us to understand the works of Botticelli or Michael Angelo but the faith and the passion that made their works possible are no more available.

Ethical life is reduced to a code of rules supposed to be rational. Our conventional codes are pretentious failures, which break down at the first touch of reality. Human life is not a scheme of moral mathematics. We care for appearances, demure gentlemanliness public school good form which throttles originality. We extinguish the light within us for the sake of peace with the world.

We should recognise that happiness is found in the adequate realisation of all human powers. Physical prowess, mental cunning and spiritual peace are needed. The ancient text says : *Prānārāmam manānandam Santisamruddham, amritam*. The play of life, the satisfaction of mind and the fulness of peace form the life eternal. It is emphasis on intuitive understanding, or spiritual values that we need to-day. How we can develop them in the intellectual conditions of to-day is the problem to which philosophers have to

address themselves. The work which ancient religions did require to be done now by a new synthesis or samanvaya.

India of the ages is not dead ; nor has she spoken her last creative word. The time has come for a new religious expression, a new language for the old everlasting emotions in terms of modern knowledge, a religious form that should contradict no fact and check no inquiry. The everlasting spirit of love and righteousness which has inspired the religions of the past must now quicken and inform the new learning.

Atmanism.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

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Metaphysics is the comprehensive intellectual effort to form a theory of reality by the thinking together of all the sides of experience and is the self-discovery of the absolute or the underlying source of all thinking and material things. Owing to the coincidence of existence and value, it postulates a faith in the apprehension of reality in its integral wholeness and the appreciation of its values. Philosophic criticism is an immanent criterion of reality based on logical stability and the will to truth. It is thus a synthetic unity of the methodology of Science with its passion for disinterestedness and the spiritual effort for the conservation of all intrinsic values. The stirring problems of the "philosophy of to-day" or "contemporary philosophy" are the age long problems, Eastern as well as Western. The immortal formulation of the Upanishads "What is that by knowing which everything else is known?" is echoed in the *samanvaya* method of the Vedanta Sutras and the synoptic view of Plato. The philosophy of Atmanism follows the great tradition of absolutism and is based on the following fundamental truths :—

1. Reality is realisable. To ask ultimate questions and elicit answers for them is the vitalizing principle of thought—thought not as discursive thinking nor pure act, but as purified, atmanised consciousness can break through the confines of finiteness and intuit the infinite.

2. As Aristotle says, there is nothing in the end which was not present in kind in the beginning. What is enfolded as a possibility in the absolute is unfolded as an actuality.

3. "It takes the whole reality to elicit the whole mind."—Plato. The whole self can know the whole reality. As the Veda puts it, the ground of existence is the goal of experience ; the object of *Brahmajijñāsā* is *na cha punarāvartate*. The whole of metaphysics is the hope of religion. The principle of comprehensiveness which is the criterion of philosophic criticism demands that reality should be metaphysically satisfactory and spiritually satisfying, and it thus requires a synthetic effort and a synoptic vision. By a review and criticism of the fundamental categories of reality which are now employed by naturalism, vitalism, phenomenalism, personalism and theology, philosophy discovers the Ātman as the all-pervasive unity and self-explanation of the forms or kingdoms of experience. It is the endeavour of the Atmanistic philosophy to examine the validity and value of these concepts by the method of negation by fulfilment, and reveal the informing principle which is their foundation and fruition.

THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF MATTER.

The scientific attempt at the systematic connection of particulars is rooted in the deterministic postulate of the reign of causal law, and, when it brings out all its quantitative implications, it becomes a materialistic metaphysic. The scientist with a synoptic view thus becomes a scientific metaphysician. When Lewis asserts that in the new era of science, man and the world are explained by an all-embracing system, he forgets that a science which co-ordinates the sciences is really a philosophy. Matter refers (1) to sense-objects,

(2) perceptual objects, (3) scientific objects, and (4) the unknown substratum that causes sensations in the mind in a mechanical way. It is this fourth view of the material reality that is really physical philosophy or the philosophy of the Charvakas, which insists on the priority of matter to mind and regards consciousness as a merely incidental phosphorescence, as Ward puts it. As the liver secretes bile, the brain secretes consciousness. Laplace said to Napoleon that the physicist in his nebular theory has no need for the hypothesis of God. The spiritual is the epi-phenomenal and is a superfluity. Matter is the mother of the universe and is the promise and potency of life. Mechanistic biology gives a physico-chemical interpretation of life and mechanistic psychology traces the phenomenon of conscious behaviour to physical and physiological conditions.

It is said that we now know too much about matter to be any longer materialists. The materialistic theory is the result of the scientific methodology of selection and abstraction. In the interest of exactitude the scientist restricts the subject-matter. The theory of matter as the cause of sense-data, of space-time without consciousness, is merely the result of hypostatizing an abstraction. Matter as the unthinking mother of the world is unthinkable. As Eddington says, matter of the physicist is a cycle like the house that Jack built. Smuts thinks that the make-up of matter should be explained as an inner activity holistically and not arithmetically as a whole of parts. It is the abstract intelligence that explains the physical world as a closed system and fails to explain creative efficiency and the reality of moral and spiritual life. The mechanistic theory of the visible and the tangible world as an aggregation of atoms and electrical constellation is said to refer only to conceptual constructions and not real entities. It is true that matter can be weighed ;

but, as Joad asks, who can weigh the inspiration that produced a Shelleyan lyric ?

Naturalism, as a more refined type of materialism finds its most articulate expression in the scientific attitude, which protests against the anthropomorphic and animistic ways of interpreting reality, and is hostile to the theologising tendency of the mind which has faith in supernatural intervention. It interprets the more evolved in terms of the less evolved and explains the self in terms of sensation, sensation in terms of cellular activity and cellular activity in physico-chemical terms and thus traces the wisdom of a Socrates to the whirling of atoms. The tension in matter, according to Spinoza, becomes the attention of psychology ; the chemical becomes appetite in life, purposiveness of will, and the physical becomes ideals of life. The holistic activity starts with the material activity of matter, and ends with the self as the end in the series. Scientific intellectualism, as a still more refined form of naturalism, seeks to avoid the risks of materialism by allying itself with agnosticism. In Spencer's theory, naturalism ends in agnosticism and its antinomies, and agnosticism often leads to superstition.

In explaining the higher by the lower, the end by the origin, naturalism puts the cart before the horse. As Smuts himself says, the naturalist wrongly infers the primacy of matter from its priority, and, in the name of simplicity, the concrete becomes shadowy and the abstract becomes real ; the physical is the primary and the metaphysical secondary. The scientific understanding in its excessive zeal for objectivity has an aversion for the metapsychical. But, as Ward points out, we can never divest ourselves from our consciousness. In ignoring the work of thought, it presupposes thought. Naturalism deals more with the mechanical cause than with reason and it rules out teleology, denies moral freedom and banishes

spiritual autonomy and its metaphysical meaning. In seeking the object the scientist forgets the subject which is his own self, and his thinking is therefore only sectional. Naturalism, as a method, is thus ship-wrecked on the rock of creative evolution and, as a philosophy, it mistakes the empirical for the transcendental. According to Jeans, the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality and the universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine.

There is a third type of physical philosophy represented by Eddington, Einstein and Whitehead. As Muirhead remarks, mathematicians have not been for some time on speaking terms with metaphysicians, but now, there is an attempt at a searching criticism of the scientific pre-suppositions and the co-ordination of results. The fundamental postulates of science have become the problems of philosophy and the scientist has turned a metaphysician. "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of *ad hoc* hypotheses, it must become philosophical and enter on a thorough criticism of its foundations".—Whitehead. According to Northrop, Greek thought as the pattern of all later thought gave a threefold solution of matter,—the mathematical, the physical and the functional. The mathematical lays stress on rationality, the physical emphasises atomic motion and the functional, teleology. This triple movement is discernible in our own time in the mathematical theory of Eddington, the physical theory of Einstein and the functional theory of Whitehead. Muirhead is glad that the concept of nature is now affiliated with the idealistic philosophy. To Eddington, the world of space-time is a system of mathematical or logical relations, but a genuine law is transcendental and there is something in us that has value for the eternal. But as Hoernle says, metaphysics cannot be modelled on mathematics. In the words of C. D. Broad,

"It is a bad thing where a science and the philosophy of that science are mixed up."

Einstein's physical theory of space-time or the four dimensional continuum denies the Newtonian view of the homogeneity and absoluteness of space and time, which Kant regarded as final, and insists on the relativity of space-time. The structure of space time varies with its contents. The view of nature as a system of events in space-time related to the mind has changed the orientation, but it is on the borderland of relativism and subjectivism and the Jain philosopher may seek affinities between relativity and his theory of *nayas* or standpoints of knowledge.

In his philosophy of organic mechanism, Whitehead constructs an objective theory adapted to the scientific view of space-time as a system of changing relations and claims to bring together Descartes and Leibnitz. In his philosophy of nature, he concludes, in a rather Newtonian way, that space time is more uniform or homaloidal than relative. His doctrine of organism as a systematic correlation of events in nature claims to free philosophy from materialistic mechanism with which science has so long saddled it. In interpreting events as unities, which are self-identical in change, actuality in terms of eternal patterns or forms, he leans towards the Platonic reality of the universal and intrinsic value. But there cannot be a self-complete philosophy of nature as perception of things pre-supposes the existence of the percipient.

As Broad points out, science has an aversion for the intrusions of metaphysics, and, we may add, metaphysics has an aversion for the intrusions of science, but it utilises the method of science while rejecting its fractional views. The philosophy of nature, as re-interpreted by Atmanism, insists on the reality of the world of space-time-causality as a fleeting flux of events and its relative externality to the finite self. The

self as the subject of experience and nature as the object of experience are distinguishable, but not divisible. Nature serves as an environment or opportunity for, and not the cause of, the moulding or perfection of the self, and it is the Ātman alone that sustains nature and is its driving power. A physical absolutism, as Muirhead says, which sets up a physical thing in itself is an abstraction. While matter is real, the materialist outlook which identifies the self with the space-time series is false.

“The world of fact is not volatalised, but has its palce in the scheme of values.”—Bosanquet.

BIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Life has no mechanistic origin, but is *sui generis* and is more comprehensive than matter. Bergson and Driesch bring out the inadequacy of the materialist hypothesis by referring to the phenomena of mutation and metamorphosis. Life is not a physico-chemical mechanism but an autonomous whole which is the same in all its parts. Smuts thinks that life has an inner character of self-maintenance and self-multiplication. It is a controlling and cooperating inner activity and not an external determination of self-repeating parts. No laboratory can produce life. J. S. Haldane is led to the same idea that life, as studied by physiology and biology, can alone explain the phenomena of self-maintenance and heredity. No mechanism can reproduce or maintain itself. When the biologist refers to the vital principle as the essence of reality, he becomes a biological philosopher or vitalist. Miss Underhill selects Driesch, Bergson and Eucken as the exponents of that theory. Driesch, in his philosophy of organism, applies it to the organic side of life, Bergson to the metaphysical side and Eucken to the spiritual. Driesch postulates a special imperceptible factor or agency, called *entelechy*,

midway between the physical and the psychical. It is a non-mechanical or unconscious soul hidden in all living beings, and is based on the logical view that there is more content in the effect than in the cause. But Hoernle criticises the theory of entelechy as too hypothetical a creature to command conviction. Needham observes that vitalism fills gaps in mechanistic descriptions like the map-maker of Columbus who said "Where unknown, place terrors." The entelechy is an immaterial ghost which is neither body nor mind. As Haldane says, Driesch is wrong when he assumes that life can develop independently of the environment. Entelechy is thus a mystery, a *deus ex machina*.

The vitalistic philosophy of Bergson starts with the distinction between intellect and intuition. While the intellect infects time, spatialises and mechanises reality and makes sections of it, intuition seizes the whole of it as *élan vital*. The intellect is selective and practical as the instrument of action, but intuition is pure duration. Though life is confronted or loaded by matter, it enters into it and magnetises it. Reality is not a repetition but a creative evolution having its own spontaneity and supernal value. But the view of the practical intellect and pure duration creates a dualism and ends in subjective idealism. When the idea of life is replaced by that of universal spirit, the vitalist becomes an absolutist and this thesis is worked out by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*.

The vitalism of Eucken is spiritualistic or activistic philosophy which emphasises spiritual vitality and the intuitions of experience. It insists on the primacy of spiritual life and evolution and is therefore opposed to naturalism and intellectualism. Life is more than logic, and evolution of spiritual life contains the assurance of its victory over nature. Ulti-

mately it lays stress on the mystic consciousness as the fulfilment and freedom of spiritual life and the vision of wholeness is opposed to quietism.

Biological philosophy is really no philosophy at all because it tries to expound the nature of ultimate reality by an empirical category. The idea that there is more content in the effect than in the cause savours of the naturalistic fallacy. Wisdom is more than vital efficiency or the vital impulse. As J. A. Thompson says, the biologist has to steer clear of the metaphysical Scylla of entelechy and *élan vital* and the materialistic Charybdis. But as he himself speculates, biosis may be psycho-biosis.

PHENOMENALISM.

Psychology, till now the child of philosophy, has, owing to its insistence on experimentation, emerged into an independent science—a psychology without self or consciousness,—and it is anxious to affiliate itself with the physico-chemical sciences and biology. And Broad emphatically says that it is a natural science and not philosophy. But psychology cannot be an annexe of physics and biology as consciousness is not a superaddition to life but is *sui generis* and more comprehensive than matter and life. The behaviourists explain animal behaviour psychically as sensori-motor and not centrally aroused and deny that mind is a *vera causa*; but, as Hoernle observes, mind cannot be fitted into the context of nature. "Purposiveness cannot be explained as a material response to stimuli".—Joad. And McDougall's Hormic Psychology lays stress on purposivism as a corrective to behaviorism. The behaviour of a living organism is blind as it does not exhibit any evidence of learning by experience. Behaviourism is sometimes criticised as only a "muscle-twitch psychology" which

relies more on environment than on endowment ; and Woodworth's claim that it is a religion which can take the place of Religion is not justifiable. Consciousness cannot be explained as a mere aggregate of atoms or a by-product of the bodily process. To affirm that matter emerges from brain, and that, when it becomes conscious of itself, it glows as mind is to ignore the primacy of consciousness. In an article by A. Wenzl on Psychology in *Philosophy To-Day* and in *The Contemporary Schools of Psychology* by R. S. Woodworth, the current psychological theories are classified. The old atomistic psychology which refers to the states of consciousness as a bundle of faculties or an aggregation of self-existent sensations in terms of association is not seriously maintained at present. It is now only academic psychology. Kant exposed the futility of this atomistic and associationist school very much as Śaṅkara did in the case of Buddhististic phenomenalism. The sensory psychology applying the method of experimentation studies the problems of light and colour, speech sounds, tonal theory and the world of touch. The psychology of thought, feeling and volition is described as uniform mental coordination. The existentialist who studies the sensory analysis and series forgets the self which is their real subject. Gestalt psychology revolts against associationism based on analysis of atomic sensations and is concerned with perceptions and configurations which are more than the combination of parts. The organism is not a sum of parts, but a complex unit. But this is also a form of materialism like the atomism which it seeks to oust and it is anxious to be an ally of behaviourism. Psycho-analysis is the exploration of the suppressed complexes imprisoned in the depths or the interior of the unconscious and the development of the conscious from the unconscious. The libido or the sexual instinct together with the ego instinct is the dominating pleasure-principle of life, and the other impulses are evolved out

of it genetically. Moral and religious life can be traced to repressed infantile sexuality and oedipus complex. As Haldane truly observes, psycho-analysis is bad physics and bad physiology. Love is too sacred a thing for psycho-analysis and the theory of wish-fulfilment is only an instruction in nastiness and is retrograde. C. J. Jung also condemns the theory of psycho-sexuality and the "incestuous craving for the mother" as decidedly poisonous, and the sexual theory as merely figurative. This theory has the effect of undermining the basis of moral responsibility. The life of the soul is not the libido, as the libido is only the self soiled by its false bodily feeling. Smuts truly remarks that psychologists have not stressed the subject of a general sensibility or *senses communis* which corresponds more or less to *antahkarana* in Indian thought, and that is the unique service of Kant to psychology to discover this unifying function in the synthetic unity of apperception. Says Joad, mind overflows the brain, is creative and dynamic and the brain is according to Bergson the organ of pantomime. Eugene Osty, in *Philosophy To-Day*, refers to metapsychics as the phenomenology of the unknown functions of intelligence or super-normal knowledge like the transference of thought from mind to mind and the fore-knowledge of our individual future. There is an intra-mental relation which implies the spatial and temporal extension of the mind which official psychology has not yet recognised. The splendid speculation of Bergson which has revolutionised thought is reared on the slender foundation of the study of instinct. But if the infinite intelligence of man is developed by yoga, it would extend in space and time to other minds and become one with them in a universal psychic organism. Then metaphysics will shrink under metapsychics. The reality of inter-subjective intercourse does not eliminate the nature of the self as a centre of experience. The phenomenistic theory of consciousness as a continuum without a

cognising subject was developed in British empiricism and the Buddhistic school. But Kant and Saṅkara have conclusively proved the futility of the phenomenal without the noumenal.

PERSONALISM.

Metaphysical psychology or personology deals with the ultimate meaning of the mental life, the freedom of the will and personal immortality. Psychology without the self is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. The self is central to experience and is therefore a new orientation of reality. It is not a mere assemblage of atoms or a colony of sensations or a synthetic unity. It is not a freak of matter, but has its own spiritual flavour. The problem of the self is, as Smuts says, the great mystery of the universe. It is at present a "wide and wild no man's land, an unexplored region and may in future be the key-stone of all knowledge." Science in its zeal for averaging and generalisation ignores the uniqueness of the self and its moral and spiritual values. As the body consciousness, it is an infinitesimal speck in the infinity of space-time, but spiritually it is the very image of the infinite and the eternal. Both naturalism and absolutism depersonalise and despiritualise the self and make it a series, and thus ignore its inner work. The law of variation and self-persistence which is a mystery can be explained only biographically and not biologically, and then it would be the basis or pivot of a truer metaphysics. Smuts suggests the name of personology as more comprehensive than the term characterology coined by Ward; but his view that personality is the last term in the holistic series or a fresh emergence of holism is entirely opposed to the idealistic view. Personalism and the humanistic sciences are concerned with the same problem. Humanist voluntarism, as Schiller says, should supersede absolutism and emphasise the dignity of human life.

The self is the prius and pre-supposition of all knowledge and is its own evidence. Its existence is proved not by physical evidence or metaphysical speculation but by direct intuitive experience based on what the mystics call introversion and self-naughting. Owing to its mistaken identity with mind-body, the self suffers from the materialistic consciousness. But by the subjugation of the empirical self of sensibility or mind-body, the self realises its spiritual and transcendental nature or *kaivalya*. Evaluative metaphysics insists on values that are intrinsic and eternal. As the image of eternity, the self thinks God's thoughts after Him and seeks the logical, ethical and aesthetic values. Truth, goodness and beauty form the content of spiritual consciousness and are eternally conserved in its nature. Humanism is justified in its repudiation of naturalism, but its tendency to secularise and socialise spiritual life and balance the extremes in the Greek way is rooted in its distrust of the absolute value of soul-culture. These values have infinite worth which cannot be translated into mere workability. The self as the subject of experience is eternally distinct from nature which is the object of experience and forms the environment for realising its infinite possibility. The self has moral freedom and can obtain sovereignty by transcending the empirical and eliminating it. And this self-realisation is followed by self-satisfaction. Owing to its uniqueness and inner work it is not only immortal but also eternal. McDougall's theory of a belief in individual immortality is dismissed by Haldane as the animistic conception of a soul separable from a material body. The theory of soul-survival "as a bloodless, fleshless thing" is against the bodily basis of consciousness and the animistic view. Likewise, Pringle-Pattison's idea of conditional immortality fails to do justice to the eternal values of personality. Eternity is rooted in the temporal, but it is not endless duration. Ward's panpsychism as a realm of ends consisting of a

hierarchy of self-acting and self-realising individuals is a form of mentalism. Stern is wrong when he says that atoms and molecules are persons. The sphere of the self is different from the world of nature. The real problem of the self is the reconciliation of the uniqueness of the finite self with intersubjective intercourse and the universality of the all-self. If the self is windowless, then it cannot mirror the universe. Though it has self-direction, it is not a self contained monad. The philosophy of Atmanism corrects the one-sided views by its theory of an in-dwelling reality that is the informing principle of matter and self and gives them substantiality. Though the world of space-time-cause emerges and the self subject to space-time evolves and is in the making in an infinite series, the Ātman is the absolute consciousness and indeterminate activity and freedom. The finite self exists, but it connotes the absolute, and freed from self-idolatry and self-centred consciousness, it shifts the centre of reference. Its being and blending with the absolute is a sacred mystery. Pan-psychism, like monadism, is a purely spiritualistic view of reality which starts with the bare life of the plant and ends with Brahma. It is the self that contracts as a microbe and expands as a mahatma; owing to its moral freedom it can grow into a God or sink into the vegetative and the sensitive world. Panpsychism ignores the philosophy of nature which insists on the externality and eternity of the natural order. Matter is external to the finite self, but not to the universal consciousness.

THEOLOGY.

Theology is a deduction from scriptural authority and is therefore dogmatic, compelling and coercive. It is the protest which the believer makes against naturalism, vitalism and intuitionism in the name of authoritarianism. But "the self-respect of thought has to pursue every tangle of thought to its

final unravelment." (Whitehead, p. 266.) And the philosophy of religion has to mediate between these extremes and bring out the central truths of spiritual experience and it is not a compromise like humanism, positivism and pragmatism. While rejecting the mythological as irrelevant, philosophic criticism accepts the foundational facts of the spiritual life. When Russell traces religion to fear and asks us to abandon its consolations, which are ideal and not actual, he fails to reach the heart of religion. Freud's theory that religion is an illusion based on pan-sexualism is itself an illusion; in the name of culture it glorifies sex. Religion is not a subjective or social need which elevates fancy to the level of objective reality. James, in his immortal work on religious experience, has once for all established the case for a philosophy of religion by refuting the dogmatism of medical materialists who attribute religion to physical and mental diseases, and by a systematic study of the genuine mystic experience of all countries. Positivism in its attempt to free science from religion has yet founded the religion of humanity. Likewise, meliorism, which insists on philanthropy, moulds religion entirely on a moralistic pattern. But as James himself says, religion is a specific spiritual experience, which should not be evaluated by a non-religious standard. James Ward and Dean Rashdall think of God as finite will and infinite goodness on the ground that omnipotence and goodness cannot co-exist. James believes in a kind of polytheism and pluralism, which has faith in a finite God and the chance of salvation. Berst is mistaken in his view that the universe is fashioned *causatim ab extra* and by an external Designer.

Theism, as explained by Webb, repudiates this view and insists upon the absoluteness of the one personal God entering into personal relations with the finite self. The absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet recognises the self-contradictions of the finite-infinite life and regards the theistic God as an

appearance of the absolute and a finite category. The absolute transcends and transforms within itself the opposition of good and evil and evil is finally absorbed in the whole. But the absolute is not a sponge that endlessly sucks its own selfhood. The philosophic agnosticism of Kant, which was developed by Hamilton and Mansel, culminated in that of Bradley and the only logical conclusion of the self-contradiction of relational thought is its abolition and not transcendence. Haldane thinks that spiritual unity is the loss of individuality. Pringle-Pattison is more or less on the fence or a razor-edge balance between personalism and absolutism, when he says that the finite self is not an element but a member of the absolute which is the ground of being and the whole of value. It has not, as Bosanquet says, formal distinctness or unique focalisation which contributes to the absolute but is a separate centre of experience and religion is a two-sided affair. Bosanquet's principle of totality does not contain the idea of self at all, as the world is dissolved in a collection of qualities. Values alone survive in the absolute, but not persons. But the absolute is circumference without centre, and its appearances should be saved, as insisted on by Hoernle. Dean Inge, therefore, protests against the idea of absorption in the absolute, and insists on personality as the home of all values, as conservation belongs only to the time-series. Professor Royce recognises the value of individualism and rejects the idea of re-blending and absorption. To Webb and Sir Henry Jones, religion is not a foot-note to philosophy, but the personal God of religion is the absolute of metaphysics. The historic theory, that God works out his increasing purpose with our help, takes away from the freedom of the absolute. The Ātmanistic theory saves the finite existent, but destroys its externality. The absolute Ātman pulsates through the finite and vivifies it without being infected by finiteness and its imperfections, and when it realises that it is an organ of the absolute, the self remains

without selfishness and is immersed in the *ānanda* of the Ātman. Hoernle is anxious to save the appearances and the saving experience is the eternal gift of the universal to the universe.

The accounts of the origin of the universe are conflicting and have no finality. Smuts' holistic evolution is opposed to materialism, monadism and absolutism and is a *vera causa* implying creativeness and novelty. The universe is not the explication or unfolding of implicit content but is the record of the whole-making activity in its progressive development. It starts as realism and ends as idealism and both are at the heart of things. Matter is an inner activity which is not additive but creative and the mother of the universe, and the holistic progression is exhibited in the following scale :—

The physical reality which is a mechanical togetherness of self-repeating things externally related. Organic unity involving inner coordination and selective activity. The emergence of consciousness as a new synthetic activity.

The self is the apex of the holistic universe though it is only a recent arrival. Here holism is not only creative but also self-creative. Wholeness thus starts with the small centres and ends with the self or the all-whole. The absolute of ~~meta-~~physics is not static but creative. It is a ~~monism~~ employing the immanent ideal, but it does not refer to a block universe, but is progressive and pluralistic. It is the emergence of the absolute values of personality. While Smuts thus recognises the existence of the main concepts of reality, he does not, owing to his naturalistic bias, bring out the primacy of spiritual values and wholeness of the whole, which alone avoids the polar disparities of the series. It is the Ātman and not matter that has the promise and potency of perfection, and creativity and spirituality is the actualising of the spiritual possibility of the Ātman. Progress is *in* reality and not *of* reality. The universe is not a whole-making but

soul-making or Ātmanising process and though the word 'holy' may have the same origin as the word 'whole', the idea of the Holy which belongs to spiritual reality is absolutely different from the whole of space-time. The naturalistic view of emergence should be replaced by the metaphysical view of self-unfolding and spontaneity. "The western idea of mobility—of a breathless career towards novelty—should be supplemented by the eastern idea of immobility." The absolute Ātman is the only explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the intellectual demand of comprehensiveness by recognising the values of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. Alexander's theory of the deity as the goal of the evolutionary nisus, in which God as having the quality of deity is yet to be, is simply deification of space-time and making deity spatio-temporal. It is naturalistic fallacy to explain the universe as the hierarchy with space-time event at the bottom and deity at the apex. His theory, as Dr. Radhakrishnan says, suffers from an anti-metaphysical bias. It is a mere tautology and 'verbal sedative', as it says that life and mind emerge because they emerge. The emergence of matter, life, mind, etc., is abrupt and unintelligible. Hoernle has no faith in the progression as it may be beyond deity, and Hoernle observes that Alexander produces the real world very much as a conjurer produces rabbits from a hat. No one worships space-time as the absolute and finds saving experiences in it; it is an unorthodox messianic hope expressed in modern thought. Lloyd Morgan has faith more in a finished value-frame as foundational to spiritual reality than in a space-time frame, but his theory, as Broad points out, has the leaven of Alexander working in a Huxleian meal. Space-time emerges from God and not God from space-time. Whitehead lays stress on immanence and creativity, but his God is only the primordial accident of the Absolute. But God cannot be both the

accident as well as its cause. Mr. W. T. Stace propounds a novel view that the universe is not the construction of a universal mind, but a colony of billions of human and pre-human minds which work ant-like through the æons, each making its own contribution.

Absolutism has the merit of explaining the lower by the higher. But the theory of the absolute unfolding itself by a dialectic or emanational process and the idea of the possible becoming the actual, in which the whole harmonises and transcends all discord, suffers from the defect of predicating imperfections to reality and making evil a necessity. The theory of creationism has likewise failed to reconcile the goodness of God with the reality of sin and unmerited suffering. How the one evolved into the many or how the absolute divides itself into finite centres is ultimately inexplicable. The co-existence of the absolute and the self is a sacred mystery. Creative evolution rejects the idea of the cast-iron or block universe, but it is against the view *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Moral and religious consciousness requires us to throw the responsibility of contingency, contradiction and other imperfections on the finite self rather than on the absolute, which is immanent in the finite without being infected by its imperfections. While the finite relies on the infinite Ātman for its life, the infinite is self-related and perfect. Value is more important than genesis and to know the way up to the absolute is said to be more relevant to our moral and spiritual needs than to trace the way down from it.

The absolute is the ground of existence and the goal of experience. This view recognises the world of existence and values and thus reconciles realism and idealism from the point of view of relevancy and comprehensiveness. Every judgment, logical, ethical and aesthetic, ultimately refers to the whole of reality. In an epistemological analysis of a perceptive judg-

ment like "This is a lotus" there are four factors : the physical theory refers to the things given in sense perception, physiology to the neural process, psychology to the sensation and pan-logism to reason. But neither realism, subjective idealism nor objective idealism can bridge the gap or the saltus in these sectional points of view. The ultimate unifying factor is the inner ātman or real reality that alone gives a meaning to matter, life, sensation and self. And it is the universal that underlies the particulars and gives them substantiality. Likewise in an ethical judgment, the ultimate self is not the body or life or reason or the finite self but the inner controller of all thinkers and things ; and this view offers the right perspective to hedonism, rationalism and eudaemonism. Divine possibility functions through moral freedom. In the aesthetic judgment also the realistic, the rationalistic and the intuitional views of the Beautiful find their adequacy in Ātman as the transcendently beautiful. Beauty is not on sea or land, nor is it in the self, but it is in the absolute which imparts beauty to nature and makes its togetherness into a symphony and at the same time transcends it. Thus the logical, ethical and aesthetic values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty have a cosmic meaning and are ultimately housed in the absolute Ātman. Atmanism thus satisfies the demands of metaphysics for unifying experience, the ethical need of the *summum bonum* and the aesthetic aspiration for absolute beauty and bliss. The absolute Ātman is thus the only self-explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the intellectual demands of comprehensiveness by recognising the equal values of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics and it is no disaster to philosophy to pay these metaphysical compliments to the absolute.

The absolute Ātman alone explains the subject-object relation and the pluralistic experience. While extreme pluralism

insists on the manyness and the unrelatedness of the elements of reality and explains away its unity, monism relies on the self-identity of reality and the absoluteness of the one, and dismisses the world as an illusion. But Bosanquet observes in another context, there can be no unity without the universe or the universe without unity, and Ātmanism recognises the claims of both and offers the true perspective. They are the ultimate facts or factors of reality and neither can be resolved into the other and both are distincts and not opposites. The ever-changing physical world serves as a suitable opportunity for the evolving self and the self seeks its own subject, the real reality, which environs and vivifies all things. As Broad says, the realist is unable to see the wood for the trees and the idealist the trees for the wood. In the words of Sorley, the monist, is in truth the essential dualist and the downward way of the monist is as uncertain and treacherous as the upward way of the pluralist. But Ātmanism, as a speculative philosophy, sees the pervading identity in the persisting facts. It is the absolute that is immanent in the finite, but the finite cannot exhaust its infinity. The reals of nature and self coexist as ultimate factors of reality and nature is external to the self but not to the in-dwelling self which informs both and infuses them with reality. As the eternal is rooted in the temporal, all development is *in* and not *of* reality. At the naturalistic level, the self becomes an off-shoot of matter; when it rises to the spiritual level, it realises its eternal nature by spiritual induction, and lastly, when it intuits the absolute, it is ātmanised, and attains its eternal bliss. The heart has its reasons, which the reason knows not, and intuition is not an irrational and fugitive feeling or any psychological state, but is the integral experience of reality, and is therefore the fulfilment of reason. Mysticism thus removes the breach between metaphysics and theology. We may modify the statement of

Bradley that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct and say that the self with its instinct for the infinite intuits it in its absoluteness, and metaphysics is the finding of good reasons for this integral knowledge. Philosophy makes intuition intelligible and makes it the most articulate expression of experience.

Thus all the views of reality ultimately converge in Ātmanism. The term Ātmanism is preferred to the terms Holism, Organism, Harmonism and Absolutism. While Holism has a naturalistic bias, Organism a biological accent, Harmonism has an ethical flavour. The synoptic view is not synoptic enough. The words soul, spirit and self lack definiteness and are not free from animistic and spiritualistic difficulties. Ātmanism is more comprehensive than any of these expressions. It recognises the relative positions and perspectives of the various theories but corrects their tendency to sectional thinking by using a 'large scale map' of reality. Ātman is Jñānam, Satyam and Ānandam. When metaphysics is based on science and mathematics, it illumines the intellect, but when it is allied to ethics it lays stress on will and its values, and exalts life. In its aesthetic aspect, it is applied to art, and insists on the appreciation of Reality as the absolute Beauty. When it is the philosophy of mysticism and saving experience, it thinks of the eternal ecstasy of the unity-consciousness. It is not a new spiritual adventure after the unattainable, but is the stability and safety in which aspiration is crowned with achievement. When the philosopher develops this Ātma-Dṛṣṭi, he sees all things in the self and the self in all things under the form of eternity.

As the self-actualisation of the cosmic possibility, the absolute

Ātman realises its sportive spontaneity and, as the cosmic goal or hope, it is the home of all values and its Ānanda or saving love is fulfilled only when the whole series of selves is ātmanised.

Indian Philosophy and the Present Situation

By

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I am indeed deeply obliged to the Executive Committee for bestowing this great honour on me. As I have been called upon to deliver the address at a very short notice I am certain that of your indulgence for all the shortcomings in my address I shall have a good measure. His Highness The Maharaja truly remarked that all look to the Philosophers for the immediate solution of some of the more outstanding problems of to-day. To-day we are happily in a position when it is no longer necessary to attempt any justification for the study of Indian Philosophy in our Universities; but we are yet far from having reached any satisfactory scheme where the study is correlated to other studies or, what is much more important, to the life of the student. It should be a truism to say that philosophy is an expression of wisdom that is not academic but the product of fullness of experience. In the case of Indian philosophy in particular, speculation divorced from life and its needs is peculiarly unreal. And yet unfortunately we find that the study of Indian philosophy is still largely mechanical, a kind of observation of an archaic specimen, not an introduction to the waters of life-giving spring. That such a state of affairs exists is partly due to the dominance of Western notions of metaphysics as a peculiar intellectual game. That such a game can be interesting, that it may have valuable reserves of its own, that if pursued to its very limits it may fulfil itself in a vision that is more vital—there is no gainsaying. But such a process is needless waste in the case of us, inheritors of the vastly different Indian tradition. As

the Hindu Scholiast would say, it is to infer from the foot-mark the existence of the elephant seen with one's own eyes. If now we turn from the evil to its remedies, two considerations present themselves straight away. One is that the systems—I do not mean merely the recognised schools—should be studied in the language in which they have been expounded. The other is that the study should be not merely of the dry bones of the systems but also of the flesh and blood which clothed them and continue to clothe them even to-day in however emaciated a condition. The student of philosophy, a few years ago, presumably had a body of philosophic doctrines in his mind with little or no coordination either with his inherited orthodox beliefs or the more or less heterodox practices he had to adopt in social and official life. If the position is the same to-day too, when the study of Indian Philosophy in some part or other has become compulsory, the state of affairs is really deplorable. What we try to learn is what our ancients said, not why they said it. We treat our seers as intellectual machines grinding out dogmas more or less true and fail to realise that they were human beings reacting in definite ways to concrete situations, from the study of whose reactions we can derive profitable lessons for our present and future. We remember the logic-chopping of the Naiyāyika, we forget his intense fervour for a personal God, the feeling of divine companionship that prompted an Udayana even to censure the deity for an alleged act of neglect. We remember the interminable discussions of the Mīmāṃsakas over what element should be carried over to the vikṛti rites and what should not, in what order animals are to be tied to the stake or are to be sacrificed ; we forget the soul-searching of an Appaya who, with a revulsion not unlike that attributed to Asoka, foreswore the religion of sacrifice because of the pain it involved and was at last convinced only when he heard the divine voice assuring him in something like the words of the

Gita that he was but merely the Nimitta for the working out of the proper destinies of the souls of those sacrificed. We remember that the Advaitin begins and ends with a colourless Absolute which is beyond good and evil, whose attainment can come by no external activity ; we forget that this Brahman which is no other than the soul of the seeker can be realised only by him of purified intellect, the purification involving most rigorous and arduous exercise that can be conceived of in any moral code. We remember that India is apparently the land of ascetics, of people who conveniently shirk the obligations of social life ; we forget what qualifications were prescribed for asceticism by our law-givers, what stringent regulations they laid down for the maintenance and conduct of society in which alone life is possible for the vast majority of the people. The externalism that characterised our study of Indian History sometime ago, consisting as it did in memorising the names of battles, places and rulers, is unfortunately characteristic of our study of Indian Philosophy to-day. Add to all these, there is the very regrettable fact that the few who take up the study on more orthodox lines,—for example, the students who take an advanced course of Sanskrit in our Universities, fail to realise that the horizon has been widened, that the world of Vyavahāra has become wider and more closely knitted together, that the cultural influence of the West is a fact to be intelligently reckoned with and made use of ; they have little or no knowledge of Western speculation and have shown little desire to profit themselves by the study of it. It is no wonder in these circumstances if the cultural contact of the East and the West has proved to be what Bradley would call “a marriage attempted without a *modus vivendi*”.

Our Philosophy Courses and our Sanskrit Courses then should be made to go together hand in hand, any distinction between them being based solely on the stress on the linguistic

or the doctrinal side. Secondly, Indian Philosophy in the Philosophy course should be taught not as one among other subjects but as basic to the study of other subjects. Thirdly, a student of Sanskrit should learn not merely one or more of the Indian Schools but some one school of European Philosophy besides acquiring a general knowledge of its history. It is only such a correlated study that will lead to a revitalising of the philosophic current of our country.

Some point may perhaps be given to the above apparent platitudes by showing their application to some of our practical problems. Take, for instance, the sore question of Temple-entry, agitating the minds of our countrymen, great and small. One form in which the question is most usually put is whether it can be right to recognise certain persons to be Hindus and yet exclude them from Hindu forms of worship. Before such a contention can be accepted or rejected, it surely behoves us to enquire what is meant by Hinduism. One fact at least stands out clear—the universality of Karma and of Adhikāra-Bheda. I am not aware personally of any Hindu system other than that of the Cārvāka, if it can be called Hindu, which does not recognise the working of the law of Karma. What does this tell us ? That every creature is bound in its due station because of its own acts in a previous life, that the inevitable consequences of that life have to be worked out in particular stations in this life through duties, obligations, enjoyments and sufferings incidental thereto. If then birth in a particular caste is determined by a previous life, if the disabilities of this particular birth are but the necessary consequences of that life, how does it follow that the enforcement of the disabilities is contrary to the spirit of Hinduism ? It is again an undoubted truth that while truth and goodness are unitary, not all truths are true for all nor all goods good for all. The acquisition of fresh knowledge depends on the previous existence of a suitable apperceptive system. The acquisition of greater

moral worth depends upon moral sanctity already achieved. "To him that hath, to him shall be given". Is there then no helpful message which Hinduism can give. Is the voice of conservative orthodoxy also the final voice of Hinduism? Not necessarily. Hinduism does say that the world from one point of view is a prison and that life is prison-routine. But it does not require either the prison or the routine to be conducted in a manner that the moral conscience of the age would condemn as inhuman. So long as humanity is not perfect, we shall always have jails and jailors. But they need not and do not continue in the same conditions of barbarous unsympathetic tyranny. If the unfortunate brother who is born to greater disabilities can be made to realise that his disabilities, such as they are, are due to his own past life—that is all that the law of Karma, conceived as a moral force, need achieve. This being achieved, its task of purification is done. And it would be unphilosophical to insist on a physical death and rebirth to mark his spiritual rebirth. Adhikāra again is not fixed for all time. It is capable of growth, of education. To purify, sanctify and educate should be our mission, not to dispense spiritual favours after the fashion of granting political franchise. And in this matter of Adhikāra we have also to remember that it is not merely the depressed that are defective but also the conservatively orthodox. The former clamour mostly for they know not what and the latter mostly refuse they know not why. If we would be wise in dealing with both sections of the community, we should devise means which would alienate neither. Would it not be better to create a new cult or to invent a deity than arbitrarily force the one into the society of the other. Such a synthetic reform is not unknown to Hinduism. Have we not admitted even a Buddha, the greatest reformer of ancient India, into the Hindu pantheon and profited by it by enlarging the scope of Hinduism and forcing Buddhism itself to seek refuge in fresh pastures under

other climes ? Should we not proceed by the time-honoured method of a synthetic growth, welding opposites into itself rather than by the arbitrary methods of referendum and democratic legislation ? What shall it profit our depressed brethren if they enter our temples but depart from our hearts ? Surely Divine presence is more marked in the hand of human friendship than in the forbidden physical proximity to an image of stone and metal. Those of us who believe that these are our brethren truly in spiritual kinship, that these in spite of their birth have by God-given talent and by education acquired the competency to apprehend and worship the Most High in the very same way that we do, let us knit ourselves if we can into a closer society ; let us build new temples ; devise new forms of worship, where brethren will really be brethren, where there will be no feeling either of condescension or of discomfort, where the spirit of non-violence will really prevail because while good is done for those who are worthy of it, the less good is left intact for those who comprehend that alone. And in this we have the high authority and noble example of Śrī Saṅkara who distributes the emphasis equally on tradition as well as individual experience. For he says, "Scripture as well as experience are equally authoritative in the quest of ours". For his own guidance he was not found wanting in welcoming every one, even our depressed brother, into his fold. For he has said, "Be he the lowliest born or the highest born ; he shall indeed be my preceptor." If humanity has a birth-right and a goal, it cannot be cheated of either. But the attainment of it can be hastened and made less tortuous by efforts inspired with insight. And if philosophy is studied in correlation to practices as mentioned above, if fractional thinking is not introduced even into the study that is meant to correct that mode of thinking, then we may find solutions for our problems by a mode of synthesis which while giving unto each part its due will yet quicken the evolution of the whole.

The Growth of Ethics

BY

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In Greece, Ethics came after Philosophy (in the sense of metaphysics). Socrates was practically the first to deal with ethical problems. He made virtue identical with (in the sense of following from) knowledge. One who knows his interest or good is bound to follow it, he argued. As a corollary from this tenet, he held that virtue could be taught. If virtue is knowledge, vice must be ignorance. But if vice is ignorance, you cannot blame or censure a bad man. Immorality must accordingly be considered to be, in principle, the same as a physical malady. Punishment with Socrates was only curative or deterrent, not retributive.

The position of Plato is essentially the same as that of Socrates, though it is solidified by its being given a substantial metaphysical basis. Socrates contented himself with proving the truth of the proposition, virtue is knowledge of the good. He did not address himself to the question what exactly is the good of man. That question was taken up by Plato. Now this is a metaphysical question. For, the good of man must be his being what he really should be, in relation to other things, as they really are. The enquiry about the good of man must therefore, be prefaced by an enquiry as to what Reality is. It is in this connection that Plato elaborated his Doctrine of Ideas, which culminated in the establishment of the Idea of the Good as the all-absorbing Reality. Plato shows that the knowledge of the Idea of the Good rids Reality of all darkness, caused by ignorance, and dispels all false shows or appearances. One who has achieved this knowledge is a

Philosopher and is both good and blessed. It is in this way that the good of man is linked up with knowledge. This knowledge is to be communicated by a competent preceptor to students. But not all and sundry can be students fit to receive this high knowledge. A small proportion of the population of the Ideal State have the necessary competence to take in what is communicated, and they too have to be subjected to a rigorous mental and moral discipline before they become fit to receive the dazzling light of the Idea of the Good. The rest cannot aspire to acquire this knowledge, and have to be content with doing what they are told to do, reposing faith in the wisdom and integrity of the higher class people. The capacity for goodness or the absence of it is with Plato a matter of good or bad fortune. To quote the words of Dr. Martineau, "Though he (Plato) pitches upon the right sort of men to be called good men, what is it that constitutes them good in his eyes?—that by a happy infection or infusion, more of the essence of the Universe has got into them than into others; that the magnetic wires from the fount of real ideas pass the currents of the fair and good with peculiar intensity through them, and evolve within them the responsive and miniature God.....In such a scheme no room is left for guilt as opposed to ignorance or for retribution as different from discipline". Thus, according to Martineau, Plato and Socrates have not done justice to what he would call the Ethical fact of moral feeling in man and therefore cannot present a satisfactory philosophy of morals. Guilt and retribution connote ideas which imply moral responsibility of the person who must be recognised as an independent and free agent, shaping his own destiny and therefore meriting credit or discredit for the results achieved. But the spirit of the Socratic-Platonic Philosophy is opposed to such an individualism. It is rather animated with the most uncompromising universalism. In the ideal community such as Plato dreamt

of, the State is all in all, the individual as an individual is nothing. He is a part of the State Machine, outside the State system he has no significance : It is only in the light of this universalistic spirit that one can understand and perhaps appreciate Plato's communism,—the political, economical and social regulations that he prescribes for his ideal State. His division of the whole population into castes according to their functions in the State and his anxiety to entrust the ruling power to only the gifted few after putting them through the most exacting moral and intellectual discipline, show his faith in an intellectual aristocracy and his opposition to all democratic notions.

Aristotle differed from Plato in his metaphysical doctrine and gave to Matter, in relation to Form, a higher status than Plato would vouchsafe to it, and consequently was disposed to recognise the importance of phenomena and study them with a view to their scientific treatment. In Ethics he would study with a scientific eye and arrange systematically the facts of moral life, rather than worry about the metaphysics of morality. He has not the metaphysical insight to understand what Plato means by making the Idea of the Good the Summum Bonum. Yet in spite of all this he does not betray an individualistic tendency. Ethics, he insisted, was a political inquiry and his list of virtues contains some which must appear queer to a man bred up in the individualistic environment of modern Europe.

After the dissolution of the City States of Greece and their passing successively under the sway of the Macedonian and Roman Empires, the solidarity of the Hellenic communities was broken and no interest was left which could attract and bind the individuals together into social unities. In this situation the individual Greek considered himself an independent unit working for his own individual well-being. This state of

things was favourable to the growth of an individualistic spirit which should naturally be reflected in the Philosophies of the post-Aristotelian period. The most important of these Philosophies were Stoicism and Epicureanism. But it was in the case of the latter only that the individualistic tendency manifested itself in an unmistakable manner. The former did not tear itself away from its kinship with Socratic thought. The difference that the removal of the binding force which the Greek State exercised upon the individual made, in the case of Stoicism, was to develop in it a universalism of a much wider sweep than is found in Platonism. The Stoic considered himself to be a citizen of the world and held that his Reason was identical with the Reason in Nature. It is interesting to note that the Stoics believed in Destiny.

It is in the case of Epicureanism which takes its metaphysical creed from the Atomists that one sees how Individualism affects Ethics. It does not require much thought to see that an individualistic spirit is bound to produce confidence in one's own independence. Consequently, the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will and personal responsibility finds favour with all individualists. The Epicureans were the first philosophical libertarians in the ancient world. On the other hand, it should be equally clear that Universalism is bound to be associated with Determinism. We find this illustrated in the history of Christianity. Christ, who broke away from the ritualistic tyranny of Judaism, held out the hope of salvation to one and all in their individual behalf whatever their position, whether they be rich or poor, strong or weak, provided they surrendered themselves to God and threw themselves on His mercy. His message to mankind was that they were all God's children and that before Him there was no distinction of caste or colour, of age or strength or wealth. Christ stood for religious democracy. Every one was promised the same opportunity

for salvation, but at the same time ran the risk of damnation, if the opportunity available was not improved. Each could make or mar his fortune according to the choice made. Complete freedom of the will was recognised as the most valuable possession of man. Libertarianism was implicit in the new religion and was welcomed as a great relief by the down-trodden suffering and helpless people in the Roman Empire.

But with the growth of the number of its followers the strength of Christianity increased. The Church became an organised and powerful system vying with political Empires in its splendour and dignity. The Ecclesiastical law demanded and received submission from countless subjects, and the Church dignitaries enjoyed influence which was even greater than that of princes. Under such an organisation individualism could not only not thrive but could not be tolerated. Universalistic spirit animated the Catholic Church and the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will was disowned. St. Paul's doctrine of salvation through Divine Grace had a fatalistic or determinist complexion. In the hands of St. Augustine it received further definiteness and became an essential element in the Catholic creed. Of course, the teaching of Lord Jesus could not altogether be forgotten and Libertarianism continued to be nursed in one school of Catholic Theology, the leading name in which is that of Pelagius. Yet the influence of Augustinian theology was vast and continued for a long time. Hence, according to Dr. Martineau, the reason why Christianity could not develop a systematic Ethical doctrine, distinct from religious Dogma, was that the Augustinian theology held sway over the Catholic mind and led it to believe that Mankind had, through the transgression of the Divine command by its first representative, fallen once and for ever, lost all freedom for good and could be reclaimed from sin and saved only by Divine grace. The fatalism of the Catholic Church is quite in keeping with its Universalistic spirit. Its formalities and ritualism

with its hierarchy of priesthood, its distrust of all popular forms of government, its championship of the Divine right of Kings and its love of pageantry and social ranks are all in a line with the anti-individualistic tendencies of its religious creed.

The case is different with Protestantism. That religious movement, as its name implies, was aimed against the domination of the Church over individual Reason. It rebelled against the formalism and autocracy of Rome and stood for the free right of every individual to approach God without the intervention of any priestly agency. The translation of the Testament into the native tongues of Europe and the use of the common language of the masses in prayer are evidence of the democratic spirit which pervaded the Reformed Church. In short, it was the obvious tendency of Protestantism to make the individual independent of the Church official system in his relations to God. This tendency may not have been fully manifest in its early phases and there may be forms of Protestantism in which the Church was nearly as autocratic as under Catholicism. Yet there is no doubt that the inner spirit of Protestantism was antagonistic to sacerdotal autocracy and favourable to individual independence. Such an attitude marks it as an individualistic religion. The sympathy which Protestantism felt for all attempts at popularisation of Governments in Europe is an evidence of its individualistic spirit. It is quite natural that under the aegis of such a religion, religious teachers and writers, as well as philosophers, should believe in and try to prove that man enjoys perfect freedom of the will. It cannot be a rash assertion that Protestantism is a faith congenial to libertarianism. At any rate it could be safely maintained that whenever and wherever Protestantism has been true to its spirit a doctrine of the freedom of the human will has been held obstinately.

In the light of the principle that individualism and libertarianism must go together, while determinism is associated

with universalism, we can understand Hobbes being a determinist, and Locke, Hume and Mill libertarians. Thus it is again that Kant and those who thought like him e. g. Green and Martineau, are great champions of the doctrine of human freedom. It is interesting to note that in Europe, Protestantism in religion, democracy in politics, and industrialism in the economic sphere of life going together have generally been accompanied by the philosophical teaching that Man is a free agent and therefore responsible for his conduct. No positions and tasks are recognised as hereditary. No castes and privileges are allowed. It is significant that while Ethics, as a special branch of study, did not exist in the pre-Protestant period of Christianity, it received great impetus with the advent of Protestantism, especially at the hands of those thinkers who believed in the personal freedom of man. So much so that the libertarians have questioned the very possibility of a satisfactory ethical science except with freedom as a necessary postulate. They have decreed that all ethical language in which such terms as Praise and Censure, Remorse, Penitence, Guilt, Punishment, Duty, Continence and a host of similar expressions occur and particularly the word "Ought" would lose all its significance if Free Will is not accepted as an undoubted fact.

We may now sum up all this discussion in two or three general principles. Thus it may be laid down that Ethics becomes an object of special interest and study when religion is not so powerful as to bring under its sway even the social relations of man. On the contrary, when religion has an all-absorbing power and all other interests are subordinated to it, Ethics becomes merged in religion and does not receive special treatment. Once more, Ethics as a separate subject acquires philosophic importance, when, though religion wields great influence, people take an individualistic view of life. Thus we find that among the Greeks and the Romans whose religion

was weak in spiritual influence the study of Ethics received the necessary impetus. In the case of Catholic Christianity religion absorbed all human interest and no scope was left for Ethics as distinguished from Religion to thrive. But with the advent of Protestantism the individualistic view of life, which prevailed, rendered man, as a free moral agent, an object of careful philosophical analysis. Another conclusion which has been hinted at in the previous remarks may be re-stated now. It is that whenever and wherever a Universalistic view of life has prevailed, man is not credited with Freedom and what is described as moral responsibility is not supposed to lie with him.

If now it is conceded that here we have a fair hypothesis about the genesis and growth of an Ethical Philosophy among a people, we may perhaps hope to give a satisfactory account of the state of such a philosophy in India.

It has been said that morality has not been in India an independent subject of inquiry. If the meaning of this charge is that Ethics as the Protestant writers understand the word, viz. a science of Morality which assumes freedom of the Will as its indispensable basis, is unknown, then, according to one of the principles already explained, the Hindu view of life being universalistic a belief in the moral freedom of man is inconsistent with the view and an individualistic type of ethics must be absent in India.

Again, if the assertion means that Ethics is not separated from religion in India, that is also as it should be, for according to another principle suggested, Religion in India being all-pervading, Ethical merit and demerit are not different from religious merit and demerit. Hence Ethics as a special science has no scope in Hinduism.

But there is no dearth of Ethical teaching and Ethical practice in Hindu Society, for difference between good and evil

conduct is recognised, though good and evil are not associated with the responsibility and freedom of man. There is nothing to prevent philosophising about the effects of a given action on the life of a man. Can we not say, for instance, that the effect of wholesome food and proper exercise must be sound health of the body, whereas bad food or over-indulgence of the palate and want of exercise must lead to decline of health? The same may be said about the control and indulgence of passions generally. The kind of Ethics that thus results would be of the determinist type, and Sidgwick is convinced that satisfactory Ethical doctrine can be developed without any reference to free will. It is true that the resulting Ethics will then be a positive science, not normative as it is the fashion to call it.

‘What produces good conduct which brings in its wake happy results or, to put it differently, what is it that leads men to go in for virtue which makes for happiness?’ was a question to which the answer of Socrates and Plato was—Knowledge. The opposite state of things, they asserted, was due to ignorance. The Hindu or rather the Aryan thinker in India said nearly the same thing. According to him Knowledge—the Sanskrit word being *Jñāna*—is the means, the only means, for the realisation of the real goal of existence. But the Indian thinker was more thorough-going than the Greek. He clearly defined the summum bonum—which according to him was the freedom of the individual soul from all the trammels of finiteness and its recognition of its identity with the Infinite or the Absolute—the technical term to signify this summum bonum is *Mokṣa*. Similarly Knowledge meant with him enlightenment and consequent removal of ignorance or darkness from the soul, which leads it to regard itself as a limited individual entity different from what are, through the same ignorance, treated as other such limited individuals. So long as the light of knowledge does not dispel darkness and improve the vision of the soul, so long the soul takes the false shadows in the cave, that the world is, to be real

and wallows in misery. It is when the vision is turned towards light, through good fortune, that the soul realises the truth, understands its own identity with the Absolute and is freed from all the deceptions of the relational world. The descent of the Soul into the false world and its being involved in all the ramifications of life are the effects of its Karma which is identified with *Māyā*. The theory of Karma, briefly stated, is that all the doings of an individual being in the present life are the effects of his former Karma and the effects of the present doings become the storage which flows out as the doings of the next life, and so on *ad infinitum* unless the ever-lengthening chain of Karma snaps, through the sudden darting in of a beam of light which by its heat burns the effects of Karma and frees the soul from the clutches of unrelenting fate.

The hypothesis of karma and its sequel, the cycle of births or the worldly incarnations of the Soul, offers an explanation of the differences between individuals so far as their dispositions, endowments, opportunities, etc are concerned. Of course, the inevitable difficulty viz. how did this unending stream of Karma at all start and why should there be different Karmas for different souls? remains unsolved. But probably the impossibility of its solution is due to the difficulty itself being an absurdity, and there cannot be a rational solution for an irrational difficulty. Of this type is the question—how did the stream of Karma start? The question is exactly like the question—when did the time process make its beginning? “*When*” itself means, ‘At what time,’ The question therefore is reduced to—At what time did time start? Time cannot be measured or marked by time just as the eye cannot see or the hand cannot hold itself. Karma is often identified with *Māyā*, and ‘starting,’ i. e. ‘beginning’ is a *Māyik* idea. An attempt to explain *Māyā* in *Māyik* terms is absurd. Hence the reply to the above difficulty is that the difficulty itself is absurd. The answer that is conventionally given is that Karma or *Māyā*, in common with time, is

beginningless. It is therefore that the existence of karma is recognised as inevitable, without prying further into its secret.

With regard to the second part of the difficulty referred to above, viz. why should there be different karmas for different souls? a preliminary issue may be raised—Why should we worry about differences? Is not the lot of all beings, from the point of view of real bliss, the same, i e. equally miserable, notwithstanding differences? In evidence of the implication of this question, it may be pointed out as a fact that very few, if at all any, will be prepared to exchange their lot—of course in its entirety, with that of others. If, however, this, the first shot, does not silence the objector, another question may be asked in order to parry the thrust, viz. why should there be different souls at all? The difficulty about the difference of the karmas of the different souls may be shifted backwards and an explanation sought of the difference between the souls themselves. If it is found impossible to answer this question, it may be suggested, as a means of rescue, that the difference whether in the karmas or among the souls themselves is *Māyā* and, therefore, it may be added, that an attempt at explaining the difference is tantamount to an attempt to show how it came into being. But coming into being is itself *Māyik*, for we cannot talk of the coming into being of what is non-*māyik* or eternal, and it has been already pointed out that trying to explain what is *Māyik* in terms of *Māyā* is to attempt the impossible. Hence the second difficulty may be disposed of in a manner similar to the first.

And now it may be observed, on behalf of the Karma doctrine, that the rival theory of freedom of man is not exempt from the above difficulties. Supposing that a man's deeds in the present life are not determined by Karma but are the results of his free choice and that a bad deed shows a bad or

weak will and that a good and virtuous deed shows a good or strong will and that therefore a bad man must be condemned and punished and a good man honoured and rewarded, may it not be asked, why or how does a bad man happen to be bad or to be weak-willed and a good man strong-willed? The weak and the wicked do not certainly desire to be weak and wicked. They would rather be strong and good. If then the difficulty remains insoluble, the doctrine of freedom can claim no superiority over that of karma.

Hinduism is no doubt fatalistic. The question is whether this is a disqualification. It is true that fatalism is generally considered as a term of abuse. Once it is decided that a doctrine is fatalistic, it is the philosophic fashion to treat it as condemned once and for all. The reason seems to be that it is held to be an axiomatic truth that fatalism kills manhood, for, as is alleged, it paralyses all spirit of self-confidence and induces a feeling of helplessness and renders a man indolent. But let us subject the fatalistic theory of Karma to some cool and dispassionate thought and see whether it deserves the slur that is cast on it.

According to the karma doctrine all that happens to a being and all that the being does are determined by the accumulated karma of the being. This statement itself is the result of some thinking on the part of a thinking being or beings, so that, according to the Karma theory, the thought about the karma is itself the fruit of some former karma, so that it is fated that some beings will have power to think and through thought derive knowledge; further that such beings will know that through knowledge of the nature of karma, they might acquire freedom from its shackles, when it is realised that karma that is done without any selfish desire to enjoy the fruit, would render the karma impotent for further mischief and produce that serene state of intelligence

which enables the soul to receive the light of the supreme knowledge which consists in seeing that the ignorantly conceived individual self is nothing but the Absolute itself. In this way it may be fated that such a being or beings may attain Mokṣa—the Summum Bonum. It is difficult to see where, want of self-confidence, helplessness or indolence comes in. Such a man will be inspired by the kind of spirit which, according to the champions of free will, should animate the ideally virtuous man, viz. that of doing duty for duty's sake and not with an eye to the advantages accruing therefrom. On the other hand, a man who is not gifted with the power of such philosophic reflection, will remain blissfully under the delusion that he has in him the freedom to achieve his own welfare. Here again there cannot be any question of his being in any way depressed or diffident or lazy. In no case, therefore, will the Karma doctrine, fatalistic as it is, produce the lethargy which it is feared it may produce.

But let us assume that the Free Will doctrine is the truer of the two. What is the resulting improvement? It is true that credit for good conduct will be given to the good will of the good man, while the bad man will be awarded discredit. But then if again the former question is asked—why is it that one free man is able to restrain his evil propensities, while another equally free man is not? what is the answer that may be supplied? There is no means of solving the difficulty except by saying that one is fated to be good and another fated to be bad. Thus from a practical point of view there is no difference between the two views except that the meaning of such words as Virtue, Vice, Merit, Sin, Guilt etc. would be slightly different in the two theories. Guilt or sin, for instance, would imply in one case the idea of responsibility and deserve to be punished retributively whereas, in the other case, the same would be regarded as weakness or defect of the soul, requiring

a curative treatment. Sin in this latter view would not in principle, be different from physical or aesthetic disability—a matter of defective natural endowment. This may be looked upon as scandalous in some quarters. But if freedom cannot be philosophically justified, little store need be put by merely sentimental considerations.

Let us not pursue the question further. Whether freedom is a fact or a fiction is a metaphysical problem and is not germane to the present discussion, which is simply aimed at finding out the circumstances under which different types of Ethics flourish. It is, however, noteworthy that in an elaborate work of Ethics, recently contributed to the Library of Philosophy, Hartmann the author—a clear and convincing writer—admits at the end of a volumeful treatment of “Freedom” that in spite of a strong feeling in favour of freedom, what can be established logically is only that the existence of Freedom is highly probable.

Whatever may be the metaphysical decision on the point, it is a fact that Hinduism has not accepted the Doctrine of Free Will. Tilak, in his monumental work on the Bhagavadgita, argues in favour of personal freedom, but his argument leaves the reader unconvinced. *Pace* Tilak, Hinduism is a determinist scheme of existence and that is in keeping with the Universal-istic view of Life which pervades it. Its social system, of which the division of mankind into four principal castes is an outstanding feature, its recognition of the divine right of Kings, its anti-democratic political creed—all point to a view, which is opposed to individualism. Further, it is a religion-ridden system. These two characteristics are, as suggested in the theory put forth in this paper fatal to the development of a separate science of Ethics. Of course, Ethical thought is not absent from Hinduism, and it is possible to carve out therefrom a system of Ethics that can be labelled as Hindu Ethics. This is possible because of the

fact that the Religion of the Hindus is philosophical. It is philosophy turned into religion. Consequently it takes under its charge all the aspects of the life of a human being. So that from birth to death and from sun-rise to sun-rise, a Hindu is under the watchful eye of his religion. No wonder then that the Ethical philosophy of the Hindus should be a part and parcel of their philosophico-religious system and should not appear as an independent head of philosophic speculation. Ethical conduct is, with the Hindus, ancillary to the realisation of the ultimate goal of Existence proclaimed by their religion.

—Mokṣa.

Suggestions for A New Theory of Emotion.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

(*Psychology Section*)

By

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There are noticeable in the modern academic world a keen interest in the study of feelings and emotions and an unusual effort to understand their workings from various standpoints. The holding of the Wittenberg Symposium is an evidence of it. Thirty-four eminent psychologists of international fame have grappled with diverse aspects of this problem and have made their valuable contributions towards its solution. No one would find better materials to start a fresh discussion on the subject than the volume on *Feelings and Emotions*, edited by Carl Murchison and published in 1928 by the Clark University Press. It makes a present to the world of the considered views and mature opinions of the leading psychologists of the day on the question of feelings and emotions. Therefore I need make no apology in accepting this book as representing the current academic position with regard to the question at issue.

When founders or accredited representatives of different schools of psychology are invited to deliver lectures on the same psychological topic, it may easily be conjectured that each will emphasise his own particular viewpoint and discuss, within the limits of the time allowed, such other schools as he seriously considers to be its rivals. The present symposium is no exception and accordingly we find different viewpoints urged with great force and cogent arguments.

With refreshing candour Bentley asks there whether the subject of emotion is after all still anything more than a mere chapter-heading in the text-books of psychology. In putting the question in that form he has boldly given expression to what many a less vocal worker in the field felt but dared not utter. I wonder if, after the close of the Symposium, Bentley has felt any necessity of changing his views or modifying his attitude. Has he, for example, been able to find that the diversity of opinions has lessened to a certain extent or to satisfy himself that the problems have approached nearer solution?

But whether we are satisfied with the present position of the problem or not, there is one question relating to its past career which interests us. The present conflict may be explained by the fact that the scientific interest in the subject of emotion is of comparatively recent origin and it may be that we have not as yet discovered the proper method or the right technique of studying this particular phenomenon. What I would like to enquire, however, is why emotion did not so long receive that amount of attention from the psychologists, which, by virtue of its importance in the mental life of man, it so richly deserved and why it has suddenly become such a fascinating problem as to call forth even a Symposium on the subject by the most eminent psychologists of the day.

The answers most commonly given are that feelings and emotions are such peculiarly elusive states of the mind that they do not subject themselves so easily to objective study as other mental states do. It is difficult to engender in the laboratory a real virile emotional state in the subject's mind for the purposes of experimental study. For these reasons, though interest was not lacking, results were so few. I maintain, however, that these are only half-truths which, though partially serving to answer the first part of my question, fail completely

to account for the sudden accession of unprecedented interest in the problems of emotion. The answer should be sought elsewhere. To me it seems that the explanation at once becomes easy if we only remember that the renaissance of emotion in psychology has coincided with the discovery of the unconscious by Freud. This coincidence is not an accidental one, as Jastrow has said, but it has more significance and greater consequence than Jastrow would like to admit. It is this one single fact that has been primarily responsible for the impetus given to the study of feelings and emotions. Freud took the lid off the mind and all that lay hidden underneath became revealed. The gates were opened and the prisoners at once escaped. The individual became conscious of the powerful emotions that move him and psychologists were compelled to pay attention to them. In other words, the newly released emotions spread over all and everybody had to take notice of them. At the same time that Freud was reconstructing theoretically the individual man after ridding him of his repressions, the world was practically carrying out the task of reconstructing itself and removing its own repressions. The war ruthlessly broke down all barriers with the consequence that the elemental passions of mankind and their forceful emotions, repressed so long by the process of civilisation, dashed out of the caves in their undisguised nakedness and throbbing with all their unmitigated virility. A surer test and a better experiment no psychological theory had found before. Freud was fortunate, as no theorist ever was, that just as he was beginning to forecast the inevitable consequences of unnatural repressions the world staged a large-scale experiment, unsurpassed before in its magnitude, to put his bold assertions to the test and to prove his fundamental assumptions to be valid.

I have drawn pointed attention to these historical events because it is my earnest desire to emphasise the fact

that emotions in their pure and original forms were not accessible to us so long and therefore a proper perspective for their study was not hitherto obtained. Titchener in his *Text-Book of Psychology* has said that man boasts of being a thinking animal, but how little in reality does the average person think in all his life ; he goes on almost always accepting facts uncritically and conforming to traditions unreflectively. Similar remarks, I think, may be made regarding the average person's emotional life. How little real emotion does he feel in all his life ! His feelings are mostly a matter of habit and his emotions are regulated by the conventions of society. How is it possible under the modern conditions of life to experience the rich varieties of emotion with all their different nuances and shadings ? The emotions that have been studied so long in the laboratories or by professional psychologists are only skeletons or are at best but feeble and considerably attenuated forms of their originals. Psychological research with the help of biology and physiology has done much to point out the external and environmental conditions under the pressure of which the manifestations of emotions have gradually changed their forms. But not until the study of abnormal minds in the neurological clinics and mental hospitals began to make itself felt, did the nature of emotion as such receive the legitimate attention that it deserves and emotion find its proper place in psychological investigations. It was never properly realised before, for example, that what is expressed as undue resentment of A towards B may only be an indication of the strong attachment that the former feels towards the latter. While the forms as also the transformations of the expressions of emotions have been studied with great success by able physiologists, the subtle and manifold sublimations of the emotions themselves have only been very dimly apprehended as yet.

If all that I have said above be true, as I believe they are, the first remark that I would make with regard to the

book *Feelings and Emotions* as a whole is that too little and unduly limited space has been allotted to psychoanalytical findings. The grouping together of psychoanalysis with the pathology of feeling and emotion into a separate part may be justified by the fact that the psychoanalysts have so far dealt mainly with pathological cases; but it should not go unchallenged if it betrays any unwillingness on the part of the organisers of the Symposium to recognise that psychoanalysis has any contribution to make to normal psychology. The psychoanalysts are mostly medical men and naturally it is the diseased minds that often approach them and which they get frequent opportunities of studying. It is not their fault, therefore, that they have not as yet made adequate contribution to the traditional topics of psychology. It is the duty, on the other hand, of the academic psychologists now to try to assimilate the large mass of new information that the former have placed before them and to attempt to incorporate it into the general body of scientific knowledge on psychological matters. The habit of keeping the eyes shut and pretending that there is nothing to be seen is as detrimental to the cause of science as it is useless in the case of ostriches. I do not know, of course, whether any invitation was issued to Freud, Jones, Brill, or other eminent authorities of this school of thought to join the Symposium. All that I can do in this connection is to express, on behalf of a very large body of workers I am sure, a deeply felt regret that a book so valuable in itself in all other respects should be lacking in the most essential article of value.

From the standpoint of descriptive psychology Krueger's treatment of the subject is one of the finest specimens of keen observation, close thinking and logical consistency. His one attempt is to keep as rigidly true in his description to observed phenomena as possible. Though his own article is presented in a rather difficult style, partly due to the limitations of trans-

lation, the essence of his theory has been made clear by the questions and answers that followed the reading of the paper by Dr. Schneider. His theory is based on the fundamental observation which cannot be seriously questioned by anybody, *viz.*, that at any moment our experience is always of a complex total consisting of parts organised into one whole. Feelings, he says, are the complex qualities of the experienced totality. There is a continuum of qualitative changes in our experience and therefore feelings can pass over steadily from one into another and even change into their qualitative opposites. There is no limit to the kinds of feeling that can be experienced. The Gestalt principle is adopted but it is subsumed under another inclusive principle of *Ganzheit*. His conception of the feeling-like forms of experience reminds us of similar conceptions in our Indian system of thought, *viz.*, *Rasābhāsa*, *Cidābhāsa*, etc., and the urge towards totality that he assumes is of special value as an explanatory principle.

I must confess, however, that I have some misgivings as to whether I have properly understood Krueger's theory. I feel, for example, that no attempt has been made to bring the manifold varieties of feelings, which according to him we experience, into relation either with the varieties of complex totalities or with the drive towards the *Ganzheit*. Does he imply that feeling is the background of all experience when he speaks of the "*bewusstseinerfüllende Breite*, a spread which fills consciousness completely"? Are feelings the functions of the complex totalities, or is it the feelings that are responsible for the degree and the quality of the organisation that the parts have achieved in the total whole? It is true that there is a continuum of qualitative changes in the experience of a normal man, but there may sometimes be serious disruptions of this continuity, as is evidenced in the cases of double personality or multiple personality. Besides, it seems that Krueger has entirely disregarded the unconscious factors which

are partly responsible for bringing about the apparent phenomenal continuity of the normal man's experience. The rôle of feelings in the socio-cultural development of mankind has been ably depicted, but the part that emotions play in the development of the individual has not, I think, been sufficiently touched upon. I hope my revered teacher will not take any offence if I record here the total impression that I formed after the perusal of his contribution to the Symposium. It seemed to me that he was rather too preoccupied with the totality concept and was more anxious to demonstrate the applicability of the concept to feelings also than to give us an analysis of the feelings themselves. Even his very description of feelings seems to be a deduction from the concept.

Claparède's defence of the peripheral theory of James-Lange is clever, but it misses the point of the objection. Can we, for example, describe in a similar way our perception of 'redness' as the consciousness of a form of nervous impression? Physiologically, we may say that these organic changes accompany the emotions that we experience; but that does not give us any idea as to the quality of the experience as such. All attempts at a purely physiological explanation of emotion are entirely one-sided. No one can be unmindful of the highly interesting and immensely valuable physiological researches that have been conducted by Cannon, Bekhterev and others in connection with emotion. The scientific world is indebted to them for their contributions. But we agree whole-heartedly with Prince when he tells them and the Behaviourists, "God-speed to you. Go as far as you can go; but you are bound to come up against a stone wall somewhere, sometime, and you have finally got to come to conscious experience".

From the functional standpoint, Claparède considers emotion as a regression of conduct and Howard maintains that it is a state of disruption. There are some who emphasise feel-

ings as the characteristic of emotions, but Howard thinks that neither the sensation elements nor the feeling elements are in the focus of consciousness in an emotional state. We shall, however, have occasion later to refer to one idea of his which he expresses in the following sentence: "The affective tones which introspectionists describe—or try to describe—are probably present in all our experience".

Feelings have been distinguished from emotions on various principles. Claparède says "Feelings are useful in our conduct while emotions serve no purpose". Also that feelings and emotions are distinguished not only by their quality and their intensity but also by their depth. "The pain which a pin-prick causes me may be much more intense than the pain which is produced by the news of a shipwreck of a boat full of passengers, but the latter is assuredly a deeper pain". McDougall maintains that in a developed individual the feelings are always complex and never oscillate between mere pleasure and pain. This complexity has been introduced as a result of the development of the individual's cognitive power, as a result of his having learnt, *i. e.*, 'to look before and after and pine for what is not.' These complex feelings however are to be distinguished from the emotions. The former are conditioned by the degrees of success and failure of our strivings whereas the true emotional qualities are prior to and independent of success and failure. "The true emotions, on the other hand, must be supposed to be of very much earlier appearance in the evolutionary scale" than the complex feelings. The complex feelings might have developed later and therefore can be distinguished from emotions; but what about the simple feelings? What, according to McDougall, would be the criterion of differentiation between simple feelings or those that he describes as primary, and the emotions?

Some have suggested that feeling is passive while emotion

is an attitude involving a reaction to a situation. Undoubtedly this is verified, as Titchener says, in certain forms of emotion, but there are intermediate cases where this is not attested.

The only difference which we can reasonably assume to exist between feelings and emotions is a difference in complexity. Feelings and emotions are species of the same mental genus; the former may under certain conditions assume the form of the latter and the latter similarly may degenerate into the former.

It is a commonplace in psychological text-books that attention destroys feelings and emotion paralyses thought. Feelings can never be objects of presentation, as Ward has said, and Washburn has discussed the relation between emotion and thought according to her motor theory. But the implication of this very obvious fact of daily observation seems to me to be of more far-reaching consequence than is generally recognised. That emotion can be controlled by thought and that thought can be paralysed by emotion may be put into this form that both of these mental states cannot be simultaneously present in the individual's experience. If we assume that these are but two kinds of transformation of the same limited amount of energy, the fact becomes explainable that one can develop or gain in intensity only at the cost of the other. And that is what, I maintain, commonly happens. Normally none of these forms assumes such intensity, *i. e.*, draws so much energy unto itself, as to leave no supply for the other kind of transformation. But there are extreme cases and it is then that we observe the above mentioned phenomena of thought controlling emotion and emotion paralysing thought. In training our children it had been the fashion so long to emphasise the exclusive culture of that kind of transformation of the mental energy which underlies the intellectual development. The baneful effects of this procedure have been made apparent by modern students of child minds and the danger of neglect-

ing the emotions has been pointed out in this book by Terry. It is a truism that children are more emotional than the adults, and the savages more so than the civilised. My contention is that both phylogeny and ontogeny illustrate this fundamental fact that feeling or emotion is the primitive mental characteristic out of which and at the expense of which all others have developed. The type of thinking and outlook on life that a man, whether normal, abnormal or super-normal, develops in later life is determined by the way in which this original feeling-nature of his has been treated. Titchener's definition of affection as unclear sensation fits in with the theory that a wise man is he who has transcended the tyrannies of passions and emotions. It need not be assumed, however, that I subscribe to this definition of wisdom; what I am seeking to convey is that the growth of the intellectual powers can only take place at the expense of the emotional equipment.

Consider, for example, perception. That perception is not conditioned by external factors alone is not a novel statement to make. It has been observed that a bush may easily be perceived as a bear under the stress of fear. But there need not be any highly excited state of emotion to transform the object of perception. What happens in an intense form in that exaggerated state of emotion takes place in normal proportions at the ordinary state of feeling—at the state which Krueger would perhaps describe as the feeling-like state. Numerous quantitative experiments have recently been performed both here and abroad on the lifting of weights and all have testified to the great influence that the attitudes play in the perception of weights or in the perception of the difference between weights. By simple tests and easy methods Bose demonstrated the same phenomenon in some other cases of perception¹. Perception being an interpretation of a clue, as Hollingworth

1. *Is Perception an Illusion?* By Dr. G. Bose—*Ind. J. of Psy.*, Vol. I (1926), p. 135ff.

has defined it, must vary with the variation of the interpretation. And nothing is so obvious as that the powers of interpretation possessed by different persons vary according to their age, sex, training, and temperament. In other words, the interpretation differs in accordance with the difference in the original feeling equipment and the way in which it has been modified.

Common observation points out similar differences between man and man as regards other manifestations of intellectual activity, *e. g.*, memory, etc. Differential psychology has attempted precise measurement of these differences and has sought to express them in quantitative terms. But it is psychoanalysis that has demonstrated the rôle of feelings in producing these differences. The psychopathology of everyday life explains particular slips of memory or lapses of language, etc. But the application of this principle to all such cases of a single individual will easily account for the type of memory that the person possesses. In describing cases of affective transfer and affective expansion Titchener came very near recognising this influence of feelings on our thoughts and daily activities, but as he, out of methodological considerations, determined not to transgress the conscious field of experience, he deliberately refrained from taking the final step—to the satisfaction of many, it must be confessed, but at the expense of sacrificing America's leadership in academic psychology.

I have made it sufficiently clear, I hope, that I regard feeling as at once the background and the source of all our experience and as the essence of what we call mind. Consciousness forms only a part of mind, a very small part as is now well-known, and therefore cannot be properly regarded as the essential characteristic of it. That is my first assumption. My second assumption is that this mind is dynamic in nature. Now none of these assumptions is novel. The former is as old

as Plato and the second is current coin in most of the modern psychological schools. The combination of these two yields the concept of 'dynamic feeling' which may be described as a yearning. Plato calls this Eros or Love, and Freud describes it as Libido. The goal of this Eros, according to Plato, is Immortality or Eternal Happiness. For happiness is what all men desire. Of the Libido the goal is the satisfaction of itself by overcoming the conflicts that the Ego has inevitably to meet with by virtue of its living amidst natural and social surroundings. Bose maintains that Wish, taking it in its usual sense, is the primal factor in mental life and actions are prompted by the fact that there is always a repressed wish contradictory to the one in the conscious field.

All these views, however, can be reconciled if a third assumption be made regarding the aim of the Eros or Libido or Wish. Let us assume that mind is at first a vast store of potential energy in a state of perfectly stable equilibrium, quite content and at harmony with itself. The external world enters this mind through the channels of the senses and makes impressions on it. The equilibrium is at once disturbed, and the harmony destroyed. Some of the potential energy is changed into kinetic form and activity is initiated in order to regain the lost equilibrium and the disturbed harmony. I suggest, therefore, that the fundamental yearning of the Ego is for that harmony which it has lost simultaneously with its coming into the world. Pleasant is the primal state of harmony, the disturbances are unpleasant. I would define pleasantness as simply the experience of the harmony and unpleasantness as the contrary experience. A perfectly harmonious state free from all disturbances is the *Ānandam* of our *śāstras*. The world does not cease to act but goes on continuously to inflict itself on the Ego with the result that the original harmony, first disturbed by the act of birth, cannot be fully gained again except at the cost of life itself. It would

seem therefore that there is a yearning in every man even for that blissful state of lifelessness itself. And I take it that that is what Freud describes as the instinct for death. Various are the means adopted by the mind to retain and realise even some sort of temporary harmony amidst the incessant attacks from different quarters. It is the main task of psychology to study these ways and means, surrogates and subterfuges, that are employed by the mind for regaining the Paradise that has been lost. Habits develop of meeting, with the least disturbance of harmony, particular stimuli or groups of stimuli in particular ways and that is Perception.

Out of these conflicts of activities arises Reason also. It is a special modification of the uppermost layer of the mind, as it were, attempting to serve the purpose of preventing extreme dislocations of the harmonious arrangements within. It is however one of the biggest Rationalisations of Nature, as it pretends to be what it is not and has succeeded for generations in imposing itself on all as the only saviour of mind. It even went so far, some centuries ago, as to claim a divine origin and to insist on its fundamental difference from all other properties of mind, i. e., from all other means by which mind attempts to reach the state of harmony again. But I particularly remember here a relevant passage from Hobhouse where he says, "We might parry the question whether animals reason by asking whether man reasons, and there would not be wanting plausible grounds for answering the latter question with a negative".¹ Besides, the mode of behaviour of reason itself unmistakably testifies to its fundamental identity with the primal yearning for harmony. Not only has the course of its evolution been promoted by that yearning, but even when it works for itself without reference to any specific demand from outside, all that it seeks is harmony. For what else is Logic

1. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution* (1915), p. 347.

but an effort to establish consistency either with the various premises themselves or with the premises within and the world outside?

Different schools of philosophy, as different intellectual systems, are but different ways of rediscovering lost harmony. Herbart, the great champion of reason, found the task of metaphysics to be freeing the general ideas from the contradictions that they contain. He named his philosophical treatise on education as *The Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe*. Is not the term 'aesthetic' significant? Kant's great mission was to bring back to philosophy that harmony which she had lost by the conflict of the two opposing schools of thought, *viz.*, Rationalism and Empiricism. Hegel's dialectic is the continued attempt to establish a Synthesis between the Thesis and the Antithesis. The view has been expressed that progress always proceeds by way of over-emphasising now one aspect and then another. Without subscribing to the implication of the word 'progress' I readily agree with the view, for that only illustrates my fundamental conception. According to the principle of harmony the disturbed equilibrium caused by the over-emphasis of one aspect must necessarily be sought to be counterbalanced by the subsequent over-emphasis of the previously neglected aspect.

It is unnecessary for me to refer to Aesthetics for the support of my contention. For harmony is universally accepted as the keynote of all artistic creations and aesthetic appreciations. I shall only refer to Langfeld where he speaks of conflict as giving rise to artistic creation. "The conflict is a state of unpleasantness, which frequently goes over into an emotion, and this conflict (or unpleasantness, if one agrees that the terms are identical) is the urge towards continued action, whether 'real' or in fancy, until an adjustment is made. Such an urge is present in artistic production"¹.

1. *Feelings and Emotions*, p. 348.

Religion is another attempt at escape from the emotional disturbance. The religious-minded man finds solace and the solutions of all his troubles in the tenets of religion, because these tenets assure him of the possibility of reaching that perfect state of harmony again which he has been seeking all his life.

Social reformers and political leaders are alike actuated by the desire to remove maladjustments and secure justice. Class-war is the modern slogan; that only reveals the particular phase of the disturbed equilibrium on which emphasis is just at present laid. If justice here means the removal of the political and the social inequalities, it is only tantamount to restoring harmony between different classes, which, therefore, once more illustrates the point I am seeking to draw your attention to.

Now, if collective activities of groups of men verify the assumptions that I have made, they are still more exemplified in the actions of individual men. And it is in the understanding of these actions that psychoanalysis has rendered the greatest possible service to us.

We have realised now, thanks to the genius of Freud, that there are more things in the mind and in its workings than were dreamt of even a few years ago by the academic psychologists and the professional teachers. We have come across the Censor and have recognised the repression machinery at work in the subterranean depths of the mind. We have heard of defence mechanisms and projection methods. Defence against what? Against the anticipated or the actual disturbance of the loss of harmony. The persistent urge to maintain the equilibrium eternally is the emotion of Love. Perpetually rejuvenating itself by union with another and acquiring fresh strength to meet the incessant demands of life—that is the essence of it, and biologically considered it is the Sexual Impluse. When this effort or any other effort made to recover the harmony is obstructed we are in Anger. We are in Despondency

when all efforts fail to overcome the threatening situation. When an unexpected event suddenly disturbs the equilibrium we are in a dangerous situation and the consequent loss of harmony is 'Fear'; when an expected danger threatens the equilibrium we are in a state of Anxiety. So the various forms of emotion are but different attempts made to recover or maintain the equilibrium that is lost or threatened.

These are in broad outlines what happens in normal life. The various conditions under which the original yearning for harmony assumes the different transformations, which we describe by the different names of the emotions, have just begun to be more fully studied. Psychoanalysis and abnormal psychology will give us by and by more materials to build up a systematic theory about them. The latter gets plentiful opportunities of studying the exaggerated manifestations of the emotions and their interrelations with each other. As Janet says, "Don't let us forget that the disease only magnifies facts which exist in everybody. Doubtless, veritable melancholia is a disease, but sadness in its most simple form is, after all, identical with melancholia and contains the same fear of action"¹. The former, though now still confined to pathological cases, will one day, I am convinced, be a method of studying normal minds too. I have once before pleaded for the recognition of psychoanalysis in the text-book of psychology as a legitimate method of obtaining normal psychological data². I take this opportunity of once more pleading for the same cause. It does not benefit anybody to remain wilfully ignorant. And when that is done and psychoanalysis is taken more seriously by the psychologists than at present, psychology will not be the dry and dreary subject, divorced from life, as it now is, and the subject of

1. *Feelings and Emotions* p. 309.

2. Mitra, *Psychology and Psycho-analysis*, *Ind. J. of Psy.*, Vol. V, July-October, p. 161ff.

emotion will no more be a mere chapter heading in its textbooks.

Let me present here once more in very general outlines the tentative theory relating to the emotional life of man that I have attempted to propound above. It might also be described as a theory of the mental life as a whole, because my very first assumption is that feeling constitutes the essence of mind. Every mind is a store of energy the nature of which is not at present known. Minds differ from one another in their potentialities as, to give a physical analogy, the differences in shape of the contained water are conditioned by the differences in the configurations of the containers. The original fundamental feeling of mind is the feeling of harmony. Pleasantness is the experience of this harmony. This harmony is first disturbed by the act of birth; simultaneously with that act the external world begins to thrust itself on the mind. Unpleasantness is the experience of this disturbed harmony and therefore is later in its genesis than pleasantness. This is in agreement with the view of Bose. Says he, "I would urge that originally all wishes are pleasurable and it is only when they are in conflict that unpleasantness arises".¹ Mind yearns for the lost harmony and action ensues to bring it back. Actions produce changes in the external world and these again have their reverberations in the mind. And so the conflict continues. Complexities develop in the procedure by which the external world acts on the mind and complications arise in the modes in which the mind seeks to defend itself against the violation of its harmony or to recover the lost equilibrium. Thinking develops as a mode of defence and of reaction. As all things made of clay bear the characteristics of clay so thinking reveals its inner nature in its efforts after consistency and harmony. The yearning to go back to the original state of harmony is the

1. Bose—*Concept of Repression* (1921), p. 55.

Death Instinct and that to maintain it for all times is the Sex Instinct. Says Plato, "Having none of the divine unchangeableness it (Eros) feels the necessity of sustaining itself by continual self-propagation. This propagative impulse is Love.So Love is, generally speaking, the endeavour..... to fill itself with what is eternal and imperishable, to generate something enduring"¹.

Not only thinking but other methods are also resorted to. Suppression and Repression, Introjection and Projection are some of the means utilised by the mind for gaining its end. These have been elaborately studied by the psychoanalysts. When a certain degree of balance is somehow maintained we have a normal mind. When the methods adopted fail in their object we have pathological cases and dissociated minds.

This view, I venture to hope, reconciles many a conflict both among the academic psychologists and among the psychoanalysts. Thus the fundamental yearning may be identified with the 'w' factor of Spearman and others of his school. This yearning however is not felt by us consciously as such. It remains therefore as the unconscious drive. Hence the necessity and importance of studying the unconscious remain. That feeling is the background of all our experience and colours them all is perhaps the view of Krueger too, as also of Dunlap who however insists only on the physiological aspects of emotion. Howard also mentions this in the quotation already cited. That it is best to consider emotion as a form of energy has been said by Prince. That there is a rich variety of feelings is not denied but this theory accords a special importance above all to pleasantness and unpleasantness. There is no difficulty in recognising Excitement as an undifferentiated emotion for which Stratton has pleaded. The theory is not opposed to physiological methods in psychological studies but is not

1. Zeller—*Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. Trans (1888), p. 193.

convinced about the sufficiency and the adequacy of such procedure. Along with the Gestaltists the totality of experience is admitted but analysis is not necessarily denied. A meaning is found for the phrase 'unbalanced mind' in connection with abnormality. Besides, Freud's Libido, Jung's Compensation, Alder's Inferiority Complex and Bose's Opposite Wish all may find a place here without needing the slightest modifications. This I consider to be one of the special merits of the theory.

SYMPOSIUM

The Possibility of a New Morality.—I

BY

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It is a remarkable fact that up to quite recent times very little consideration was given to the possibility of a morality which should differ essentially from that which was currently followed, or rather which men professed to recognise some obligation to follow. I must not state this fact too categorically, for as a sweeping generalisation it may be challenged. In the history of the human race there has been great variety of practice in behaviour; there have been varieties of institutions; and there have been differences in the values which have been attached to particular virtues and in the conceptions which have been held of the relative places of the different virtues. But in spite of all these I think we are more deeply impressed by the great measure of agreement which we find amongst those who have thought on questions concerning the moral life.

One cannot but be struck by the way in which this is manifested in the writings of European thinkers. It is implied in the thought of the Intuitionists. However individualistic their thought may sometimes seem in form, there is none of them, among those at least who are regarded as serious thinkers, who finds in his intuitions material for a new private morality. In Butler, for example, this is clear. Conscience is not a private possession which may lead one man in this direction, another in that. It is a principle which is to be found in every man, in whom it is an expression of the higher mind of God.

"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in *every* man; which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a *higher and more effectual sentence*, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."

Sermon II

The same thing comes out in Kant, when, for example, he declares an erring conscience to be a chimera, or even more clearly in his exposition of the law of reason. One might expect something more startling from the attempt to derive morality from the bare form of reason than the very familiar duties which he actually discovers. In neither Kant nor Butler is there any radical criticism of current moral ideas. What they try to show is the source from which these ideas as properly understood have been drawn.

John Stuart Mill is equally sure that current moral ideas owe their origin to the principle of utility. He pours scorn on the objection to utilitarianism that there is not time previous to action for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. He says there has been ample time namely the whole past duration of the human species, during which men have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions. Like the sailor who goes to sea with the Nautical Almanack already calculated, all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their

minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong. There is room for indefinite improvement of the corollaries from the principle of utility, but it is one thing to say that the rules of morality are improvable and another to say that we have no rules of value at all.

T. H. Green approaching the matter from a different angle, arrives at a very similar conclusion. He finds himself in agreement with Plato and Aristotle in their understanding of the good as goodness, and he says :—

“In the development of that reflective morality which our own consciences inherit, both the fundamental principle and the mode of its articulation have retained the form which they first took in the minds of the Greek philosophersWhen we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to know what is true to make what is beautiful; to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (*i.e.* to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, and to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to but what is due.”

We are all familiar with the way in which Green illustrates by examination of the virtues of fortitude and temperance how our understanding of goodness has grown in fulness and determinateness.

There have always been rebels against the established morality, but the rebels, if one may develop the political analogy, have been comparable rather with criminal law-

breakers than with political revolutionaries. They have refused in this or that detail to live what is understood as the moral life, but they have not often claimed that in so doing they were practising a higher morality. And up to recent times there has not been much evidence of serious attempts at a radical reconstruction of morality. The first important revolt in modern times was that of Nietzsche, who set out to transvalue and invert current values. He characterised the current morality of Europe as "herding-animal morality" and described the virtues of the "gregarious European man" such as public-spirit, kindness, deference, industry, temperance, modesty, indulgence, sympathy, as qualities which made him useful to the herd. It is a slave-morality, suitable for the mass of men, but not suitable for the great men in the production of whom the historical process is fulfilled.

"The essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the *significance* and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, *for its sake*, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is *not* allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence."

Beyond Good and evil ; P. 225.

He stands above the morality of the herd. Nietzsche makes it clear that he does not propose to restore the "blonde beast" or the "robber-man". His "Vornehme Mensch" has also a "Vornehmen Moral". He stands above the common

herd, strong and self-sufficient but at the same time self-disciplined, and imposing discipline on others.

“Every aristocratic morality is intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws; it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of Justice.”

Beyond Good and evil ; P. 235.

Among the excellences of character which belong to him are pride, venturesomeness, bravery, self-assurance, the will to responsibility, the will to self-mastery.

It may be said that we have here no new morality but a very old morality—a morality which would find a large measure of approval among the aristocratically minded of almost all ages. This is no doubt partly true, but there are two things which are worthy of note. Firstly, a considerable part of the new morality of Nietzsche represents undoubtedly a return to an older point of view; it is the old conception of the relation of the ruler to the ruled, though put in a more extreme form than it was usually put by the supporters of absolute monarchy or aristocracy. (It may be remarked in passing that in this respect it resembles a good deal which is described as new in morals.) But whatever amount of reversion there may be to older ways of thought and practice, I think Nietzsche goes beyond what has been laid down in any serious justification of caste or class in his assertion that the lower classes exist only as a scaffolding for the higher, and this is a conception which belongs to the essence of his teaching. Secondly, there is this other significant fact, that the gentler virtues which involve love and self-sacrifice—the virtues which have been generally supposed to be the finest flowers to be developed in the evolution of the moral life—that these virtues are despised and rejected in favour of qualities of aggressiveness and

self-assertiveness. It is one thing to follow the lower and more primitive when there is nothing else to follow; it is another thing to follow it in preference to the more highly developed. And in this Nietzsche's ethic may be regarded as new.

I have mentioned Nietzsche's ethic not as one which is specially influential at the present time, though I admit that it is difficult to gauge the extent of his influence. I have been interested in him as the man who in recent times first applied radical criticism to current morality. Since his time, and more particularly within the last fifteen years or so, there has been a great deal of radical criticism, some of it almost entirely destructive, some of it accompanied by constructive ideas. We cannot ignore the large place which this criticism occupies in the current thought and practice of the day and not least the fiction of the day. We are familiar with the saying that metaphysics is the giving of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct. We might say with as much truth that ethics is the giving of bad reasons for what we practise by instinct. There is at least enough truth in the saying to prevent us from ignoring ethical tendencies that are not rooted in profound systematic thinking.

The most striking feature of present-day life is probably the revolt from authority. This is not in itself a new thing, but what I think is significant at the present time is the widespread questioning of authority in almost all of its spheres—religious, political, and social, as well as moral. This is on the negative side. On the positive side there is the demand for freedom—freedom for self-expression, it is often put. The Hegelians made familiar to us a conception of freedom, for the presentation of which they made large use of New Testament terminology. There is a bondage which is the

condition of freedom, a death which is the condition of life. The modern spirit in its more extreme expressions will have none of this, but seeks free expression for the free spirit. Established institutions are irksome and the recognised virtues are stodgy. They carry no evidence either within themselves or without why they should have the right to compel our conformity to them, and we may with a good conscience ignore them if we feel that they hamper our free life. I have stated this briefly and dogmatically as a tendency in our modern life, but it would not be difficult to demonstrate it from much of the literature of the day.

It is with reference to this very widespread tendency and not any systematic formulation of new moral ideas that some of the most vigorous criticisms of the "new morality" have been made. Here is one that has met my eye as I have been preparing this paper, a quotation from a new book by Professor Jose Ortega Y Gasset:

"Do not believe a word you hear from the young when they talk about the "new morality". I absolutely deny that there exists to-day in any corner of the Continent a group inspired by a new ethos which shows signs of being a moral code. When people talk of the "new morality" they are merely committing a new immorality and looking for a way of introducing contraband goods. Hence it would be a piece of ingenuousness to accuse the man of to-day of his lack of moral code. The accusation would leave him cold, or, rather would flatter him. Immoralism has become a commonplace, and anybody and every body boasts of practising it".

If it be true, as this writer asserts, that there is no group inspired by a new ethos which shows signs of being a moral code, then the strictures which he passes on the "immoralism"

of the day are justified. We cannot call a revolt against established morality or a demand for free expression by the name of a new morality, for morality means more than this—it means *mores*. Accordingly, if this were all, there would be no occasion for this discussion. But there are proposals of a more systematic and constructive kind for what does merit the name of a new morality. The term has been specially associated with the name of Lord Russell (better known as Mr. Bertrand Russell), but he is only the most outstanding of a considerable group of thinkers. They are concerned more especially with sexual ethics, but by no means to the exclusion of other departments of human conduct. Lord Russell himself has said that “the received moral code, in so far as it is taught in education and embodied in public opinion or the criminal law, should be carefully examined in each generation, to see whether it still serves to achieve desirable ends, and, if not, in what respects it needs to be amended.”

I do not propose to enter into any detailed discussion of sexual ethics in the light of these ideas. But there are one or two things to which I think I may properly draw attention. In the first place it is difficult to deny the great ethical importance of the family as an institution. The fact that there are unhappy families and families that are ethically ineffective or worse need not be denied. But on the other hand we shall probably agree that the family has not only served as the most valuable of all spheres for the ethical training of the young, but that it has also been the sphere in which much that is finest in the moral life has found its expression. Proposals for making the family less permanent, or for impairing its unity either by lightening the obligations which the members owe to each other or by licensing promiscuous sexual relations,—proposals such as these must mean very considerable moral loss, unless it be shown that there are compensating advantages. The advantages which are alleged

are, I believe, greater freedom for the individual for self-expression and deliverance from the narrowness and selfishness which the family embodies. In regard to this experience may help us to form a judgment, but for the present my impression is that the experience which is available is not particularly convincing. Further there has to be taken into account the fact that the weakening of family bonds means that increasing responsibility must fall on other bodies for the care of the young, and it is rather surprising that some of the apostles of freedom should look to the state as the institution to which the burden should be transferred. I shall return to this presently when I come on to look briefly at another present-day tendency.

There is another aspect to the matter, and with regard to it I shall now say a few words. Some at least of those who stand for a reformed sexual morality are concerned less with the institutional side of morality than with its personal side. I think of a writer such as Mr. Joad, who thinks that with the discovery of means of birth-control the bottom has gone out of sexual morality, and who in regard to this department of conduct seems to teach that pleasure is the guide. This point of view seems to me to be extremely unsatisfactory. There is no sphere of human activity in which there is more need for the virtue which the Greeks called *sophrosune*—self-control or temperance. And I believe I am right in asserting that experience shows that on any view of the moral end—whether it be pleasure or self-realisation or reason—this virtue is necessary for its attainment. I shall not develop this point, but I believe it to be of great importance.

The term "The New Morality" has by some writers been appropriated to these revolutionary ideas regarding family relationships and sexual morality generally, and this whole

question has been discussed, with special reference to the views of Lord Russell in an interesting book by Mr. Newsom, Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge. But we are concerned here with these views not as setting forth *the* new morality, but as illustrating in one particular way the wider question which we have set ourselves of the possibility of *a* new morality. We have another important illustration on a larger scale and in more thorough-going style in the actual morality of the Soviet Republic.

Many questions force themselves upon us when we give our attention even in the most cursory way to the principles of Bolshevism. There is for example the whole materialistic view of history which serves as a background for all Bolshevik thinking. There is again the explicit doctrine of the nature of morality which appears against this background. Here, for example, are the words of Lenin :—

“In our opinion morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of the class war ; everything is moral which is necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order and for the uniting of the proletariat. Our morality thus consists solely in close discipline and in conscious war against the exploiters. We do not believe in eternal principles of morality, and we will expose this deception. Communist morality is identical with the fight for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

There is again the actual content of the moral life as so conceived, and in regard to this certain things stand out. What seems to me to be most important in this is not the emphasis which the Bolshevik lays upon a more satisfactory distribution of material goods among the people, for the question of distribution is exercising the minds of all socialists and of many who are not socialists. It is the complete

subordination of every interest and every institution to the state, or, rather, not to the state but to a particular conception of the interests of society. The Bolshevik idea has been not unnaturally compared with the idea of the state with which Plato played in the Republic. But there are certain obvious differences. However much in form the Platonic conception of the state may seem to coincide with the Bolshevik in respect of the determinative position which is given to it, the radical difference between the two comes to light, if we contrast the ends which they respectively aim at. Plato is concerned not with interests of the proletariat, but with the good of society as a whole. And with this end in view he puts an iron discipline not upon the community as a whole, but upon Guardians and Auxiliaries. We see something new, if not in theory, at least in practice, in the Bolshevik attempt to regulate all life by an idea such as Bolsheviks have so definitely adopted.

This seems to me to be quite an extraordinary attempt. There may be circumstances in which it may be permissible or even necessary for the state to concern itself with matters that affect the personal life of its members. But here is an attempt to re-organise from the beginning the whole life of a people on the basis of an idea. The Bolsheviks have abolished or discouraged many of the most important of the old institutions in which the moral life of the people expressed itself, and they have created institutions of their own. The institution of the family and that of private property have in particular been objects of attack. Neither has in the strict sense of the word been abolished, for complete abolition seems to be beyond the power of any state. But legislation regarding marriage, divorce, the training of children, extra-marital unions, and other matters relating to sex has had the effect of impairing the institution of the family as a social unit. The confiscation

and nationalisation of property of almost every kind represents a valiant effort to transfer from individuals to the state the control of all wealth.

I shall restrict myself to these two aspects of Soviet activity, ignoring certain activities of even more fundamental importance, such as their attempt to control all thought in the sciences, in philosophy, and in religion, for a discussion of this would carry us into spheres beyond our purely ethical enquiry.

In regard to the family I have already said certain things. What remains to be said relates to the place of the family as an institution in organised society. It is not necessary to argue against any conception of society which would make the state the sole permanent social institution. Even the most extreme Bolsheviks have not so conceived the state, but they do seem to have come perilously near to it. As one recent writer puts it:-

"A fundamentally ethical conception, the idea of the brotherly union of all men, was transformed into the curious notion that all individual persons without exception must be merged in a mechanized economic body."

Fulop-Muller,—*The Mind and Face Of Bol.* p. 15.

There has been a definite levelling down of men in subservience to the purposes of the state which has been in conflict not with the relative independence of family life but with the free development of personality in the individual. The truth is that the family is the sphere in which some of man's primary instincts find their most adequate and harmonious expression. The state does not itself serve as an alternative sphere, nor can it artificially create one. It may attempt to do so, but I believe the attempt is bound to fail. For, to take it at its simplest, it is only by an act of violence that the

spheres of the operation of the mating and the parental instincts can be separated, so far at least as whole communities of human beings are concerned. This is to take the case at its simplest. In the developed human family we are carried far beyond the mere primary instincts into a region in which many of men's highest purposes find their fulfilment and their finest emotions are evoked.

Again, the state is unfitted for another reason to take the place of the family. The very unwieldiness of the state disqualifies it for meeting the social needs of men. Apart altogether from the question of mating and parenthood, there must be social units of limited size, in which the members are bound together by ties of affections and a purpose of mutual helpfulness. Associations like clubs and societies only go a little way towards meeting this need. There may be occasional people who find complete social satisfaction without family life, but these people must be rare and unusual.

Let me, lastly, say a few words regarding the Soviet attitude to property. The case here is a little confused by the fact that there is to-day very general recognition of the desirability of putting limits and restrictions on the possession of property. This recognition is largely the outcome of the modern phenomenon of the accumulation of immense wealth, with the power which this involves over the destinies of masses of their fellow men, in the hands of individuals. The Bolsheviks aimed at a practically complete nationalisation of property, but they speedily found themselves faced with difficulties, particularly in regard to land and agricultural produce. They have effectually demolished capitalism; the question is whether they have in so doing demolished something more, which is essential to the moral life. In an interesting article on "The Ethics of Communism" in the *Journal of*

Philosophical Studies for April 1928, Professor Laird discusses the ethical significance of property. He remarks :—

“The old individualist argument that private property is the necessary incentive to industry seems to me a huge *petitio principii*. Among the wealthy by birth private property is notoriously an incentive to idleness.”

No one will deny this. But there is a kind of private property which has nothing to do with bloated wealth—with the exploitation of others or the disintegration of the character of the possessor. There is that kind and that degree of property which is the natural extension of a man's personality—the instruments by means of which he may express himself. A man's body and mind are his own, and cannot in any real sense of the term be communalised. Neither can his clothes or his home—at any rate with profit to himself and to the community. The skilled craftsman cannot do his best work with community tools nor the artist with community implements. One might extend the list. but the principle is clear.

In regard to both the family and property anyone can see how they may, and in certain circumstances do, stand in the way of “the brotherly union of all men.” Any association of men may do so, and any right which men may claim may do so. But attempts at the abolition of either the family or property in the interests of better human relationships seem to me to be certain to defeat their own end. The affections, of the family may be “the germ of all public affections”, and they are so in the normal family. Property in all respectable communities is used on the whole so as to benefit and not to injure the other members of the community. We can no doubt find many instances to the contrary, but I cannot believe that the remedy for this is the abolition of

property and the family and the bringing of all men into direct dependence on the state.

I have dealt briefly and inadequately with these ways in which we see the attempt being made to break not with traditional morality in the strict sense—for we are continually breaking with parts of it—but with what seems to be in the true line of evolution in morality. If morality be a living, spiritual thing, and not merely a set of customs which have won respect by their age, then it must be capable of adjusting itself to new conditions. But I do not believe that any development will lead to the supersession of the virtues which have been recognised since the days of the early Greeks. There will doubtless be changes in emphasis, and there will be, as there has been, a deeper understanding of all that is involved in them. But it is hard to think of any circumstances that will render them obsolete. As for institutions, there are great possibilities of change. But I have given some reasons for believing that the institution of the family has a necessary place in human society.

SYMPOSIUM

On the Possibility of a New Ethic—II.

BY

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The general position of Principal Mackenzie seems to me to be one of unquestioning acceptance of the traditional and orthodox ideas and ideals in moral life. He indeed makes a timid admission that it is possible for considerable changes to be made in regard to both moral institutions and virtues; he is, however, not prepared to entertain the view that such changes will have anything to do with the substantial alteration and revaluation of those accepted ideas of old, and that we are in sight of anything like a moral reconstruction or evolution, far less of a moral revolution.

In formulating this position of his that a radically New Ethic is as yet dubious and even impossible, he has taken no little pains to establish the immutability of the *abstract moral ideals* and *principles*, inspite of the influx of concrete moral experiences of the present-day human life of growing complexity which have tended largely to undermine those accepted moral abstractions and to replace them by those that take human life and its activities and relations in a more comprehensive and concrete setting. He has referred to the teachings of Kant and Mill who in their respective ways have generally opined that the current moral conceptions are on the whole valid. He has particularly leaned upon Green as his mainstay for the support of his orthodoxy in morals. For Green is a great admirer of the old Greek ideals and thinks that we have inherited from the Greek thinkers both the principles of morality as well as their general articulation and that the

moral and social progress of the present day cannot mean anything more than the mere explication or unfoldment of what was lying implicit or enfolded in the Greek ideals, which are therefore eternal and immutable. Green has even gone the length of maintaining that Socrates and his followers who have given us the theory of duties and virtues, were not the inventors of it, but were only the elaborators of the principles of conduct which are but the self-explications of the will to be good.

But curiously enough, Bishop Butler, whom the Principal has laid under contribution, for the support of his view, though belonging apparently to the old school, is not without his suggestions for the concrete character of moral life. There are according to him two distinct currents of thought, one in a line with the old abstract Ethics which simply concerns itself with the explication of certain *a priori* moral ideals out of touch with the particularities of the concrete moral situations in human life, the other which takes cognisance of the particular nature of man in its actual relations and interrelations in their concrete setting; and Butler seems to be inclined to think, and rightly, that the ideal can have any significance only in so far it is determined by the actual. "There are two ways," says Butler, ¹ "in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things; in the latter, that it is a violation and breaking in upon our own nature." And Butler continues, "The first seems the most direct formal proof, and in some respects the least

1. Preface to *Sermons* 7.

liable to cavil or dispute, the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted to satisfy a fair mind; and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life” And it is interesting to note that in Butler we have the first formulation of that kind of Ethics which can really justify and encourage proper attitude to human life and conduct and can explain *real* progress in ethical thought and practice.

Principal Mackenzie has referred, by way of criticism, to the attempts of the opposite school who have expressed disapproval of the old ideals, only with a view to strengthening negatively his own fundamental position that except certain incidental changes in the details of our moral life, it is not possible to think of a decidedly new era of morals that may be said to have dawned in recent years. He has begun his inquisition from Nietzsche, the most violent of reactionaries against traditional morality who has with his ideals of Power and Beauty gone beyond good and evil, beyond right and wrong, and has spurned the so-called ‘Slave morality’ of the masses, by bolstering up the Superman, of whom a Beethoven or a Bismark or a Wagner is a type. Referring to the romantic and Ibsenian tendencies in modern literature, which show signs of revolt against the old conventions of sex and family life, the Principal has disposed of them as the outcome of a vaguely conceived idea of increased personal freedom, and has subscribed to the view of some of the orthodox critics of modern literature who have pronounced this new spirit a “new immorality”. He has passed over Bertrand Russell as more critical than constructive in his pronouncements on the reconstructions of political, moral and social life of man, which, however, have opened up really new vistas of modern life since the great world-war. He has laid under scrutiny the Communist State with its institutions of Property, Family and the Church, but the net result of his inquiry here as elsewhere, has amounted to a mere passing consideration of

Communism, without eliciting from him any candid acknowledgement of those elements in it that might really contribute to the reconstruction of a programme of life needed for the changed outlook of the present day.

After this preliminary remarks on the general standpoint of Principal Mackenzie, I would like to point out that my thesis is one of *Moral Evolution or Moral Reconstruction* which he apparently denies. We may not indeed be on the eve of a moral revolution in the sense in which Nietzsche took it, but it would not be going too far to acknowledge that there have already been at work efforts at reconstructing and re-interpreting moral ideals and principles in the light of new and varied moral experiences especially after the great war. Now these new and varied experiences have been of different ranges and dimensions, not only personal or individual and social, but also national and international and even cosmopolitan. Then again not only the inroads of these new and varied experiences themselves, but also the immense development in the Psychological Method, which again has drawn largely upon the method of physical science, have jointly contributed to the re-orientation of life and experience as I would understand it. When I thus uphold moral reconstruction I equate life with experience and take these terms in their widest connotation. By life I mean not simply the life of the individual but that of the whole human kind as one organic whole, not simply the ideals and aspirations, experiences and practices of the individual, but rather those of the whole human race in their relations and interrelations. By experience again I would mean not simply that cross-section of the mental life to which the traditional moralist is accustomed to reduce it, with a view to establishing the transcendental character of the moral ideals as though completely unaffected by moral experiences, just as in the sphere of knowledge too the

rationalist is apt to give unnatural primacy and ultimacy to purely logical thought as if transcending all experience. What I would mean by experience is the whole range of experiences as they are humanly lived, so that the ideals, moral as well as intellectual and aesthetic, are not pure abstractions but are concrete universals growing out of and determined by real and throbbing experiences. It would follow then that moral ideals and principles are subject to change and evolution, reinterpretation and reconstruction in the light of new and changing circumstances of the concrete moral and social life.

A historico-psychological analysis of the concepts of virtue and duty in relation to the norms would further justify the position I have been convinced to accept. The concepts of virtue arise out of the facts of moral life in reference to motives, and the concepts of duty in reference to ends. It is thus evident that these two classes of concepts are dependent on the varieties of moral practices furnished by concrete life for the formation of ideas about motives and ends of conduct. And it is worth while to remember that the concepts of virtue are not wholly without relation to an end, nor are those of duty unrelated to the motives of conduct.¹ And when we come to consider the nature and origin of norms we are told by the older school of moralist that the ethical norms are those fundamental principles which are 'eternal verities' and from which the concepts of duty are deduced and which are therefore prior to all such concepts, just in the same way as the logical laws of thought are the eternal truths and had been in use thousands of years before Aristotle propounded them. But the purely formal character of such norms involving conflicts with the actual moral situations can be exposed as easily as the Experimental Logic of to-day is cutting the ground from beneath the Formal

1. Wundt's *Principle of Morality*, Ch. IV.

Logic of Aristotle which so ill applies to reality and life. Even the imperative character of the ethical norms is derived not so much from their being formal *a priori* and abstract ideals which transcend all real concrete life, as from the fact that they are the concrete products of the combined experiences of many ages and cultures arrived at as so many tested hypotheses, so far as they are based on the present state of our experience of moral life, but not excluding the possibility of better and newer ones. The facts and values are thus no water-tight compartments, but are such that the former can be interpreted into the latter, that facts are implicit values and that values are facts re-interpreted in the light of experiences of mankind in their varied circumstances. As a very brilliant writer has observed: "If we would understand the nature of Beauty, Goodness and Truth, we must turn our attention to what has been offered and accepted, as beautiful, good and true. The acceptance may have been after a long struggle and much heroic battling, particularly in the field of conduct. But what in the last analysis is the process involved but experiment,—an experiment carried out in the laboratory of the universe, with its crucible of endless space and time; its material, whole peoples and civilizations."

My proposition therefore is to take the moral life of man as a concrete reality—not as a pure, immutable and undifferentiated unity of moral ideals and principles wholly undetermined by the multiplicity of the concrete moral experiences as the ancient Greek ideals and the great momentum of their tradition have even to this day sophisticated most minds; nor again as a scattered and disintegrating plurality of mere chaotic moral experiences without any ideals and principles, without norms, values and standards whereby to organise and reinterpret these experiences and to reevaluate its old values; but rather I take it as a concrete reality, evolving its ideals and values, its standards and principles out of its own experiences,

revising and reformulating them as the needs of time and circumstances of progressive culture and civilization would demand such reconstruction and reformulation. This attitude to moral life has thus taught us to look upon Ethics as a heuristic science, appreciating and absorbing with candour and open-mindedness those fresh and obtruding data which the complex moral life of recent years has been thrusting upon contemporary minds. One of its most important achievements in this direction is its emphasis on the Group-mind as distinct from the individual. The old traditional systems of Ethics were based on individualistic psychology, but the psychological outlook has in recent years been greatly widened in view of the increasing social and political interests, and the post-war German ethical thought is the natural expression of that necessary change in the social and political life of man. We have now to think of Ethics and Politics not as mere contrasts, but rather have to ethicise Politics, that is, to evolve such a positive relation between Ethics and Politics as would enable us to place Politics on the bed-rock of Ethics¹. We have now to think, and rightly, that not only an individual, but in a sense more truly, a nation is a mental and moral organism. The goal of civilization will thus be approximated by the degree of success in the realisation of a higher level of international morality². And it is needless to add that international morality can be established only on the broad basis of a sound democracy. Modern writers like Mc.Dougall and others have been in recent times emphasising the need of such an international Ethics which is indeed a new development in the present day life of man. And in his endeavour to affiliate Politics with Ethics Mc.Dougall has so great an authority as that of

1. Cf. *Philosophy To-Day : The Development of Ethical Problems.*

2. McDougall's : *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*
Preface p XI.

Plato whose Republic is the living recognition of the need of such affiliation, and even quite in recent times Edmund Burke explicitly declared that the "principles of true politics are but those of morals enlarged." Indeed Mc.Dougall has gone a great way towards the recognition of a wider moral life in so far he has striven to impress upon us the need of a concrete and dynamic view of moral life in the place of old statical one which was either abstractly universal or individual, and has shown in his own way how international Ethics is the need of the hour. But we would like to point out at this stage that his view is not sufficiently liberal and has the tinge of narrowness in that he is always anxious to protect his internationalism with national Christian Ethics which, he thinks, would prevent, the otherwise inevitable degeneration of the race by miscegenation. His spirit of ethical reconstruction has yielded to biological and eugenic demands and is pervaded by what we commonly call superiority complex. We shall indicate in the sequel the line of development which, I think, would meet the real demands of the wider moral life which has recently grown.

Then if I am asked as to the method of the concrete Ethics, or the Ethics of Reconstruction I have advocated, I would unhesitatingly reply that it is the *Experimental Method*. For reconstruction can have meaning only in reference to experiment and trial. Just as the method of philosophy in recent years has outgrown the purely *a priori* elaboration of certain intellectual concepts, but has liberalised itself enough to embrace all that concerns man and his life in the world, instead of clinging like a timid spinster to the old-fashioned problems and ideas and of leaving the 'direct pre-occupation with contemporary difficulties to literature and politics', even so Ethics which aspires to explain the conduct and character of human life, personal and communal, should no longer

indulge in the barren metaphysical abstractions, but rather begin from the very beginning by seeking out and sifting the particulars of moral and social experience, and then rise into norms and values as so many *hypotheses* to be retained or rejected and replaced by fresh norms and values arising out of and explaining the new complexities of life. We must meet each problem with a specific hypothesis and no universal theory; theories are tentacles, while fruitful progressive life must be lived through trial and error. I do not know how to make myself more clear on this than by using the words of Prof Dewey: "The Experimental attitude..... substitutes detailed analysis for wholesale assertions, specific enquiries for temperamental convictions, small facts for opinions whose size is in precise ratio to their vagueness. It is within the social sciences, in morals, in politics and education, that thinking still goes on by large antitheses, by theoretical oppositions of order and freedom, individualism and socialism, culture and utility, spontaneity and discipline, actuality and tradition. But with the advance of the experimental method the question has ceased to be which one of the two rival claimants has a right to the field. It has become a question of clearing up a confused subject—matter by attacking bit by bit."¹

Now having outlined my standpoint and my method of concrete Ethics which I advocate, I would now enter upon an estimate of Principal Mackenzie's observations on certain so-called departure, from the old stereotyped moral conventions specially those connected with sex and family life. But at the very outset we would do well to realise that the set of conventions which, for a particular age in the history of human society, usurps its moral universe should not claim more than what they deserve as conventions. And it is also worth while to remember that not only in the sphere of

1. *New Republic*. Feb. 3. 1917.

morals, but also in those of noetics and aesthetics, conventions play a great part. In fact life is, in its major part a matter of conventions. But conventions command adherence to them, not because they replace ideals but because they satisfy the demands of the society under certain conditions which are also subject to alteration. Since moral evolution is a fact conventions also are subject to change and evolution. But at the same time caution and circumspection in the highest degree are necessary for the proper interpretation of new phenomena and appraisement of their significance and value in the changed circumstances of our life. Rashness in this is as bad in its effect as conservatism. From the wider standpoint of Life and Experience and of moral evolution and reconstruction which follow as necessary corollaries from such a standpoint, the new perspectives in social life and sex relationships which the last great war and the post-war conditions have opened up, should be regarded as necessary claimants and should be given the chance of tentative hypotheses which await acceptance or rejection after sufficient sifting of materials. The individualistic tendency which had been seething so long in the sphere of politics and religion, has but its natural outlet in sex relations and family life. And the recent famous "Women Movement" is the natural and necessary development of the changes that are breaking forth on all the walks of present day life, and advances the opinion that it is our women folk that can really purify and elevate human civilization by the use of their power and influence. Every new movement has of course its aberrations for which due allowance must be made. We must not be surprised when we find Lady Trance Balfour observing at the National Council of Women at York (Oct 16 th 1928). "None of us can move anywhere without finding that men are trembling before coming events." A.M. Ludovici voices forth the same idea in her *Woman : A vindication; Man : An Indict-*

ment. Storm Jameson, Mrs. Bertrand Russell, Oskar Schmitz and a host of them subscribe to this view. These movements are not to be overlooked as mere surface streams having nothing to do with the deeper undercurrent of social life, but deserve to be viewed in their proper perspective in order that they might yield the necessary elements in the evolution of human morals. But on the other hand commit yourself to the old conservative ideals and you shut out all such new phases and new developments as the flimsy freaks of a few frenzied fops.

When he comes to consider the spirit of revolt against old morality as manifest in the present-day fiction, the learned Principal seems to forget the value of the contribution of Literature to the moral progress of man. Literature is the spontaneous self-revelation of man in the simple unconventional and communicable form, and its revelations are often so comely and intimate, that it is not really surprising that they should have dissipated many of our cherished and comforting illusions. Human nature is far more complex than what the sermons and formulas of the moralist can comprehend. The moralist's account of conscience pales before the passionate analyses of a Dostoevski, his remarks on natural affection need to be qualified in face of *The Way of all Flesh* or *Father and Son*. Literature is certainly more than mere description and analysis. "It is not only that the literary method of a Marcel Proust is as worthy of the name 'Psychometry', as the painfully compiled statistics of Galton;" but "the very experiment forbidden to the eugenicist is the natural sphere of literature. The work of Moliere is strictly comparable to the laboratory activities of the experimental chemist." Bernard Shaw and D. H. Lawrence deserve the special credit of having shown the perfect naivete of the instinct of love. While Shaw in his *'Apple Cart'* describes the 'strangely innocent relations' between Magnus and Orinthia, Lawrence

wants love to be strongly animal, though not bestial and seeks to bring back the primal energy of Eden. Huxley strips off hypocrisy and cant of false moralists. We have indeed on the one side the liberalism of Bertrand Russell, and on the other, the extreme conservatism of Dean Inge. But the *via media* is struck by Walter Lippmann in his "*Preface to Morals*" where he quotes from the Analects of Confucius : "I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right." So that self-discipline is not at a discount. These hard and realistic revelations which the contemporary literature makes to the inquiring mind are too significant for the Ethics of Reconstruction to be given the go-by, but rather demand as much of its attention as any other phases of social and political life of the present day, for their proper adjustment in the economy of human existence.

The problem of divorce has been one of the burning problems of the family life of the West and any attempt at moral reconstruction must have its say on the problem however difficult of solution it may be. The dissolution of marriage becomes the legalised instrument for separation between the husband and the wife, where marriage has no solemnity and sacredness of the *dharma* which *holds* together man and wife into the unity and integrity of the family life, but where it has for its sole aim the promotion of pleasure and self-interest of the individual. Divorce which has been advocated by a majority of western thinkers and on easy ordinary conditions, has been restricted in its application by some and has been denounced altogether only by a few. Now divorce to my mind appears condemnable under any circumstances, either when the parties concerned are of opposite habits and temperaments or are guilty of sexual delinquencies. The banes of the system of divorce, amongst others, are that it disintegrates the family which is the unit of society, that it gives unbounded licence to the sexual life

of man and lastly it produces the most deplorable effect on the children of the marriage. The root of the trouble is to be traced to the fundamental misconception of the purpose or ideal of marriage and the remedy lies in the proper interpretation of that ideal. When it is recognised that the institution of marriage is for the purpose of helping the spiritual growth of two individual souls, it ceases to be the union of flesh with flesh, the delays and obstacles fail to make the partners impatient, mistrust and misunderstanding cease to vitiate their minds. Children are a great aid to the development of the higher life—they are the embodiments of the purest conjugal love which receives its perennial flow from them. On the other hand for the healthy development of the inner potentialities of the children's minds the much talked of state-nurseries in the western countries are but poor substitutes for parental home where alone the children can freely breathe the genial atmosphere of benign love and superintending care. It appears to me that the problem of divorce which is the most threatening of all that the western family life has to face can be successfully tackled only by the changed outlook I have outlined above and Hindu conception of married life may contribute largely to that solution.

I have already indicated that the general tendency of recent ethical theory is to break down the rigid barriers between the ethical good and other goods co-ordinated with it, and to subordinate all goods under the moral good which includes the whole of life. I have also indicated that this moralistic interpretation of politics necessarily involves a democratic broadening of its basis which alone can render real help to the growth of virtues and institutions of the ethico-social life of man. The old absolutist theory of the state has been forced, by the changed outlook of life, to abdicate in favour of the individualist and democratic theories, as it has proved fundamentally opposed to the individual freedom. Every

individual, every member of a society has a right to the attainment of the fullest stature he is capable of, in his business, art, religion and government, in his social and moral institutions. "Democracy," says Dewey, "has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning it is found in resolving that the supreme test of political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth of every member of the society." With all its shortcomings democracy is in keeping with the experimental attitude which we have accepted as the proper attitude for reconstruction in science and philosophy; for instead of proceeding by any preformed standard whereby to guide and measure the growth, possibilities and self-realisation of the individuals, it makes growth itself the end; because it is impossible to know beforehand the exact ideal into which the human life is to grow. Democracy is nothing less than the persistent will to liberate experimentally the actual activities of each and every individual. Democratic ideal implies a reorganization of Education as an institution; for it throws open, before every individual, self-governance in an empirical sense in which every individual is given the opportunity in every act to be guided by a knowledge of the consequences or significance of his own act. Instead of merely preparing the individual for a future adult life as a means to some other end, it enables the child to acquire the habits of intelligence by following out the bearings of his present interests and activities and to make him conscious of himself as an end in himself. This reorganised education will have a very important bearing on the relation of virtue to knowledge. It is more than true that no theoretical description of facts, but an active creation of and participation in them only can produce a norm worth living up to, just as a mere description of the housing conditions cannot improve them but only a direct acquaintance with those conditions by actually living under them, with powers of judgment and discrimination

kept wide awake. Democracy has succeeded in most countries not because it is a theory of Socio-political life settled once for all, but because it is an ideal yet to be realised, a hypothesis yet to be verified and modified with the modifications in the life of the community. The democratic aim of equalisation can never be fully realised, men will never be born with equal physical and mental powers. The claim of democracy to our acceptance as a working hypothesis consists not so much in this levelling down process, as in throwing open to community an equal opportunity to its members. The aristocracy of intellect and power is an inevitable fact, but for the moral and political uplift of mankind as a whole, what is most urgently needed is the *democracy of aristocrats*--a liberalisation of the aims and ideals, the ambitions and aspirations, of those that are gifted with superior physique, richer intellect and immenser wealth and better opportunities to utilise them.

But this liberalising tendency, if it has to attain its widest expansion, cannot be satisfied with anything short of common-wealth of nations. Democracy practised in every nationality would only pave the way to that highest achievement of human existence. Such world-federation might sound like a Utopia, but the experimentalist either in science, or in politics or in Ethics is after all a visionary and need not fight shy of the uncertainties and of the adventures which he has to encounter. In that federation of the human kind the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, the nationalism of the nineteenth, and even the internationalism of the present day will have their respective ideals transmuted into something which would include and transcend them all. Under the auspices of such a political ideal every branch of the human family would find freedom, enjoy security and attain self-realisation in the wider life of humanity. And the ethical basis of that ideal lies deeper in man's cultivation of love and

respect for man. Internationalism is a sham so long as there is the national pride and prejudice allowed to preponderate; no amount of external adjustment can effect an internal harmony. Untouchability, political and social, would be banished from the face of the globe, colour-bar would reach the vanishing point and disarmament question and Kellog Pact would be back numbers, the moment man will have ceased to suspect man, but begun to love him as his brother and respect him as his divinity, and '*homo homini deus*' and not '*homo homini lupus*' would be the guiding principle of his life.

SYMPOSIUM

The New Morality—III.

By

Prof. G. C. CHATTERJI

(Government College, Lahore.)

[Abstract of paper read by Prof. G. C. Chatterji, Government College, Lahore, at the Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore, 1932 Session.]

Professor Chatterji defined Ethics as a Normative Science, concerned with two main problems, which he called, the problem of the *Intrinsic* Good, and the Problem of the *Instrumental* Good. Our knowledge of Intrinsic Goods was intuitive, while our knowledge of Instrumental Goods was inferential. He held that in both these departments of Ethics our knowledge was progressive, and if this were so, then no Morality could claim to be Absolute. Our knowledge of the Intrinsic good was intuitive, but we could not defend the view that Intuitive knowledge was never erroneous. Nor could we hold that intuitive knowledge of the Intrinsic Good was already complete and could not be amplified in the future.

With regard to the Instrumental Good our knowledge was based on inference, and had to take account of the specific physical and social conditions in which the agent had to act. This introduced factors of infinite complexity, and our judgment that a particular action was our duty, defining duty as that our action which in a given set of conditions is the most conducive to the greatest amount of good, could never claim absolute finality. Thus though the Good was Absolute, and Duty was Absolute, Ethics was relative, as by Ethics was meant *our knowledge* of the Intrinsic Good and of Instrumental Good.

In support of this view Professor Chatterji proceeded to examine the claims of Christian Ethics to finality. He attempted to prove that both the Christian conception of values, as well as the Christian scheme of duties required to be modified if they are to supply the ethical creed of the Modern Age.

Mr. Chatterji proceeded to point out that human nature was dynamic and it underwent a continuous process of change, through the development of sentiments. It was the sentiments, and conduct springing from them, which was the object of moral approbation or disapprobation. Since sentiments were acquired, they could not adopt a uniform pattern in all individuals and in all groups. It was a natural corollary from this that morality itself could not be static or universal. The question therefore which deserved examination was not whether a New Morality was possible, but, what were the *directions* in which our conceptions of the *good*, and of *Right* and *Wrong* were undergoing change.

Mr. Chatterji deprecated the view that the New Morality meant merely a certain laxity of restraint in matters connected with Sex, or a readjustment of the economic basis of society. He contended that these were mere symptoms of a more fundamental change in the modern man's scheme of values, which involved a new appreciation of the worth of the Individual and of human personality. The trend of the New Morality was towards the free development of Personality, so long as this did not conflict with the claims of social justice. When thus viewed, the New Morality was in no sense inferior to the old, though it must be admitted that at present it was more inclined to adopt the form of revolt against established standards, rather than in a search for the positive aims the pursuit of which alone could endow the individual with Moral worth.

SYMPOSIUM.

The Possibility of a New Morality.—IV.

By

HANUMANTO RAO.

In joining issues with the three principal speakers, I can take as my basis only such portions of their papers as were read at the Congress and only such impressions as were left upon me by their reading, as I have had no opportunity of reading them.

I shall begin with the last of the speakers, Mr. Chatterji. I am fully in sympathy with his contention that the Christian scheme of morality needs to be considerably modified and extended in order to suit the demands of the modern ethical consciousness. But I do not agree with him when he contends against Mr. Bhattacharya that the attempt on the part of the new moralists to change morality from a basis of tradition or of speculation to one of experimentation and "observation of the results of conduct," cuts at the normative basis of ethics. There is nothing in the experimental method as such which makes it inapplicable to normative studies. Merely because the experimental attitude has been mostly employed in the sphere of physics and chemistry, there is no reason why it should not be adopted in the sphere of life and conduct. The employment of the experimental attitude in the field of ethics does not mean either the converting of society into a laboratory, or the employment in ethics of the same technique as is employed in physics, it only means constructing moral ideas and ideals in close relation to their practical working. The experimental method when so employed far from coming in the way of normative ethics, serves as a necessary complement to the *apriori* methods usually employed in its study. It helps to render moral ideals into experiential

terms; it helps to make ethics concrete and practical. How fruitful the employment of such a method in the field of philosophy, logic and ethics can be is to some extent exemplified in some of the recent works of John Dewey. But there is a tendency as it is evident in Mr. Bhattacharya's paper to lay an exclusive emphasis on the experimental method. Such a tendency is detrimental to the elaboration and refinement of ethical conceptions and there is need for one to guard oneself against it.

Coming to the view-point and opinions adopted by Prof. Mackenzie towards the newer ventures at moral theory and practice, I find myself at variance with him not only in respect of his general attitude but also in respect of the particular opinions regarding the new moralists even though I do not accept their solutions of current problems without considerable modifications and reservations. I. His general attitude is that there should be nothing new in ethics except by way of the readjustment of established ethical rules to new situations and that the attempts at constructing new theories or newer schemes of evaluation are neither possible nor desirable. II. His particular conclusions are: (a) that Nietzsche's ethic is a defence of selfishness, immorality, barbarism, (b) that the advocates of the new morality in sexual matters aim at promiscuity in sexual relations and the destruction of family life; and (c) that the Bolshevik theory and practice cut at the root of family life and property rights of individuals.

I The General Attitude of Prof. Mackenzie:

It must be admitted that there is nothing like the absolutely new either in morality or in other forms of life. I don't think that any sensible person would be so rash as to think that he is setting out to give the world something that is totally unlike or unrelated to everything in the past. Some of us, as youths, set out to do things very romantic, fresh and

fullsome, things far different from anything that our parents did. But before we have lived the life of husbands, parents and teachers for a short time, we shall have realised that what we have achieved is not anything so new or startling as we expected to achieve. But can we say therefore with Prof. Mackenzie that the moral life that we have constructed is nothing but a new adjustment of old ideals. Are the changed relationships that we have established between man and man, man and woman, nothing but merely changes in the mechanism of life? Have not the changed relationships meant also changes in our attitudes and ideals? Have not our attitudes and ideals widened or deepened? Is it true to say as Prof. Mackenzie says that the new morality that we are thinking of is a mere adjustment of established principles to the changing environment? Do not changes in the objects of contemplation imply at the same time changes in the subjects that contemplate? It is only possible for a theologian to say that the principles of morality are set down once for all by this or that revealed text and that our main concern as moralists lies merely in applying them to new situations in life. But such a view is impossible for a moralist who takes a historical, humanist and above all rational view of morality. The history of morals has shown to us that morality through the ages, has changed not only in content but also in form, not only in practice but also in theory. Sometimes, theory has changed in the light of practice, at other times, practice has changed in the light of theory. But in whichever order the one may have influenced the other, the two have been inseparably related to each other; each has been in and through the other. We can not have any change in the body of ethical practice, unless there is a change in the spirit of moral inquiry. Christianity, Democracy and Nationalism were the forces that inspired moral inquiry in the past. To-day Industrialism, Internationalism, Feminism and Pacifism

have taken their place. They call for a more liberal and rational outlook than the one called for by Christianity and Nationalism.

II. (a) Coming down to the particular opinions which he holds regarding the newer ventures at moral theory and practice, the conclusion that Nietzsche's ethics is a defence of selfishness, immorality and barbarism strikes us as profoundly untrue. I wonder how he arrived at so false a conclusion. There are some penny-a-liners who has set current such a view about Nietzsche's ethics. But I am sure that Prof. Mackenzie has not taken his view from such sources. From whatever source he may have derived his ideas about Nietzsche, it will be plain from what follows that it is a gross caricature of Nietzsche's ethics. In order to clear up the colossal ignorance and misunderstanding about Nietzsche's ethics one needs to attempt an elaborate exposition of it, but the scope of this paper does not admit of any such elaborate exposition. For such an exposition, one should go to Salter's Book—*Nietzsche The Thinker*, which is admitted on all hands as the best book on Nietzsche's philosophy. I shall here confine myself to such portions of it as have a close bearing on the points raised by Dr. Mackenzie.

1. *Nietzsche's Ethics not a defence of selfishness in any gross sense but a defence of selfishness of a profoundly altruistic character.*

For Nietzsche, the roots of altruism lie deep in man; more than any other animal man is originally altruistic.¹ Two factors co-operate to produce this original attribute of man. On the one hand, social existence requires it and on the other, individuals themselves find compensation for a sense of their unimportance in serving others—mothers their children, slaves their master, the soldier his commander, even the

1. *Will to power*. See p. 771.

prince his people.² Pleasure in the group to which one belongs is really older than pleasure in oneself, and the sly, loveless ego that seeks its own advantage is not the origin of the group but its destruction.³ But altruism taken as a universal maxim leads to an *impasse*. Only when a limit is set to it, it becomes really possible⁴. Altruism becomes possible only when it implies some egoism, not as its contrary, but as its complement and condition. If there should be service, there must be those who are willing to be served. The selfishness of the group is the necessary condition for the expression of altruism in individuals. Selfishness becomes indispensable for altruism for another reason. The man who would serve others must strengthen himself first. Nietzsche says: "Love your neighbour as yourself, but first be such as to love yourself⁵." If you make altruism absolute, it leads to the degeneration of the human self. If all should find the significance of their lives in serving others, it would show that none found value in themselves, had no real self (none worth while) and humanity would be on the downward grade⁶. A weakened, thin, obliterated, self-denying person is useful for no good thing. Selfishness of this type has no value for 'either heaven or earth⁷'. Lest his doctrine of selfishness should be misunderstood, Nietzsche distinguishes between two kinds of selfishness—a sacred one that forces us to serve what is highest in us and another, the egoism of the cat that wants only its life⁸. Some only want to receive and gather others in the weak, the needy, the sickly in body and mind, when such people say "all for myself" they are

2. *Ibid.* See p. p. 785, 964.

3. *Zarathustara*. II. xv.

4. *Joyful Science*. See p. 21.

5. *Zarathustra*. III. v.3.

6. *Twilight of the Idols*. ix, p. 35.

7. *Dawn of Day*. See p. 345.

8. *Zarathustra* I. xxii, See p. 2.

a horror to Nietzsche. But there are others who get and accumulate only to give out again in love, their selfishness, even if it is insatiable in gathering to itself, is sound and holy⁹. It is the latter kind of selfishness which is creative not possessive that Nietzsche advocates.

2. *The immorality of Nietzsche—the morality of superior man—the morality of a higher altitude of life.*

The morality of Nietzsche is a morality of rank life—the Hindu morality of varna and asrama. But it is different from the morality of rank as maintained by the mediaeval Hindu moralists in so far it does not maintain unbreakable lines of social cleavage. According to Nietzsche, there are three classes of men¹⁰. In the first class are men who are the most spiritual, the strongest and the supreme ruling class. They do not rule as princes do by physical force; they rule by the weight of their ideas, by the relative perfection of their personality. The second class of men are their instruments for governing. They are the warders of justice, the guardians of order and security, the higher ranks of soldiers, above all the king as the highest formula of soldier, judge, maintainer of the law. The third class engage in manual labour, in business, in agriculture, in science (as distinguished from philosophy), in the ordinary forms of art, in short any kind of more or less mechanical work. Nietzsche does not really look down upon the lower classes as some of his extravagant and unguarded expressions indicate; they have a right of entry into the higher class and the qualification for such an entry is not a property-qualification, but a personality-qualification. Even as they are, the lower classes have, in Nietzsche's eyes, an important and indispensable place in

9. *Zarathustra I.* xxii.

10. In his earlier writings he spoke of four classes on the analogy of the Hindu philosophers, but in his later writings he combined the agriculturist and commercial classes into one class.

the social structure¹¹. All three classes are organically related, each being necessary to the other and to the whole.

In order to distinguish the morality of the highest class from that of the lower classes, i. e. morality in the ordinary sense, he calls the latter by the misleading name "immorality". Nietzsche does not deprecate morality as ordinarily known, though he grows wild with it when it is set up for the highest morality. Nietzsche affirms as strongly as do moralists like Dr. Mackenzie that morality in the ordinary sense is necessary both for individual and social well-being. He goes further and maintains that it is necessary as the basis of "immorality".¹² We will be, he says "heirs of all morality that has gone before and not start *de novo*"¹³. If he speaks of the overcoming of morality by immorality, it is only a self-overcoming. "Why do I seek free thinking?" he asks and answers: "As the last consequence of previous morality—justice, courage, honesty, loving disposition to all." The demand for a critique of morality is a form of morality, the most sublimated kind of it¹⁴. The immorality that he embraces is thus the fulfilment of morality.

The need for this immorality arises for him from the inner contradictions and disharmony of the present moral life of Europe. "Immorality" is a solution to cure the ills of European moral life. It aims at making an ideal, a goal, a principle of organisation that is proof of man's creative power. The instinct for something perfect, or as perfect as the conditions of existence will allow is, the bottom instinct, the ruling impulse of Nietzsche. His aim is cosmical; he thinks of the world as pressing to a higher realization of its potencies through us. Says Nietzsche "we are buds on one tree.

11. *Will to Power*. See p. 764.

12. *Werke*. xii, 411. vii, 486, 36. *Will to Power*. 764.

13. *Werke*. xiii, 125, 282.

14. *Werke*. xiii, 124, 281. *Will to Power*. 399, 400.

What do we know of what can come out of us in the interests of the tree!"¹⁵ His ideal is a new species of man, a new human personality, a new type of sainthood¹⁶.

3. *His will to power not a proclamation of barbarism; behind and underlying it are tenderness and love.*

The power which Nietzsche wills is not the brute power of physical nature—the power of free non-ethical forces uncontrolled by the intellect. He dislikes the power of blind nature, for it is wasteful, indifferent and uncertain, without purpose or consideration, pity or justice, at once fearful and desertlike. The power he worships is the power that blends with reason, the power that serves something higher. The power of the tyrant, no less than the power of the masses in modern democratic society are odious to him. Of the German Imperialism he is profoundly contemptuous: He exclaims "Power is tiresome. Witness the Empire!"¹⁷ His will to power is really will to higher values like beauty, truth, goodness and above all of love. His tenderness and love are more tender than even the tenderness and love of Christianity. Look at the following passage: "If you have an enemy, do not return his evil with good—that will humiliate him; if he curses you, curse a little back; if he does you a great wrong, do him a few small ones—dreadful to behold is one under the weight of wrong that he has done alone; more humane is a little revenge than absolutely no revenge".¹⁸ Compare the above with the motive given by the great apostle for returning the evil of an enemy with good; "for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." Which is truer or more christian in spirit let Dr. Mackenzie judge for himself.

15. *Werke* XII. 128-29

16. *Will to Power*. See 943-4.

17. *Werke*. 244, 505.

18. *Zarathustra*. I. XIX.

All this is overlooked by persons like Prof. Mackenzie when they conclude that Nietzsche proclaims an indiscriminate "gospel of might" of the "wild beast" type. They only fasten upon the stray extravagant and irritated utterances which came out of the bitterness of heart of a man who found no sympathy or echo for his ideas. There is also another reason for the general misunderstanding of Nietzsche by the European. Nietzsche's ideas are altogether foreign to the European mind which is generally engrossed with a religion of the superstitious kind or in values that are merely utilitarian. But to the Indians Nietzsche is no foreigner. They find that Nietzsche is speaking in the idiom and the accent of their own philosopher-saints. He has done a great service to Europe in laying emphasis on the life of Sanyāsa of which Europe is greatly in need. Europe will soon recognise him as the first European philosopher, who revealed to it a new life and a new morality.

(b) Dr. Mackenzie's conclusion about the new moralists like Bertrand Russell and C. E. M. Joad that they advocate sexual promiscuity and the abolition of family life is equally untrue. That even the more extreme of the two—Joad does not advocate the relaxation of the marriage-laws for the sake of sexual promiscuity or the abolition of the institution of marriage will be evident from the following extracts. "What then is likely to happen?"

"Certainly not a relapse into complete promiscuity. The belief that people are fundamentally licentious, and that a partial removal of the barriers with which society has hedged about the business of reproduction, will precipitate the population into a welter of unbridled license, pleasantly shocking though it is to the minds of respectable people, has absolutely no foundation in fact."¹⁹

19. C. E. M. Joad: *The future of Morals*, p. 68.

"Within reason, continence and constancy are natural to human beings. It is only the intolerable strain to which our absurd social arrangements have subjected them that has caused us to regard ourselves as being by nature unfaithful and incontinent. There is no ground for the belief that the average man or woman who allow themselves to be guided by their own impulses must needs be scoundrels. For among their impulses must be numbered self-respect, moderation and a sense of what is right and fitting."

"If this means, as it probably does, that unhappy families have broken up and that husbands and wives who disliked each other have availed themselves of the opportunity to make a fresh start, we need not regret the change. Nobody would contend that society is the gainer by condemning the unhappily married to a lifetime of domestic misery, and it is difficulty to see why the commonsense of the community which considers the wishes of the parties concerned a sufficient ground for consummating their marriage, does not regard the wishes of the same parties as a sufficient reason for terminating it"

"On the other hand it is unlikely that those who are happily married will rush to the Register with the object of making themselves miserable by separating, simply because reasonable divorce laws give them the opportunity to do so."²⁰

In so far as the changes which the new reformers propose have only in view the remedying of the manifest evils of social life, the providing for decent ways of retreat in cases of failure in matrimonial relations, there is no need to find fault with them. But when they forget as Joad and Russell tend to forget—that the remedies are only remedies and go on to institute them as ideals, we must protest severely. we must point out that they only point out ways of escape from the bad life; but that they do not define the good life of sex.

If it is mere love as a passion and nothing else that they aim at, it is sure to leave the lovers soon with a sense of emptiness and nothingness and the only thing for them to do would be to break off and begin again and repeat this till the end of their lives. Love becomes enduring when it is not an end in itself but a condition for the realisation by the lovers of something valuable. As Walter Lippmann says "It is this understanding that love cannot successfully be isolated from the business of living which is the enduring wisdom of the institution of marriage. Let the law be what it may be as to what constitutes a marriage contract and how and when it may be dissolved. Let public opinion be as tolerant as it can be toward any and every kind of irregular and experimental relationship. When all the criticisms have been made, when all supernatural sanctions have been discarded, all subjective inhibitions erased, all compulsions abolished, the convention of marriage still remains to be considered as an interpretation of human experience. It is by the test of how genuinely it interprets human experience that the convention of marriage will ultimately be judged."

"The wisdom of marriage rests upon an extremely unsentimental view of lovers and their passions.....The convention of marriage rests on an interpretation of human nature which does not confuse the subjective feeling of the lovers that their passion is unique, with the brutal but objective fact that, had they never met, each of them would in all probability have found a lover who was just as unique. 'Love' says Santayana 'is indeed much less exacting than it thinks itself. Nine-tenths of its cause are in the lover, for one-tenth that may be in the object'. It is the overlooking of this brute fact that is responsible for the unhappinesses of many romantic lovers. "The deep fallacy of the conception", as Lippmann says "is in the failure to realize that compatibility is a process and not an accident, that it depends upon the maturing of

instinctive desire by adaptation to the whole nature of the other person and to his common concerns of the pair of lovers... It is what the lover does about that nine-tenths which is decisive for his happiness. It is the claim, therefore, of those who uphold the ideal of marriage as a full partnership, and reject the ideal which would separate love as an art from parenthood as a vocation, that in the home made by a couple who propose to see it through, there are provided the essential conditions under which the passions of men and woman are most likely to become mature, and therefore harmonious and disinterested.....It is the hidden issues between lovers, more than anywhere else, that modern men and women are compelled, by personal anguish rather than by laws and preachments or even by persuasions of abstract philosophy, to transcend naive desire and to reach out towards a mature and disinterested partnership with their world"²¹

This is the attitude, if not of all, but at least of some new moralists towards sex relations. It is such an attitude that should be taken as the attitude of new morality for purposes of evaluation and criticism. Of course, there are persons who take a less exalted and less positive view of the matter, but such men have always existed and they do not go to make a new age.

(c) Prof. Mackenzie's criticism of Bolshevism is in many respects truer than his criticism of the other modern moral movements. Bolshevism tends to the relaxation of the family and places very heavy restrictions on the property rights of individuals. It is not by any means a happy solution of the ethico-economic problems of modern life. But the problems are there staring us in the face and they have got to be solved by a new morality and there is no going back to the old morality for their solution.

21. Walter Lippmann: *A Preface to Morals*. p.p. 309-313.

In conclusion, it seems to me, that Prof. Mackenzie takes too formal and external a view of the modern problems of morality and is therefore precluded from adopting a sympathetic and humanistic attitude towards the new attempts at solving them. If such an attitude were to be adopted universally, moralists will be looked upon as Dean Inge says, "as persons who are under the illusion that they are attracted by God but who are really repelled by men."

The One and the Many.

By

G. R. MALKANI.

(Logic and Metaphysics Section)

The problem of the one and the many may be said to be the central problem of metaphysics. It is not possible here to enter into a detailed consideration of it. I shall therefore simply state the problem in its most general form as it presents itself to thought, and indicate the lines on which I believe a solution of it is possible.

We know the "many" of experience. We do not know the one. Still the many are not given to us merely as many. They imply in different ways and in different degrees some kind of unity. The problem presents itself to thought, how are the two reconcilable? For there appears to be a contradiction in saying that both the one and the many are real. That which is many cannot really be one; and that which is one cannot really be many. We must either be able to reconcile the two concepts with each other, or in the alternative decide to reject either the one or the many as unreal.

It is at once evident that on the plane of pure thought, the one and the many cannot be reconciled. What is one cannot also be many, unless either the one or the many is illusory. In the same way, the one cannot *become* the many without losing its one-ness, and the many cannot

become one without ceasing to be many. It might be thought that this clear-cut division and so the contradiction arising from it exists only in abstract thought. In the realm of actual facts with which our experience is chiefly concerned this contradiction is absent. The real is neither pure identity nor pure difference. It is identity in difference and difference in identity; it is a differentiated unity. Further, this conception cannot be said to be irrational. For pure identity is unthinkable. Space, time, substance and quality, relations, etc. are all principles of the manifold. What does not conform to these principles can never be known, and can never be posited. If the real *one* is nevertheless known, it would at least be an object to a subject and thus stand in this relation at least. Pure identity then is impossible to find in the realm of being with which alone our experience is concerned. Pure identity is pure nothing.

Similarly, pure difference too cannot be. For elements which are absolutely discrete and are in no way related cannot even be different. Difference is a relation; and every relation is only possible within a unified whole. Thus the only alternative left is to suppose that both unity and multiplicity are real. The real is a differentiated unity.

What however are we to understand by this last notion? Is it intelligible? Attempts are made to render it intelligible by an appeal to certain facts of experience. We are supposed, for example, to have an idea of one substance which has many qualities. It is a unity in difference. Again a physical organism and a work of art are clearly unities that cannot do without real difference. Every organic unity is a unity of parts that are what they are only as they are related in the whole. They both contribute to the whole and derive their sustenance from it. There is real unity in difference.

The instances here given do not in our opinion render the above notion at all intelligible. They only restate our

problem, and do not solve it. The so called unity of substance requires to be elucidated. It is more of a postulate than a fact known. We can legitimately ask, what is the substance over and above the qualities? It is no answer to this question to say that although the substance is nothing apart from the qualities, it can be something together with the qualities. For what is this "it"? Again, a physical organism is no doubt a whole of interacting parts which hold together for certain purposes. But the existence of none of its parts is entirely dependent upon other parts or upon the whole. A part could not contribute anything to the whole if it were thus dependent. In order to contribute, it must have an individuality of its own not capable of being annulled in the whole, or in any higher unity. So far then it must stand outside this unity. We know as a matter of fact that any part of an organism can leave the organism and still be something. It may undergo a great change but it will not be nothing; and so far as this is so, it will remain alien to the unity; it is an outsider that mixes only for a purpose, and not because of its very being. Indeed in the whole which is the universe, no part can leave the whole. But the essential nature of the relation will remain materially the same. The part cannot be the whole. But if it is not the whole, how is it related to the whole? Evidently the whole is made out of the contributions of the parts and has no being of its own apart from the latter; it has no real being at all. The parts are the real thing. It is this thought which inspires the proposition that the truly real must be indivisible; for if it is divisible, its substantiality is not truly in it but in its parts, and we should have to look for our reality in some ultimate indivisible parts and in nothing else.

The above analysis is also true in the case of products of art. Each note in a melody and each tint in a picture is something in itself. Their unity with other parts in the

whole is only partial, teleological, and not essential. The primary problem of metaphysics is the problem of being, and only secondarily the problem of ends ; for ends cannot subsist by themselves. We can always ask, ends for whom? Why any ends at all? Is there real dualism in being making ends possible? The above-mentioned unities are all teleological unities, not essential unities or unities of being.

The problem of the understanding is not solved. Reality cannot be both one and many. But it might now be said that the many can be many and yet one in the sense that they have a partial unity. This however does not carry us any further; for, in the part in which they are one the difference is annihilated, while in the remaining parts the difference is unbridged. In other words, that in which the many are one they are not many, but that in which they are many they are not at all one. Where is any difference-in-unity ?

There is however one more argument that might be advanced here. It would be said that, we have argued as though the parts have the primary reality, and the whole only a derivative reality. But this is not true. The position ought to be reversed. The whole alone is primary. The parts are real only as parts of the whole; they have no being outside this whole. Thus there can be real unity; and yet this unity is not simple or indivisible. It is truly a differentiated unity.

Now it is indeed true that there is a sense in which the whole is more real than its parts. The parts taken by themselves are comparatively more limited in being and incomplete. The whole completes them. It both includes and transcends them. We might even say that the whole endows them with parthood; for without the whole, parts would not be parts at all. But clearly this is not the whole truth. For although we can never get a part except as

part of a whole, it is equally true that the parthood of a part is derived not only from its membership in the whole, but primarily from its own being or essential independence. The relation of the part to the whole cannot constitute the whole being of the part. If it did, the part would be nothing in itself, and it could not therefore sustain any relation to the whole or to the other parts of the whole. This argument can be extended to all the parts of the whole. It thus becomes clear that the being of the parts cannot be conceived as wholly subordinate to the being of the whole. They must be conceded a certain being-in-themselves. But so far as this is true, the unity is external to them; it is superficial.

This becomes still more evident when we try to understand the being of the whole. The whole would not be constituted a whole unless the parts were self-constituted or had reality in themselves. If we suppose that the whole has an individuality of its own or a being apart from the being of its parts, then to that extent it is not divisible in parts at all; it is simple, unique and indivisible; it is not a whole. But if it has no such individuality, then it is what it is because of the parts constituting it. Can we really argue that the parts are in themselves nothing, and that they derive what reality they have from such a whole? It is because the whole is not a real unity, i. e. it does not annul the parthood of the parts, that we are obliged to regard such a whole as possessing only a secondary and therefore derivative reality. A true unity has no parts.

This disposes of the contention that the ultimate unity must embrace differences. Differences cannot cease to be those differences because they are embraced in some kind of unity. It is asked, what content can the Absolute have except the content of the appearances? Take away all the appearances and the Absolute is reduced to nothing. In our

opinion, this is only a confession of the emptiness of the Absolute. For if the content of the appearances is all the content which the Absolute has, then wherein lies the claim of the latter to greater reality? Should we not rather go farther and say that the substance of the appearances which the Absolute has borrowed is the only true ultimate substance? The notions of harmony and of systematisation are superimposed upon being and are subordinate to it. They do not affect the being-hood of being. They do not even affect its intelligibility, if, as we shall show, there is only one true being and that being is intelligent; the dualism of matter and form giving rise to all the conflicts and contradictions in thought has no place there.

It might now be urged that the last remaining alternative, namely that the one alone is real, is also not tenable; the conception of the one involves the conception of the many. In pure non-difference, there will be nothing to prescribe any boundary, any limit, any distinction to being. How can we then significantly call such being *one*? When we call anything one, we separate it out from a manifold and constitute it into a unit in itself. The unbounded, the unlimited, and the undifferentiated, if it did exist, would be one in no sense of the term.

We admit that the conception of the one, as it is used in mathematics and in ordinary speech, is the conception of what is limited or what is only one among many. Its specific sense is that of a unit that can be repeated in almost identical form and measure. But in this specific sense it is certainly not true of reality. If we looked at the being of things as such, we should find it throughout continuous; there is no hiatus, no discontinuity, no real separation anywhere to serve as a basis for enumeration. If, on the other hand, we concentrated attention on real differences, then each different element would be simply itself, unique and

non-repeatable. Such a real manifold would be alien to the idea of number. This idea implies a unit, throughout self-same, by the self-addition of which other numbers are reached. But a universe in which nothing was repeatable, and nothing could be got twice over—in other words, in which everything was unique,—would not be amenable to a numerical treatment. How can we get anything that is *one*, since we can nowhere proceed from a given something to a second? Still we may admit that where a distinction can be made, the idea of number can also be applied. We can thus give meaning to *one*. But *at* the same time, this only shows the limitation of the conception of the *one* in ordinary use. It does not show that the unlimited and the undifferentiated cannot be. That is the only *real* one, if one we may call it; for it is one without a second.

Whether such an undifferenced unity exists or not is a question that can be asked. But one thing that is certain is that if anything exists it must be such a unity; for the notion of this unity involves no self-contradiction, while there is self-contradiction in the notion of the pure many or the notion of the one-in-many. The one in our sense then alone is a possible existent.

We shall now proceed to give some further indication of this non-dual being. It is evident that what can be objectified can only have a limited being; it will be *this something* and *not that something*. It will exclude, and also be excluded. In itself, it will be divisible, and it will stand in relations without which it can be nothing. The ultimate unitary being cannot therefore be objective in character. Can we find this being in the subject? But our idea of the subject is of something that is related to the object, the subject is therefore itself known; it cannot be said to be wholly unobjective. Can we suppose that the true being is the unity of both subject and object? But that unity is nowhere realised, and by the

very nature of the terms can never be realised ; for the object must always be *other to* the subject. If it ceases to be other to it, it ceases to be object. How can the opposition be overcome?

It might be thought that the unity is realised in all our experience. Experience is a single unitary whole from which the subject and the object are obtained by abstraction. That may be so. Still the distinction of the two terms is either real so far as this experience goes, or it is not. If it is real, the unity is not realised. If it is not real, then there is no reconciliation of any real terms. What is certain is that once the relation of otherness between the object and the subject in experience is recognised, it cannot be supposed to be cancelled without cancelling the fundamental dualism of terms. It will no doubt be said that notwithstanding this dualism, experience is a single whole or a unity. But either it is a unity with an inner contradiction ; or it is a unity in which one of the terms, namely the object, is reduced to falsity, being regarded as having no existence apart from the experience of it. In no case is a real dualism of terms overcome, and a real subject and a real object reconciled in being. The so-called unity through otherness is a contradiction in terms. If otherness is conquered, there is no otherness left in the unity , if it is not conquered, there is no unity yet.

Let us suppose that the unity is realised in some kind of experience in which the distinction of the subject and the object and so the relation of otherness between them is completely lost. Have we any such experience ? It might be said that in feeling there is no dualism of the subject and the object. The felt is not something other to the feeling of it. It has no existence except in feeling. Tooth-ache, for example, and my feeling of it are not two distinct terms such that the former can be said to be other to the latter. Similarly,

the feeling of well-being. The same thing is both feeling and the felt looked at from different points of view.

Now feeling in this sense is a subjective fact with an objective character. We speak of the perception of the table as a distinct perception from the perception of the wall. Just in the same way we speak of the feeling of well being as a distinct feeling from the feeling of pain. Thus feeling is to be distinguished from the pure subjective function. It is ultimately not wholly unobjective. Although therefore the relation of otherness might not exist between the feeling and the felt, any actual feeling cannot but have this relation to awareness as such or to the pure knowing function. Feeling cannot be the ultimate unity we seek.

It might be thought that the unity is realised in some form of mystic experience. That indeed may be so. Still we cannot help asking, how is the miracle to be achieved without annulling the terms? For the object cannot be the subject, and the subject cannot be the object; they have nothing common between them. Their unity is impossible by the very nature of the terms. We therefore cannot help thinking that if the unity were realised, it would not be found to contain any suggestion of two terms at all, and no suggestion of any reconciliation between them.

We are told that in absolute experience, the distinction of the subject and the object ceases. But if that is so, that experience would have no content. It would be just pure intelligence that is confronted by nothing and knows nothing. This intelligence is the true ultimate subject. The empirical subject or the ego is confronted by objects and is necessarily related to them. It is also impermanent, it comes and it goes even as the knowledge of objects comes and goes. But that which reveals this subject, and its coming and its going, is not itself revealed. It is self-revealed if we might say so. It is the eternal light that never comes and never goes. This

enduring essence of being which is the ground of the subject-object relation is their only true unity. Distinctions are available within objects, and in the subject-object relation ; they cannot be carried further to the ultimate ground of all appearances. What is not a subject, and is not confronted by anything, cannot know any distinctions and cannot stand in any relation of otherness to aught else. It is the true ultimate unity that we have been seeking to know. The *many* of our ordinary experience are related to it as false and illusory appearances are related to their underlying substratum ; for the many can never be truly one except in the sense that the many are not ; their appearance is only an illusory appearance.

Our conclusion is that if anything does exist, it must necessarily be one, without a second, and non-dual. This being we can only find in pure intelligence or the ultimate selfhood. Lastly, since there is nothing *other* to it, and nothing that can stand in any relation to it, the *many* of our experience and all the relations which they render possible, are only illusory appearances.

Knowledge and its Object

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Is there any relation between knowledge and its object ? If there is, what sort of relation is that ? Can we determine from this relation anything about the nature and being of the object known ? I propose to discuss these questions briefly in this paper and shall attempt to give some answers to them.

Whenever we think of knowledge, we think of it as having an object. To know is to know something. Knowledge thus implies object and goes with it. Since knowledge and object go together, it seems we must suppose that they are related, for relation is nothing but the togetherness of things. Moreover, as knowledge implies object, we cannot but think that knowledge must be related with object, because one thing cannot imply another without being related with it. The chair on which I am sitting is not related to the coming German Election and cannot by any means imply it. On the other hand the chair as a constructed object implies a maker and is so related to the carpenter who made it. Thus there is a *prima facie* case in favour of some relation being present between knowledge and its object.

But one may deny that knowledge is related to its object if one holds (1) that knowledge does not imply any object, or (2) that there are no objects, or (3) that knowledge is identical with its object, or (4) that knowledge itself is a relation and does not need to be further related, or (5) that the character of knowledge is such that it cannot be related to anything else, or (6) that no real relation is possible between knowledge and its object. Let us consider these points.

1. We are not at present interested either to deny or to affirm that there is such a thing as pure knowledge in which nothing is known. But surely there are cases of knowledge in which objects are known. In fact our ordinary notion of knowledge requires that there should be an object if there is to be any knowledge. We do not however mean to insist here that knowledge must always have an object. We want simply to know whether and how knowledge is related to its object when there is an object given to it.

2. Since we have chosen to consider only the cases of knowledge in which objects are given, we cannot here entertain the hypothesis that there are no objects at all. To think that there are objects and objects are known may be an error, but we are concerned here with the analysis of this erroneous position, taking it to be true.

3. If knowledge were absolutely and literally identical with its object, there would be no sense in discussing the relation between them. But it seems impossible to identify knowledge with its object. When I know a book, I cannot say that my knowledge of the book is the book. If my knowledge were identical with the book, the material characteristics of the book would be the characteristics of my knowledge, which is certainly not the case. My knowledge is not heavy or thick as the book is. Moreover I know a book and I also know a table. If knowledge were identical with its object, the table would be identical with my knowledge which again is identical with the book, and so the table would be identical with the book which is absurd. Some difference has to be granted between knowledge and its object and so the question of their relation becomes significant.

4. Is knowledge a mere relation? Relation between what? The knowledge-relation can exist only between the subject and the object. But what is the subject? The subject must be defined as that which knows. But to know is, according

to this view, to be related in a particular way, (since knowledge is a mere relation). We thus find that if we are to view knowledge as a mere relation, one of the terms turns out to be such that its whole being is constituted by this relation. But it is absurd that a particular relation should constitute the whole being of a term. We cannot therefore regard knowledge as a mere relation. Even Alexander who speaks of knowledge-relation speaks of it in a secondary sense.

5. This is an important issue. There are people who think that we cannot assert any relation between knowledge and its object. If we are to assert any relation, both the terms of the relation must be given. But object alone is given and knowledge is never given, and so we cannot assert any relation between them. If we still assert some relation between knowledge and its object, we shall degrade knowledge to the status of the given and thus deprive it of its real character, and so the asserted relation will not be really between knowledge and its object, but between two objects merely.

But is it a fact that we can assert a relation only between things that are given to us? Can we not suppose that a thing is related to something else, if our idea of that thing justifies such relation, even when the thing is incapable of being presented to us? My heart and my brain are not given to me and yet I can very well suppose that they are related. But it will be argued that we have objective notions of these things and can therefore relate them. Is it then seriously meant that we have no notion whatever of knowledge? If we have no notion of knowledge, we cannot significantly talk about it. It must be granted that we know what knowledge is and can therefore also know its relation to objects.

It may be objected that knowledge is, as we have maintained, different from object, and if knowledge is known, then it becomes indistinguishable from object which is also known,

We recognise the force of this objection but we must nevertheless point out that although object is known and knowledge is also known, they are not known in the same way; and so a distinction between them is still possible. It is the peculiarity of consciousness that it can turn back upon itself without withdrawing its look from the object. When I know, I may also know that I know. Object is given in consciousness which need not be reflective, i. e. self-conscious. Knowledge is known in reflective consciousness and is known as distinct from the object proper. If knowledge were not known at all, the fact that there is knowledge would go entirely unnoticed and we should not discuss any problem about it.

6. It is argued that the real relation between knowledge and its object, if there be any, must be direct and immediate, because object is directly given in knowledge. But what sort of direct relation is possible between knowledge and its object? The reality of knowledge must be admitted, as it cannot be denied. The object must also be real, if there is to be any real relation between it and knowledge. The only direct relations possible between two real entities seem to be contact (Samyoga) and inherence (Samavāya). They are obviously not possible between knowledge and its object, and so it seems we have to deny all relations between them.

But from the fact that the direct relations, which hold good between other real things, are not possible between knowledge and its object, it cannot conclusively follow that there is no relation between them. It may only mean that the relation is unique and is not like any other relation.

We thus come to the conclusion that there are no sufficient reasons to deny all relations between knowledge and its object, and so we accept the *prima facie* case we made out at the beginning that knowledge is related to its object.

We now come to the second question : What is the kind of relation that subsists between knowledge and its object ? Is it internal or external ? Is it like any other relation or quite unique ?

It seems that there are difficulties in the way of regarding it as either external or internal. By an internal relation is generally meant a relation that makes a difference to its terms and an external relation is that which makes no difference to its terms. We can at once see that the knowledge relation is not internal, for the purpose of knowledge is to reveal its object as it really is and not to change it, and this purpose would be defeated if the relation of knowledge to its object brought about a change in the latter. If the knowledge-relation were merely external, i. e. made no difference to its terms, then an object known would be as good as not known, and there might be knowledge even without its relation to the object, which is absurd.

Mr. Ewing discussed at length the internality of the knowledge-relation in two issues of *Mind* 1925 and came to the conclusion that the internality of the knowledge-relation is consistent even with realistic presuppositions. He rightly pointed out the main objections to the view that the cognitive relation is internal. (1) It seems impossible for a present knowledge to change the past or a universal law or a mathematical truth. (2) To say that knowing changes its object seems to imply that knowing is a process of construction exercised upon the object known, and this seems to be incompatible with the nature of knowledge. But he thinks that these difficulties arise only if by 'change' we understand 'cause a change in'. An internal relation no doubt makes a difference to its terms but only in the sense that if either related term were different in a way affecting the relation, the other term would be likewise different. The relation of cause and effect is such a relation. A "cause

cannot be what it is if its effect is different. The effect makes a difference to the cause in this sense, but it does not produce a change in the cause. Similarly knowledge makes a difference to its object. An object cannot be what it is if its knowledge is different. Therefore the cognitive relation is internal.

Now when I have known an object, we cannot possibly suppose that my knowledge could be different from what it is and yet would remain the knowledge of the same object. This fact is probably never sought to be denied by anybody who may be inclined to deny that the cognitive relation is internal. But in my knowledge of a thing there are at least two things involved, (1) the fact of my knowing and (2) what I know of the thing or the content of my knowledge. When one denies the internality of the knowledge-relation, the denial has reference not to the content of knowledge, but to the fact of knowledge. When my knowledge is once there, the content of it cannot be different unless the object known were different. But the fact of my knowledge may not occur at all. If I know, I cannot know differently; but it is not at all necessary that I should know. The content of knowledge is certainly determined by the nature of the object, just as an effect is determined by its cause. But that there should be a subjective consciousness of the object in this or that individual is never determined by the nature and being of any object. The occurrence or non-occurrence of such consciousness is quite immaterial to the being of an object and the knowledge-relation is in this sense quite external.

To say that the knowledge-relation is external is not to say that it comes to the same thing whether we know an object or do not know it. Those who support the doctrine of external relation do not, I suppose, mean to say that there is no difference whatever between related and unrelated terms.

That would make the doctrine absurd. What they mean or should mean is that when terms enter into any relation, they do not become different from what they were outside the relation, except in the newly acquired property of having this relation. This being so, a thing known need not be as good as not known, and so there should be no difficulty in regarding the knowledge-relation as external.

But we cannot bring out the peculiarity of the relation of knowledge to its object by saying that it is external. The relation is quite unique and can be described only as that of having an object (*viṣayitā*). It is not like other relations which hold good only between objects. The fact of knowledge is quite plain and we also clearly see how objects are given in it. The relation of knowledge to object, as it is experienced in knowing anything, and which I have described here as that of having an object (or that of knowledge to object), cannot be made plainer or more intelligible by any elaborate characterisation.

Some people (e. g. Western Idealists) try to make our understanding of this relation deeper by suggesting that knowledge and object are not two different things but are only inseparable aspects of one and the same thing, because neither of the terms is available apart from the other. But in fact we are more mystified than enlightened by this description. Our notions of knowledge and object are so very different that we shall always find it very difficult to conceive of a real unity constituted by them. If the unity is not known, its reality, and so the validity of the conception, cannot be asserted. If it is to be known, it must be known subjectively (in reflective introspection) or objectively (in perception). But the alleged whole cannot be known in either way, because subjectively object cannot be known and objectively knowledge cannot be known, and so the whole, constituted by knowledge and object, if there is any, is bound to remain always unknown.

Some other people (e. g. Advaitists) suggest that inasmuch as when we know an object, our knowledge takes on the form of the object, there is some identity (*tādātmya*) between knowledge and its object; but since there can be no real identity between knowledge and object, we have to take it as illusory (*ādhyaśika*). But to say that there is illusory identity between knowledge and its object is not to say what the real relation is. It is better therefore to remain satisfied with the idea that knowledge is related to its object in a unique way than to imagine some illusory relation between them.

We now come to our last question. Has the object any independent being of its own or is it entirely dependent on knowledge? It seems that the object must be dependent on knowledge for its objectivity, because objectivity is not intelligible apart from knowledge. But objectivity is never the only property of anything in the world. Nothing is ever known merely with the property of objectivity. As Stout says, the being of a thing is never wholly constituted by its being known. We may then suppose that objects depend on knowledge for one of their properties, viz. objectivity. But objectivity is not an intrinsic property of anything in the world. It is a relational property which is acquired when things are brought into relation with knowledge. That it should be and must be known does not follow from the nature of any object, unless it is a subjective state.

It is possible to decide that objects are independent of knowledge, when we find them only in knowledge and can never ascertain their being apart from knowledge? It is true that we cannot find objects apart from knowledge. But this only proves that finding of objects is not possible apart from knowledge. And however minutely I may examine an object, I can never discover 'finding' as constituting any part of the object. Since knowledge forms no part of the object and the

character of knowledge is such that it cannot enter into the material constitution of any object, it appears reasonable to suppose that the object owes nothing to knowledge, and therefore will not lose anything when it is not in relation with knowledge, in other words, its being is independent of knowledge

The Universal and the Particular.

By

T. R. V. MURTI.

I. We shall start with the readily acceptable notion of the particular as the unique or the unrepeatable, and of the universal as the repeatable. The latter is so, as it is a determinate character, a content that can be fixed upon by thought. Conversely what is determinate in thought is universal. Not being a thinkable character, the particular is not repeatable.

Three views can be held with regard to the nature of the particular and the universal. Some philosophers—the empiricists and the nominalists—hold that the particular alone is what is given in knowledge, the universal being but an ideal and generalised entity, more often a mere name. There are others who think that both the universal and the particular are given, there being no thought without these. Against both the above, we have to maintain that the universal alone is given. On each theory, the relation between the universal and the particular is a problem, though it takes a different form in each case.

The difficulties of the empiricist theory are insuperable. How is the object of thought made intelligible at all without determinate and distinguishable characters? If they are present, for even to deny them should be fixed upon by thought, the universals are *ipso facto* given. It is not that we start with the particular, but through some mysterious leap we generalise it through induction, and that generalisation is not strictly valid. This view labours under the misconception that universality is distributedness, extensity and that the universal is an ensemble of particulars, thought supplying the needed glue that binds them. We should, however,

conceive the universal more intrinsically as a thinkable character, e. g., colour, sound, pain, pleasure etc.

The second view does lip-service to the self-intelligible character of the universal; it is insisted that the universal too, if it were not to be abstract, must somehow depend upon the particular. Are the two precipitated simultaneously in one thought or successively? If the first, it is hard to see how the universal *mediates* the other, or that it is *through* that the particular is made intelligible, or vice versa. The distinction between the two will not, in that case, arise. If successively given, it is evident that either of them does not depend upon the other for its intelligibility; the universal does not need the particular.

It is more reasonable to hold that only universals, thinkable characters are given. Being intelligible in themselves, they do not stand in need of being defined, but all definition is possible through them. The universal is certainly not reached through a process of generalisation. The problem on this view is how does the universal get particularised; how does the colour of the rose come to stand for a unique unrepeatable fact? The particular is the universal caught in a net of external relations. Only *position*, a fixed place in a series, is particular. The universal does not contain any principle of particularity. It might be thought that "This tree before me" is particular. But its meaning "A tree that the speaker has before him" is still universal; for a number of such situations are possible.

Our contention involves two things: that only in order or position can particularity be found, and that position cannot be given in thought but must be posited. Take for instance, the two combinations that are different, though their constituents are identical—5F, F5, and 'But' and 'Tub'. Position is neither in one of the constituents—5—, nor in the other—F—, nor in both taken as a whole; for this would be a unit itself, and can have

position only with regard to entities outside the group. Position has somehow to be understood. Number, Language, causal chain etc. are examples of order. But there is no order which does not involve Space and Time; they are the greatest individualisers. For, a togetherness of entities, having a certain dimension or spread-out-ness is indispensable to any position. And without succession the position of entities is not sustainable. But spatial or temporal position is impossible without entities which sustain the relative positions; ciphers cannot engender position.

Mere spread-out-ness and succession do not suffice to make anything particular; we are still in the realm of the ideal. The play of *Hamlet* has certainly spatial distinctions and succession of events; still it has no assignable position. To have one, an entity must sustain relationships not only with certain entities, but with all and sundry. Herein consists the superiority of the world of action. My speaking can be particularised beyond any chance of repetition, if it is related with the room I am in, and that with other places, they in turn with others and so on, until all conceivable entities are related or thought to be related. So too in the case of time my speaking shall have to be fixed in position with regard to other happenings, and these to others and so on. An historical event can sustain such relations to any extent, and, therefore, is a real particular. An ideal event, e.g. the death of Hamlet can have relationships only with other events in the play i.e. in a very limited sphere; it is, hence, not a particular. A particular is what it is in virtue of its position i.e. infinite relationships with other particulars. It is evident that when one entity is known all its relationships are not known, as this would mean the apprehension of the entire universe when a tiny drop of water is seen. Position is believed in, and is posited in action. It is not a thinkable. What is thought being wholly

within the apprehending consciousness, it cannot sustain any relation to things outside it, and without this there is no position. The particular belongs eminently to the field of action, and the universal to contemplation.

2. Several considerations of importance follow from this conception of the particular and the universal:

(i). The totality of spatial and temporal positions—the cosmos for instance—is not a particular, though entities within it are particulars with regard to other entities equally within. For, it cannot be fixed in position, moored to anything, there being nothing, by our definition of cosmos, external to it. It is a universal, and is repeatable indefinitely. In keeping with this view is the Hindu conception of cycles of creation intelligible.

(ii). This leads us to another point—the confusion between universality and necessity. Kant, as is well-known, speaks in terms which would imply that universality and necessity are identical, or that they are invariably connected. The necessary is that which is inexorably fixed; this is unthinkable if an entity were considered in itself; then it is absolutely free. Necessity is nothing if not a position, a relation to other entities. The absolutely necessary is thus that which is inexorably related to all things; it is the particular *par excellence*. The absolutely free, on the other hand, is the unrelated, for, if there were anything external to it, it could be related to that.

(iii) It might be thought that the universal is related to its particulars, in ways variously conceived by philosophers both in the west and the east. But the universal is not related in any way to the particular even. For, both of them never appear on the same plane to get related. To the universal the particular never appears in that light, for we have seen that the particular owes its particularity to its relation to,

or position in the midst of, other particulars. The universal itself is not a specific position ; if it were so, the difference between it and any one particular will not be shared in common by others equally ; particulars as such will not be different from it. This is to say they will not be comparable even on one plane of existence. Therefore, the difference between the particular and the universal belongs to a plane different from that of the difference among particulars themselves. From the side of the universal there is no particular, and hence there is no relation.

(iv). There cannot be one particular at any time ; the very notion of particularity, as due to position, militates against it. Obviously, no position is possible with one entity. It would be indistinguishable from the universal and from thought. The particular is essentially and inherently many. It would thus appear that the particular is doubly conditioned ; it depends on the universal, for it is just the universal caught in the midst of external relations. The contribution of other particulars to its nature is very evident. The dependence of particulars upon one another is reciprocal, while its dependence on the universal is not so. The being of the particular is a standing contradiction. For A, a particular, is what it is due to the being of other particulars which in turn depend upon A—an unavoidable vicious circle. No such contradiction is to be found in the being of the universals.

3. Hitherto we have been considering the universal and the particular without any reference to their relation with knowledge. It may at once be pointed out that all statements about the universal are valid in their entirety of knowledge. It is intelligible in itself and does not need to be defined in terms of others. It is never coincident with the object, which is essentially many and limited. If it were one, the object would be indistinguishable from knowledge. The object can,

therefore, be taken as particular. Knowledge must extend before and after the object to know it as an object. The difference between knowledge and object is not on a par with the differences among objects. Not being presentable in one plane of being, the relation between knowledge and object, like the supposed relation between universal and particular, is not tenable.

It is in keeping with this view of knowledge as universal, that Pure Being—Brahman—the highest Universal and Consciousness—Chaitanya—are conceived as absolutely identical in Vedanta. From the standpoint of Consciousness—Pure Being—the world of particulars does not exist, or even appear as such. Spirit or Pure Consciousness cannot know any particular; to do so it shall have to take a station in the midst of particulars, identifying itself thereby with one specific position and viewing other particulars from that privileged and prejudiced position. Spirit has to become the ego; consciousness has to become discursive thinking. Even the Ego, limited as it is, is still more universal than the objects it encounters. This particularisation of Spirit is inexplicable, but it has a *de facto* validity.

4. Can there be many universals? *Prima facie* there seems to be no objection to their plurality; there are colours, sounds, pains and pleasures of various kinds. The pertinent question, however, is to ask whether the plurality of the universal is in conformity with its self-intelligible character. When I see a colour, its being one among many universals is not an immediate datum to me as the colour is. Its plurality is a character acquired in relation to others, and hence the universal has *ipso facto* lost its self-intelligent character. But a universal must rigorously avoid all reference to things not immediately given, just as it does not countenance the particulars. Pure Being, therefore, is the only true universal;

other universals are particulars with regard to that. It alone is in itself, being self-intelligent. It is absolutely free, for its universality precludes its relationship with anything inside or outside it. It has no position. The essential character of the universal is not repeatability, but its self-intelligent and immanent nature.

The Epistemological Corollary to the Western psychology of Perception.

By
D. M. DATTA.

Western psychology is almost unanimous as to the view that in the perception of an external object the mind does not come into direct contact with it. Even those psychologists who admit causal interaction between mind and matter hold that the mind knows an external object through the impressions created in it by changes in the body generated by influences coming from the object. Among Indian philosophers there were some who held the theory of the direct contact of the mind with the object—secured in the case of visual perception, for example, by the going on of the *antaḥkāraṇa* to the object. But no such theory is found among Western psychologists. All Schools of Western philosophy accept the above psychology of perception ; but they try to foist on or deduce from it different epistemological conclusions. The purpose of this paper is to consider the legitimacy of some of these important conclusions and to show what kind of epistemology is strictly consistent with this accepted psychology.

The specific epistemological theories which we consider in the light of this psychology are those which concern the two cognate problems, viz. (1) Do we know any external object ? (2) If so, is it known immediately or mediately ? Now, if it be a fact that the mind has no direct contact with the object of perception and comes to know the object through the sensations created by the physiological changes generated by the stimuli coming from the object, the most satisfactory answer to the two questions will be "Yes, we know an external object and that mediately." Two other answers also are

theoretically possible and actually given by some philosophers, though they are not in strict consistency with the psychological theory from which they start; namely: (1) We know the existence of an external object and that immediately; and (2) We do not know the existence of any external object and, therefore, the question as to how it is known does not at all arise. We shall try to show one by one how these two answers are inconsistent with their psychological premises and then show also the reasonableness of the view that external objects are known mediately.

Let us take the second answer first. It is the answer given, as is well known, either by sceptics who deny the *knowledge* of external objects or by subjective idealists who altogether deny the *existence* of the external objects. The chief objection against this answer is that unless we believe in an external object we cannot explain why there should be any sensation, the nature and duration of which are not wholly dependent on our minds. Some idealists have tried to explain this charge away by holding that the reason why there are some perceptions which are not wholly dependent on our wills is not that these are caused by extra-mental objects, but that these are caused by some forces within the mind which are not under the control of the mind as the knower. But this defence only admits in a round-about way the existence of factors other than and therefore external to ourselves as *knowers* and thus amounts to the confession that there are realities external to the knower. There are many other well-known grounds on which subjective idealism is rejected; but as this one is sufficiently conclusive, we need not mention any other here. In fact, so far as the psychological premise in question is concerned, subjective idealism is wholly incompatible with it, because the premise involves the belief in external objects as the sources of the sense-stimuli. The psychological account of sense-perception can stand only if

subjective idealism be false and subjective idealism also can stand if the psychological account be false. The attempt to deduce subjective idealism from the psychological view (as is sometimes done by some who start with the psychological origin of sense-impressions and showing thereby that all that we know about the objects are the mental changes, conclude that we do not know anything except these changes) involves the contradiction of the premise.

The first answer (namely that in sense-perception we know an external object and that immediately) which is held now by many realists is more consistent with the psychological account in so far as it does not deny the knowledge of an external object. But it is not consistent with the account in so far as it asserts the *immediate* knowledge of the object. For, the knowledge of the object takes place, according to this account, through the *mediation* of some factors, namely, the stimuli and physiological change which stand between the object and the mental state. In holding that an external object is immediately perceived, in spite of these mediating factors, the realists owe an explanation, and the explanation that is mostly given is that the mediating factors taken together constitute a series which ends in one knowledge namely the perception of the object and though this knowledge is thus obtained *through* many factors, it is not obtained through any other *knowledge*. If this statement be true and if the definition of 'immediate knowledge' be 'knowledge that is not obtained through any other knowledge', then this contention must have to be granted. But the correctness of the definition apart, this statement itself is open to objection. For the consciousness of the physiological change really amounts to a knowledge and the object being known *through* it cannot be said to be immediately known. In normal sense-perception the consciousness of the physiological change cannot be separated from that of the physical object. If this were always

the case, there would have never been any suspicion that the physical object is known *through* the consciousness of the physiological change; like a word and its meaning the two would have remained undistinguished. But this is not always so. We have at times, through artificial stimulation of a sense-organ, simply the consciousness of physiological change resembling the one we have when stimulation is really caused by a physical *object*. From such a case we come to know that in the case where a physical object is said to be known, we have no consciousness other than the one which we have when there is no such object. In other words, in both the cases we have nothing more than the consciousness of the physiological change. In normal cases, where the physical object is believed to cause the physiological change, the consciousness of this change comes to acquire, by repeated experience, the meaning of the consciousness of the object, in much the same way as the visual perception of cotton has come to acquire the meaning of the perception of softness as well. Again, just as inspite of the subjective feeling of immediateness, the knowledge of softness in such a case is revealed by logical analysis to be obtained only *through the mediation* of the visual knowledge and not directly as the knowledge of the colour, similarly inspite of the subjective feeling of the direct apprehension of the physical object, logical analysis irresistibly reveals the fact that the knowledge of the physical object is really obtained through the mediation of the physiological change. The knowledge of the physical object, therefore, cannot be held to be immediate, if we stick to the definition of immediate knowledge stated above.

But this irresistible conclusion is often avoided by taking 'immediate knowledge' as identical with the general and somewhat vague term 'perception'. In the above discussion it has been found that the knowledge of the physical object can be likened to and brought under acquired perception ;

and if immediate knowledge is identical with perception, the knowledge of the physical object, in question, must be admitted to be immediate. The equation of 'immediate knowledge' to 'perception' only introduces confusion and prevents a clear conclusion by making it obscure. If 'immediate knowledge' be defined, as it should be, as 'knowledge not obtained through the mediation of any other knowledge' it can be easily ascertained, as shown already, that acquired perception cannot be thought identical with it. 'Perception' has come to include 'internal' and 'external,' 'primary' and 'acquired' and many other kinds, all of which are not cases of immediate knowledge, in the sense defined above.

Many realists take the case of the perception of an external object as the very type of immediate knowledge, and they have no difficulty, therefore, in asserting that an external object is known directly or immediately. But this is only cutting the Gordian knot by asserting a verbal proposition. To call the doubtful case of sense-perception a type of immediate knowledge is to beg the question. The correct procedure should be to take a case which is admitted by all as immediate. Consciousness of mental states furnishes such a case and should, therefore, be taken as the type of immediate knowledge. When compared with such knowledge, the perception of an external object, as analysed before, will at once be found to be much different from it, as regards the factors involved in the acquisition of the knowledge. The latter can no longer be brought under the same class as the former.

All these considerations show, therefore, that if the psychological account, of the origin of sense-perception be admitted, the theory of the immediate knowledge of external objects cannot stand.

But before we conclude, we must consider also briefly some objections that can arise against the mediate knowledge of external objects. The most forcible objection that can be

raised is to ask : If the physical object is *never* known immediately how is it possible to know the existence of it at all ? If we knew in any case that k, the knowledge of a physiological change, was accompanied by the existence of the physical object, p, then it might have been possible for us to infer in a subsequent case, p, from k. But as p is never known immediately, the physiological change being in every case the only consciousness we have, how can we know at all the invariable relation between k and p, so as to be able to infer p from k ? How do we at all know the physical object and assert its existence ?

In criticising subjective idealism we have already shown the reason why at all we are led to suppose something other than the knowing self as being responsible for a sense-perception. We find that the nature and duration of the sensation are not wholly dependent on ourselves and hence we are not satisfied to think of the sensation as being wholly due to ourselves. But this will not wholly answer the above objection. We have also to show through what kind of knowledge we come to know the external object. Inference is usually known, in Western philosophy, as the only kind of mediate knowledge and it has been pointed out that inference cannot yield the required knowledge. To answer the objection we have to point out that inference is not really the only kind of mediate knowledge. There is a kind of knowledge which consists in believing something without which a certain given fact cannot be explained. It is recognised by some Indian thinkers as an independent source of knowledge and called *arthāpatti*.¹ The knowledge of the physical object is of that kind. The knowledge of the physiological change in the case in question, cannot be explained without supposing some extra-subjective factor and

1. For a defence and elaborate discussion of this method of knowledge reference may be made to the author's work—"*The Six Ways of Knowing*". (George Allen & Unwin)

consequently we have to believe in it. And if this necessary supposition or postulation cannot be brought under inference it only shows that it should be given another name. The want, of a technical name cannot reasonably stand in the way of a valid belief; it only shows the insufficiency of the classes of knowledge, so far recognised.

We can conclude, therefore, that modern Western psychological account of sense-perception does not lend support to either subjectivism or the theory of the immediate perception of external objects and that the theory of the mediate knowledge of external objects follows as the only corollary to such an account. We see also negatively that unless some sort of direct contact between the mind and the physical object be admitted, no theory of immediate perception of the object is possible.

"The Soul of Knowledge."

BY

P. NARASIMHAM.

Introspection has become unpopular of late with certain psychologists, and yet it is forgotten that by that method of study alone we seem not only to understand ourselves as conscious entities but also put ourselves in a position to interpret others even by the results achieved by so-called external observation and analysis. There is no other method of enquiry to get at the self in *conscious* experience. In ignoring the self (whatever be its metaphysical status) in a psychological study, we are like the person who, seeing the world with his eyes open, and yet not "seeing" his own eyes, declares that the eye is not proved but that there is only seeing in evidence ! It is thus Hume denied the self; he forgot it was the subject "directly known as such," but looked for it in the "objects" of knowing. Similar has been the case with the problem of knowing. The main question how "a subject" can know an "object" is ignored. We are dazzled and dazed by the achievements of sciences and are willing to believe that Science will one day solve the whole problem of existence and that there is no place for any metaphysics or philosophy in the field. We forget the weakness in such a stand. Science is not self-critical, introspective. It does not analyse its own right of knowledge or our ability to know. Where science is silent, philosophy strives to speak. But yet the philosopher or the metaphysician seems also to fall into the same habitual groove of the so-called "scientific" way of thinking. We are not yet clearly aware that we are using only the external or objective categories of knowing, and that there is besides, or must be, some internal or central view-point which puts us right into the heart of things where knowing and being are

not two but one. So long as we take that knowledge, even complete knowledge, consists in a thorough understanding of the inter-relations of all the parts which thus constitute a whole, so long we shall be far away from the "soul" of knowledge. The real whole is not and cannot be made up of parts; it belongs to a different dimension of meaning altogether. The parts are only parts of the whole; the parts, starting as parts, can never create the whole. Philosophy, as a mere unification or synthesis of sciences, building up a system of completely co-ordinated knowledge, can but be a fore-runner of sciences and scientific discovery, belonging to the same category of knowledge as the sciences. It does not touch the soul of knowledge. Philosophy has so far remained "outside" as a theoretic consolation, supplementing the defects of sciences, by its own bold thought-solutions which it one day hopes to "scientifically" prove. It is no doubt a worthy endeavour to so forerun and anticipate the sciences, if philosophy is to be worthy of any scientific respect; but yet it cannot claim to be the *ultimate* knowledge. We should strive to discover deeper still the very soul of knowledge from which the various other types of knowledge take their source and derive their authority, i.e. that *form* of knowing which transcends the common *judgment type*.

What is the psychology or rationale of knowing, what are its postulates, and what do we mean by logic and metaphysics? The psychology of knowing, as we now have it, however deep our analysis of its mechanism, does not reveal to us the source of knowing either internally in the subject or externally in the sense organs and the object. We simply say we know and believe we know. We are like the denizens of Plato's cave, cognisant of the picture-shadows on the tri-dimensional screen of space, but knowing nothing of either their source or the *what* within us by which we *can* know. Further, we require to understand how we, as both bodies *and* minds, are

constituted and evolved to know what it is that knows and what is the known. There is again the awkward question how we know that we know. Our logics do not help us in this direction, either the quality-judgment logic of Aristotle, or the quantity cum space logic called mathematics, or even the logic of causal thinking of our inductive sciences including the semi-mechanical theories of Evolution. They all express only the *onlooker's* point of view, getting deluded by the ambiguity of the question "How". The charge of materialism is made against the scientific outlook because it is uncritical and unreflective of its own postulates, and does not admit or is unaware of a different way of knowing. It merely studies objects as only *objects*. The science that is honestly self-conscious and introspective can never become materialistic, but rather would point out that there must be an as-yet unknown factor within the very heart of nature which evades every objective observation. Even our metaphysics, though nominally *meta*-physics, seems to recede more away from reality as though attempting to draw sciences behind it, rather than introvert in a sort of fourth dimensional direction to look into and touch the very centre of *both* being and knowing. It unconsciously adopts the same "scientific" *out*-look of nature; it does not study nature as a "subject", nay, as *the one-subject*. We seem to require a new and real metaphysical *in*-look if we want to truly know. But we seem to be baffled at the very outset, since we ourselves to ourselves seem to be hermetically sealed up, as enigmas, dreamily feeling surrounded, as it were, by a cloudy panorama of "ideas". Where are we in this field of "knowledge"? How can we hope to know Reality when we know not even ourselves?

What is knowledge, or rather what is the Soul of Knowledge?—that is our problem. Let us picture to ourselves as in a progressive series the main stages in the "Evolutionary" process, to find out where and when the beginnings of know-

ledge can be detected. In the external world we may not be prepared to speak of the "behaviour" of inorganic things in obedience to the "laws of nature" (a phrase, by the way, more indicative of the profoundness of our ignorance) as "knowledge" on their part. Yet, we might question, wherein lies the error in describing the responsive reactions of an "atom" as its own appropriate "instinct-intelligence"? A step higher, when we observe even in inorganic matter some symmetrical modes of growth, like those in crystals, even then we shall not concede them either life or "knowledge". A stage next, in the primitive forms of growth of little vegetable organisms, is there needed, shall we say, an intelligent principle to account for their being and sustenance? What are we to make of their larger variety, each in its form and yet with variations to pave the way for a higher that is not-yet but towards which it is "unconsciously" groping? What is a seed, each of its own kind, produced from the parent (apparently) for the very continuity of its species? Shall we say that the apparent parent is *not* the parent, but it is the one fundamental principle of all Life that uses as its medium the apparent parent while itself is the real parent, remaining itself as the one abiding and sustaining "cause" of both the parent and the offspring? And so on, from tiny animal organisms up to man whom we take as representing the highest product of evolution, where are we to say "thus far instinct and thence forwards intelligence"? Are instinct and intelligence two distinct factors somehow brought into co-ordination with each other and yet different from the "*uniform laws of nature*"? Where are we to discover the unity of "mechanical nature", "instinct" and "intelligence"? Where and how are we to seek for the unity-continuity principle of knowledge which at the same time can be identical with the *being* of things? We answer, it must be by insight into our own being. If man does repre-

sent the final (not yet completed) product of evolution, then, just as a machine produced out of a factory must reveal to an intelligent mind how it has come into existence, so also the human-complex must tell us the story of its own evolution right from its beginning. It is thus that "man is the measure of things", the "microcosm" that some ancient thinkers described it to be. It is man that must be the one key to solve the double-faced riddle of knowing and being. The more we understand ourselves the more will be our knowledge of things, animate *as well as* inanimate. It is man that is the soul of knowledge. This is the secret of the endeavour called Raja-Yoga in India, Introspection *par excellence*

Whatever our ignorance regarding inorganic nature and its laws, and even if we ignore the vast portion of the organic life at the earlier levels of evolution, if only we should strive to interpret what stands and must stand as the background in the life of well-evolved instincts, we may be able to see that instinct is very much more allied to our so-called intelligence than what may be evident on the surface. It is quite easy to conceive that it is the same principle that works at one level as instinct in the animal (man also is an animal) and at another is expressing itself as intelligence in man. Theories that try to account for instinct as a result or *product* of sundry actions (that *somehow* come) are like attempts to describe a circle without a centre. They are like "*parts*" accounting for the whole, when the whole has its own distinct individuality and the parts themselves obtain their meaning only from the whole. Such theories will not work *forward* to explain the formation of any instinct. They illustrate the proverbial "putting the cart before the horse". If we accept evolution as a fact of the process of *becoming* in nature, the living as well as the non-living, then there must be a whole, a unitary something, from which the process obtains meaning and intelligible status. The various activities and the corres-

ponding building up of forms are to be interpreted as the results inspired by an all-brooding and every-where-present principle, remaining as the one Source of Life and consciousness as well as accounting equally for the very formation of the original "lifeless atoms". It is as a sort of psychologist's fallacy that we attribute to each organism an individuality and separateness of its own and speak of it as prompted by instinct or as being itself intelligent. We forget that even our personality, is, on ultimate analysis, a camouflage, a myth, neither its beginning nor its ending being within *our* ken. We merely act and think as though we were individuals. It may be that the same Something that has worked out the inorganic world of "matter" with its various laws, and is the informing life of all the sub-human instinct-guided organisms, is also trying towards individualisation through "intelligent" action in man. In spite of all protestations to the contrary there is nothing that is one's *own* in the world either inorganic or organic. We have not yet become; we are yet in the process of becoming. A little introspection will convince any one that not only one does not know when and whence one has come into being as a conscious entity, but that one is equally ignorant and unconscious of the rising and fading of one's thoughts, and of where one is going to find one's end. A genius or a sinner can no more with any psychological honesty say that he is what he is by dint of himself than a fool or a sinner can account for himself by himself. All forms of existence from the lowest to the highest, the purely mechanical, the instinctive and the intelligent, are members of one and the same mighty structure of Life and Being, rooted in it and sustained by it. In instinct, therefore, as the immediate evolutionary predecessor, we ought to find the origins of intelligence,—the latter representing a process of centralising or being individualised of what, as the former, was working as an external and unconscious moulding principle. Our

intelligence, however, as it now stands, only just touches the fringe of such universal life from outside, -at the circumference. We are yet to enter into it, or rather it has yet to establish itself as a centre within our hearts that we may really know Life. Man represents the animal in whom the attempt has begun to be made to localise or focus the one Great Life that, up to man, was working externally, moulding and modelling the suitable forms of being. If God made man in His image, i.e, ideally and archetypally, it is man that "makes" God in His image *really* and *literally*. What the next step will be when man has become more of a complete being, when the centralising becomes more fully established, we can only conjecture. We have not yet had in our midst any human form as a specimen that could be declared in any definite sense as being conscious of itself as such. On the other hand we find at present that the higher the genius the greater is its unconsciousness. Even the inspired, the gifted and the so-called mystic are to that very extent, as the names themselves betray, unconscious only. From the high to the low we act more as mediums of the Unseen and the Unknown than as self-conscious and self-directing agents or entities. Starting therefore in instinct-life we are being moulded to become self-contained intelligences as the fruition of Evolution. What now works as intelligence or "knowledge" within each of us is only the Parent-principle of Life and Consciousness. It fulfils itself by making us its "Sons" sharing all the meaning and reality that is itself as the one source of all. Until then our knowing is only external, "objective" and determined from outside of ourselves, a knowing that can work only in relation to a something that stands always, "opposed" as an "other" to us. We merely find ourselves as somehow constituted to know and act. We are not yet in the possession of the Soul of knowing; the "subject" and the "object" of knowledge are not yet become *one* through the very act of knowing, but remain as *two*.

Let us now look at the problem from the other point of view, viz, that of the Evolving Parent principle—which finally is the same as that of the fulfilled individuality. To such a one there can be no knowing of a “what” that is as an “other” ; the process of knowing itself will consist in the unification of the object with the intelligence, the subject. The subject and object become as one. It is knowing by the process of becoming or rather being the very object itself. There, doubt and error find no place. The knower, the known and the knowing stand as one and the same. If from such a point of view we say we have known an “object” as for example, our own body, we become, as it were, the very body itself, the very units of the cells of our body with their various activities and inter-relations, *living* their very life both as parts and wholes. Such knowing will be a state of being at-one with the object in one’s consciousness ; while now it is as a picture show working quite unconsciously and externally to ourselves by the fiat of the one Great Life called ordinarily Nature. Such is the inner and central, the timeless and spaceless knowledge that we associate with Divinity alone. It is called the knowledge “Brahmic” in the Upanishads. We do not possess it now. We are “knowing” at present “mayavically” as external observers, as in a show. We are merely presented a panoramic *picture* of the process—leaving good room for theorisation,—we are not become the *substance* itself, the Thing-in-Itself. Hence we say we know now only unconsciously. Man as a higher animal is slowly evolving to be En-souled, to be the temple of the one Great soul of the Universe. He is now only the “flower” of evolution waiting to become the “fruit” that contains within it the very “seed of Existence”. It is but so, because in any fundamental sense there cannot be *but* one Soul, one Life, one I, that is also the Universe. There can be no other meaning metaphysically tenable for individuality—there cannot be two “absolutes” in the Universe. “By Its Light alone all these

shine", says an Upanishad. That unique single principle is called at once Brahman and Atman, the former meaning the Reality or Object and the latter the Subject, the Eternal knower, yet *one* only in every sense. It is at once the Soul of all-knowing and of all Being.

Broadly speaking we may note three important stages of Evolution in knowledge : the unconscious, the pseudo-conscious and the conscious. The first is what is working as the uniformities or laws of the inorganic and a large portion of the earliest organic world. The second comprises the whole of the reflex-instinct system of the later organic world up to the animal man. And the third is the future consummation of the evolution process in the completed man commencing with his intelligence-instinct. We may say that the very trend of evolution, viewed from the inner or central point, is progress from the unconscious to the fully self-conscious, just as from the biological point of view, that is of forms, it is one of change from a homogeneous and undifferentiated state to one of definiteness of structure and function. Form is the symbol externally of the definiteness in the stage of progress, and the perfection of form will therefore represent the goal of Evolution. Form has meaning and status only for Life, and conversely, Life without its form has no real existence. To speak of a life beyond and without any form will therefore be only an abstraction, a figure of speech, something that has not come to *exist*. Evolution would be a meaningless lie if the goal be considered as anything formless. We cannot therefore agree with any Vedantin or Buddhist that the goal of our life is a *post-mortem state* in some other "world" than here on Earth; but take it as what must be accomplished, completed and made to stand as a *fact* here, in the world of facts. The long and laborious process of evolution should otherwise appear as either childishness or lunacy. When the perfect

man is evolved, he stands as the *living* evidence of the so-called "Immortality".

From the above outline of the "Soul of Knowledge", of what we consider as the ideal hope of the Upanishadic thinkers, we may attempt to examine the significance of the idealistic "slogan" *Esse is percipi*, what is true about it and what false. It is easy to understand that it is only a psychological truism to say that the "being" of a thing for us is and can be only in terms of our experience, and that to speak of an existence in terms beyond such experience is psychologically at least *ultra vires*. This interpretation, however, does not help us any further as a theory of Reality. Of Reality as such, in terms of our ordinary knowing the statement is preposterous. We cannot agree with a Berkeleyan Idealism that shows scant respect to the normal "instinctive" distinction that man (let alone the brute, which is only an "idea" for Berkeley) makes between his subjective act of knowing and an objective being, that seems to voraciously swallow up all objects by simply knowing them, and that miserably impoverishes all reality by reducing it to "bare" human souls, a god and the play of "ideas" between them as if by a sort of miraculous wireless. It makes the story of evolution from the lowest to the highest forms a meaningless delusion. We would rather have a Leibnizian view that regards everything as at once both real and living. But from the point of view maintained here regarding *real* knowledge, the phrase *Esse is percipi* may be interpreted rather as containing a profound truth, as pointing out towards the very one-ness of knowing and being. While it is not true of the mere "mortal" man, it is utterly true of "divine" man. It is the "saving knowledge" of the Upanishads that the ultimate Subject is only one and the object is also Himself. We are not yet able to take up our stand at the centre of things to fully appreciate its significance; we seem to be roaming about round and the deluding circle at whose

centre lies the Soul of Existence, the Eternal Truth, Knowledge and Reality in unity, the Upanishadic Atman. Our highest scientific and philosophic achievements are yet only external "appearances". We have to get at the Heart of Reality, *be* It, to say that we have known. "That is the Atman", "That thou art" is the "*ultimate*" of the Upanishadic thought. It is only its implication that we have tried to outline here. The fruition of such knowledge when *real-ised* is called Mukthi or Liberation or rather Emancipation ; it is the Great Disillusionment. The liberation however should not be interpreted as escaping from existence into a non-being ; such escape is meaningless and impossible. Mukthi is not annihilation. It is the state of true *being*, or *positive* existence ; it is called *Sāsvatha* or *Eternity*. The liberation is rather from the present limitations of knowledge, from the illusion of separateness as of a "this" from a "that", of a "you" from a "me". The difference-seeing mind, the psychological "me" is merely the "negative", dependent and *mortal* self. It must be transcended ; it is not the Atman. Says an Upanishad "one who sees differences goes only from death to death".

The "soul of knowledge" stands for us as the Ideal. When it begins to work out *even in any one of us*, there and then shall the Earth and her humanity stand for ever blessed.

The Individual in Kant's Philosophy.

By

HUMAYUN Z. A. KABIR.

The preponderance of epistemological over ontological interests which characterises modern Philosophy may have begun with Locke, but it is in the Philosophy of Kant that this tendency reached its full development. Locke started with an enquiry into the nature of the human understanding, but this enquiry was merely preliminary to an examination of the objects of our awareness in order to determine their ontological nature and status. The recognition of substance as a mystical "I know not what", mysteriously characterised by primary or original qualities, remains as evidence of his inheritance from the ontological metaphysics of his predecessors.

For Kant the problem always was, not what things ultimately are, but how is it that knowledge is at all possible. Human knowledge is a process in time, coming about in a finite individual mind and yet it claims to hold true for all minds at all times. To explain this paradox, it is necessary to examine the judgment and its types, for knowledge exists in the medium of thought and the most fundamental act of thought is the Judgment. Kant thought that formal logic had completed the analysis of judgment as pure form in abstraction from all content of knowledge. All that was therefore left for him to do was merely to analyse thinking in its relation to knowledge of objects and this he proposed to do in his transcendental logic. This respect for formal logic did not however prevent him from altering its scheme wherever in conflict with that suggested by his own analysis. Though he was not aware of the fact himself, he is therefore the pioneer of the tendency, both to recognise more forms of judgment than are allowed in the scheme of formal logic and to minimise the

differences between them to one of degree rather than of kind, which is characteristic of modern logic.

The epistemological interest also explains why critical philosophy began with the Critique of Pure Reason. At this stage he thought that the empirical judgment of perception offered no difficulty, for in it the question of validity beyond the moment of experience did not arise. It expressed a particular perception of a particular finite mind at a definite point in the space-time order and carried its validity in the experience itself. He did not here raise the question that even this judgment involved a reference beyond the individual mind, for as the objective unity of given representations, it claimed acceptance from everyone, and was adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have merely subjective validity. Similarly he thought that the analytic judgment also offered no difficulty as its validity was guaranteed by the concept itself. But the judgments of Science were different, for they claimed universal validity like the analytic judgments, and yet like the judgments of perception, applied to objects of experience which are given to us as particular and finite. The answer of the first critique was that the unique nature of space and time explained this paradox, for their uniform, self-external and intuitive character made the application of the categories to the manifold of perception possible.

Now this is no doubt the position of common sense, analysed and made self-conscious. For, we have, on the one hand, merely general laws or pure forms of abstraction lying ready in the mind, and on the other, the manifold of disorganised sense data to supply the material for these forms. The categories are shown to be involved in the structure of experience as such, but even on Kant's own analysis, the categories by themselves are not adequate to the constitution of experience, and require a further intuitive element.

In the first critique, this intuitive element was assumed and characters attributed to it without any attempt at critical examination. Kant did not here even canvass the possibility, that if the manifold of sensations really was disorganised, it might refuse to submit to the forms which the categories sought to impose on it and thus destroy the possibility of experience itself. Now experience is no doubt an unquestionable fact and the starting point of Kantian as of all other philosophy, but the experience with which Kant started required the perceptual element no less than the categories.

The neglect of the perceptual element in the first critique is not however surprising, for Kant's main interest here was in the mathematical sciences. The individual instance or case is not considered sufficiently, because for Science it is the similarity of the class rather than the peculiarities of the members of the class which is important. But the class concept implies some recognition of the idiosyncrasies of the individual members of the class, at least in noticing their significant resemblances to one another in contrast with their important differences from members of other classes. Though with the progress of Science, the perceptual element tends to become less and less explicit, judgments of science are yet possible only on the presupposition of previous judgments of perception.

In conformity with the tradition of rationalist philosophy, the first critique began with an implicit belief in the adequacy of Reason to know the real, through its final conclusion was that intelligence could not go beyond what was given by perception and the categories were valid only of the empirical. But Kant did not in the light of this result examine his original assumption of the *thing-in-itself* and his insistence upon it as the noumenal reality remained to prove that, for Kant, it was merely the limitation of the human intelligence which prevented the attainment of the rationalist ideal. This Kant expressed by saying that the categories

give knowledge only of the phenomena, because the human Understanding is not intuitive but must have intuitions given to it from some other source.

The Understanding gives knowledge, but the knowledge it gives is general and abstract. Strictly speaking, it gives only the form of knowledge rather than actual knowledge, for the general divorced from the particular is a mere abstraction. Its *a priori* constitutive principles have universal validity, but when we come to examine the territory where the Understanding rules, we find that it gives the barest skeleton or framework, which can be filled up only by what actual experience gives.

This neglect of the perceptual or individual carries with it its own nemesis. For the principle of mechanical causation which is exalted in the first critique leads in the end to its own negation. In causation, we start by premising that we must not regard the nature of things as determined by their spatio-temporal positions, but their time and space relations as determined by their nature. This however cannot be their nature—merely as parts of a series, for they could not be even parts of a series unless they were something more than mere parts, for a system of relations without *relata* is a contradiction in terms. Yet in causation we state relations of things and the more we extend the causal chain, the more do things lose their independent individuality and become merely determined points in a space-time order. The perceptual element seems to become less and less important, till at last, the whole or reality is sought to be represented as the quantitative function of some element whose quality is neutral or indifferent. Change itself becomes impossible as the result of this attempt to reduce everything to a synthesis of the homogeneous. There are no qualitative differences among the elements of reality to allow for change from one quality to another, and quantitatively, its magnitude

remains constant, so that the process of explaining change comes in the end to denying change altogether. "In the Absolute there is no change."

The importance of the individual character of things is more explicit in the case of the dynamical categories, because they deal with the synthesis of the heterogeneous, for which the most important element to consider is the specific character of the object. That is why Kant regards them as regulative, not constitutive principles of the understanding in respect of perception, for they prescribe the form, but cannot anticipate our actual sensations. The mathematical principles are on the contrary constitutive, because they are involved in our perception of even space and time and the homogeneity of the time and space order guarantees that there must be a certain homogeneity in all that we can experience. Now, individual experience can be understood only against a background of a whole of possible experiences and is determined in its spatio-temporal relations by the one common spatio-temporal order of all experience.

This distinction between constitutive and regulative principles is important for Kant, as it distinguishes him from both the dogmatist and the sceptic. For the dogmatist, all *a priori* principles are constitutive, while the sceptic recognises no constitutive principles at all, but regards them all as merely regulative of experience. Kant, by recognising the two types, tried to make room for both the regularity and the novelty of the world, and explain at the same time the distinction between Reason and the Understanding. The conclusion of the Dialectic was that antinomies arise because the Ideas of Reason are taken to be constitutive. Reason demands the unconditioned totality, and thus prescribes the aim and sets the limit to the

work of the Understanding, but the Understanding is left to do the actual work of collecting data and systematising our experience. Reason deals, not with the individual, but with the system which the Understanding has built up by the application of the categories. Reason by itself has therefore merely the form of a system to which the matter is supplied by the work of the Understanding.

But if Reason gives merely the form of an empty system, Judgment is in no better case. For Kant, Judgment is essentially empirical, as it is concerned with the concrete exemplified in the individual act of apprehension. It is the power of applying the rule to particular cases or of finding the rule for particular given instances, so that the alive, elusive element in perception which we call feeling belongs essentially to Judgment. But in the first critique, Kant considers the faculty from only one of these two possible points of view,—as the faculty of applying a given rule to particular cases, or in other words, subsuming a particular instance under a given law. This however is characteristic of Deduction and Kant calls it the Determining Judgment. There is however the other type of empirical judgment, corresponding to Induction, in which the particular instance is given and we have to find out the law under which it can be subsumed. Now the distinction between the types is one of degree, for most empirical judgments are both determining and regulative, both use a concept and help to make one. The emphasis on the Determining to the neglect of the Regulative Judgment in the first critique can therefore be explained only by Kant's failure to draw the necessary implications of his limitation of the categories to the empirical, for this involves that the sensible individual element is as essential to knowledge as the abstract law.

The whole emphasis in the first critique is therefore on the Understanding, for the function of Reason in defining the end

is not adequately recognised, while Judgment is treated only from the point of view of the Determining Judgment which is hardly distinguishable from the Understanding. Reason deals with Reality as a system but presupposes that the work of the Understanding has been completed. This is a condition that can never be satisfied for men, for under the influence of the Ideas of Reason, the Understanding goes on continually extending the chain of conditions in its attempt to reach the unconditioned totality. But the principle of mechanical causation in itself involves contradiction, for we have seen that causality is unthinkable unless there is an element of spontaneity or freedom somewhere; and yet, the principle of mechanical causation is adequate to applying the categories in all empirical knowledge, as we know and can know things, not in their individual character, but only in their relation to other things.

The first critique therefore ends with the problem of the relation of the general principle of causation to the particular specific causal laws. It has established the validity of the *a priori* constitutive principles of knowledge, but cannot explain their application to the details of experience. This distinction is not merely that between form and matter, as Kant at one time tended to suggest. It is impossible to regard the second element as mere matter without form, for it obviously has laws and connections of its own, and explains the possibility of starting with the individual and from an examination of its own specific character, describing and classifying it in its relations to other individuals. This however is not recognised in the first critique whose final conclusion is that the Understanding gives us knowledge but not of the individual.

In the second critique, Kant attempts to go beyond the abstract universal of the Understanding by the realisation of the individual from the realm of conduct. The importance of Reason also becomes clearer, though the

confusion between the Understanding and the Reason still persists in the insistence upon rule or law. Side by side with this emphasis on the rule, morality which is the product of Reason as such, is seen to be self-legislation. In the first critique, the distinction between the subjective and the objective with regard to knowledge was that the objective was perception according to a law,—the law being somehow given by the *thing in-itself*. In the second critique, there is the parallel distinction between the particular and the universal in conduct,—only the universal and objective character of the moral act is due, not to any external compelling force, but to the nature of Reason itself. The positive character of Reason as, not merely regulative but also constitutive, becomes more explicit here, and its contribution in experience is recognised. Though Reason in morals is concerned with the individual, it however gives us no knowledge, for knowledge is confined to the empirical which is governed through and through by the causal law. We therefore know and can know things; not as individuals exhibiting freedom or spontaneity, but only as determined links in a chain of mechanical necessity. On the other hand, they cannot be even the links of a causal chain unless they have an individual nature which determines their spatio-temporal relations and is not determined by them, so that reality must be regarded as a system which exhibits causality and freedom simultaneously. We cannot however know this freedom, for freedom belongs to things only in their character as individuals in the noumenal realm, while we know them only in their relations to one another as parts of the phenomenal world. If however there be any sphere where we deal with things as individuals, we shall there be dealing with things as free and this is what occurs in conduct.

So far Kant's solution is that the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves explains how causality and freedom may and must be regarded as both applicable to reality, though in its different spheres. It is however no real solution, for it makes the relation between them even more difficult to understand. Besides, the restriction of the two categories to two different and mutually exclusive spheres of reality reopens the very problem which the recognition of the dual categories sought to solve. For we have seen that mechanical causation is itself inconceivable without an element of freedom or spontaneity in the terms between which the relation holds; on the other hand, the noumenal objects¹ characterised by freedom remain outside our knowledge, and can appear to our consciousness only as parts of the phenomenal world governed by the law of causal necessity. The argument for spontaneity based on the fact that the individual nature of a thing must determine its time and space relations applies to all things which are individual, and therefore to nature as well as to man. On the other hand, the fact that individual things appear only as parts in a system demands strict causal connection among them.

Reality then must be regarded as a system in which the parts are both determined by their relation to the whole and also determine the whole in virtue of their individual character. In such a system, the adherence of the different members to the system need not be uniform, so that the whole may determine and be determined by the different parts in different degrees. But the sharp distinction between freedom and necessity made any explicit recognition of degrees of freedom impossible for Kant, for his position involved that the individual was

and must be regarded as purely individual. It could not be a member in any causal series and hence was also entirely free, but that meant that it had no character at all, for whatever had a determinate nature, must to that extent have limitations imposed upon its freedom of manifestations. Further, the sharp division between the phenomenal and the moral world required that the principle of moral actions must, even in details, be deduced from the pure form of the moral law. The law of morality therefore furnished its own particulars, so that there was and could be no conflict of duties. According to Kant, the difficulty therefore lay in deciding to act according to the law of freedom rather than by the law of causality, so that once this conflict was resolved, there was no difficulty in knowing the dictate of the moral law in any given case. This is obviously a mechanistic interpretation of human action, for in it the motive of duty is opposed to the phenomenal motives and they are compared to two opposing forces acting on the will. The attempt at complete divorce of freedom from mechanism thus results in the application of the category of causality to the sphere which is peculiarly that of freedom.

Nevertheless, in Kant's threefold meaning of 'freedom', there is some suggestion that he vaguely felt the need of some concept like that of degrees of freedom. In the antinomoy, freedom means merely the spontaneity of all *things-in-themselves*, but we have already seen that the spontaneity cannot belong to individuals merely in their noumenal character but must also belong to them as objects of the phenomenal world. Freedom gets a more specific meaning when it is regarded as the peculiar attribute of moral beings,—the differentia which distinguishes man from physical objects and suggests that, though subject to the mechanical laws of the phenomenal world, he is

at the same time free as an individual in the realm of *things-in-themselves*. Man is not, however, always conscious of his noumenal character, and hence by a still stricter interpretation, freedom is confined to man only when he acts in a very particular and exceptional way, namely out of reverence for the law which is the product of Reason as such. The law of morality therefore emerges as self-legislation and moral acts are distinguished from particular actions demanded by inclinations and desires phenomenally caused. Yet the law is expressed as a categorical imperative, a command that is addressed to the will, and like all commands, suggests a duality between the source of the command and those to whom it is addressed. Thus even at this stage, there is a suggestion of externality in Kant's conception of the Reason, a suggestion due to the exaltation of the abstract rule at the cost of the concrete individual case.

The third critique is an attempt to soften the distinctions which the first two critiques had made too rigid, by showing that both the Understanding and the Reason require, though in different ways, a living individual element in thought. Knowledge of the Understanding, because it was concerned with relations, neglected the individual, as, for its purpose, no one thing was more individual than another. Morality was the expression of the individual will, but according to the law of Reason, which, as noumenal, was indifferent to the actual results of the action in the phenomenal world and remained beyond the reach of our human knowledge. Thus the Understanding gives knowledge, but not of the individual: the Reason is concerned with the individual but gives no knowledge. The Judgment is therefore invoked to explain the relation of the two, for the Judgment is concerned with the individual and yet gives knowledge.

Kant describes his task in the third critique to be the discussion of two problems concerning the application of law to the individual case. The relation of the sphere of causality to that of freedom, and, the task of knowing the details of experience, are both problems which depend for their comprehension on an adequate understanding of that, which is individual in the sense that it cannot be fully explained by anything beyond itself and yet at the same time manifests law, i. e., has a universal aspect which necessarily transcends its existence as a mere particular. The main defect of mechanism as a principle is that it offers and can offer no explanation of individuality, but reduces it to a mere point in a mechanical order. This makes change itself inconceivable, and it becomes imperative to find some way of regarding objects as individuals and yet related to other objects. Freedom as expounded in the second critique satisfies the first condition, but only at the cost of the second. The third critique tries to solve this problem by an examination of art, for art is concerned with the individual and yet it obviously exhibits law or form, though law or form of a kind which cannot be divorced from its individual manifestations.

The advance in the third critique is that the principles of the hypothetical Reason become the principles of the Regulative Judgment, with come into play as soon as we begin to consider the individual, not after we have already determined and described it. The Regulative Judgment starts with the individual and tries to relate it to the whole of our knowledge by describing it in its true character. Out of the indefinite number of resemblances and differences to other things which result from the infinite aspects of any individual thing, only some are vital for our knowledge. An ordinary empirical judgment about an individual thing is an answer to a definite, determinate question,

in which the concept comes first and the judgment is merely determinant. At first sight, it seems that the only alternative to such a judgment is the casual noticing of some accidental difference or resemblance. We seem, however, to find a third possibility in the aesthetic judgment, for it is not determined by a concept and yet seems to express the true nature of a thing and claim universal validity. An artistic representation of an object answers no questions as to whether the object is this or that, and yet calls attention to resemblances and characteristics which are recognised by all as significant of its truest character.

Reason is fully creative here, for there is no longer any suggestion of an abstract rule which comes to it as a command from some external source. The necessity is now its own necessity, and the law merely the expression of its own nature in instances where form cannot be divorced from matter. The emergence of the Regulative Judgment brings with it the further recognition that the spontaneous creative activity of the mind is necessary, not merely to think of the unconditioned totality which the Reason seeks to know, but also for the awareness of the barest particular which the Understanding grasps by the application of the categories. We now know that within the limits of the constitutive principles of the Understanding which make knowledge possible, there is room or rather necessity for the regulative use of the principles of Judgment, whose results must agree with the former principles though they are not and cannot be deduced from them. So, in the conduct, the categorical imperative is seen to be, not a command to, but an expression of the nature of Reason itself, and the laws of morality, not deductions from but only in accordance to it. For, the symbol of morality is beauty in which the individual displays form or law. Only it is a law by which the individual cannot be deduced from the general law, but is the only

way in which the general law can be manifested or understood. Art is significant and is recognised by all to be significant, without being significant of anything which we can experience in any way other than by art itself.

The Cardinal Principle Of Idealism

BY

HANUMANTA RAO

I

It is said that a good cause suffers more often by its adherents than by its opponents. Of no other thing could this be spoken with greater truth than of idealism in recent times. It is difficult to find any one who has any serious concern in life who does not love ideals and hitch his wagon to them. Idealism is the most natural and normal attitude of man. Yet, it is strange that philosophers should be at such great pains to defend it. The reason is not far to seek. If one looks at the literature on idealism that has grown up within the past decade or two, it will be found that much of it is by way of its defence and the defence has invariably been the defence of some corner of it rather than the central shrine. When philosophers speak in the name of idealism, they are no longer stressing the cardinal principle of idealism but each of them is striving to put up his own favourite idea as the cardinal principle of Idealism. The time has therefore come, for persons interested in idealism, to seek the cardinal principle of idealism and to state it in clear terms.

II

What is the cardinal principle of Idealism ? Is it absolutism ? Is it Mysticism ? Is it Theism ? Is it the epistemological assumption that the world as a system of interrelated things is "Idea" ?

1. It cannot be Absolutism, for all idealists are not Absolutists. No one will admit that if Absolutism should fall with it idealism would fall also. Besides, experience does not warrant either the urgency or the reality of the absolute. On the admission of the Absolutists themselves, the Absolute is nowhere actually realised, nor is there any chance of its being realised as such at any time. Such an entity is far removed

from experience to be true to experience. All that experience directly delivers to us is an ideal element that is immanent in the actual. All that we are warranted to assert is that the reality of the actual facts of experience lies in their being expressions of the concretely and practically possible. Everything that we come across in experience is seen as arising from an ideal impulse, unconscious in the main but tending to become conscious here and there. Facts do not stop at being mere facts, but tend to become more of themselves. This principle of self-transcendence, the tendency of things to rise on their dead selves, the tendency to perpetual resurrection, is all that experience reveals and that is all that is necessary as a working principle to render experience intelligible. To assert more than this is to assert the pure possible, not the possible that is actually realised and realisable. Absolutism tends to make philosophy speculative, transcendental, and preposterous in theory and unprogressive in practice. Even if we admit the absolute as a philosophic principle for the sake of argument, the assumption leaves us no better to-day than it left us in the days of Plato. To have recourse to the Absolute as a solution of life's problems is like a person in financial difficulties having recourse to day-dreaming as a solution of his economic problems. What experience needs for the solution of its problems is a dynamic whole that transforms the possible into the actual, a whole in the construction of which our thought and will are exercised from time to time, a whole which when thus constructed leaves us intellectually, economically, ethically and religiously in a better position. The chief defect of Absolutism is that it asserts a mere unverifiable possibility or as Newton said, a *hypothesis non fingo*. What is needed is a working programme or, in the phraseology of science, a working postulate which we may check and verify and record progress.

2. If Absolutism cannot be the cardinal principle of Idealism, may it be mysticism? It cannot be mysticism either. For mysticism is not what a philosophy starts with or works with; it is something which it has recourse to in the last resort. It cannot be asserted as philosophy though a philosopher may have to assent to it when he is at his wit's end. This is not to disparage mysticism. Mysticism has its own legitimate place—perhaps, a place higher than the one assigned to philosophy, but it has no place in philosophy as a philosophic principle.

3. Nor can theism be the cardinal principle of idealism. Theism is more a postulate of religion rather than of philosophy. To make theism the chief principle of a philosophy is to allow religion to reign supreme in philosophy. This militates against the catholicity that should characterise all genuine Philosophy.

4. The epistemological assumption that the world as an intelligible whole is an idea, has in recent years played so important a rôle in the history of idealism that it has technically come to be recognised as the cardinal principle of idealism. It is no doubt true that the assumption is epistemologically important, and idealistic philosophers have striven hard to develop it. But the stress that has been laid upon it so as to make it the cardinal principle of idealism, is out of all proportion to its real importance. The fact that much thought and effort has been expended in developing and elaborating it from the days of Descartes down to our time, does not entitle it to be called the cardinal principle of idealism. It can at best be regarded as one of the important features of the idealistic programme. It was the peculiar epistemological turn that Descartes gave to modern philosophy that is responsible for making much of it. The

fact that such a turn was given does not make it valid. An ethical or religious turn might as well have been given and that would not have justified our making an ethical idea or a religious idea the cardinal principle of idealism. Just as it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted, if an ethical or religious conception is made its cardinal principle, even so it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted if it would make an epistemological assumption its central assumption. For a healthy philosophy, epistemology should be no more important than physics, or ethics or religion. Each of them is a basis of philosophy, not the basis of philosophy. It is the aim of philosophy to evolve a conception of the universe that explains and unifies the manifold forms of experience. To unify experience in terms of any one of these is to turn away from the true aim of philosophy. Such a procedure has tended to make idealistic philosophy sectarian, and it has left us without a cardinal principle that could serve as a common platform for idealists to meet. Each idealist in trying to make his own bias—epistemological¹, ethical², aesthetic³ or religious⁴,—the principle basis of idealism, has contributed to the disintegration of idealism. It is of utmost importance for the revival and reintegration of idealism to create a platform wide enough for idealists of different interests and temperaments to meet and work in a co-operative spirit.

III

What should such a cardinal principle be? What should be its main features?

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- (1). Bradley and Bosanquet have made the epistemological bias the principal basis of idealism.
2. Soreley and schiller have made the ethical . . . „
3. Fawcett has made the aesthetic . . . „
4. James Seth and Pringle Pattison have made the religious „

1. It is essential for idealism to be what it is to conceive reality as a dynamic whole which has the actual and the possible as its inseparable aspects. The actual has no meaning apart from the possible and the possible has no meaning apart from the actual. The actual was the possible of yesterday and the possible is the actual of tomorrow. Experience is the dialectical back-and-forth movement from the actual-possible to the possible-actual. As Tennyson has conceived it :

“Experience is an arch wherethro’

Gleams that untravalled world whose margin fades

For ever and ever, when I move.”

2. Reality as a dynamic whole of actual-possible is at once individual-universal ; It is a whole in which the individual and universal are inseparably related—the individual enriching the universal and the universal enlarging the individual.

3. Reality as actual-possible, individual-universal is also a unity in diversity.

4. It reveals three important features characteristic of a self-freedom, creativity and conservation of values.

(a) It is characterised by freedom in so far as everything that we experience is instinct with a tendency to become more of itself, a tendency to express itself more fully, a tendency to transcend itself.

(b) It is creative by virtue of the fact that every whole is characterised by a certain freshness and novelty that cannot be explained merely in terms of the antecedent factors that condition it. Though everything has had a past and is largely determined by it, yet it is never completely bound down by it. Everything has immanent in it the creative energy whereby it can transform itself and give to itself a freshness and vitality that can never be analysed into its antecedent factors, however thorough our analysis might be. No philosopher has done so

much to bring home this feature of reality as Herni Bergson, perhaps, with the exception of a person like Bertrand Russell. It has won recognition at the hands of almost every contemporary philosopher—idealistic, realistic and pragmatistic. In the philosophies of such eminent realists like S. Alexander, Llyod Morgan and A. N. Whitehead it has come to figure as the fundamental feature of reality.

(c) It has a tendency to conservation of values. This tendency is implied by its freedom and creativity. There cannot be creation unless there is conservation. Every creative act has a back and forth glance; it implies at once the realisation of a value that is new and the conservation of a value that is old. In fact, the one is possible only in and through the other.

These attributes of freedom, creativity, conservation are true not of any one part of reality, but apply to all life and being. They are true no less of stocks and stones than they are of human beings. The stone has a value to conserve even as a saint has a value to conserve, though of course the value that is conserved by the stone is different from the value that is conserved by the saint. There is a tendency to outgrow the actual in the stone as well as in the saint, though the forms in which the stone expresses this tendency are different from the forms in which the saint expresses it. There is a norm on the plane of matter, just as there is a norm on the plane of life or consciousness and deviations from the norm are as numerous in the one case as in the other. Just as we say that a certain person has a more highly evolved intelligence than another, even so we say of a piece of matter that it is more highly evolved than another. Evaluation is not peculiar to only certain forms of science, but is common and crucial to all science. So long as science is concerned with the

interrelation of facts and all facts are not on the same level, it is inevitable that it should evaluate. You cannot study the idiot or even call one an idiot, unless you place him in relation to a normal man. You cannot study actual facts as actual facts unless you study the ideal also, for the ideal is one of the actual forms. Nor can you study the ideal as ideal unless you study the actual, for the actual is one of the ideal forms. It may be that such a view of science may appear startling, but it is coming into vogue in scientific circles and is known as the Gestalt or configurationist view of science.

IV

Such, in its broad features, is the cardinal principle of idealism. It emphasises such features only as are absolutely necessary to idealism and only such as are necessary to form an idealistic platform. The principle as thus formulated must have for its programme (1) the detailed working of it with reference to every field of experience—scientific, artistic, economic, ethical and religious; (2) the placing of each of these studies in their proper relation, so that physics may not usurp the place of psychology, psychology of ethics, ethics of religion and so on, and (3) the evolving of a conception that will tend to reveal reality as a self-expanding universal with distinct but complementary dimensions like the annamayakośa, prāṇamayakośa, manomayakośa, vijñāmayakośa and ānandamayakośa of the upanisadic Brahman; (4) the statement, from time to time, of the progress that has been achieved in working out this fundamental postulate and the modification, if necessary, of the postulate itself in the light of growing experience. If this last fact is overlooked, idealism will cease to comprehend the possible in its actual forms and would degenerate into apriorism and formalism.

Philosophy would then cease to be the "empirical study of the apriori", and would become the apriori study of the apriori.

V

Conceived thus, idealism will gain in strength and vitality. It will considerably weaken opposition in so far as each of the fundamental human interests—*aesthetic*, *scientific*, *economic*, *ethical* and *religious*, is given its proper place on the idealistic platform. It would not be inconsistent for an idealist to be a scientist as well as a theist, a logician as well as a mystic. Just as being a scientist does not come in the way of one's enjoying a novel or a poem though the novel or poem is not science, even so, being a scientist does not prevent his heart from going up to God even though God is studied by other methods than those that physics employs. Similarly, being a logician does not prevent one from becoming a mystic though the method of mysticism is not the method of logic. Though I should admit that if a thing is to be known it should be known according to the laws of logic, yet I am not prevented from giving myself up to feeling when knowing fails to put me in possession of reality. If idealism is worked out in a catholic spirit as a method of viewing things, it may even win many a realist to the side of idealism. Though it would take a long time for persons like B. Russell to come under the sway of idealism, it would not take a long time for persons like S. Alexander, Llyod Morgan and A. N. Whitehead to come under its banner. Then we could say with Croce that all philosophy is essentially idealistic philosophy.

The Empirical Tradition in Bradley's Logic.

BY

R. N. KAUL.

In a recent publication by Prof. Muirhead, entitled '*The Platonic tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*' we find a masterly analysis of the development of thought, as it took place in the works of F.H. Bradley beginning from the date of his first publication in 1875 of a Pamphlet, which was "long out of print and even out of reach in Second-hand-book stores", viz. '*The pre-suppositions of Critical History*'. Prof. Muirhead rightly points out that even in this early work of Bradley, though Hegel's name is not mentioned, it is not difficult to discover the essentially Hegelian trend of argument. Bradley himself tells us in the Preface that the essay was suggested to him by reading C. F. Baur's "*Epochen der Christlichen Geschichte-beschreibung*" which work was itself inspired by the Hegelian conception of History. This early work, together with "*Ethical Studies*" and the essay on "*Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism*" which appeared in 1876 and 1877 respectively mark the first phase of Bradley's thought. These essays went to form the foundation of the Idealistic contribution that Bradley was destined to make towards the Development of British Metaphysic.

2. But with the publication of his "Principles of Logic" in 1883, a new era in the history of Bradley's thought begins. It is true that this monumental work stands unique in the history of modern thought in general and in the development of logical doctrine in England in particular. It stands aloof and apart from the general confusion prevailing both among English and German writers about the sphere and scope of Logic. In England in particular the confusion was worse confounded by the writings of the Empiricists such as

J. S. Mill and Prof. Bain, and by "the psychological method" which they had inherited from their brilliant predecessors, Locke, Berkely and Hume. The use of the term "idea" in a rather loose and vague sense was one of the prevailing confusions. Owing to the psychological attitude prevalent, an idea meant a state of consciousness, a subjective entity existing in our heads, and judgment, like Association, meant the linking of these isolated atoms, on the analogy of physical or chemical principles. It is no wonder then that in logical theories of judgment and inference, current at the time, this fictitious atomism of the idea crept in almost as a matter of course and right, and gave rise to disastrous results. Thus Bradley was compelled to start by clearing up this confusion in the use of the term 'idea' and he does so by the statement that for logical purposes we have to take 'ideas' in a particular sense viz. Symbols. To Explain what he means, he makes a three-fold distinction between (i) existence (ii) content and (iii) meaning. Every idea has the first and the second aspect, but it is with its third aspect viz. its meaning, that the Logician is concerned. For logic all ideas are signs used for the sake of their meaning or significance. "The idea, in the sense of mental image, is a sign of the idea in the sense of meaning."

3. Having thus cleared up the ambiguity in the use of the term 'idea' Bradley proceeds to define Judgment as the reference of an ideal content to reality. This general theory in itself was a great advance on the Empirical Logic of Judgment, current in English thought of the period, and there is no doubt of the new departure in logical doctrine which Bradley signalises, whether we trace it to the immediate influence of Hegel or to the remote influence of the Platonic tradition as Prof. Muirhead characterises it. Without denying the presence of this influence in Bradley's logical doctrine the aim of this paper is to trace the remnants of English Empiricism in his modified logical theory of Judgment. The presence of this

element in Bradley's thought seems to strike us more and more, as we stumble again and again on passages where he sweeps aside not only the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of thought and reality, but also the Platonic suggestion that "our sensuous presentation may be misrepresentation that cannot give fact." That famous passage in his *Principle of Logic* which is perhaps the most frequently quoted in modern idealistic literature remains as a striking reminder to us of his empirical and dualistic tendencies. "That the glory of this world in the end is appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour ; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstraction, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we cannot embrace them. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more *make* that Whole which commands our devotion than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful".

4. This change of front, this backsliding, as it were, puzzled even the most sympathetic and understanding of his readers. Bosanquet, in his "*Knowledge and Reality*" a criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, which appeared in 1885 writes "If I have read Mr. Bradley right, he joins a thorough understanding of the ideal of knowledge to a peculiar impatience of something, *I do not quite know what*, in the ordinary doctrine of relativity". It was only natural that a hostile critic should suspect Bradley of playing fast and loose with a double standard—on the one hand, that of a stable intellectual construction ; on the other, that of correspondence with *sense-given* fact. In the words of Bosanquet, Bradley "cherishes a deep discontent with any effort to resolve reality into an intellectual movement". "Only a rich man may wear

a bad coat and only a philosopher of Mr. Bradley's force should escape suspicion of a crude dualistic realism."

(Kn & Reality ; P. 18)

5. But we regret to note that even Bosanquet did not hold himself high enough to escape pollution from the empirical touch. Even he, while formulating a theory of judgment in his "*Logic*", seems to grant a dual nature to judgment and thought in general. All judgments are no doubt the developments of significant contents, but this is not their complete nature. They have also another side or aspect—which appears as 'my judgment' or 'your judgment' qua mine or yours respectively. They are mental occurrences or processes and events in time in the life-history of a sentient being. Bosanquet sometimes distinguishes the two as the internal or external aspects of judgment.¹ "Thus the duration of the judgment as a transition in time is, so to speak, its external aspect, the aspect which, as a whole, it presents when compared with other occurrences in consciousness."² The fact, however, that Bosanquet calls these aspects 'internal' and 'external' shows that he is prepared to give the latter only a secondary importance. In fact, as a logician, he has to disregard it as more or less irrelevant.

6. *Bradley's Logic : Terminal Essays (1922) : the same contrast appears.*

Again, in Bradley we find the same idea implied throughout in his treatment of judgment. But it is in the "*Terminal Essays*", added to the second edition of his *Logic*, that we find a clear and explicit statement about it. It is important to see that this view, appearing in an explicit form, in Bradley's latest writings, was not a result of his immature thought, but on the contrary is a fundamental and essential part of his system to which he clung in his maturest work.

(1) *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 95.

(2) *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 82.

7. *Aspect of truth as "psychical occurrence": the "personal" aspect, not confined to a particular person.*

Truth, according to Bradley, necessarily implies an aspect of psychical existence, — it must happen and occur in a mind and must exist as a mental event.³ But if judgments are recognised as things which somehow or other exist *in my head or psychically as events in me*, there is an obvious objection, because they would then seem to depend, at least to some extent, upon my activity.⁴ Bradley seems to have found some difficulty in accepting this psychical factor without more explanation. And he adds that he does not mean that "this psychical existence is *"merely mine"* or that my activity is not essentially also the "activity of the Universe."⁵ In a different context he shows that the objection is made on the assumption that "whatever is, is mine only." Judgment or inference is not vitiated on this ground because inasmuch as the real whole works in and through me, its activity and mine are identified. "And hence to take the personal aspect as implying confinement to a particular person is a fundamental error."⁶

8. *Logic compelled to abstract from an important aspect of truth. Hence a special science, coordinate with and complementary to Psychology.*

Thus Bradley is quite clear in his mind about the distinction between the content of the judgment and its psychical duration. As every judgment is a psychical event it must have duration, and to ignore or deny wholly the existence of this aspect is to commit a serious

(3) *Principles of Logic* p. 612.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 631.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 632.

(6) *Ibid.*, P. 615.

error.' But this distinction has a fundamental importance for Bradley's antithesis between the point of view of Logic and that of Psychology. And the implication in Bosanquet's distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' aspect of judgment is clearly worked out by Bradley into the explicit assertion that for logic, the aspect of judgment as a psychical event is irrelevant. "Every judgment may be taken to involve a psychical lapse and succession, but this aspect of its existence falls outside of the *judgment as logical*."⁸ Thus logic is compelled to abstract from a certain necessary aspect of judgment, and in so doing, it falls into the position of a special science. Psychology, on the other hand, deals with judgment as psychical lapse and succession, abstracting from the content and meaning. Both are equally abstract and defective, and "if we could have a view of the world which was wholly intelligible, then the logical and the psychical side of any truth would not only be necessary each in its own way, but the connection of both would follow also as a result from intelligible premises."⁹ Bradley thus comes to the conclusion that logic should not attempt to "struggle with final difficulties", because it is clearly beyond its scope as a special science.

9. *The nature of the abstraction: the naive realism of "event" implied*

At this point it seems that we should pause for a moment and reflect on the nature of this abstraction, which logic employs and by which it is doomed to remain perpetually one of the special sciences; as ultimately

(7) *Essays, Truth and Reality.* p. 403.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 389.

(9) *Principles of Logic* (T. E.) p. 612.

defective and provisional as the rest. According to Bradley, Logic deals only with the 'contents' of judgments, leaving out their temporal aspect, the aspect of their happening or occurring as events in the human soul. But we have to ask the question, Does this supposed temporal aspect really add anything to the totality of our judgments? If it does and we can make out what the addition is, surely it will, ipso facto, become a content or meaning. And, on the other hand, if it does not really add anything, nor can we make any sense out of it (for fear of turning it into 'content') in what way does it exist? The same conclusion is forced upon us if we ask what empty duration of a process is and how we can study it. We can study the development of contents and meanings, but as soon as we have abstracted from them, we find that there is nothing left to study. The whole situation seems strikingly unreal like shadows. The 'shadows' in our discussion are the 'events', which have been taken over into the realm of 'mind' from the popular physical conception of them. The rising and setting of the sun are physical events, and so it is argued that my '*thinking*' about a philosophical argument is an analogous mental event. But as soon as we move out of this native realism which makes the physical event an independent happening in the physical world (whether there be any mind to conceive it or not), we find that we have removed the only foundation there could possibly be for creating a new fiction, viz. that of a mental event or a happening in the soul. Just as there is no independent nature in the event called 'rising of the sun' apart from the *meaning* it has for the conceiving mind, similarly there is no independent aspect of my 'thinking' a particular thought, apart from the meaning and significance of the thought itself.

10. *Bradley's distrust of Hegelianism — a possible reason for Bradley's distinction.*

Indeed, the whole situation seems so fantastic that it might have been suspected that it is not worth while wasting one's time and labour in discussing it, had it not been for the fact that thinkers like Bradley and Bosanquet, who have been among the greatest champions in Modern Philosophy in dispelling these shadows and illusions, have themselves unconsciously fallen a prey to them. And it seems that it would repay one's labour, if one could trace the origin of a confusion in the writings of such distinguished thinkers.

What, then, could have been the aim and purpose of Bradley, for instance, in maintaining the untenable distinction between the two aspects of judgment? It might be suggested (though of course the suggestion is only a surmise and should be taken for what it is worth) that one of the reasons which consciously or unconsciously influenced Bradley in this matter was his irreconcilable distrust of Hegelianism. Though he never claims to have mastered Hegel's system perfectly, yet so far as he understood it, he could not accept what seemed to him an essential part of that system.¹⁰ "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if 'thinking' is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational ... the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism ... our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more *make* that whole which commands our devotion, than some

(10) *Principles of Logic* ; Preface to First Edition, p. x.

shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful."¹¹

11. *The attempt to save Individuality by preserving the temporal aspect of judgment*

The general relation of Thought and Reality in Bradley and Bosanquet is outside the scope of this paper,¹² but here we have to see how far that attitude was responsible for their theory of judgment. It seems that Bradley was anxious to retain the individuality of finite judgments, qua 'mine' and 'yours', in the absolute system of judgments. And for this purpose, he found that mere distinctions of content between one judgment and another were not enough. It is true that our judgments, all being finite and fragmentary, are different from one another and it is in and through this finite diversity that the identity of the Absolute Judgment is manifested, yet if we regard this distinction as one of content only, we cannot distinguish between 'my' judgment and 'yours.' 'My' judgment has an individuality not qua mine, but qua 'judgment manifesting a finite content' and the personal pronoun becomes purely irrelevant in any ultimate sense. When Bradley emphasised the temporal aspect of judgment, it seems to me that he was really anxious to preserve its *personal* aspect intact. And at first sight it appears that Bradley's suspicion was not wholly unjustifiable. Because to rob the personal pronoun of all meaning for the Absolute Reality seems to be falling into the most abstract Pantheism; and if we regard finite minds as 'sheer appearances' we are in danger of losing the rich complexity which they contribute to the Absolute system. And surely no one would condemn Bradley for recoiling from such a horrible situation.

11. *Ibid.*, PP. 590-591.

12. See below §§52 and ff.

12. *Failure of the attempt. Individuality a matter of content and system.*

But it seems that here again it was a confusion which led Bradley to take recourse to a theory which not only involves him in difficulties, but does not even help him in the least in achieving his end. And we have here to face the question 'Does the temporal aspect of judgment contribute to its individuality? Does it help to make the Absolute richer or more concrete?' And the answer, if we so face the question, is a clear 'No'. It is a confusion to think that Individuality lies in something 'unique' or 'arbitrary' something which cannot be reduced to a 'universal content'. And judgment, if it had the *supposed aspect of being an event*, apart from being a content could not possibly enrich the Absolute by that fictitious uniqueness. It seems an instance of the old fallacy of setting the individual over against the universal. The individual is thus reduced to an arbitrary whimsical being, without any system and coherence. But, as it has been pointed out by Bosanquet, true individuality does not consist in the denial of such law and system; while true universality, on the other hand, does not mean sheer repetition or bare uniformity. Individuality, therefore, meaning not "empty eccentricity" but a coherent and self-contained system, is quite compatible with Universality or Uniformity. In our completest types of individuality, such as a work of art or a highly organised society, it is obvious that the different parts having something unique and distinctive of their own, go to form the nature of the whole system, from which they derive their value and importance.¹³ And it is no less true and obvious that our judgments retain their importance and value for the Absolute Reality—not as arbitrary and eccentric, but as a development of a coherent system of contents or meanings. Thus, if we are to safeguard the individuality of our finite judgments, the

(13) *Principle of Individuality and Value*. pp. 98, 105, 120.

argument from their being events in the finite mind does not help us in the least. And here again we have to note that Bradley and Bosanquet who have done most to dispel the doubts about individuality have failed to be true to their own doctrines in this matter

13. *What is the nature of "psychical processes"? Is anybody aware of it?*

The next question, then, to be asked is: "What exactly is the psychical process which we have assumed to be an aspect in the making of a judgment? Is anybody aware of it and if so, of what precisely is he aware"? It may be assumed that when I am judging, I am not aware of the 'process of judging' in me. What I am apprehending is the problem before me, a question of complex content and meaning. For me, *qua* judging and apprehending, the process of that judging does not exist at all. But it may be retorted that though I am too much engaged with the problem before me to notice the 'process' of the mind, it does not prove that this process does not exist at all. And if I, the judging subject, subsequently return to my judgment and reflect upon it, I can detect the changes and incidents, which constituted the 'psychical process' of the judging. And apart from this subsequent reflection of my own, the psychologist can reflect on my judgment as an incident in my mental history and in so doing, he is studying the 'psychical process' of my judging. In this way, it might be said, we can surely understand the nature of 'psychical process' and can study it.

14. *In reflection the 'process' is changed into a new judgment. An infinite pursuit.*

But in all this there is apparently a confusion. The process of judging in my mind is a unique and singular process and the psychical events or facts which are its parts are the unique and singular steps in the unique and singular process of my

judging. But when I subsequently turn back and reflect on my judgment or when the psychologist studies the 'psychical process' in me, in each case the object studied is a new 'object', and this is again for us a logical content, with its fresh complexity. Supposing the content of my previous judgment to be P, we wanted, in this subsequent judgment, to study the 'psychical process of judging P', but instead of that we find a judgment meaning Q. And in this judgment again, according to the theory, there must be a psychical process; but when we look for the 'psychical process' in the new judgment meaning Q, we shall find a judgment meaning R. Thus we are committed to an infinite pursuit, in which at every step, the supposed 'psychical process' eludes our grasp and leaves us in possession of a fresh 'logical content'. And the pursuit is by its very nature self-defeating. For we set out to study the "living process of a judging mind", but in making it an object of study, we have removed it from the mind whose process it was, and in so doing, it has ceased to be the same *it*. Our study is now directed "upon a lay figure, a thing of straw and stuffing, a caricature of the living process"¹⁴. Thus the supposed psychical process of judgment exists neither for me, when actually judging or subsequently reflecting upon my judging, nor for the psychologist who sets out to study it. And we can safely say that in the sense in which we have been taking it, there is no such thing: or at least if there is, it cannot be known, and much less made an object of study.

15. *Logic does not make any abstraction. The transition to an examination of Bradley's complementary assertion about psychology.*

Thus Bradley's contention, that Logic abstracts from the aspect of judgment as psychical lapse and succession, falls to

(14) H. H. Joachim on "Psychical Process" *Mind*, 1909. pp. 67-70 [This paragraph and the last are based on the above article.]

the ground. There can be no plausibility whatsoever in maintaining that judgment is an *event* in the soul. For judgment is nothing but a development of universal content towards a coherent whole of truth and finite judgments have their importance in proportion to the richness of their contents, or to the contribution that they have to make to the Absolute system. Thus Logic deals with Judgment in its entirety and not in one aspect abstracted from the rest. It follows that Logic is not a special science, in the sense in which the other special sciences are so called; the latter employ legitimate abstractions to define their scope and subject-matter. Whether Logic is to be identified with Metaphysics or not is a question which requires further consideration, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but the grounds on which Bradley rejects Logic as abstract and defective from an ultimate point of view are surely baseless.

Concluding Remarks:

Thus the suspicion of an empirical tradition in Bradley's Logic which was entertained by us in the beginning of this paper, has been thoroughly confirmed. The part of Hegel's teaching which was most unsatisfactory for Bradley was the place that was claimed for *thought as not merely apprehensive but, in some exclusive sense, constitutive of reality*. And this side of Hegel resulted in the new Logic which he gave to the world viz. a Logic of Thought-Determinations which were at once the stages by which the Absolute Reality unfolds itself to itself. This could not but be distasteful to the mind of Bradley who to that extent always remained an empiricist in his Logical doctrine.

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Motion and Rest.

By

T. R. V. MURTI.

Nāgārjuna's refutation of motion and rest presents several interesting features and raises some big issues. Zeno denied motion; he did not disturb rest. Nāgārjuna performs the seemingly impossible task of denying both at once. Zeno's argument, repeated in all the famous examples, rests on the infinite divisibility of space without taking into consideration a similar circumstance with regard to time. His arguments do not bring out any epistemological or metaphysical standpoint; Nāgārjuna's do. An attempt will be made to elucidate his general standpoint, after a presentation of his dialectic against motion and rest.¹

1. Motion is denied by showing the untenability of the factors indispensable for its generation—viz, the space traversed, the mover and the commencement of motion. To take each in turn :

What is traversed? Not that which has been already traversed; nor even that to be done so; there is no third division of space as 'the being traversed'. When a foot-step is put forward, it divides the space exactly into two—the one already traversed and the other yet to be done so. It will be pointed out that there is some such space that *is being*

1. Section I of this paper is an analysis of Chapters II & VIII of "Mādh. Kārikās," while the other sections are based on the general standpoint exhibited in the whole book, esp. in Chap I.

traversed ; for that is the place where activity is present ; and this activity does not pertain to the traversed or that portion yet to come. But as the activity belongs to the moving body and not to the space, this too will not help us to distinguish that space, unless we accepted motion in both—two motions in the space covered and in the moving body. If there were only one motion—namely, that of the moving body—how can the space, though unrelated to motion, be still said to be ‘being traversed’ ? there is nothing to differentiate it from other spaces. With two motions, two moving bodies shall have also to be accepted, unless we hold that motion can exist disembodied, apart from the moving body. We here come to an impasse. There is no space which is being traversed. The divisions in space are relative and unreal ; from the standpoint of knowledge no such distinctions are tenable.

Motion is possible, because there is the mover in which it inheres. We must make the distinction between the two. But is the mover intelligible with or without the motion ? Can we say that the mover moves ? He is either motionless in himself apart from the motion, or has a motion other than the motion which inheres in him. In the first case, we have the contradiction of a mover without motion ; in the second, there are two motions, for it is a *mover* that *moves*, not a non-mover as in the first case. But this too is unpalatable ; disembodied motion cannot be contemplated.

It may be thought that these difficulties are really about the locus of motion, whether it resides in a body which is itself bereft of motion or not, and have nothing to do with motion at all. When and where does motion begin ? Not at the place already traversed, nor even in the space yet to come ; and we have seen that there is no such space like ‘the being traversed’, for this would involve

two motions and two bodies. When does motion begin? Not when a body is at rest; for at that time, before the commencement of the activity, there is no space that is being traversed or that traversed etc. Can there be motion in the space not yet traversed? This is a veritable contradiction; motion is to commence where it does not exist. Without motion, the divisions of space into the 'traversed' etc, are untenable. It would be seen that on the basis of these distinctions can motion be conceived to arise, and only with its commencement are such distinctions tenable, involving thereby a vicious circle.

2. Motion does exist, it might be asserted, for, its opposite—rest—does do so; that exists whose opposite exists, as darkness and light, or as this side and the other side. Logically therefore, a denial of motion involves that of rest as well. It is here precisely that Nāgārjuna proves himself a truer dialectician than Zeno.

Here too, as in the case of motion, the indispensable factors are denied. Who rests? Not the mover, nor the static—the non-mover; and there is no third who can rest. The static does not rest, for it is already stationary; there are no two rests, as these would involve two stationary bodies. It is a flat contradiction to say that the mover rests, when a mover is impossible without motion; when any body rests, it is, *ipso facto*, not a mover. It will be said that rest is possible, as cessation from motion is possible. The mover can stop; stopping is an opposite activity. Not so; for, whence will he stop? Will it be from the space already traversed, yet to be traversed, or that which is being traversed. Now this activity brought in to ensure rest is on a par with motion, and will be assailable on that score. There is no motion in all these three spaces for the said reasons; and hence there can be no cessation of it.

Rest is possible, for it can be begun, it might be said. But is it begun when someone is at rest, or not at rest, or when about to rest?—precisely the very alternatives considered in connection with the commencement of motion.

A general difficulty about motion is that it can be conceived neither as identical with the mover nor different from him—the difficulty of all predication. If identical, the subject and his activity cannot be distinguished; but to assert this identity a distinction is necessary. If activity be different from the subject, the latter can exist without activity and vice versa; motion should be possible without the moving body. Nāgārjuna comes to the conclusion that both those things do not exist which can be conceived neither as identical with nor as different from each other. (“Ekībhāvena vā Siddhir nānā bhāvena vā yayoh ; Na vidyate tayoh Siddhiḥ katham nu khalu vidyate” “Mādhyamika Kārikās” -Ch. II 21.)

3. What is the general principle involved in this dialectic against motion and rest? It is undertaken from the standpoint of pure immediacy of experience, and is a consistent Solipsism of the ‘present moment’. Santayana has very admirably developed this method in his “Scepticism and Animal Faith”. Far from being self-contradictory, solipsism of the present moment is the only attitude that demands radical evidence—experience—for any assertion; it is not to be frightened into acquiescence of universally believed notions. Confine yourself at any time rigorously to the immediately given, the distinctions of space into the traversed, yet to be traversed, etc., and of motion as originating, progressing and ceasing cannot arise; for these issue out of relating, out of positing characters that transcend the immediately given. All such relating and positing involve a vicious circle. Distinctions in space are possible on the commencement of motion, which itself cannot be understood without these very distinctions it engenders. The Mādhyamika Dialectic is a call to purify the

given object of thought of all beliefs in the transcendent, of dogmas. It finds that when such a purification is effected, no assertion—affirmation or negation—is possible. Everything is *Sūnya*. The *Mādhyamika* cannot have any thesis of his own—positive or negative.

4. This raises two fundamental issues: Is Criticism of any thesis possible without any counter thesis; and can all the alternatives under any head be rejected, without thereby violating the Excluded Middle?

It is commonly held that to criticise a theory, we should have a rival theory or standpoint of our own, or that some tenets should be held in common by the disputants. But the acceptance of a common tenet, a common platform cannot serve to favour any of the rival hypotheses; nor does a special tenet or thesis particular to each party fare any better; for to claim peculiar strength on the basis of a special tenet will cut both ways. How then is any hypothesis to be demolished at all? It is by pointing out that all the consequences of the hypothesis contradict either the hypothesis, or are mutually contradictory. The holding of a rival hypothesis is not only unnecessary but is clearly irrelevant. Nor is it necessary that the consequences of a hypothesis should be believed in by the party which urges the objections, but merely that the consequences should be shown to be implied in the hypothesis to the satisfaction of the party concerned. This is the only way by which we can confute an opponent. The absurdity of his position must be brought home to him. The *Mādhyamika* claims to do nothing else. He is a *Prāsūngika*--having no tenet of his own and not caring to frame a syllogism of his own. "An opponent in putting forward a thesis is expected, as he is a believer in *Pramāṇas*, to validate it; he must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusions. . . . But the case of the *Mādhyamika* is different; he does not vindicate any asser-

tion in order to convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples which he believes to be true."² Every endeavour of the Mādhyamika is, therefore, exhausted in reducing the opponent's position to absurdity on principles and consequences which the opponent himself would accept. So we may answer the first question by forcibly asserting that to criticise a position it is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to advance another position.

It might be urged that criticism is the application of certain logical canons—the valid sources of knowledge etc. These at least shall have to be accepted even by the Mādhyamika. But for a critic of knowledge, for a Transcendentalist, there are no first principles, no inviolate axioms which he should respect, or at which he should arrive at the end of his enquiry. If the first principles and the valid sources of knowledge are themselves under discussion, will it do to start by unquestionably accepting them? Just as this enquiry can proceed without being saddled with the acceptance of any dogma, other enquiries can fare equally well. Formal Logic may proceed on certain assumptions, but a self-conscious dialectic cannot, without being false to its position, accept them.

5. Another line of objection may be adopted to confute the Mādhyamika. When one alternative is rejected or accepted the other is, *eo ipso* accepted or rejected, else the Excluded Middle is violated. The Mādhyamika flagrantly violates the rule; we find him cutting down all alternatives that are exclusive and exhaustive. For instance, four alternatives are framed by him with regard to causation, but none is accepted:

"Neither out of themselves (Svataḥ), nor out of others

2. Mādhy. Kārikās, Ch. I, I. pp 16 ff. (B. B. Edn).

(Parataḥ) nor from both (Ubhayataḥ), nor at random (Ahetutaḥ) have entities sprung into being" (Mādh. Kār. 1. 1.) Here too both motion and rest have been denied. The Mādhyamika alone is not the sinner in rejecting the Excluded Middle. Kant does not accept this when he formulates his antinomies and rejects them both, e. g. "the world has a beginning in space and time" and that "the world has no such beginning" etc. Hegel himself does not recognise it; had he done so, he should have chosen either Being or Non-Being instead of seeking a third.

i. No logical flaw is involved in not observing the Excluded Middle. If any one wants to vindicate this law, he must not only resolve the antinomies which any dialectic presents, but show that in rejecting one alternative we do so by covertly accepting its contradictory or vice versa.

ii. The law of Excluded Middle assumes a sort of omniscience and makes capital out of our ignorance. That any two alternatives together exhaust the realm of discourse and that no third is possible cannot be known from the alternatives themselves. Such is not the case with the law of Contradiction; it derives all its force from the material in hand, what is actually presented to us. We can, even on the strength of immediate experience, say that both the contradictories cannot be true. Excluded Middle too, it will be urged, does not presume anything more than the particular kind of disjunctives called the Contradictories—as Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. Such contradictory alternatives can easily be recognised by any one. To this our reply is that the doctrine of Contradictories conceived by Formal Logic is defective; for, it is always possible to suggest one other alternative in all cases; besides being and non-

being, we can admit the Indefinite; affirmation and negation do not exhaust all attitudes towards an assertum; we may not assert anything at all, but simply entertain a datum without these two modes. The contention is not merely academical. Consider for instance the two propositions—“An integer between 3 and 4 is prime”; “An integer between 3 and 4 is composite, not prime.” Neither of these propositions is true, though they are contradictories in the formal sense. Can the Excluded Middle help us here? For, this is a case where *no* adjective, no alternative can be predicated without absurdity. The illusory snake is another example; it cannot accept the predicates *Sat* or *Asat*, for it is not an existent.

If we want to formulate the contradictory of any proposition ‘S is P’—, it is not merely ‘S is not-P’ but also ‘S is not’— i.e. the proposition is contradicted if the subject does not exist. It is clear that because there are two contradictories to any position we can never pass from the denial of the position to any one of the contradictories or vice versa. This is tantamount to giving up the Excluded Middle.

A formal objection, pointed out by Johnson, can also be raised against the law. If it were true, the existential import of a proposition and that of its obverse must be neither less nor more. ‘S is not P’ says nothing about the existence of S or of P; the proposition will be valid even if they had never existed. What is required is that the combination SP should not be found, and this is available with or without the existence of these terms. Now following formal logic, we shall be told that ‘S is not P’ can be positively rendered into ‘S is non-P’. But this is more than a mere verbal change. The new proposition affirms a negative predicate of a subject S. If S were not an existent the proposition would be meaningless, as it would be even if there were no P and non-P. But as

we have seen, the original proposition gives no guarantee of the existence of S or P. The obverse imports, tacitly under cover of an indubitable law, existential matter not to be found in the original proposition. The obverse will be valid, only if one implied premise 'S is' is supplied. Therefore it is clear that the principle on which obversion is based, namely the Excluded Middle, is not valid. 'S is not P' does not commit us to any position, while 'S is non-P' commits us to the existence of S and possibly of P and non-P. It is apparent that Excluded Middle is not a purely formal principle, but a device to serve a metaphysical doctrine, in which to negate a judgment is taken as affirming a negative predicate. It seems to be a very cheap device for asserting the existence of any subject. As a matter of fact it does not question the existence of the subject; its only trouble seems to be confined to the assignment of a positive or negative predicate; the fundamental question of the existence of the subject of a judgment is left to take care of itself.

The Mādhyamika, on the other hand, questions the very existence of the subject of which there may be any dispute about the proper predicate. And as the subject cannot be discussed or known apart from the predicates, he formulates a general rule—that a subject, an entity of which all assignable positions, predicates, either taken singly or collectively, are inadmissible, does not exist. If the existence of the subject is not assumed at the outset, non-existence is also not presumed, but everything is decided on its own merits. The Mādhyamika finds that he can formulate at least four theses or alternatives in any case. One can assert existence of a subject, or deny it, or assert both existence and non-existence, or assert neither existence nor non-existence. It will be seen that the first is the Positivist or Realist thesis; the second is purely negative, the third is a synthetic position, say that

of Hegel or of the Jaina , the fourth is the purely agnostic thesis. All these, singly and collectively, are wrong and Tattva is that which escapes all these predicates.

“Na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayam ;

Catuṣkoṭi-vinirmuktaṁ Tattvaṁ Mādhyamikāḥ viduḥ”

The Realistic Analysis of Perception

By

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In discussing anything the first thing expected is a clear-cut definition of the subject intended for discussion. But in dealing with Realism, this demand cannot be fulfilled, and the reason for this is that Realism is not a body of systematic doctrines to which numbers of different philosophers can be found to have subscribed. The Realists for the most part content themselves with dealing with a number of isolated problems without even attempting to bring them into any rational connection with one another. Perhaps the only thing which is common to all realists and which justifies their designation as 'realists' is their Refutation of Idealism.

Besides the refutation of idealism there is another topic, on which most, if not all, of the modern realists have something or other to say. This is the 'Problem of Perception.' The analysis of perception, is in a sense, the starting point of their philosophy—that is to say, of the *positive* part of it; and the reason is obvious. If, as their refutation of idealism proves, objects, in their opinion, are not to be resolved into the states of the knowing mind, the next thing that should engage their attention, is an account of the process by which the 'independent' things come to be related to the mind.

Realistic views of perception may be divided into three types, the first of which maintains the existence of three, the second, of two, and the third, of one element only in perception.

The Austrian philosopher Meinong may be taken as a typical representative of the first class. He distinguishes three elements in perception — (i) the act of perception, (ii) the content of perception and (iii) the object of perception, which

correspond roughly to the three elements distinguished in perception by the '*Vedānta-paribhāṣhā viz., 'pramātri-chaitanya* '*pramāṇa-chaitanya*', and '*vishaya-chaitanya*, respectively. The similarity of the conception of the 'act of perception' with that of the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' is apt to seem a little doubtful at first ; but their resemblance becomes obvious if we look a little below the surface. For, the '*pramātri-chaitanya*' is an exact analogue of the Kantian conception of the 'Synthetic unity of apperception, which is evident from the part the '*pramātri-chaitanya*' has to play in the perception known as '*vishaya-gata*' or '*jñeya-gata*' *pratyaksha* (i. e., the perception of object as *object*) as distinguished from '*jñāna-gata pratyaksha*.' The 'synthetic unity of apperception' is the correlate of the object, according to Kant ; so also is the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' in the *Vedānta*. If the object is to be perceived as an object, the '*pramātri-chaitanya*' must be explicitly opposed to it ; so also in Kant, the object can be perceived as an *object* at all only in distinction from the synthetic unity of apperception. But the 'Synthetic unity of apperception' is more an 'act' than a 'fact,' i. e. it is not as a *substance* but only *because of the synthesising function it has to perform*, that the 'ego' had importance with Kant. The same may be said of the Vedāntic conception of the '*pramātri-chaitanya*.' Thus it is not far from the truth to trace a sort of resemblance between the *pramātri-chaitanya* and the 'act of perception' admitted by Meinong.

But there are important differences as well. Meinong thinks that in the perception of different objects the 'act of perception' remains the same, and it is only the 'content of perception' that changes, *e.g.*, in the perception of the 'cow' and in that of the 'horse', Meinong will suppose that the same act that is capable of perceiving the 'cow', is capable of perceiving the 'horse' as well, the difference lying in the content only, the content in the one case being a cow-content, in the other a horse-content. But, according to the Vedāntic

analysis, the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' changes as well as the '*Vritti-chaitanya*,' with the change in the object of perception. For the '*pramātri chaitanya*' is always determined (*upahita*) by the '*vritti*'-consciousness and thus, is dependent for its form (the essence of course being no other than *chaitanya*) directly on the '*vritti*,' and therefore indirectly on the object.

The superiority of the *Vedāntic* analysis to that given by Meinong, is evident from the fact, that Meinong's characterisation of the 'act of perception,' as remaining unaltered even if the object of perception changes, renders it a bare act^a of thought, divorced from all the characteristics which give it form, and therefore makes it an unthinkable something. It is psychologically impossible to distinguish in consciousness a thought which is not a thought with a definite content. Epistemologically also, one can be conscious of an act of perception only so far as it is distinguished from the object which is perceived through it.

There are differences regarding the conception of the content of perception as well. In the first place, as regards the origin of the '*vritti*' the Vedānta is explicit in stating that the '*vritti*' originates as a consequence of the mind going out of itself to the object and being modified in the form of the object (*Antahkaraṇaṁ chakshurūdi-dwārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviśayaśeṣam gatvā ghaṭādiviśaya-kāreṇa pariṇamate. Sa eva pariṇāmo vrittiriti yuchyate*). But Meinong is silent on the point. According to him the content of perception is altogether mental, and the object is something altogether external. On this theory it is difficult to perceive how the object can ever come into relation with the content, so as to enable the latter to take the form of the former. Thus Meinong's theory is open to all the defects that vitiate the '*representation*,' etc., theories of Perception of Descartes, Locke and others. He ends by tacitly assuming the possibility of the content

being of the form of the object without bothering himself by entering into the 'how' of it. Another important difference follows from this difference between Meinong and the *Vedānta*. Past and future objects as well (i. e., object of memory and anticipation respectively) may constitute the objects of perception, according to Meinong. But *prima facie*, the *Vedāntin* cannot accept this for, in as much as, according to him, the mind must go out to the object in perception, it follows that the object must be a *present* one, i. e., must belong to the same *time* as that when the perception takes place. The *Vedānta* itself anticipates Meinong's position and refutes it (*nanveram svavrittisukhādismaranasyāpi sukhādyamśe pratyakshāpattiriti chet na...aham pūrvam sukhī ityādismrītau ativyāptivāraṇāya vartamānatvaṃ viśaya-viśeṣaṇaṃ deyaṃ*).

The *Vedāntic* analysis of perception should however, be dwelt on a little more at length in this connection, as the *Vedānta* furnishes the best type of the realistic analysis of perception in India. The *Vedāntic* analysis can best be studied in connection with that of Meinong, the latter having many points of similarity with the former, as has already been pointed out. Considered *a priori* also the *Vedānta* should find a place in the same class with Meinong, according to the standard of classification proposed in the present discussion, for it also is an upholder of the three-element theory of perception.

From the ultimate metaphysical point of view, the *Vedānta* admits the reality only of one all-pervading *Chaitanya*. But all determinate knowledge involves a stratification of this one *Chaitanya* into three determinate forms,—the *pramātri-chaitanya*, the *vrītti-chaitanya*, and the *viśaya-chaitanya* (The suffix '*Chaitanya*' by the way, at the end of each of the terms, serves as a constant reminder of the fact that they are in their metaphysical essence, nothing

but '*Chaitanya*,' the only reality admitted by the Vedānta). However this distinction between the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' and the '*vishaya-chaitanya*,' explains Vedāntic realism so far as determinate or empirical consciousness is concerned. These three—the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' the '*vr̥tti-chaitanya*,' and the '*vishaya-chaitanya*'—correspond roughly to Meinong's distinction of 'act of perception,' 'content of perception' and 'object of perception' respectively, as has already been shown. Now, what happens in perception is as follows. First of all there is the mind and there is the object independent of the mind. The mind goes out of itself to the object and takes the form of the object (योग्यवर्तमानविषयकत्वे सति प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वम् इत्युक्तम्). This gives rise to the '*vr̥tti*'. The perceiving subject also is determined as to the particular form it is to take, by the '*vr̥tti*' (स्वाकारवृत्त्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्यसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वाभावः). All three, the '*pramātā*,' the '*vr̥tti*' and the '*vishaya*,' are then mingled together into a homogeneous whole. Then there is the perception of the object.

In their analysis of illusory perception they try to keep their realistic position intact, by bringing in their peculiar theory of an indescribable reality (अनिर्बचनीय-सत्ता). An illustration is necessary. The usual instance they give in the case of illusory perception when the 'nacre' is mistaken for 'silver'. The explanation offered is that, defects in the eye or in the adjustment of light, etc., cause the really existing nacre to be modified in the form of silver, owing to similarity between nacre and silver. Thus the object no longer continues to be nacre but becomes *silver* which also is not altogether unreal, though not of the same nature of reality as the nacre is. This peculiar reality is a kind of reality which is not real but apparent, i.e., a *prātibhāsika satta* as distinguished from a '*pāramārthika*' or '*vyāvahārika*

sattā in the Vedāntic terminology. Thus instead of the *pramātā*, the '*vritti*' of the form of nacre, and the nacre, we have now the *pramātā*, the '*vritti*' of the form of the real-apparent-silver (पारमार्थिक प्रातिभासिक रजत) and the real apparent-silver. Everything else happens as in ordinary perception, and thus the perception of silver ensues. The silver also being ascribed a sort of reality, illusory perception also is quite in keeping with their realistic theory of perception; at the same time the illusory nature of the cognition is not explained away because the object of the perception is not ascribed a real reality but only an apparent one.

Two-element Theory of Perception.

Next we have to take into account the second class of thinkers, viz., those who hold that only two elements are involved in perception. It has been urged with great force and clearness by Professor Alexander, who speaks of perception as a process in which the mind enjoys itself in compresence with an object.

The two elements involved are the mind and the physical object. Meinong's 'act' and 'content' are run together by these realists and expressed by the single word 'mind'. They do not regard the 'act' and the 'content' as two distinct elements, because they think that one and the same physical object determines both. (This analysis seems to bring the realistic analysis of perception into a closer connection with the Vedāntic one, because according to the Vedānta also, the object determines the form of the *vritti*, and the '*vritti*,'—which is thus indirectly the object,—again, determines the form of the '*pramātā*.' Of course, in making comparisons, it should always be remembered that analogy does not walk on all fours. The physical object is at once the *stimulus* and the *content of the conscious act* (determines the *pramātā* as well as the '*vritti*' in the '*Vedāntic*' terminology. Their explanation

is as follows: the physical object, when placed in a certain juxtaposition to the sensory organs, produces a stimulation of those organs. The stimulation is conveyed to the brain and enters into consciousness. The consciousness is then directed to the physical object and thus the content of consciousness takes the form of the physical object. From the fact that the physical object determines the act it follows that the 'act' differs with the difference in the object. (This also distinguishes the theory from Meinong's according to whom the 'act' remains the same in all perceptions, and connects it with the *Vedānta*, according to which the form of the *pramātā* differs with the difference in the object, *e. g.*, the form of the *pramātā*, when the object of perception is the *parimāṇa* of the *ghaṭa* is different from the form of the *pramātā* when the object of perception is the *rūpa* of the '*ghaṭa*'). Thus the 'act' in the perception of 'red' will be quantitatively different from the 'act' in the perception of 'green.'

One-element Theory.

Next we have to take into consideration the account of perception given by those realists according to whom only one element is involved in perception. These realists are generally known as neo-realists. The designation neo-realist is rather ambiguous. It has been used by some writers to denote any modern realist—more usually, however, it has been applied to the particular class of thinkers we are now going to deal with. Throughout this discussion, the term will be used in this narrower sense.

Neo-realism in this sense, can best be studied in connection with realism in its oldest form. Descartes and Locke may be taken as the best exponents of the oldest type of realism. Both of them believed in the existence of a world of things independent of the mind and both of them believed that the independent world can be known through the medium of

ideas, truth consisting in the correspondence of the idea with the thing, *i.e.*, both were 'representationists' with regard to the relation of the mind and the world.

Now, neo-realism is at one with old realism with regard to the first position, *viz.*, the belief in the existence of an independent world of things, but the two theories differ with regard to the other position, *viz.*, the knowability of the world through the medium of ideas. The neo-realists think that the object is directly *presented* to the mind when the latter comes to know the former, and is not *represented* to it through the medium of ideas, as older realists would have it.

The neo-realistic analysis of perception may be summed up in the single phrase 'immanence of the independent,' or what Perry terms as 'epistemological monism'. What the phrase means is simply this, that objects exist, independently of the knowing mind (independence) but they are *identical* with the perceptions of the mind when they are perceived. The object is not perceived *through something* which is other than itself. It itself is immanent in the mind, becomes itself the perception and thus makes its own perception of itself possible. This explains why these realists have been described as holding 'the one-element theory of perception.'

The explanation of the possibility of this immanence, they find in the peculiar way in which they construe the duality of mind and matter. The neo-realists think that the difference between mind and matter is simply a difference of organisation. Neither mind nor body is really simple—both are complexes capable of being analysed into more primitive terms. These primitive terms are neutral elements, in themselves they are neither mental nor physical. When considered in one relation they constitute mind, when in another, they constitute body. This view is best set forth by Ernst Mach in a little book (*Die Analyse der*

Empfindungen). The elements of the physical and the psychical, according to this author, are the same. But while the physical studies one type of relationship, such as the relation of colour to the source of light, the psychological studies its peculiar relation to the *retina or nervous system* of a sentient organism. The colour itself is neither physical nor psychical.

Ralph Barton Perry may be taken as the most well-known representative of the theory sketched here. This theory became generally recognised through the publication in 1912 of a co-operative volume by six American writers, Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and Edward Gleason Spaulding,—called the New Realism. All these writers agree in what has been described above as the definitive characteristic of neo-realism, *viz.*, the insistence on the identical presence of the object in knowledge. Neo-realism has English representatives also. Mr. Russell, the most formidable of realists in some of his writings, drifted towards this theory. Of course it is not possible to class him with any realist in particular, for he does not adhere to one single view throughout his philosophical career. It is impossible to do justice to all the phases in his philosophy in this short paper.

There is another type of realism, *viz.*, that represented by the Scottish School of Common Sense. This theory agrees with neo-realism in admitting a sort of real presentationism, so far at least as the primary qualities are concerned. The main difference is that the Scottish realists dogmatically asserted presentationism without offering any explanation as to how it could be possible in spite of the dualism of mind and matter with which they started. Though this theory has been receiving attention since only 1912, Perry traces the germ of the theory as far back as Hume. Perry thinks that Hume regarded things not only as possessing being indepen-

dent of the mind, but *identical with perceptions when present to the mind*. For this view of his, he refers us to Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature' (Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 207) and also to an article by W. P. Montague in the *Philosophical Review*, entitled 'A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy.'

Another analysis of perception has been offered, under the name of Critical Realism, by seven American professors—Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellers and Strong,—in a co-operative study entitled the "Essays in Critical Realism."

The peculiarity of these thinkers consists in this that, unlike the other realists, they do not believe in the independently existing physical objects as constituting the data of perception. They must not, however, be supposed on this account to be following in the footsteps of the Idealists according to whom the data of perception are nothing but the states of the mind.

But if the datum is neither the physical object, nor the mental state of the perceiver, it follows that there must be a third term which is supposed by the Critical Realists to be the datum, and hence the analysis of these Realists makes perception involve three terms. Still these realists cannot be classed with Meinong because these views differ from Meinong's on a point of fundamental importance, *viz.*, that they do not believe in independently existing physical objects constituting the data of perception.

The datum of perception, according to the Critical Realists, is a 'character-complex', or as Professor Santayana would express it, an 'essence,' which is not the object itself, nor any selection from the object, but in perception is supposed to be a characteristic of the object. What happens in perception is roughly as follows: when an object C comes into contact with a conscious organism A, it causes the appearance to A

of certain character-complexes. These character-complexes are imagined by A to be out in the world. These constitute the data of perception. When these character-complexes are the actual characteristics of C, the perception is correct; when otherwise, the perception is erroneous. These character-complexes *have being* or subsistence only, but they do not *exist* in the same sense as physical objects do. Professor Santayana speaks of these 'essences' much in the same way as Plato spoke of his Ideas. But inasmuch as in true perception these 'essences' are identical with the actual characteristics of the object, the Critical Realist, in holding these essences to be the data of perception, holds that in perception, they perceive a physical object, so far, at least, as its nature or 'what' is concerned. The object itself, however, he is forced to admit, always eludes the perceiver's grasp. All this, however, is falling back on the defects involved in the representationistic theories represented by Descartes and Locke.

Lastly, any account of realism remains incomplete, if at least a passing reference is not made to the *Vaibhāshika* and *Sautrāntika* Schools of Buddhism, and the Jainas. The *Vaibhāshika* analysis of perception resembles that of the naïve realists of the Scottish School of Commonsense in their acceptance of a real objective world independent of thought, together with their belief in *presentationism* in perception. But though the *Vaibhāsikas* agree with the natural dualists in holding that our knowledge of things is not *creation* but only *discovery*, still there is an important difference—a difference which is due to their atomistic metaphysics. The objects of perception, they say, are constituted by permanent atoms but the objects themselves are momentary. The atoms constitute the object on the occasion of the perception, but separate as soon as the perception ceases, and so the object also vanishes. But

inspite of this apparent Berkeleyanism, it is interesting to notice that they are far from holding that the *esse* of things is their *percipi*. Their peculiarity consists in their combination of Berkeleyanism with natural dualism. Objects cease to exist the moment we cease to perceive, still it is not perception that makes them into objects.

The difference between the *Vaibhāshikas* and the *Sautrāntikas* is like that between Locke and the naïve realists. The *Sautrāntikas* agree with the *Vaibhāshikas* in admitting the independent existence of the outer world. Only they deny the possibility of a direct perception of it. We have, they argue, mental presentations through which we infer the existence of external objects.

The Jainas give a detailed analysis of perception, into the technicalities of which it is impossible to enter here. In short, their analysis reveals the mediate character of perception, and also tells us that things are extra-mental realities. It is to be noted that unlike the western Realists who start from the independence of the external world and then go on to analyse how that world can be related to mind, the *Jainas* start from the empirical fact of perception and then at the end of their analysis are brought to the conclusion that an independent reality exists. The question how consciousness can be related to objects—a question which puzzles the Western mind so much, is dismissed by the Jainas as absurd.

"The System of Ramanuja"

By

K. A. KRISHNASWAMY IYER

(Indian Philosophy Section)

Besides political, social and economic wars, there were bloodless fights in the thought-world for centuries over the respective merits of Idealism and Realism. In Europe, the cause of Idealism long supported by leading thinkers like Kant, Hegel, etc. is fast declining and making room for Realism. In America, Pragmatism and Behaviourism together with New Realism are finding favour with the people. Similarly in England, Bertrand Russell and others declare themselves for Realism and Pluralism. This change is mainly due to the advance of Physical Science.

In India, the same influence has been at work to revive the dying embers of controversy between the Illusionism of Saṅkara and the Realism of Rāmānuja and Madhva. Modern conditions demand a resurvey of these thought-positions. Discoveries in Science must react on the philosophical concepts.

Old notions of Substance, Cosmic time, Infinite space, Matter and Causality must be revised and the claims of consciousness re-examined. Religious beliefs must pass through a fire-bath of fact and verification. The opinion of Modern Science is "there is no absolute truth.". Laws are formulas subject to change in the light of experience.

The basis of Theology and Vedānta must be scrutinized and Hindu theism must face the storm of modern research. Idealism may not be affected so much by modern criticism as Realism. But a realistic theology like Rāmānuja's must have its position carefully reviewed.

When Rāmānuja appeared, Saṅkara's system had fallen into decay, and people anxiously looked for a thinker, who

could confirm their natural prepossession in favour of a Real World, a Real God and a Real Soul assured of a Real Salvation. The land had been thrown into a religious ferment, and a class of Vaiṣṇava theists had come into prominence, under the name of Bhāgavatas. Rāmānuja's learning and extraordinary intellect came to be widely known and the Bhāgavatas induced him to write a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras in support of their cult.

Rāmānuja hesitated before accepting their doctrines, but an oracle decided him. Such is the origin of Sri Bhāṣya.

The stand-point of Saṅkara greatly differed from those of Rāmānuja and Madhva. The last two depended on faith and the reality of practical life and interpreted the Upaniṣads so as to harmonize with them. Saṅkara relied on reason and all-sided experience and the truth he so derived he found in the Upaniṣads. In deference to the prevailing tone of the Scriptures, Rāmānuja believed that the Brahman was the only Reality, but included within Itself the elements of multiplicity, such as the world and the souls with which It invested Itself as Its body. This Brahman is a Personal Being ; in short, God. The points of agreement in the three systems are then pointed out.

Doctrines

There is one God. He is a Personal Being and the only Reality. The world and the souls are His body and are eternal. His body periodically expands and contracts leading to Creation and Destruction. The Soul through Karma becomes embodied and is subject to Birth and Death, which never cease till it obtains the Grace of God through meditation and holy works. With Release, the Soul enters upon a new life of Bliss in Heaven and participate in all the privileges of God, except the Power to create and to control the Universe. One Soul does not differ from another in essence, not even from

God. Their individuality is preserved and are eternal. The existence of God and of the Soul as an independent entity are all known only from the Scriptures. Evil is the effect of Karma and can be overcome only by devotion and prayer.

Madhva does not believe in the embodiedness of God. To him every Soul is distinct from the other and after Release enjoys its own degree of Bliss. He believes in eternal Hell for the Monists.

Both believe that the Soul's size is atomic, and agree in most respects.

Criticism

1 Rāmānuja relies for his Realism on commonsense. "Every act of perception is real and involves a real object. There is no illusion that cannot be explained as caused by the peculiar conditions of perception." But, one might say, an illusion *is* an illusion and its entry into the real world must be inexplicable. Besides, the senses are only instruments of perception and cannot vouch for their own and their object's reality.

2 The individuality of objects is determined by their "where" and "when," not by any peculiar virtue of their own. Their qualities, being "Universals," are communal in character and cannot uphold the idea of *absolute* distinction between one thing and another.

(3) Similarly, multiplicity implies number which in its turn implies a class.

Hence distinctions etc. can be real only for practical life. If the World, God, and the Souls were of one grade of reality, they would be interdependent and relative; and God's reality would cease to be absolute.

His analogy of the soul and the body on which he bases the Relation of God to the Soul, is unacceptable, as

the latter as a subject would exclude from itself God as its object. This conception, besides, would turn the Soul and God into mere objects.

(4) Again, if God is embodied, He can enjoy no independence of His body, and whatever changes the body undergoes must affect Him likewise. Otherwise the relation is untrue.

(5) God, with the universe for His body, must be spread out in Space and develop in Time. He cannot escape from these limitations and Rāmānuja does not explain the place of Time and Space in his scheme of creation.

(6) It is not possible to imagine a Soul to contract and expand. It is Spirit and *not* Matter.

Rāmānuja's criterion of reality is criticized from four points of view, (1) the evidence of the senses, (2) the power to effectuate results, (3) Being in Space and Time, (4) Subsequent Sublatability, and shewn to be untrustworthy. Śaṅkara's position is explained. Madhva and Rāmānuja give no satisfactory reason for the existence of real Evil in a real world created by a real Merciful God.

Rāmānuja was a great and a good man. He wholeheartedly worked for the cause he espoused. If he had been free from the trammels of a sect, his high intellect and lofty views might have enabled him to produce a system more perfect and less obnoxious to criticism than the one with which his name must be associated for generations without end.

Social Changes And The Brahmasutras.

BY

RAI BAHADUR AMARNATH RAY, B. A.

Belvalkar¹ has greatly helped a proper appreciation of the true import of the Brahmasūtras by establishing that the Sūtras, as they stand, are not the work of a single author, but represent a growth of several centuries. He postulates that the work was originally the result of an attempt to harmonise the teachings of the Sāmaveda upaniṣads, particularly of the Chāndogya, that at a later period Sūtras were added to make it Sarvasākhya, that is, a Synthesis of the principal Upaniṣads of all the Vedic Sākhās; and that the Tarka-pāda, consisting of refutation of the doctrines of other schools of thought, was added still later. He thinks that the original stratum of the work is anterior to the Bhagavadgītā, the second elaboration as old as 300 B. C., and that the work took the present shape about the beginning of the Christian Era. So far the learned Professor seems to stand on sure ground.

A student of the Sūtras, however, comes across a few groups of Sūtras, which are irrelevant to the main purpose of the work, viz., the inquiry into Brahman, and could not have found a place in the original Brahmasūtras, or been added during the two subsequent rescensions postulated by Belvalkar. These sūtras appear to abruptly interpose two connected sūtras, and they appear to have no manner of relevance to the context, and were evidently meant simply to register the social changes of the age.

(1) See Basu Mallik Lectures, Pt. I. Lecture IV.

A. The first group of such sūtras constitutes what Saṅkara calls the 'Āpa-sūdrādhikaraṇam', which denies Sūdras the rights to attain Brahma-knowledge. (Sūtras 1.3. 34-38) This adhikaraṇa and the one preceding it cut off Sūtra 39 from Sūtra 25. Sūtra 24 lays down that the 'Puruṣa' of the size of an aṅguṣṭha, spoken of in the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, is the Paramātmān. Sūtra 25 meets the objection why the all-pervading universal Soul should be represented as of the size of a thumb finger by saying that as human beings alone are entitled to Brahma-knowledge, there could be no harm in contemplating the Paramātmān as of the size of a human thumb. Here a view attributed to Bādarāyaṇa has been interpolated which holds that Devatās, too, were addhikārins of Brahma-vidyā, a view which practically stultifies Sūtra 25. But, to make matters worse, this discussion is followed by certain sūtras, which, all on a sudden, deny the sūdra the right to Brahma-vidyā. The discussion is not only abrupt but wholly irrelevant. In the upaniṣadic age, Sūdras (e.g. Raikva and Jānaśruti) and even men of doubtful lineage (e.g. Satyakāma Jābāla) if otherwise fit, were admitted to Brahma-vidyā. At a later age, it was thought fit to exclude the Sūdras, but śruti passages stood in the way, and the fiction of interpretation was resorted to and the episodes about Jānaśruti and Satyakāma were misinterpreted so as to yield the meaning desired by the interpolator. The story of Jānaśruti is to be found in the Chāndogya upaniṣad 4.1. and that of the Satyakāma in 4.4. of the same work, and no impartial reader will fail to observe that neither Jānaśruti was a Kṣatriya nor Satyakāma a Brahman. Sūtra 39 clearly continues the discussion in Sūtra 25, and the intervening sūtras, at least sūtras 34-38, must have been added at a later period.

B. The next group of Sūtras is III.3. 4. 18-24. This

group cuts off sūtra 25 from sūtra 17, and was, according to Belvalkar², added subsequently by a champion of the no-action theory, the original theory having apparently been opposed to it, as will appear from the conflict of these sūtras with the Jābāla Śruti quoted by Śaṅkara towards the end of the commentary on sūtra 18.

C. A similar group of sūtras, also added possibly by this very champion of no-action, is III 4. 47-50. In this case, this champion is evidently frightened by the expression 'bālyena tiṣṭhāset' in the Kahola Brāhmaṇa (Br.up. III. 5) There is a silly discussion seeking to make out that the Śruti did not intend that merely 'bālya' was mandatory but that 'pāṇḍitya' and 'mauna' were mandatory as well. The main object of these sūtras is to obscure the meaning of the word 'bālya'. The writer argues in this fashion :—"don't suppose that 'bālya' alone is mandatory, 'mauna' and 'pāṇḍitya' are equally so, and what, after all, do you understand by 'bālya'? Well, it means nothing more than childlike simplicity and absence of arrogance". All commentators have explained 'bālya' as desired by the author of these Sūtras, and in the Subāla Up. the word is similarly used.

But if an unbiassed reader goes through the Kahola Brāhmaṇa he will be at a loss to understand why the author of this group of Sūtras should have taken so much pains in explaining away the stress in the expression 'bālyena tiṣṭhāset' if 'bālya' in this context meant nothing more than 'childlike meekness and simplicity.' Śaṅkara in his commentary on Br. Up. III. 5. explains 'bālya' as meaning 'strength begotten of self-knowledge', and not after the manner of Sūtrakāra, though in his commentary on sūtra 50 he follows him. Even so great a man was not clear what the word 'bālya' in the context meant. I am inclined to think that B. Barua is perfectly right when he says that by

(2) Basu Mallick Lectures, Pt. I. P. 170, footnote.

the word 'bālya' the sage Yājñavalkya means nothing but the householder's life and its attendant duties³. The champions of Sannyāsa used to ridicule the champions of the 'Gṛhastha āsrama' by calling them 'bālāḥ,' 'mūḍhāḥ' and so on, and in the passage under discussion, Yājñavalkya proposes a compromise between the two schools of thought by suggesting that, in order to attain knowledge, a man must pass through all the āśramas. He indulges in a little humour when he gives to the householder's life the name given to it by its detractors, viz. 'bālya' or puerility.⁴ To this interpretation of the word 'bālya' the objection might be urged that the Kaṭha and the Muṇḍaka śrutis, which dub householders as 'bālāḥ' or mūḍhāḥ, are later works than the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and Yājñavalkya could not have anticipated this derision and replied to it in advance. To this it might be said that the dates of the upaniṣads have not been fixed beyond doubt and that, even though the Kaṭha and the Muṇḍaka might be later compilations than the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, there is nothing to show that the mantras referred to could not have existed earlier, or that champions of no-action, who derided the householder's life in similar words, could not have existed before or during Yājñavalkya's time. Sūtra 50 mystifies the meaning of the 'bālya' in order to explain away the stress implied in the verbal form 'tiṣṭhaśet'. There can be no doubt that 'pāṇḍitya' in the passage means acquiring knowledge of the vedas as a brahmacārin, and 'mauna' the life of contemplation in the forest, while the word 'brāhmaṇa' which follows means a man who has attained Brahma-knowledge. It might be pointed out that the 'Īsopaniṣad,' which is found at the very end of the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* of the White Yajurveda, of which

(3) Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy P. 160.

(4) Kaṭha up. I. 2. 5-6; II. 1. 2; Muṇḍaka up. II. 1. 7-10.

Yājñavalkya was the reputed compiler, inculcates that a man must perform the āśrama duties all his life and that knowledge and works jointly led to liberation.⁵

D. The last group of sūtras, apparently added as result of social changes, is III.4. 28-31, which cut off sūtra 32 from sūtras 26-7. This discussion about 'āhāraśuddhi' and untouchability is quite irrelevant to the context, and it must have been added with a view to make so important a work as the Brahma-sūtras a supporter of the new doctrines of untouchability which were being introduced into society. The whole discussion is unconvincing and the interpretation put upon the 'āhāra-śuddhi' śruti⁶ by the writer is possibly wrong. Saṅkara, in his commentary on the Chāndogya, interprets the expression 'āhāra-śuddhi' in a different, and possibly, the correct way, but in the present instance he gives way to the *Sutrakāra*.

These four groups of Sūtras were probably added at the same time. When this was done it is not easy to say. It seems likely, however, that the addition synchronises with the revival of Brahmanism, under the Imperial Guptas as Buddhism was on the wane, the Buddhistic partiality for 'No-action' having found favour with the section of Brahmanical teachers to which the interpolator belonged. If chance placed us in possession of a manuscript of Upavaṣa's vṛtti on the Brahma-sūtras, the dates of the later strata of the work would be easy to ascertain.

(5) Saṅkara, a champion of no-action, attempts to explain away these passages with little success.

(6) Chāndogya Up. VII.26.2.

Brahmasūtra and Adhyāsa-vāda.

By

AKSHYA KUMAR BANERJEE M. A.

In this short paper it is not my intention to examine the merits of Sankara's *adhyāsa-vāda*, which is evidently the cornerstone of the whole edifice of his philosophy. I mean merely to examine whether this theory can be traced to any unequivocal statement in the *sūtras* of Bādārāyana and whether the illustrious *Bhāṣyakāra* is justified in passing it as the true view of the revered founder of the Vedānta system of philosophy. In this attempt, I propose, however to accept in the main the constructions put upon the *sūtras* by Acharya Sankara himself.

In his introduction to the great commentary, Sankara gives a clear exposition of his theory of *adhyāsa*, and promises to demonstrate by a detailed interpretation of the *sūtras* that this doctrine forms the purport of all the teachings of the Vedānta. The fundamental postulate with which he begins his introduction is that the subject and the object—the self and the not-self—the spirit and matter—are obviously distinct from and opposed to each other in their essential characteristics, and neither can *really* be in communion with the other, or participate in the nature and the attributes of the other. The only relation that can possibly exist between them is that of *adhyāsa*, i.e. the false attribution of one or of one's characteristics to the other. This *adhyāsa* gives birth to a relative or phenomenal or apparent reality, which may be described as a combination of the real and the unreal, the true and the false,—the real in respect of the *adhisthāna* or the substance to which what it is not is attributed and consequently the true character of which remains hidden or unmanifested, and the unreal in respect of that which is

attributed to it and which falsely appears as real and pretends to present the real character of the substance.

Āchārya Sankara asserts that the whole phenomenal world with which we are acquainted,—the world of subjects and objects, egos and non-egos, in intercourse with one another,—the world of finite spirits and minds and matters—the world of substances and attributes, causes and effects; spatial and temporal externalities—is the product of a general *adhyāsa*, the natural causeless beginningless attribution, to the one timeless, spaceless, differenceless, absolute Spirit or Self, called Brahman or Atman, of a plurality of names and forms, which by themselves possess no reality, and likewise the attribution of the reality and spiritual characteristics of Brahman to these names and forms. All knowledge, emotion and activity,—all consciousness of Me and mine, Thee and Thine, the actual and the ideal, happiness and misery, ought and ought-not,—are the creations of this *adhyāsa*.

Adhyāsa evidently involves two elements,—the concealment of the true nature of the substratum (*adhisthāna*) and its appearance as what it is not. This again refers to an observer from whom the true character of the substance is hidden and to whom it appears with false names and forms. With reference to such an implied observer, it is to be conceived as due to *avidyā* or ignorance. This *avidyā* is destroyed by *Vidyā* or true knowledge. When the observer, by suitable spiritual discipline, attains *Vidyā* or true knowledge of the real character of the Substance, viz. Brahman, *adhyāsa* vanishes, the world of names and forms falsely attributed to Brahman disappears or no longer appears as real, and Brahman alone shines in His absolute infinite differenceless attributeless character. The observer himself also, as a separate entity, vanishes, or rather, having realised his absolute identity with Brahman, is completely merged in His differenceless unity.

Āchārya concludes his introduction with the assertion that in course of his interpretation of the *Sūtras* he will establish this to be the true significance of all the teachings of the Vedānta. I am here in search of some unmistakable and unambiguous evidence in the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana, in order to be satisfied that he also wanted to teach us the same truth.

The revered *Sūtrakāra* introduces his philosophy with four *sūtras* called '*chatuhsutree*', in which he states in explicit terms the subject-matter of his inquiry, the principal source of knowledge about it and the rational method of arriving at the truth. He proposes to inquire about the true nature of Brahman, who has been described as the ultimate Reality, from whom all animate and inanimate things of this phenomenal world derive their existence, by whom their existence is sustained and in whom they are finally merged. In the third *Sūtra* he emphasises that the *śāstras* or the revealed utterances are the only unquestionable source of evidence with regard to the truths about this transcendent Reality. The authorities cited in the *sūtras* indicate that by *Śāstras* the *Sūtrakāra* meant principally the *Srūtis* or *Upanishads*, which are regarded as the verbal embodiments of the super-sensuous and super-intellectual truths, revealed to the *Rishis* in their innermost spiritual experience, and are therefore sometimes referred to as *Pratyaksha* or *Darshana*, and secondarily the *Smṛiti* which are based upon the former and are sometimes mentioned as *anumāna*.

The fourth *sūtra* lays down the principle that true knowledge about the ultimate ground of all existences and about other truths for which we are to rely on *Śāstras*, has to be attained by *Samanvaya*, or the harmonisation of the various texts in which the truths have been revealed in the *Srūtis* and interpreted in the *Smṛitis*, and penetration into their innermost significance. It is this method which Bādarāyana chiefly adopts in his philosophy to reach the end of his inquiry.

Independent logical and metaphysical arguments are resorted to for removing doubts, meeting objections and refuting rival theories, and for establishing to the satisfaction of the rational faculty that the conclusions obtained by *Sruti-Samanvaya* are the most unimpeachable rational conclusions.

The *Sutrakāra* then proceeds with the analysis and synthesis of the authoritative texts of the upanishads and establishes that Brahman, the sole ultimate Ground of the universe, is essentially of a different character from *Prakriti* and *Jeeva*. First of all, he points out His distinction from *Prakriti*—the unconscious changeable primordial matter, regarded by the *Sāṅkhya* school as the material cause of the world,—by showing that Brahman, who is proclaimed by the *sruti* to be the sole material as well as the efficient cause of this world, 'is also described as thinking' and 'willing' before creation, as the 'atman' or the Self or the indwelling spirit of all living beings, as the giver of *moksha* or perfection to those who are absorbed in His thought and surrender themselves to Him, and as the one whom the finite spirits never desert as a foreign entity (like *Prakriti*), but whom they realise in the state of true knowledge as their inner self,—the self of selves.

Next he goes on to show that Brahman must be distinguished from *Jeeva* or the finite spirit as well. *Jeeva*, of course, has essential points of community with Brahman. It is a self-luminous and self-willed knower, doer and enjoyer like him. It is not essentially limited in space and modified in time. It is uncreated and eternal, and exists above spatial and temporal externality. All these are common to *Jeeva* and Brahman. In the state of liberation *Jeeva* cannot be even recognised as having any individual existence at all, apart from that of Brahman. But still, says the *Sutrakāra*, Brahman must not be identified with *Jeeva*. He points out that the *Srutis* draw a definite distinction between the two. The ultimate Ground

of the universe, viz. Brahman, is described as *ánandamaya* i.e. perfectly blissful or self-enjoying. This means that He is eternally and absolutely self-fulfilled and self-complete, His knowledge and activity and enjoyment are eternally and absolutely perfect. There is no kind or form of imperfection in Him. But this is not the case with individual spirits. The spiritual nature of Brahman is only partially manifested in them, and progressively realised through their *Sádhana* or spiritual culture. They have limitations of knowledge, will and bliss, which they have the capacity to transcend, and by transcending which they identify themselves with Brahman.

Again, Brahman has the unique power to create, sustain, govern and destroy the universe, which no *Jeeva*, even at its highest state of perfection, can, in the view of *Sutrakára*, ever aspire after (*Jagat-byápára-barjan*). Moreover, He alone has the unique power of manifesting Himself by the mere act of His will as this boundless world of plurality without the least prejudice to the perfect unity of His nature. The all-round perfection of His character is in no way touched or affected by the diversities and limitations of this phenomenal world.

The reality of the distinction of Brahman, Supreme Spirit from the *Jeevas*, the finite spirits and from *Prakriti*, which is established in the first *páda* of the first chapter, is maintained throughout the rest of the book. In the second *páda*, it is pointed out that the *Sruti* declares Brahman as dwelling in the cave of the heart of every living being along with the individual self. They are sometimes described as two birds dwelling in the same tree. Both are distinguished from the material body and the objective world. But the individual spirit is primarily related to one body at a time. Through ignorance born of the will of Brahman, it identifies itself with the body for the time being and attributes its movements and sufferings and enjoyments to itself. It passes from one body to another according to

its *karma* born of ignorance. But Brahman is at all times related to all bodies and is the self of all selves. The individual self, being related to the body, loses partially the consciousness of its supra-physical supra-mental and supra-human character (*swarupa*), and becomes a victim to *karma* and its fruits, bondage and liberation. The indwelling universal spirit is not at all touched by the imperfections and limitations of the bodily existence, never loses even in the smallest measure the consciousness of His blissful perfect transcendent character, never attributes any action to Himself or suffers any consequences, never comes under any form of bondage and therefore requires no liberation. Nevertheless, all activities of the individual spirits and their consequent enjoyments and sufferings, the courses of their destinies and their bondage and liberation, are controlled and managed and regulated by His eternally perfect will. He is unconditionally the supreme object of their worship, the ultimate object of their quest, and the final goal of their progress. When they attain *Vidyā* and realise their unity with Him, when they feel themselves in Him, by Him, from Him and for Him, when they see Him and Him alone within and without, when they experience nothing,—not even themselves —apart from Him, they are emancipated from all bondage and limitation and enjoy the blessedness of His perfect existence, being one with Him. This of course does not imply that the *Jeevas* have really no individual existence, and no bondage and liberation, and their varieties of experiences are all illusory. At least Badarayana in his *sutras* does not appear to draw such an inference. He carries the emphasis on the points of distinction to the third *páda*. Then in the rest of this chapter he explains many apparently ambiguous texts of the upanishads to avoid misunderstanding. The conclusion of the whole chapter is that the one omniscient and omnipotent, infinite and eternal, all-pervading and

transcendent, changeless and absolute, blissful and perfect Supreme Spirit or Brahman, as distinguished from the individual spirits, the Prakriti and even the *Iswara* of the *Naiyāyikas*, is the efficient (*nimitta*) as well as the material (*upādāna*) cause of the real phenomenal objective world.

There are, however, a few *sūtras* (such as 1.1.30, 1.3.19,) which refer to scriptural texts, that admit of being interpreted to mean the absolute identity of Jeeva and Brahman from the metaphysical point of view. The *Sūtrakīrti*, however, interprets them as implying what may be called identity-in-difference (*Bhedābheda*), so that the consistency between them and other texts on the subject may not be broken.

As in a state of bondage the *Jeeva* identifies itself with the body and mind, so in a state of *Mukti* it identifies itself with Brahman. In reality the finite spirits are, as it were, sparks of the fire of Brahman, the spiritual parts (*angsha*) or partial self-manifestations (*ābhāsa*) of the Supreme Spirit, in whom they always 'live and move and have their being', - unknowingly in the state of bondage and knowingly in the state of *mukti*. The relation between the Spiritual Whole and the Spiritual Parts, the Absolute Spirit and His spiritual self-manifestations, is one of identity as well as difference. The parts, though having no existence and essential characteristics apart from those of the whole, cannot be regarded as absolutely identical with the whole. The parts have limitations and changes of states and embodiments and environments; but the whole is absolutely free from them. The life of the whole pervades the lives of the parts, the self of the whole is the ultimate self of the selves of the parts, the whole governs the parts; but still the parts are parts, and they are not completely identical with the whole. When these parts become perfectly self-conscious, when their essential character, freed from the veil of ignorance and the consequent limitations, is perfectly unveiled,

(*ābirbhūta-svarūpa*), when their pure non-material supra-mental spiritual nature is perfectly realised they experience the whole—the supreme spirit—as their true self, their egoism which apparently divided them from the whole and the other parts is gone, and they identify themselves with the whole. There being no spatial externality between the Spiritual whole and the Spiritual part, the part in the state of perfect self-consciousness is in experience identical with the whole. But the difference of states of existence, the liability to ignorance and error, etc. imply the individualised existence of the parts. The reality of this individualised existence is presupposed by the very possibility of *adhyāsa* and its destruction,—*avidyā* and *vidyā*. Badarayana is nowhere in the sutras found to deny the reality.

In the second chapter Badarayana adduces rational arguments to demonstrate that the conclusions he has arrived at in the first chapter are free from the charges brought against them by rival schools of philosophy and that all other hypotheses suggested by those schools are vitiated by various kinds of fallacies.

One objection against his doctrine is that to regard the Spirit as the sole cause of the material world means a virtual denial of the universally acknowledged fundamental distinction between spirit and matter, subject and object. To this the *sutrakāra* simply answers—"But it is seen". It obviously means that our experience supplies us with numerous instances in which an object becomes the cause of another different from it in essential characteristics. What we find is that everything cannot be the cause of everything else. The fundamental condition is that the possibility or the capacity for the production of the effect must be present in the cause. What object has the possibility or the capacity for the production of what effect can be rightly ascertained only by the observation of the actual effect produced from it. The

Sruti, which is the ultimate source of evidence as to the cause of the universe, gives us the knowledge that Brahman is the sole cause of the universe and that He possesses eternally the power (*Sakti*) necessary for the purpose. His power is unique, and nothing parallel to it can be found in any created object of our experience. There is, however, no logical inconsistency in holding that the Supreme Spirit who is regarded as omnipotent and omniscient, infinite and eternal, is by nature endowed with the power and wisdom necessary for creating from within Himself such a boundless well-ordered world of diverse mental and material realities. As a consistent *Satkāryabādin*, Bādarāyana maintains that before creation and after dissolution the world of spiritual and material plurality remains in an unmanifested undifferentiated unified state, i.e. in the form of *Sakti* (power or potency), in the cause, from which it is then non-distinguishable. Since it is then one with Brahman, the question of the nature of the cause being polluted by the limitations, relativities and special features of the phenomenal realities of the manifested and differentiated effect does not arise at all.

A question arises: how can Brahman, who is conceived as one without a second, without physical organs, mental faculties, material stuff and suitable instruments, be reasonably regarded as originating and sustaining and governing a plurality of beings, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, with bewilderingly diverse characteristics, and if He does so, how can He be regarded as absolutely unaffected by these actions, absolutely free from all sorts of modifications of His nature, preserving the perfect unity and purity, the supreme unconcernedness and beatitude, of His transcendent self? Bādarāyana's answer to this also is very simple, but of supreme philosophical importance. He simply says—"It is known from the *Sruti*, which is the primary source of knowledge with unquestionable authority in the matter." Whether or not

our finite and relative understanding can reconcile the presence of such an extraordinary capacity in any Being with its phenomenal experience and logic, Brahman has in Him this unique and incomprehensible capacity, and this is known for certain from the *Sruti*, whose authority on the subject cannot be challenged. Every object has got its specific nature and power, which so long as it is unmanifested in action, remains absolutely identical with and indistinguishable from its pure existence, but becomes cognisable and distinguishable, when manifested in action. Brahman also can similarly be regarded, without any violence to reason, as possessing this specific nature and power of manifesting Himself as a diversified plurality by mere act of His will without in the least producing any form of modification in His transcendent nature. The power in its unmanifested state is identical with and indistinguishable from His absolute differenceless character, but may be reasonably inferred from the work of creation, regulation and destruction of the phenomenal universe. The manifestation of His power does not make Him changed or transformed or other than what He is by Himself.

The power, activity, knowledge and enjoyment of Brahman cannot be compared to those of any created being, however great. His knowledge being eternally perfect involves no process ; His activity being perfect involves no change in Himself ; His will being perfect involves no effort ; His power having no rival or obstructing force involves no self-modification ; His enjoyment involves no difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed. This truth we get from *Sruti* or from the deepest spiritual experience. In order to give a vague idea of His inconceivable power, Bádaráyana compares it to the creative power of man in dream-consciousness and to that of the *yogins* and gods to create by will, in which cases the work of creation is accomplished without the help of any materials and instruments, and

without any movement of limbs and senses. He describes this work of Divine creation as a pure play (*Leela-Kaivalyam*) of Brahman, in as much as it is something like a spontaneous expression of his infinite *ananda*, which is a super-conscious state in which the knower, knowing and the known, the will, act and its fulfilment, the enjoyer, enjoying and the enjoyed, the subject, the object and their relation, are all completely unified. All through His work or play, He remains within Himself.

In *Sutras* like 2. 1. 14, Badarayana raises the question whether the effect, viz. the world of plurality, is different or non-different from the cause, viz. Brahman. His doctrine is that the effect is non different from the cause (*tadananyatvam*). Sankara lays the greatest stress upon this doctrine of the *Sutrakara*. But neither the *Sutras* nor the scriptural texts they refer to anywhere suggest that the world is non-different from Brahman in the same sense in which the illusory serpent and silver are non-different from the real rope and oyster to which respectively they are falsely attributed. The relation between Brahman and the world is, according to *Sruti*, analogous to that between earth and earthenware, gold and golden ornaments, iron and ironware. It implies that Brahman is the ultimate substances of the universe. As substances like earth, gold, iron etc, without any change in their essential characteristics produce those various kinds of articles, which are not substantially different from them, so Brahman also without any modification whatsoever of His essential nature, creates from within Himself the world of multiplicity, which is not substantially different from him. The analogy should not of course be drawn too far, for the power or potentiality of any created conditional material cause cannot be compared to that of the self-existent, absolute, sole spiritual ground of the whole universe. Brahman is the substance,

the self, the ruler and the final end of all that was and is and will be. The text explicitly states that it is from His undifferentiated self-luminous spiritual existence that all differentiated existences are manifested by His will ; that He enters into them as their indwelling self or spirit ; that all particular existences with particular names and forms are sustained and regulated by His immanent existence. In this sense the whole universe of finite spirits and matters is non-different from him (*tadananya*) and has Him for its true self (*aitadātmyam*) and may be said to be identical with Him. This doctrine does not imply the unreality of the world (*Jagat-mithyātva*) or any sort of *adhyāsa* of the world upon His otherwise differenceless self-existence.

The *Sutrakāra* explains the above doctrine of the *Sruti* by logically establishing the non-otherness of the effect from the cause (and not unreality of the effect) on the ground that the existence of the effect is completely dependent upon that of the cause. He concludes the topic with a peremptory general assertion that reason (*Yukti*) as well as all revealed words (*Shabda*) are in support of the conclusion that the effect is essentially non-other or non-different from the cause. It should be noted that nowhere in the *Sutras* do we find a statement suggesting that the cause also is non-other or non-different from the effect. On the contrary the cause Brahman is repeatedly proclaimed to be superior to (*adhika*) distinct from (*bhinna*) and transcendent above the effect, viz. the world of plurality. There is, however, nowhere even any suggestion of the unreality of the causal relation—of the causality of the Supreme Spirit. Nowhere does the *Sutrakāra* characterise the cause as true and the effect as false, Brahman as real and the world as illusory.

The objective reality of the world is most emphatically and unequivocally affirmed by him in connection with the refutation of Buddhistic Subjective Idealism, where he gives

a solemn warning against the identification of perception and its object, and the interpretation of the waking experience on the analogy of the dream-experience. The expressions like '*neti neti*' of *Sruti*, he interprets as implying the denial of the limitedness (*etābattvam*) of Brahman within the range of His self-manifestations, and not the denial of the existence of the world. Brahman is not exhausted or exhaustible in His effect, but eternally unmanifested (*avyakta*) as well. By expressions like '*Neha nānāsti kinchana*' he means that there is no plurality other than and independent of the one absolute Supreme Spirit. According to the *Sutrakara*, Brahman is everywhere in *Sruti* described as having an apparently dual character (*ubhayalingam Sarbatra hi*)—viz. manifested and unmanifested, immanent and transcendent, differentiated and differenceless, active and inactive, *saguna* and *nirguna* etc. But the *Sutrakara* does not, like the *Bhāṣyakāra*, think it necessary to harmonise the two aspects by saying that the one is real and the other is unreal, the one represents His true nature and the other is falsely ascribed to Him under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* or ignorance. Thus from a comparative study of the *Sutras* and *Bhāṣya* Sankara's theory of *adhyāsa* appears to be *adhyasta* (somehow attributed) upon the philosophy of Badarayana.

The "Cathartic" Theory of Morals.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

In my previous papers on Ethics read before this Congress, I have tried to prove that modern Ethics is really at the cross-ways. It has confused itself by identifying moral science with the science of *values*, the principles of character and conduct with the principles of human welfare, the problem of righteousness with the problem of goodness. Perfection, self-development, social salvation—in short all kinds of world-comprehensive ideals are proposed as the ends or standards of conduct, and the simple humble question of 'what ought I to do?' has been forgotten in the maze of ambitious programmes of the Absolute Good, the best and the most blessed life etc. And yet modern Ethics is janus-faced, so to say, with one face turned upon the world, the world of matter and material goods, of acquisition and possession, of creation and conservation of 'values'; the other, more or less turned upon itself, and engaged in the eternal task of self-creation, of creation of character, of moral self-purification. This latter is moral science proper, while the former is what I have called the science of Human well-being or the General Theory of Value. This Theory of Value is empirical, utilitarian, based on expediency¹ while moral science is intuitionist, idealistic, even metaphysical. This is the real significance of the distinction, as I understand it, which McDougall draws between Universalistic and Nationalistic ethics in his thought-provoking work, "Ethics and some world-

1. See my "The Methods of Ethics" published in the Philosophical Quarterly for January 1932.

problems." This is also the explanation of the double standard of ethics advocated in Hindu thought represented by the universal, non-sectarian teachings of the philosophical systems (e.g., the Vedānta) on the one side, and by the racial, sectarian, caste-codes (e.g., the *Dharma-Sūtras*) on the other. A proper harmonisation of these two aspects is, I conceive, the most urgent and fundamental problem of ethics at the present day. On the one side moral purity and integrity of the highest sort must be capable of being attained. To lose it or to sacrifice it in any measure whatsoever for the sake of consequences would be like giving up the soul of morality. Yet on the other we cannot afford to neglect the values of life—the concrete goods which alone could give a content to moral life. A synthesis of these two aspects so as to render moral life both subjectively pure and objectively fruitful is what I have attempted in my own humble way in this 'Cathartic' theory of morals.

The fundamental principle of this theory is that moral life is a process of self-purification, a discipline that purges, cleanses the affective-volitional nature of man (which alone is the real spring of action, ordinarily speaking), a process of 'catharsis' of desires. It is assumed that desire in the sense of attachment either to object or self vitiates the morality of an action and brings about misery to the agent in various ways. And so the rule of conduct must be such as to eliminate *this sense of attachment* from the agent's mind as far as possible. Moral purity consists in non-attachment, inner renunciation of all *sense* of possession or enjoyment or attachment. And yet through this very process of catharsis, objective or social good should naturally result. With these ends in view, the cathartic theory may be stated as follows: "Act so that the line of your action may leech your desires". The psychological distinction between impulse, desire, appetite, interest etc., is important in this connection but cannot be

undertaken here. Suffice it to say that every element of the affective-volitional life requires to be leeches. Using the term 'impulse' broadly so as to cover every such element, we may classify impulses as positive—those which in their very nature are catharsising (e.g., love, benevolence, self sacrifice etc.) and negative, i.e., those which contrariwise strengthen the bonds of attachment to and identification with themselves, e.g., greed, selfishness, cruelty, lust etc. Very often the best means of leeching a negative impulse would be to cultivate its opposite, and then catharsising the latter in the manner prescribed below (which means that even positive impulses require to be leeches). Again impulses may be classified on the basis of the *reactions* of the individual regarded either as positive when he identifies himself with the impulse or as negative when he flies away from it, e.g., neglect of family duties, indifference to personal development etc. In either case the individual betrays the mastery or superiority of the impulse over himself and so the latter requires to be leeches. Most cases of moral conflict can be resolved by asking these two questions, (1) To which impulse is the agent positively attracted most? (2) To which is he reacting negatively always? We will however now discuss some of the different lines of action which are thus calculated to leech one's desires and secure moral purity and which at the same time represent different levels of moral freedom.

(1) *Empirical Subjectivity : Freedom as distinction of empirical ego from object.*

A desire is leeches (i. e., the act proceeding from it becomes pure) in so far as it is not complicated or intensified by the object being treated as part of the subject himself. This is a stage where, to begin with, there is no distinction between subject and object. All is one vast whirlpool of subjectivity in which objects are looked upon as only an extension of the subject—as an external concretisation,

so to say, of the subject's needs and desires and where the individual is not aware of the difference between being "pulled by seductions from without" and being "pushed by impluses from within". Into such a state of empirical subjectivity must first be introduced the distinction between 'the psychological me' and the object which acts as stimulus. The 'psychological me'—the complexus of desires and feelings and impluses—though the condition of there being objective experience, must still be felt to be different from the objects which attract it.

(2) *Empiric al Objectivity : Freedom as Empirical Determinism of Society.*

A desire becomes pure when after the "psychological me" has contemplated itself as different from the object, it comes to identify itself with the 'social me' (collection of "psychological me's"), so that if an impulse conforms to the demands of the 'social me', it is so far pure. Here the aim is to substitute the rule of an impersonal social law or custom for the vagaries of psychological individualism. The 'psychological me', however, continues in the 'social me', for there is no differentiation in this stage between the impulse and the rational ego. It may be called the customary stage of morality where a clash is possible between the 'psychological me' and the 'social me'.

(3) *Rational Subject-objectivity : Freedom as the Rational self-Determinism of Personality.*

A desire becomes pure in so far as, while still pursuing social ends, there appears in the subject's mind a distinction between the "personal me" and the 'psychological me'. Within the life of the subject himself there now arises a subject-object relation, the 'personal me,' or the rational ego being the subject which while distinguishing itself from the impulse, instinct or appetite (which is the object) yet feels that they

belong to it, possesses them, and controls and develops them as it likes. And thus results what may be called 'the personal me' or simply, personality. The essence of personality lies in the integration of desires into a unitary whole so that every desire, thus correlated and organised, becomes instrumental to the truer life of the self. The self breathes its spirit into the impulses and instincts and objectifies them by giving them concrete form either in canvas or plaster, song or verse. This leads to the development of one's capacities and the stage in *general* corresponds to the western theory of self-realisation. But what distinguishes it from the latter is the fact that instead of such development being looked upon as the end or standard of conduct, it is treated in this theory as the natural result of the progress of moral purity having no ethical significance in itself, the ethical value of the stage consisting in the accentuation of that distinction between the 'rational' I and the impulses whereby the self freely expresses itself indeed (in the direction best suited to its capacities) in the creation of external goods but is not troubled with the success or failure of its enterprises. The endeavour after self-expression is a *natural consequence* of the integration of personality involved here; but since the integration also involves a corresponding differentiation referred to above, the self conceives that to action only it has a right, but not to the fruits thereof. It will thus be observed that disinterested action comprises not only the so-called duties proper but all action whatever, whether self-regarding or other-regarding. The treatment of disinterested action requires an essay by itself but suffice it to say here that it means 'neither motiveless action' nor disregard of or indifference to the kind of consequences envisaged, but only a refusal to get *worried* or *upset* by the consequences that do actually happen sometimes contrary to expectations, for Nature's processes are mysterious and there are such things as counteraction of causes and intermixture of effects. Perfect

equality to all works, results, things and persons is the keynote of this stage.

(4) *Transcendental Subjectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Self-Determinism of Individuality.*

A desire becomes pure when after having distinguished himself as a rational self from the impulses and their objects, the moral agent longs to attain a unity of self with self. The endeavour is made in this stage of recognising himself as a transcendental subject (*Sakshi purusha*—witnessing intelligence) one with other transcendental subjects. The conception of personality is sought to be replaced here by that of individuality, the true individual being the indivisible whole. But since such a perfect realisation of the individual as the witness merely is not easily achieved, the control of impulses and the performance of action suited to the capacities of the individual continue in this stage also but always with an eye to the realisation of the oneness of the self. Other things being equal, that desire would be the purest which would enable the individual to identify himself with the largest number of individuals. For the desire in such a case would be leeches to the greatest extent. This is the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" interpreted, however, not with reference to consequences merely but with reference to catharsising the motive or desire. This is the inner significance of the Indian doctrine of doing works for *lokasangraha* (*lokashreya*, *lokapālana*), for the leading of the peoples. It is the method of leeching the positive or benevolent affections (referred to before) by widening the circle of persons who are the objects of these affections (self-sacrifice, love, benevolence etc.). The affections are thus purified of their dross and imperfection arising from their confinement to local, narrow and provincial interests.

(5) *Transcendental Objectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Determinism of Nature-Soul.*

A desire becomes pure when the above realisation of the transcendental nature of the subject as a merely witnessing intelligence becomes complete and action proceeds out of the conviction that it is done not by the inactive, immutable silent witness of nature, but by the mobile mutable *prakriti* with her triple *gunas*,—*sattwa*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The self in this stage regains its true freedom from the shackles of the sensuous empirical nature which it was either identifying itself with or taking as a true part of itself before. Now it realises that its true nature is noumenal and that it has no right either to the action or its fruits while its phenomenal aspect (which it cannot however dispense with so long as it is embodied) is inescapably involved in the causal series of nature. All actions of the self therefore, regarded from this natural standpoint, are the self-energisings of this great Nature—Soul, the unequal, the active, the mutable, the three guna-imbued *Prakriti*. Even the subtle egoism of *actor-ness* is given up in this stage along with the claims to the fruits of the action. This is the true significance of "the life according to Nature" advocated by the Stoics though possibly they did not realise fully the metaphysical implications of the doctrine. Nature controls the drama of human action and develops it according to her own laws.

(6) *Transcendental Subject-objectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Self-Determinism of Super-Personality.*

A desire becomes pure when the action resulting from it is perceived to have been caused not by nature but by Him Who is beyond the self that acts not (the *akshara purusha*), beyond the *Prakriti* that acts (the *kshara purusha*), the *Purushotama* or the Supreme Person, Who is the basis of the one and the lord of the other, Who governs the works *Prakriti* and Who uses individual souls only as instruments of carrying out His purpose. The self in this stage realises that it is an *amsha* of this Divine Lord, partakes of His freedom of action and

without any movement of limbs and senses. He describes this work of Divine creation as a pure play (*Leela-Kaivalyam*) of Brahman, in as much as it is something like a spontaneous expression of his infinite *ananda*, which is a super-conscious state in which the knower, knowing and the known, the will, act and its fulfilment, the enjoyer, enjoying and the enjoyed, the subject, the object and their relation, are all completely unified. All through His work or play, He remains within Himself.

In *Sutras* like 2. 1. 14, Badarayana raises the question whether the effect, viz. the world of plurality, is different or non-different from the cause, viz. Brahman. His doctrine is that the effect is non different from the cause (*tadananyatvam*). Sankara lays the greatest stress upon this doctrine of the *Sutrakara*. But neither the *Sutras* nor the scriptural texts they refer to anywhere suggest that the world is non-different from Brahman in the same sense in which the illusory serpent and silver are non-different from the real rope and oyster to which respectively they are falsely attributed. The relation between Brahman and the world is, according to *Sruti*, analogous to that between earth and earthenware, gold and golden ornaments, iron and ironware. It implies that Brahman is the ultimate substances of the universe. As substances like earth, gold, iron etc, without any change in their essential characteristics produce those various kinds of articles, which are not substantially different from them, so Brahman also without any modification whatsoever of His essential nature, creates from within Himself the world of multiplicity, which is not substantially different from him. The analogy should not of course be drawn too far, for the power or potentiality of any created conditional material cause cannot be compared to that of the self-existent, absolute, sole spiritual ground of the whole universe. Brahman is the substance,

the self, the ruler and the final end of all that was and is and will be. The text explicitly states that it is from His undifferentiated self-luminous spiritual existence that all differentiated existences are manifested by His will ; that He enters into them as their indwelling self or spirit ; that all particular existences with particular names and forms are sustained and regulated by His immanent existence. In this sense the whole universe of finite spirits and matters is non-different from him (*tadananya*) and has Him for its true self (*aitadātmyam*) and may be said to be identical with Him. This doctrine does not imply the unreality of the world (*Jagat-mithyātva*) or any sort of *adhyāsa* of the world upon His otherwise differenceless self-existence.

The *Sutrakāra* explains the above doctrine of the *Sruti* by logically establishing the non-otherness of the effect from the cause (and not unreality of the effect) on the ground that the existence of the effect is completely dependent upon that of the cause. He concludes the topic with a peremptory general assertion that reason (*Yukti*) as well as all revealed words (*Shabda*) are in support of the conclusion that the effect is essentially non-other or non-different from the cause. It should be noted that nowhere in the *Sutras* do we find a statement suggesting that the cause also is non-other or non-different from the effect. On the contrary the cause Brahman is repeatedly proclaimed to be superior to (*adhika*) distinct from (*bhinna*) and transcendent above the effect, viz. the world of plurality. There is, however, nowhere even any suggestion of the unreality of the causal relation—of the causality of the Supreme Spirit. Nowhere does the *Sutrakāra* characterise the cause as true and the effect as false, Brahman as real and the world as illusory.

The objective reality of the world is most emphatically and unequivocally affirmed by him in connection with the refutation of Buddhistic Subjective Idealism, where he gives

a solemn warning against the identification of perception and its object, and the interpretation of the waking experience on the analogy of the dream-experience. The expressions like '*neti neti*' of *Sruti*, he interprets as implying the denial of the limitedness (*etābattvam*) of Brahman within the range of His self-manifestations, and not the denial of the existence of the world. Brahman is not exhausted or exhaustible in His effect, but eternally unmanifested (*avyakta*) as well. By expressions like '*Neha nānāsti kinchana*' he means that there is no plurality other than and independent of the one absolute Supreme Spirit. According to the *Sutrakara*, Brahman is everywhere in *Sruti* described as having an apparently dual character (*ubhayalingam Sarbatra hi*)—viz. manifested and unmanifested, immanent and transcendent, differentiated and differenceless, active and inactive, *saguna* and *nirguna* etc. But the *Sutrakara* does not, like the *Bhāṣyakāra*, think it necessary to harmonise the two aspects by saying that the one is real and the other is unreal, the one represents His true nature and the other is falsely ascribed to Him under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* or ignorance. Thus from a comparative study of the *Sutras* and *Bhāṣya* Sankara's theory of *adhyāsa* appears to be *adhyasta* (somehow attributed) upon the philosophy of Badarayana.

The "Cathartic" Theory of Morals.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

In my previous papers on Ethics read before this Congress, I have tried to prove that modern Ethics is really at the cross-ways. It has confused itself by identifying moral science with the science of *values*, the principles of character and conduct with the principles of human welfare, the problem of righteousness with the problem of goodness. Perfection, self-development, social salvation—in short all kinds of world-comprehensive ideals are proposed as the ends or standards of conduct, and the simple humble question of 'what ought I to do ?' has been forgotten in the maze of ambitious programmes of the Absolute Good, the best and the most blessed life etc. And yet modern Ethics is janus-faced, so to say, with one face turned upon the world, the world of matter and material goods, of acquisition and possession, of creation and conservation of 'values'; the other, more or less turned upon itself, and engaged in the eternal task of self-creation, of creation of character, of moral self-purification. This latter is moral science proper, while the former is what I have called the science of Human well-being or the General Theory of Value. This Theory of Value is empirical, utilitarian, based on expediency¹ while moral science is intuitional, idealistic, even metaphysical. This is the real significance of the distinction, as I understand it, which McDougall draws between Universalistic and Nationalistic ethics in his thought-provoking work, "Ethics and some world-

1. See my "The Methods of Ethics" published in the Philosophical Quarterly for January 1932.

problems." This is also the explanation of the double standard of ethics advocated in Hindu thought represented by the universal, non-sectarian teachings of the philosophical systems (e.g., the Vedanta) on the one side, and by the racial, sectarian, caste-codes (e.g., the *Dharma-Sutras*) on the other. A proper harmonisation of these two aspects is, I conceive, the most urgent and fundamental problem of ethics at the present day. On the one side moral purity and integrity of the highest sort must be capable of being attained. To lose it or to sacrifice it in any measure whatsoever for the sake of consequences would be like giving up the soul of morality. Yet on the other we cannot afford to neglect the values of life—the concrete goods which alone could give a content to moral life. A synthesis of these two aspects so as to render moral life both subjectively pure and objectively fruitful is what I have attempted in my own humble way in this 'Cathartic' theory of morals.

The fundamental principle of this theory is that moral life is a process of self-purification, a discipline that purges, cleanses the affective-volitional nature of man (which alone is the real spring of action, ordinarily speaking), a process of 'catharsis' of desires. It is assumed that desire in the sense of attachment either to object or self vitiates the morality of an action and brings about misery to the agent in various ways. And so the rule of conduct must be such as to eliminate *this sense of attachment* from the agent's mind as far as possible. Moral purity consists in non-attachment, inner renunciation of all *sense* of possession or enjoyment or attachment. And yet through this very process of catharsis, objective or social good should naturally result. With these ends in view, the cathartic theory may be stated as follows: "Act so that the line of your action may leech your desires". The psychological distinction between impulse, desire, appetite, interest etc., is important in this connection but cannot be

undertaken here. Suffice it to say that every element of the affective-volitional life requires to be leeches. Using the term 'impulse' broadly so as to cover every such element, we may classify impulses as positive—those which in their very nature are catharsising (e.g., love, benevolence, self sacrifice etc.) and negative, i.e., those which contrariwise strengthen the bonds of attachment to and identification with themselves, e.g., greed, selfishness, cruelty, lust etc. Very often the best means of leeching a negative impulse would be to cultivate its opposite, and then catharsising the latter in the manner prescribed below (which means that even positive impulses require to be leeches). Again impulses may be classified on the basis of the *reactions* of the individual regarded either as positive when he identifies himself with the impulse or as negative when he flies away from it, e.g., neglect of family duties, indifference to personal development etc. In either case the individual betrays the mastery or superiority of the impulse over himself and so the latter requires to be leeches. Most cases of moral conflict can be resolved by asking these two questions, (1) To which impulse is the agent positively attracted most? (2) To which is he reacting negatively always? We will however now discuss some of the different lines of action which are thus calculated to leech one's desires and secure moral purity and which at the same time represent different levels of moral freedom.

(1) *Empirical Subjectivity : Freedom as distinction of empirical ego from object.*

A desire is leeches (i. e., the act proceeding from it becomes pure) in so far as it is not complicated or intensified by the object being treated as part of the subject himself. This is a stage where, to begin with, there is no distinction between subject and object. All is one vast whirlpool of subjectivity in which objects are looked upon as only an extension of the subject—as an external concretisation,

so to say, of the subject's needs and desires and where the individual is not aware of the difference between being "pulled by seductions from without" and being "pushed by impluses from within". Into such a state of empirical subjectivity must first be introduced the distinction between 'the psychological me' and the object which acts as stimulus. The 'psychological me'—the complexus of desires and feelings and impluses—though the condition of there being objective experience, must still be felt to be different from the objects which attract it.

(2) *Empirical Objectivity : Freedom as Empirical Determinism of Society.*

A desire becomes pure when after the "psychological me" has contemplated itself as different from the object, it comes to identify itself with the 'social me' (collection of "psychological me's"), so that if an impluse conforms to the demands of the 'social me', it is so far pure. Here the aim is to substitute the rule of an impersonal social law or custom for the vagaries of psychological individualism. The 'psychological me', however, continues in the 'social me', for there is no differentiation in this stage between the impluse and the rational ego. It may be called the customary stage of morality where a clash is possible between the 'psychological me' and the 'social me'.

(3) *Rational Subject-objectivity : Freedom as the Rational self-Determinism of Personality.*

A desire becomes pure in so far as, while still pursuing social ends, there appears in the subject's mind a distinction between the "personal me" and the 'psychological me'. Within the life of the subject himself there now arises a subject-object relation, the 'personal me,' or the rational ego being the subject which while distinguishing itself from the impluse, instinct or appetite (which is the object) yet feels that they

belong to it, possesses them, and controls and develops them as it likes. And thus results what may be called 'the personal me' or simply, personality. The essence of personality lies in the integration of desires into a unitary whole so that every desire, thus correlated and organised, becomes instrumental to the truer life of the self. The self breathes its spirit into the impulses and instincts and objectifies them by giving them concrete form either in canvas or plaster, song or verse. This leads to the development of one's capacities and the stage in *general* corresponds to the western theory of self-realisation. But what distinguishes it from the latter is the fact that instead of such development being looked upon as the end or standard of conduct, it is treated in this theory as the natural result of the progress of moral purity having no ethical significance in itself, the ethical value of the stage consisting in the accentuation of that distinction between the 'rational' I and the impulses whereby the self freely expresses itself indeed (in the direction best suited to its capacities) in the creation of external goods but is not troubled with the success or failure of its enterprises. The endeavour after self-expression is a *natural consequence* of the integration of personality involved here; but since the integration also involves a corresponding differentiation referred to above, the self conceives that to action only it has a right, but not to the fruits thereof. It will thus be observed that disinterested action comprises not only the so-called duties proper but all action whatever, whether self-regarding or other-regarding. The treatment of disinterested action requires an essay by itself but suffice it to say here that it means 'neither motiveless action' nor disregard of or indifference to the kind of consequences envisaged, but only a refusal to get *worried* or *upset* by the consequences that do actually happen sometimes contrary to expectations, for Nature's processes are mysterious and there are such things as counteraction of causes and intermixture of effects. Perfect

equality to all works, results, things and persons is the keynote of this stage.

(4) *Transcendental Subjectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Self-Determinism of Individuality.*

A desire becomes pure when after having distinguished himself as a rational self from the impulses and their objects, the moral agent longs to attain a unity of self with self. The endeavour is made in this stage of recognising himself as a transcendental subject (*Sakshi purusha*—witnessing intelligence) one with other transcendental subjects. The conception of personality is sought to be replaced here by that of individuality, the true individual being the indivisible whole. But since such a perfect realisation of the individual as the witness merely is not easily achieved, the control of impulses and the performance of action suited to the capacities of the individual continue in this stage also but always with an eye to the realisation of the oneness of the self. Other things being equal, that desire would be the purest which would enable the individual to identify himself with the largest number of individuals. For the desire in such a case would be leeches to the greatest extent. This is the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" interpreted, however, not with reference to consequences merely but with reference to catharsising the motive or desire. This is the inner significance of the Indian doctrine of doing works for *lokasangraha* (*lokashreya*, *lokapālana*), for the leading of the peoples. It is the method of leeches the positive or benevolent affections (referred to before) by widening the circle of persons who are the objects of these affections (self-sacrifice, love, benevolence etc.). The affections are thus purified of their dross and imperfection arising from their confinement to local, narrow and provincial interests.

(5) *Transcendental Objectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Determinism of Nature-Soul.*

A desire becomes pure when the above realisation of the transcendental nature of the subject as a merely witnessing intelligence becomes complete and action proceeds out of the conviction that it is done not by the inactive, immutable silent witness of nature, but by the mobile mutable *prakriti* with her triple *gunas*,—*sattwa*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The self in this stage regains its true freedom from the shackles of the sensuous empirical nature which it was either identifying itself with or taking as a true part of itself before. Now it realises that its true nature is noumenal and that it has no right either to the action or its fruits while its phenomenal aspect (which it cannot however dispense with so long as it is embodied) is inescapably involved in the causal series of nature. All actions of the self therefore, regarded from this natural standpoint, are the self-energisings of this great Nature—Soul, the unequal, the active, the mutable, the three guna-imbued *Prakriti*. Even the subtle egoism of *actor-ness* is given up in this stage along with the claims to the fruits of the action. This is the true significance of "the life according to Nature" advocated by the Stoics though possibly they did not realise fully the metaphysical implications of the doctrine. Nature controls the drama of human action and develops it according to her own laws.

(6) *Transcendental Subject-objectivity: Freedom as Transcendental Self-Determinism of Super-Personality.*

A desire becomes pure when the action resulting from it is perceived to have been caused not by nature but by Him Who is beyond the self that acts not (the *akshara purusha*), beyond the *Prakriti* that acts (the *kshara purusha*), the *Purushotama* or the Supreme Person, Who is the basis of the one and the lord of the other, Who governs the works *Prakriti* and Who uses individual souls only as instruments of carrying out His purpose. The self in this stage realises that it is an *amsha* of this Divine Lord, partakes of His freedom of action and

frees itself from the determinism of *prakriti* who is now seen to constitute the *śakti* or the force of *Purushottama*. Not to her has he to give up his actions now but to her Master who is the Inspirer, the Source of all *prakriti's* actions. Works therefore are offered here as a sacrifice to the *Purushottama* in a spirit of utter devotion, love and self-surrender. The synthesis of divine personality is achieved here and the life lived here is the life according to God.

The catharsis of desires or motives is complete in this stage. The action performed here is a divine action raised above all humanistic-altruistic considerations. It is action which realises the greatest good of all creatures, for, for one thing, *prakriti* cannot stand at cross-purposes with *Purushottama* Whose will alone is being carried out here, and for another, to one who has arrived at this stage, the knowledge and control of nature's processes is complete. And secondly, it is action which is subjectively the purest and the best. Egoism and altruism, utilitarianism and perfectionism, eudaemonism and asceticism are all reconciled and synthesised in this stage.

Some further implications of the above doctrine may now be traced. (i) It recognises moral relativity and diversity in stages (2) and (3). (ii) It likewise allows for progress in morality as described in the several stages through which the individual, originally no better than a non-moral animal, gradually attains the highest spiritual freedom possible as an *amsha* of the Divine Lord. (iii) It gives full scope for social service while retaining the individualist tone of morality. Stages (2), (3) and (4) are especially fitted for contributing to society's welfare to the best of one's abilities although the whole theory is designed to realise objective good equally with subjective purity. It is however frankly recognised that in these stages social service is the best *means* of catharsising individualist impulses and desires while in stages (5) and (6) is a *natural consequence* of realising one's divine destiny.

This need not however make the theory selfish, for morality itself is regarded as a process of discipline to attain the freedom of the spirit. (iv) It avoids the usual insoluble antinomies of ethics *e. g.*, (a) egoism vs. altruism ; in every case where the individual is called upon to decide between two courses of action, the reference is always to the catharsis of motives as described before (pp 2-3 ante) ; (b) Incompatibility and competition of goods as described in a previous connection²—rocks upon which the ship of self-realisation is wrecked. In this theory, however, there is no special merit in trying to develop every capacity in man. The sole question being the catharsis of desires, such capacities as there is a chance for developing shall be developed ; (c) Likewise incommensurability of goods. The primary question being the disinterested performance of duty, and not the realisation of objective 'goods' as such, what constitutes one's duty in a given situation can only be solved by the individual himself regard, of course, being had to an honest analysis of one's motives and a proper application of the principle of catharsis on the lines laid down above (pp. 2-3 ante). So much being granted, the distinction between higher and lower goods does not generally arise, for from the subject's point of view, all goods are on a par, the consequences of action being left to the workings of nature. Sometimes duty may become a terrible sin and then the voice of the inner conscience must prevail, for the call of God is imperative and must rule out all other calls. Surely we could not *now* say that Buddha and Vivekananda did wrong in giving up society to begin with and that both should have stuck to their posts the one to rule as a petty prince and the other to practise as a lawyer in Calcutta ? I admit that national or collective action presents same difficulties but I cannot discuss it in the present connec-

2. "The Theory of moral Goods": Indian Philosophical Proceedings for 1925 pp. 450-451.

tion. (v) Thus the theory harmonises the demands of the world with the demands of the spirit. It does not inculcate on the individual to turn the other cheek also and to give away one's cloak also. For in such cases too the standard is the catharsis of motives. If an individual persistently refuses to look to his own personal comfort or to look after the needs of the family etc., he thereby betrays strong negative reactions to certain impulses which he admits are more powerful than he. It is then his duty to leech such impulses by asserting his mastery over them. Even Buddha and Vivekananda had finally to return to the world and leech the impulses to which they first negatively reacted. (vi) It has already been shown how the theory reconciles utilitarianism and perfectionism etc. It must now be pointed out that it harmonises rationalism and hedonism also inasmuch as while on the one hand the agent does not go seeking after pleasures, on the other he is not to shun pleasures either when they come in his way, for that shows he is negatively reacting to certain impulses—betrays his concern for objectivity—which therefore must be leeches. For obligation, it will be seen, is the sense of negative reaction* to a feeling or impulse, and so long as this reaction persists, the catharsis has not taken place. In every such case the object should be to rise superior to the crabbing, cribbing restraining influence of the impulse to which one is attached. (viii) The greatest virtue of the theory, however, consists in stages (4), (5) and (6). For it is not possible in the previous stages to control all the processes of nature and to perform action in such

* A negative reaction is permissible only where the impulse itself is negative i. e., opposed in nature to catharsis—e. g., addiction to bad habits, lust, etc. A negative reaction in such a case means catharsising the impulses, though the best way of doing so would be as already pointed out, to develop the opposite impulse and then to leech it as directed in stage (4.)

a way as to realise the desired result. And intellectual and ethical perplexities will always remain on the human level. Hence the call to rise to another consciousness with another law of being and another stand-point for our action where no personal desires and emotions play ; where being no longer in our lower nature, we have no works of our own to do but only divine works to the doing of which our outward nature is only an instrument. For the motive-power of work is entirely in the will of the Master of all works and *He* guides and directs all action. This is action done in yoga—and yoga is skill in works—by the *mukta* who has synthesised his reason and will with the divine, who has established himself in the freedom of self-knowledge and who has therefore risen above good-doing and evil-doing alike. And such action is the wisest, the most efficient even for the affairs of the world for it is informed by the knowledge and will of the Master of works—the *Puru-shottama*—whose will the active mutable *prakriti* implicitly carries out for the good of all creatures, *sarvabhūtāni*. Thus life according to nature becomes one with living in God, for the former becomes an inevitable condition and outward result of the latter.

Value and Obligation.

By

A. F. MARKHAM.

Moralists are at present engaged in an attempt to determine the ground of moral obligation. Professor Laird considers that the justification of duty must be in terms of the value it sustains and conserves. (*A Study in Moral Theory*, page XII). According to Professor Moore the assertion "I am morally bound to perform this action" is identical with the assertion "This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe." (*Principia Ethica*, page 147). To do no murder is a duty, because no such action will in any circumstances cause so much good to exist in the Universe as its avoidance. An ethical law has the nature of a scientific prediction and is merely probable.

Right, we are told, means conducive to good. Intrinsic value or goodness is a unique, simple, unanalysable, indefinable property or quality. It is the business of the moralist to determine what things are good in themselves and what things are causally related to something else which is itself good. In order to find out what is good in itself we should consider what value things would have if they existed absolutely by themselves. It seems obvious to Professor Moore that far the most valuable things known or imagined by us are the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. "That it is only for the sake of these things—in order that as much of them as possible may at some time exist—that any one can be justified in performing any public or private duty; that they are the *raison d'être* of virtue; that it is they—these complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them—that form the rational ultimate end of

human action and the sole criterion of human progress : these appear to be truths which have been generally overlooked." (op. cit. page 189).

Value or goodness is not I think, as Professor Moore supposes, a property which things possess—or do not possess—in a greater or less degree. Value, as pointed out by Von Ehrenfels, is essentially a relation between some object and some subject. What is of value in relation to one subject need not be such in relation to another subject, and what is of value to a subject at one time need not be of any actual value at another time. If there are two enemies A and B, what is good for A may be bad for B. The medicine which is of value to me when I am ill may be worthless to me when I no longer require it.

What is the value or good which is the ground of moral obligation ? It surely cannot be a relation between an object and any individual such that the individual actually desires the object. This implies that it is right for me to do what I desire to do. We might argue that the value required to justify an action is a relation between the intention of the agent and all conscious subjects such that they all desire the object or would desire the object, if aware of it, in preference to any other object that could be intended by the agent. Mr H J. Paton has recently tried to show that goodness belongs to the coherent will and that moral goodness belongs to a will which is coherent as a member of an all-inclusive society of coherent wills. Such a goodness as Mr. Paton describes is an ideal which cannot be realised here and now amid the clash of human wills. We have got to live in the world as we find it. "But," writes Mr. Carritt, "if we take seriously the contention that it is coherence that makes acts right, surely it must be actual coherence with actual desires and wills of actual people, every one to count for one, and not

with ideal desires and wills or with some selected by what the upholders of this view call "an arbitrary intuitive standard." No doubt, so far as I and others act rightly our acts do not conflict. But to say that what makes acts right is their coherence with *right* acts is nugatory. Yet unless they say that, they reduce right conduct to a conformity with the ways of mankind, including among mankind the most barbarous times and races." (*The Theory of Morals*, page 67).

Value or goodness is too vague a conception on which to ground moral obligation. Charles D'Arcy attempted to base ethics on metaphysics. He tried to show that man is a spirit or person, that God is personal and that therefore Nature is relative to an end. The end of Nature is the Absolute Good which is the true good for every person. Even if such a metaphysical view could be established there still remains the question as to why a man ought to pursue his true good. Moreover the fact of moral obligation seems to most men far more certain and indubitable than any metaphysical theory.

It sometimes happens that we know that an action is right and are distinctly conscious of an obligation to perform it when we are quite ignorant as to whether the consequences of our action will be good or bad. "No man," wrote Ruskin, "ever knows, or can know, what will be the ultimate result to himself, or to others, of any given line of conduct. But every man may know, and most of us do know, what is a just and unjust act. And all of us may know also, that the consequences of justice will be ultimately the best possible, both to others and ourselves, though we neither can say what is best, or how it is likely to come to pass." (*Unto This Last*, quoted by Carritt op. cit. page 74).

Professor de Burgh reminds us that to appeal to good as the ground of obligation is contrary to moral experience. A man's obligation to pay his rent is unaffected by any consideration

of the bad uses to which his landlord may put the money. (*Journal of Philosophical Studies*, July, 1930). Moreover Professor Prichard has rightly pointed out that an "ought", if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." If derived from "good", it can only be because what is good is what ought to be. But "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone. To say that beauty ought to be could only mean that some one ought to produce what is beautiful. Mr. Prichard concludes that "the sense of obligation to do, or the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate." (*Mind*, January, 1912 quoted by Laird, *A study in Moral Theory* page 25.)

Dean Rashdall held that the fundamental idea in Morality is the idea of Value, in which the idea of "ought" is implicitly contained. The ideas of good and right are correlative terms. "It is implied in the idea of 'good' that it ought to be promoted; the idea of 'right' is meaningless apart from a 'good' which right actions tend to promote. If, finally, we ask what is the relation of the idea of value to the idea of 'moral' value, I should answer that all that has value has moral value, in the sense that it must be moral, in due proportion to the amount of that value, to promote it; but by moral value we generally mean the particular kind of value which we assign to a good character." (*The Theory of Good and Evil*; Volume I page 138).

I cannot agree with Rashdall that 'good', 'value' and 'ought' (when applied to ends) are synonymous terms. The proposition "The good is that which ought to be" is not analytical, the predicate is not contained in the conception of the subject. If there is no God whose duty is to promote the good it would only be true to say "Whatever good can be brought about by the voluntary actions of such persons as exist in this universe is that which ought to be."

Plato held that we can only understand reality by rising to the conception of the idea of the good : the world of reality is rational and good. Leibniz believed in the principle of sufficient reason, the *lex optimi* which he sometimes calls God. In Lotze's philosophy the world principle is absolute personality, since in personality alone can we find inner independence and originality. If we follow these great thinkers we are led to the conclusion that reality possesses value and is good, not to the belief which seems to me false that value or the good is something which does not now exist in its perfection but which ought to be made real and actual by the performance of right actions. Value may be thought of as the eternally existing relation between the spirit of God and the sum total of reality. It is eternal truth even though we cannot with our finite minds apprehend it as present fact. Plato rightly regarded the idea of the good as an *ens realissimum*.

Butler maintained that we possess a principle of reflection which approves and disapproves acts independently of their consequences : that this principle has a natural supremacy of authority in itself and that actions in obedience thereto are in the highest sense natural. The consciousness of moral obligation is a sufficient motive for action. If we are not satisfied to do our duty for duty's sake and have no faith in the authority of conscience we must needs have recourse to religion which Kant called "a knowledge of all our duties as divine commands."

The task of the moral philosopher is to delineate the ideal form of life, the life of persons living together in an ideal community. The particular duties of individuals will depend upon the stations which they occupy in society. Their actions are done as elements which constitute the stuff which is the content of the form of the ideal life. Such actions in their context are good and have value. But they have value because

they are right, because they are done for duty's sake and therefore are the living matter without which the concept of duty is an empty form. We should not think of right actions as means conducive to a good end which is something different from the means. The end is the good life of which all right actions are parts.

Walter Lippmann contends that in the past moral commandments were based on divine authority. Now, however, as men have lost their belief in a heavenly king they must look for some other ground for their moral choices than the revelation of His will. Since virtue cannot be any longer commanded it must be willed out of personal conviction and desire. "When men can no longer be theists, they must, if they are civilized, become humanists. They must live by the premise that whatever is righteous is inherently desirable because experience will demonstrate its desirability. They must live, therefore, in the belief that the duty of man is not to make his will conform to the will of God but to the surest knowledge of the conditions of human happiness." (*A Preface to Morals*, page 137.)

Whether or not we continue to believe in a heavenly king it will be disastrous to base our conception of what is right solely on our conception of what is possible and desirable for mature human beings. "Morality," writes Professor Sorley, "has often been presented as a system of rules for conduct, or duties : the conception of moral law has been taken as fundamental. Nor need objection be taken to this course, provided we bear in mind that the moral law is not imposed by an external authority, and does not depend for its validity on sanctions or penalties.....Duty is the law of the moral life but the moral life itself is realised in character." (*The Moral Life*, page 9.)

Man is conscious of an obligation to obey the law of the

moral life. To ask why one should obey that law is to be a rebel and to repudiate duty altogether. There is no more ultimate principle from which the idea of duty can be derived. Duty is to ethics what the laws of thought are to logic ; it is the *sine qua non* condition of morality.

The Idea of Duty

By

DHIRENDRALAL DE, M. A. (Cal). Ph.D. (Lond).

The notion of duty and its correlate, the idea of freedom, lie at the very root of moral consciousness. Divested of the consciousness of duty, morality has no meaning. We are continually passing upon our actions or upon the actions of others such judgments as "This ought to be done," "This ought not to be done." In pronouncing such judgments we assume two things : (1) That there is right and wrong conduct ; and (2) that action, right or wrong, is attributed to an agent.

Among the Greek thinkers the idea of the good was more prominent than that of duty. This was mostly due to the character of their national life and pursuit which helped to develop a common desirable end. It was the Stoics who first brought the notion of duty into prominence. Zeno first employed the word duty and composed a treatise on the subject. The notion of duty gradually developed under the Jewish and Christian influence, involving an explicit reference to Divine commands. The outward and mechanical conception of duty entertained by the Jews was gradually replaced by the inward and spiritual conception advocated by some of the Christian thinkers. In modern times it was Kant who laid particular emphasis upon duty as the cardinal fact of our moral life. From the time of Kant the whole of morality centres, more or less, round the fundamental notion of duty.

The notion of ought or duty involved in all moral judgments is, as Sidgwick rightly observes, essentially different from all notions representing the facts of physical and psychical experience. It is, as he says, ultimate and unanalysable. Our experience cannot prove an act to be right. Experience of the past may tell us what has been and what will be but can never

tell us what ought to be. No amount of knowledge as to what is can possibly give us an ought. Our moral judgments are undoubtedly *a priori* or independent of experience. Rightly understood, we may regard the consciousness of duty as the compass of life. It is impossible for us to deny the deliverances of our own Reason. To do so is to deprive ourselves of any ground for believing in anything whatsoever. To question the validity of the assurances of reason is to ask why we should believe what we see to be true.

From what has been stated above we can come to the following positions :—

- (1) The notion of duty is ultimate and unanalysable.
- (2) It is *apriori* or independent of experience.
- (3) Rational beings have the sense of ought or obligation.

(4) The notion of ought is capable of becoming a motive to the Will, i. e., the recognition that something is our duty supplies us with what we recognise upon reflection as a sufficient motive for doing it—a motive on which it is psychologically possible to act.

After having shown the existence as well as the validity of the notion of duty, let us now proceed to consider the problem of duty in all its aspects.

The idea of duty involves or implies an opposition between the ideal or intelligible world, i. e. the form of existence which the individual is to realise, and the actual world or form of existence which the individual has realised. We should say that this intelligible world is not an achievement but a prophecy, not something that a man is but something that he ought to be. If the individual were complete man, he would no longer find any discrepancy between what he ought to be and what he is. We have an idea of ourselves as realising what we ought to realise, but it presents itself to us as an ideal, because we have not realised it. It is only in contrast

to this ideal that we can become conscious of the imperfections of our actual self. If we were altogether bereft of the idea of this ideal, we would never be aware that in all things we offend and come short of the ideal.

To put the above matter differently, we may say that the idea of duty implies an antagonism between the law of reason and the law of natural inclination.—I mean the conflict between the life of spirit and the life of nature. There is in man an opposition between the desire for the realisation of his ideal self and the desire for the gratification of his lower or sentient self.

The apprehension of the true relation of the ideal and the actual self is an essential pre-requisite to the determination of any ethical theory.

The first view which naturally suggests itself to us is that nature and spirit are two poles asunder. I have in me, it may be said, certain natural impulses which incite me to live a life that is entirely antagonistic to the life of reason. Before we can accept such a diametrical opposition between reason and desire, we must be sure that the opposition exists.

Now the question is : what has led to the view that man may act purely from impulse as distinguished from reason ? This view seems to be favoured by the actual facts of human life. Each of us seems to be an object among other objects, possessing by nature certain properties which are revealed in consciousness, but which are not determined as to their nature by our consciousness. Thus the immediate appetites of hunger and thirst seem to belong to our animal nature ; and they take the form of the feeling of a want, and this feeling leads to the impulse to satisfy the want. It is not reason but an impulse of nature that supplies the motive to action. It may further be contended that it is not different in the case of altruistic desires. Thus man has an impulse to do actions that bring

pleasure to others. That impulse grows in man because he is by nature endowed with a susceptibility which makes him avoid pain, and causes him to act so as to prevent others from feeling it. The naturalists would further strengthen the hypothesis by adducing that altruistic desires are as natural as the appetites of hunger and thirst, because they have come to men by inheritance from animal progenitors.

However plausible this view of natural desire is, it does not stand close examination. The account of consciousness given by the above theory leaves out all that is characteristic of it. The theory proceeds upon two assumptions, both of which are unacceptable. In the first place, it assumes that the subject is conscious of himself only in the individual states which in succession occur to him. In the second place, the subject is aware of himself as particular without being aware of himself as universal. If self-consciousness is merely the awareness of the subject in a particular state of desire, the subject should never be able to think of himself as capable of many desires. Tied down to each desire as it arose, the subject should be continually varying in his desires as from time to time they arose in him, but he should not be aware of this variable character of himself. To be aware of hunger as a desire to which he is subject, he must therefore be able to compare it with the other desires of which he is susceptible. But this amounts to an admission of the fact that the subject is conscious of himself as a being in whom the conflict of desires may take place. The consciousness of desire thus implies that the subject appears to himself as an object capable of experiencing various desires. Now the subject cannot be conscious of himself as capable of having a variety of desires without conceiving of himself as not identical with any of them, or the whole of them taken together. So arises the consciousness of self as a subject that is opposed to the self as an object with its varying desires. Hence arises the opposition between the subject as a being

striving after complete satisfaction and the subject as a being experiencing from time to time the satisfaction of particular desires.

Self-consciousness thus involves a primary opposition between an ideal and actual self. But this opposition is not absolute. When I have become conscious that I have many desires all of which seek for satisfaction, my action is not determined by any desire as such. I am not the passive subject of this or that desire, but it is I who compares various desires with one another and select among them that which seems to have the strongest claim to satisfaction.

Self-consciousness implies more than this. My consciousness of myself is the consciousness of a self that strives after abiding or complete satisfaction. But no particular satisfaction can yield that complete satisfaction. Hence arises a division in consciousness between the particular self—the self that seeks for satisfaction in willing a particular object—and the ideal self—the self that seeks to realise itself completely. Thus our self conscious life seems to be in irreconcilable conflict with itself.

This conflict seems to persist. Is it at all possible to reconcile the conflict? Let us first consider the attitude of those moralists who advocate the method of asceticism. This method was held in ancient times by the Cynics and the Stoics, and in modern times by Kant. True morality, according to the ascetics, consists in acting purely from the law of Reason. Reason is the true nature of man, and passion as foreign to the true self must be destroyed. Accordingly, the morality taught by the advocates of asceticism is negative in its character.

The chief merit of this conception of morality consists in the fact, that man in his ideal nature is something higher than the particular forms in which he seeks to realise himself. He

who makes the object of particular desires the end of his life will learn by the stern logic of experience that he has been seeking to allay his hunger for the infinite by feeding himself on the husks of the finite.

The perfectionists now step in and point out the difficulties of the above position. If we must, they say, exclude all influence of desires, the motive for all actions seems to be taken away; but if we exclude all forms of action, nothing remains but the general capacity of acting, and so long as there is nothing but capacity there is no realisation of the self. Thus the ideal self and the actual self fall asunder and the idea of the ideal or perfect self remains a mere idea.

Now if we properly understand desire as such, it is quite possible, the perfectionists hold, to get beyond the abstract idea of duty to the consciousness of particular duties. The real motive operative in the desire is the desire for permanent self-satisfaction. The individual who seeks satisfaction in the attainment of wealth may have no clear consciousness that the motive of his action is not the attainment of wealth but the attainment of self-satisfaction by means of wealth. The question may be asked, why is not self-satisfaction found in this way? This is not found because the individual has wrongly identified his ultimate good with what is not ultimate good. When he experiences the disharmony between the actual self and the ideal self, he awakens to the consciousness of what he ought to be as distinguished from what he is.

In the first consciousness of a higher life the individual is apt to condemn his past life as unspiritual and may even carry out to its logical issue the principle of renunciation. This path of renunciation, the perfectionists contend, is not the path that leads to the highest spiritual life.

All desires, as the perfectionists point out, are desires for complete self-realisation. So long as we seek for self-satisfaction in a particular object, we are laying up for ours lves

natural desires, but the difference between willing the object for itself and willing it for a higher end is spiritually an infinite difference. We can attain higher spiritual life only by transforming desires.

From an examination of the two positions stated above, we are inclined to believe that the difference between them does not lie so much in the particular method adopted by each, as in the implied recognition of divergent ideals. If the ascetics believe that the perfection consists in cessation from all activities, because the activities are the expressions of wants, then their method of renunciation may be appropriate to the realisation of the end. Here an opponent may urge that true perfection comes through satiety,—not through abstinence. But the ascetics may rejoin by pointing out that the principle of renunciation is based upon direct personal experience of the imperfections of all mundane things. No object or summation of objects can yield abiding satisfaction after which we have been striving. Therefore the perfect state, if there be any, must transcend all determinations, and that is possible of attainment only by renunciation of all desires.

Perfectionists on the other hand, spiritualise all actions, or, in other words, they believe in a life of ceaseless activities. Their ideal therefore recedes as they advance towards it; because there can be no limit to desires and correspondingly no limit to actions. Hence, their ideal, instead of being capable of realisation, becomes an endless process, no matter whether they look at it from the point of view of individual perfection or the perfection of humanity. If the perfectionists try to maintain that they strive after a life of complete harmony between reason and sensibility or the subsidence of conflict between higher and lower self, our reply is that such a subsidence of conflict is either illusory or at the most a mere ideal or idea, but never an achievement. Even in the case of a highly virtuous man, the moral problem is presented in the

inevitable disappointment. From this it does not follow that we are to seek for self-satisfaction by abstracting ourselves from all desires. To accept this is to assume that reason and desire are hostile to each other.

Desires, according to the perfectionists, are not the opposite of reason but simply reason in the form of unreason. Desire in its immediate form appears as appetite. Be it noted, however, that appetites are not simply animal impulses. If they were merely animal impulses, they would never enter into conscious life. Desires may take the direct form of a desire for food or drink, or they may take the complicated form of a desire for the satisfaction of immediate appetite, together with a repetition of the pleasure that one has experienced in the satisfaction.

Ascetic moralists not only condemn the artificial stimulation of the appetites but also prescribe the wholesale negation of all natural desires.

The negative method of asceticism, as the perfectionists point out, leads to a practical contradiction. Desires constitute the material basis of human life. They are, so to speak, the weights which keep the clock-work of life in motion. The only way, therefore, in which a living being can completely get rid of the particular desires is by ceasing to live.

The perfectionists point out that there is no necessary conflict between appetite and reason. The conflict, according to them, really obtains between a higher and a lower conception of the self. We condemn the action of an individual as irrational only when he is prepared to sacrifice his higher interests to the gratification of his appetites, because he substitutes a particular end for a universal. Duty does not consist in the extirpation of natural impulses, but in subordinating it to the realisation of the complete nature of the self. To realise ourselves at all, we must will the object indicated by our

form of conflict, though its intensity is weakened by the strengthening of virtuous dispositions. If our mental constitution is such that cognitive, affective and conative factors always go together, then whenever an alternative course is suggested to the mind it becomes charged with feeling, and becomes an incipient impulse, however faint, to action. The conflict is present throughout, more or less prominently. The lower impulse may be weaker and the higher impulse stronger ; but still there is a weight to lift, however slight, in order to conform one's conduct to the calls of duty.

The Practical Outlook of Indian Philosophy.

By

N. VENKATARAMAN.

I. *Philosophy in India :—*

In India, all knowledge and research-Philosophy, has always been regarded, not as a mere matter of speculative interest as in the West, but as having a bearing on practical life and action. *Philosophy has throughout been closely connected with Religion in India* ; and Religion is a way of regulating one's life, and not a mere matter of faith and dogma. It is the conviction of all Indian thinkers that one's Religion and life on earth must be based upon, and form an outward expression of one's inner convictions as to the nature of oneself, one's conception of Reality, and one's final destiny and well-being. Life at every turn presents problems for the thinker to solve, and the multifarious phenomena of the external world are an invitation to the curious and intellectually minded to explain, colligate and philosophise upon. It is theoretic curiosity that leads the student of Philosophy and Science in the West to explore the realms of fact and speculation in order to find an answer to his problems and riddles ; and Philosophy is the counterpart of Science in the West ; compare Aristotle's classification of the Sciences and his relation of physic to metaphysic.

In India, Philosophy is the counterpart, the necessary complement. of Religion. Without the former, the latter becomes a bundle of meaningless and blind observances and rituals. Philosophy in India began with *Mimāmsā* (discussion), which the priests invariably held during periods of the protracted Vedic sacrifices, as to the significance to be attached to the various injunctions laid down in Scripture in connection with the endless rituals forming part of the Vedic sacrifice (see the

beginning of most *Upanishads*). The Vedānta Philosophy grows out of such 'discussions', often between the performer of the *Yajna* and the priests, as to why one should light the fire in a particular manner, or who was the God to be pleased by a particular oblation.

The philosopher in India is one who is not prepared to accept Religion as it has been handed down to him ; or take life as he finds it regulated for him. If he did it, he would not be a philosopher, but one of the common herd. It is because he is thoroughly discontented with life as it is ordinarily lived, that he applies himself to probe into the mysteries of life, and lay bare the teachings of Religion.

II. *Philosophy to seek the Summum Bonum* :—

It is more or less a postulate with all schools of Indian thinkers that worldly life is full of misery and evil, that its goods are not real goods ; and that one can't find one's permanent happiness by simply drifting in it. Therefore, a general form that almost all types of Indian speculation assume is to find an unmistakable and effective remedy to the ills that are incidental to all life on earth (*samsāra*), and to make man supremely or everlastingly happy. This is the *Summum Bonum*, the chief of *purusharthas* ; often conceived as '*mukti*' or '*moksha*' i. e. a final separation, liberation, or release, from all the shackles, limitations, and evils, involved in all forms of worldly endeavour, successes, failures, ambitions, desires and satisfactions. None of these is final or permanent ; and the world-process, and the consequent evil and unhappiness go on for ever, if we do not try and find a means to check them. This can be done only by *solving the riddles of life*—in short, only by Philosophy ; which must find an answer to questions like—What is Real ? What is Unreal ? Who are we ? Why are we here ?—and so on.

Every school of Philosophy in India sets out to find an answer to these questions, claims that it has answered them

successfully, and that its answers constitute the sole *panacea* for the evils of life, and an unerring path to final beatitude. The *Great Buddha* renounced the World, and left a happy home behind him, in order to find an answer to these questions. The *atheistic Sāṅkhya* and the *materialistic Vaiśeṣika*, nay, even the *sciences of Grammar (Vyākaraṇa—'śabda-Brahma')*, and *Music (lāya-Brahma)*, claim that their respective philosophies offer the correctest solution to the riddle of the World and the safest remedy for the ills of Life (*Ātyantika dūḥkḥ nivṛttiḥ—Sāṅkhya*).

III. *The problem for the Vedānta Philosophy :—*

The *Vedānta* is no exception to this—It not only says that *atman or Brahman is the sole ultimate Reality*, but that a knowledge of this truth (*Brahma-vidyā*) is *the only means of final release from all evil (mukti)*. The whole of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is devoted to an exposition of the Vedantic doctrines, as having a bearing on practical life (hence the *context*, the beginning of a great-war, and battle scene; the *teacher*, the most active agent in the drama of the *Mahā-Bharata*; and the *pupil*, the greatest of the heroes and fighters of the age). The conclusions reached (and urged repeatedly on the hearer) there are, *1st.*, that *a knowledge of Reality, of one-self, as well as of the World, is essential to every rational being*; *2nd.*, that *this knowledge need not necessarily lead to a cessation of all action and effort (one's karma—duty, etc.)* and *3rd.*, that *what is most important in the life of the enlightened man ('jñāni'—the 'philosopher', one who has really benefitted by the teachings of the Vedānta)* is, not so much to lead a *life of renunciation and inaction (vairāgya, sanyāsa, nivṛtti-mārga, etc.,—so incessantly preached by Sāṅkara)*—but a *life of unattached effort and activity—niṣkāma-karma, and the disinterested and unfailing performance of all one's duties, and the discharge of all one's obligations*. To run away from one's duty, or to forget

one's obligations, would be as much opposed to genuine wisdom, and as mischievous, in the case of an enlightened man, inspite of all his philosophy and erudition, as in the case of any boor or ignorant person. The example of Janaka is quoted—the king who continued to attend to his high office, inspite of the great truth and wisdom he learnt from the sage Yājñavalkya—(*Karmanairva hi saṁśidhamāsthitaJanakūdayaḥ*.)

In Ch., II (54), Arjuna asks Krishna to tell him the consequences to one of accepting his philosophy of the Self; and the latter goes on to describe the enlightened individual as *Sthitha-prājña*—"one with a steady mind"; and to enumerate the characteristics that distinguish him (55ff)—and the whole passage ought to be carefully studied by one who wants to know the bearing of the Vedānta on practical life. It is an *equability of temper, perfect control over senses and the passions; an inward peace, contentment, and joy; complete unattachment to bodily wants and desires, and freedom from egoism and the self-regarding sentiments*, that mark the life of one who has realised the true Self.

The *Vedānta* teaches one not to locate all one's experiences in Space-time, but refer them to the Subject within. This leads to a *realisation of the Self, which is the same in all*. This is the meaning of saying that *one's salvation is attained through Jñāna, or that knowledge leads to liberation*. There is a good deal of discussion in Vedāntic treatises on the question *whether one's salvation depends on action or knowledge* (cf., similar controversy as to Grace *vs.*, desert, in Christian theology and Śaivite philosophy). This is due to the great importance attached to Vedic ritual by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and to the sway of external religious observances and the doctrine of *Karma* (desert) in Indian life. The conclusion reached in the Vedānta is that *Salvation is by knowledge alone*.

The correct performance of religious duties, meritorious

actions in one's life, like charity and virtue, the worship and devotion to a personal God, prayers, meditation, and the like, may elevate the individual in the worldly plane, help to purify his mind, and so prepare him for that enlightenment and knowledge of the Self, which alone, and not the former, is the straight and narrow path to *Moksha*. But this saving knowledge should be distinguished from all ordinary knowledge, both speculative and practical. *Liberation is not a state or condition* to be reached by any process, mental or physical. Since absolute Idealism is a denial of all causation, *there can be no becoming or change for the Self. The Self is always free, and was never under bondage*. What appears as bondage, misery, and evil, (*Samsāra*), is entirely due to the erroneous tendency to regard mere thought-forms as objective and real (*adhyāsa*). One has only to unlearn this habit of one's mind (due to *avidya*), in order to gain true knowledge of one's Self. The latter does away with the obstacle (unreal) that stands in the way of one's Freedom. *Jñāna is a hindrance of hindrances* (illusions)—knowledge, in revealing one's true Self, reveals, at the same time, that one is absolutely and eternally free. Sankara, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Mand., Up.*, says, "as a sick man recovers his health on the removal of the cause of his illness, so the Self, when freed from the (supposed) cause of his misery—the illusion of duality, realises its unity. The illusion, being due to ignorance, is dispelled by proper knowledge."

Besides cultivating *mental equanimity*, the enlightened individual should try to be *an example to the less enlightened* by his conduct and expressions (*yad yad ācharati sresth* etc). He must set the standard of virtue and upright behaviour; and never think his wisdom would absolve him from crookedness and vice (*nāvīrato dūṣcharitāt*). Nor can the Self be attained by one who is weak in mind or morals. *Bravery and heroism*,

as well as *right-conduct*, are desiderata in one qualified for a knowledge of the Self (*na esa ātmā valahinena lavyaḥ*).

Above all, the acceptance of *advaita* philosophy leads to *abhedā*—the unity of everything in Brahman. One who has realised this forgets all distinction, and perceives everything as Brahman. The same Self is in all. This truth can be recognised and acted upon even in the midst of active (worldly) experience. Therefore, the enlightened man feels himself one with the whole Universe; (hence humanitarianism, the rising superior to all distinctions of race, nation, colour, caste, etc., *Karuna*, pity and sympathy for all kinds of suffering and trouble; *ahimsa* love for all sentient creation, and so on) (*sunī chaiva svapāke cha* etc.)

VI. The Positivism of Indian Philosophy :—

It is a commonly accepted belief that life in the West is eager and intense, seeking and achieving, struggling towards the best, and trying to win joy and success to one-self, and to make the most of the opportunities afforded to one on this earth. Whereas in the East, it is quietism or asceticism, denying or restraining oneself, giving up what is best, with one's vision directed to what is far and beyond one's reach. These contrasted attitudes to life are attributed to the respective influences of Science and Philosophy. Modern Science by unravelling the mysteries and mechanism of Nature, lays bare an orderly sequence of things and forces, by mastering which one gets Power and a mastery over one's destiny, and a sure means of winning success and happiness in life and in surmounting its evils and pitfalls. Indian Philosophy, on the other hand, being based largely on a negative view of Life, discourages human endeavour, directs man's mind inward, discourages active seeking, and makes the sources of one's effort and motive power dry and feeble.

Modern Science is based on Observation and Experiment on things that are real and of every day importance; is defi-

nately positive in its outlook ; and is therefore fit to guide Life in its manifold activities. But Indian Philosophy is almost nihilistic in spirit, and tends to cool men's passions and springs of action.

But this is an erroneous picture. Indian Philosophy is emphatically positive in spirit ; and encourages action as much as experimental Science—only the nature of the action in the two cases is different, since the values they respectively embody are entirely different. It is spiritualistic in one case and materialistic in the other. The ancient seers of India had as true an insight into the nature of Spirit as modern scientists claim to have into the nature of matter. According to the latter, *matter, with its inner essence of Force or energy*, is the sole reality behind all the phenomena of the material world ; and all moral and spiritual experiences, soul, consciousness, etc., are mere *epi-phenomena*, meaningless and redundant excrescences, that appear in connection with certain physical and chemical processes, like cortical excitements ; which can't be brought into the scheme of real entities like electrons and vibrations ; and which are only effects and never causes. They do not in any way influence or interfere with the orderly sequence of physical events, or affect the smooth running of the chain of physical causation, of matter, motion, action, reaction, etc. Therefore, they can be wholly ignored in our account of reality, and left out of all scientific explanation. It is on this basis that Behaviourism, New Psychology etc., explain even human conduct, motives, passions, love, joy, beauty, and all other human values. The existence or non-existence of consciousness, feelings, ideas, etc., behind our actions, makes no difference to the latter. Life on earth would have gone on—Christ would have died on the Cross, and Shakespeare would have written his "Hamlet" and life would go on in the same way—and we will win our Swaraj—if we had been unconscious, instead of being conscious automata.

Compare with this the spiritual positivism of Indian Philosophy—even the Great Buddha, whose philosophy is said to be entirely negative, pitched his faith on a *Moral Positivism* on the eternal and immutable nature of the *Law of Dharma* ; that all life here and hereafter depends on it ; and ought to be regulated by it, and this is a cardinally accepted principle of all schools of Indian thinkers.

In addition, the *Vedanta* maintains that the only thing about which we can be positive and certain is *the Self, with its inner essence of Thought* ; and all the so-called facts and things of the external world, including the causal formulæ of science, the Laws of motion and of Evolution ; the perceptions, feelings, and other changes taking place in the mind are all phenomena and appearances only—a huge and variegated show put forth by the inner spirit for its own delectation and edification ; and no more real in themselves than dreams and mirages that appear on the mental and material planes. All causation, with its relativities of space, time, motion, etc., are equally phenomenal—mere phantasmagoria that issue out of, and depend entirely on, the one true Reality—*the Atman*.

It follows from this that according to Vedanta Philosophy, one is not to run away from Life and its obligations, but one must live it so as to insure one's best spiritual welfare. The needs of the flesh are there, but of secondary importance. "Man does not live by bread alone"—the needs of the inner spirit are of paramount and vital importance.

Proofs of the Soul in Tamil Saiva Siddhanta,

BY

VIOLET PARANJOTI, M. A.

The Siva jñāna-bodham of Meikāṇḍa Devar is the chief among the philosophical works of the Tamil Siddhānta school of philosophy. A study of this work reveals to us the fact that the Siddhāntin is convinced of the existence of God, of the soul and of whatever else goes to make up a spiritualistic view of the universe. The Siddhāntin is led to this position of a happy conviction in the eternal realities which sanctify human life as much by revelation as by reason. There is no dogmatic assertion of the realities which we in all meekness are expected to recognise as true. By the full exercise of our reason, we are led step by step to the facts of the system. And there is an implicit challenge to us to examine the system by the exercise of reason before accepting it. Since the thirteenth century when these arguments were formulated in Tamil, there has been much development in philosophic thought. And we at this date, may now examine these arguments for the existence of the soul in the light of metaphysics to see what has to be rejected as unable to stand the light of criticism and what can be accepted as valid.

The third sūtra of the "Siva-jñāna-bodham" gives seven arguments for the existence of the soul. The first of these arguments states that there is in us something which says, "I am not the body; I am not any of the sense-organs," there is something remaining after every part of the body is eliminated as not being itself, and that which thus intelligently differentiates itself from the body and its organs is the soul. This argument establishes that "an intelligent soul exists as its intelligence is exercised when it says—"This is not the soul: this is not the soul". "

This first argument refutes the Sunyavādin who says the soul is non-existent. If the Sunyavādin persists in saying that even the intelligence which refuses to be identified with any part of the body is non-existent, then his statement is equivalent to his asserting that his mother is childless.

We cannot here fail to be reminded of the similar way in which Descartes proceeds to establish the existence of the soul. He too, adopting the method of elimination, realises that even after ruling out his body and sense-organs, there must be something which constitutes his self. The very fact of doubt implies the existence of a doubter.

The second argument refutes one section of the Lokāyatas who say that the soul is no other than the body. The body cannot be the soul. As the phrase, 'my body,' is used in a separate possessive sense, there is a soul different from the body. As a man clearly realises that his city and his wife are not himself but different from him, so with careful consideration one can see that the soul is other than the body. The soul is that which with a possessive sense speaks of the body as its body.

The body certainly cannot be regarded as the soul, for as was made clear in the last argument, there is in us some residue even after eliminations of every part of the body, and it is this factor which stands over against the body, and with a possessive sense speaks of the body as belonging to it. The soul is this residual factor which exercises the ownership. The body then cannot be the soul. "I am not this collection of members which is called the human body," says Descartes, and Bradley gives expression to the same fact, saying "Few of us would venture to maintain that the self is the body."

Another sect of the Lokāyatas says that since it is admitted by all that the five sense-organs perceive the five different sensations, these organs constitute the soul. This is refuted by the third argument which says that each sense-organ has

its own particular function only, so that the eye, for example, cannot perceive sound sensations, just as the ear, cannot sense the appearance of any object. But there is some one who experiences all the five different sensations, a feat impossible for any or all of the sense-organs. This is the soul which, for gaining knowledge of the world, has the sense-organs as the avenues of sense-knowledge. The sense organs merely function, but are not capable of thinking 'We function thus.' They have the objective consciousness, but not the subjective consciousness. That which has the subjective consciousness is the soul. The sense-organs cannot be the soul because they are deficient in two respects. Not one of them can rise to performing any function but its own, nor is any of them capable of self-consciousness. There is in us, however, a factor which has neither of the deficiencies, but on the other hand is able to perceive all the five different sensations and is also characterised by self-consciousness. This is the soul.

The above arguments have proved that the soul is not the body and not the sense-organs. The fourth argument attempts to prove that the soul is not the subtle body or body of the dream condition. The argument states that in sleep, when the senses lose their action, the soul enters another body, the subtle body, and has dreams and when waking comes back to the gross body. The soul is therefore different from the subtle body. The subtle body and the soul cannot both remember the dream-experiences in the same way. The dream-body is of one nature only—dreamy—and what it sees in dreams is quite vivid to it. If it be this body that remembers the dreams, it should remember them not as dim recollections, but as actual vivid experiences just as in the dream condition. In our actual experience we find that on waking there is a factor which remembers these dream-experiences and says, 'I dreamt thus and thus.' This factor not only remembers the dream-experiences, but is of two-fold nature, capable of perceiving things

in the waking state and in the dream state. When it says 'I dreamt so,' it differentiates these experiences from waking experiences, for the former compared with the latter are now very faint. Thus, to sum up what has been explained, the subtle body should be able to have vivid recollections of dream experiences, but in our actual experience we find that there is a factor able to contrast the dream experiences with waking experiences, and the former compared with the latter are dim. The subtle body theorist maintains that the subtle body is the soul. Against this the Śaiva Siddhāntin maintains that the recollection of dream experiences belongs not to the subtle body, but to another factor which is the soul. The subtle body therefore cannot be the soul.

This argument is open to criticism in some respects. The assumptions of the argument are first that there is a subtle body functioning only in sleep; and secondly that if in the waking state it remembered the dream experiences, it would have a very vivid recollection of them. The first assumption that the subtle body is different from the gross body cannot be accepted for the two bodies are not radically distinct; there is only one body which in the waking state has all its organs functioning and in sleep has fewer *tattvas* at work: there is then one body which is co-present with the soul. If so, how can it be so easily proved that it is the one rather than the other which recollects these dream experiences? With regard to the second assumption that if in the waking state the recollection of dream experiences belong to the subtle body it would have vivid memories, we have to reply that this does not follow; for what can otherwise be vivid may be distorted by the grosser *tattvas* co-existing with that body in the waking condition.

A plausible argument on some such lines as these put forward by others is that in dreams, there comes into being a dream body which is entirely different from the gross body.

In the waking state, there is in us something which owns the dreams as well and this is the soul.

In the Sanskrit commentary the third and fourth arguments are treated as one for the purpose of proving the existence of the soul as distinct from the sense organs on the ground of the existence of consciousness in dreams when the sense-organs are at rest. The Tamil author in splitting up the argument into two has introduced some confusion here.

Another sect of the Lokāyatas, the vital air theorist, says that unlike the dream body which is present only in the dream condition, the vital air which is present always is the soul. This is refuted by the fifth argument which points out that this body is given to us in order that we may have cognition of the world and the experiences of pleasure and pain. If the vital air be the soul, then, as it functions as well in sleep as it does in the waking state, it should have cognition of the world as well as the experiences of pleasure and pain in sleep as in the waking condition. But these we see are in abeyance in sleep when the soul is resting, and resume their activities when the soul awakes. So these functions exist not for the benefit of the vital air but for something other than this and that is the soul. And it is the soul which seems to have the capacity to exercise these functions or to stop them. The vital air is not the soul. The soul is something other than this.

The sixth argument maintains that the changing psychical states cannot be the soul. There must be some underlying identity which is present through all the flow of psychic phenomena and which recognises its identity in spite of occasional lapses of consciousness as in sleep.

With regard to this argument the Tamil commentator has not strictly kept to the original. He has interpreted the argument to indicate that the soul is different from God. As he points out, our minds are subject to

various limitations. We can only learn in part, and bit by bit, and our consciousness is always in such an incessant flow that we have hardly grasped one thing, when thought moves on to another, and this present thought already seems to be giving way to another thought that will come anon only to speed away as soon. And we are subject to forgetfulness and we can never have comprehensive knowledge. One other distinction is that, "the human intelligence requires to be taught, improved and developed: it is imperfect and needs the support of a perfect intelligence." Our minds characterised by these and other limitations cannot compare with God's mind that is omniscient. The soul therefore cannot be identified with God.

As thus interpreted by the Tamil commentator, this is no argument for the proof of the existence of the soul. It is more a description of the nature of the soul.

The argument as in the original contending for the existence of the soul on the ground of personal identity is very common. Personal identity is of course an essential feature of the soul which is mostly conceived as a permanent entity that cannot be identified with the flowing psychical states, each one of which is different from the rest. But whether such identity is intelligible will be examined later.

The last argument contends that the aggregate of the *tattvas* cannot be the soul, for the *tattvas* are constituted of the perishable *māyā*. The soul is something other than the *tattvas*. This argument and the previous one are directed against the Buddhists who sought to dissolve the soul into an aggregate of *skandhas* or a series of cognitions.

From a general survey of these arguments it is evident that they are based mainly on elimination and

the sense of personal identity. The soul is not the body or the sense-organs or the dream-body or the aggregate of the *tattvas*. The soul is that which intelligently differentiates itself from all these factors, and speaks of the body as its body, and appropriates dreams as its experiences. It is that which through all the changing psychical states, and through occasional lapses of consciousness maintains its identity. The net result of these arguments is then that the soul exists, and is different from such gross factors as the body and the sense-organs and that it has a continuous existence.

Can the conclusions regarding the soul withstand critical examination? Descartes, after rigorously yielding up all that was doubtful, found that there was one indubitable fact, and that it was his self, and the existence of his self was manifest from the fact that he doubted his existence. If he doubted, there must be a doubter. The similar Siddhānta contention that, after eliminating every part of the body, there is still a factor left and that this is the soul would appear to be so far valid.

All the knowledge that we have gained about the soul till now is mainly negative. We have seen that it is not the body or the sense-organs etc. The question which now arises is "What then is the soul? In what way can we conceive of it? And in what sense can it be said to exist?" If it is not anything so gross as the body, then, perhaps it may be something psychical. Can the self be the psychical contents that are to be found at any moment in our experience? Introspection reveals that at any moment of one's existence, there is a mass of psychical contents, such as, for example, one's thoughts at the time, one's feelings, one's awareness of the environment, and in short all the felt experiences. Can these be

said to constitute the self? It is at once obvious that these fluctuating psychical states cannot constitute the self as they are in an incessant flow, and the self must be a permanent factor.

Perhaps, then, the self is constituted of what can be reckoned as one's average psychical experiences. We have noticed that one's psychical contents from moment to moment are too changing to constitute the self. Perhaps when we take these psychical contents and find out what is common to them, this average would constitute the self.

It will be objected that it is very absurd to identify the self with either the momentary or the average experiences of the self. The self we are told is an individual experiencer of these experiences. Therefore, over and above all this concrete filling is the self. But can we succeed in finding such a self that is a permanent factor and that is other than these experiences? Reflection unfolds to us the fact that what go to make up a man's self are his psychical experiences and his environment. Macbeth was a brave warrior and quite self-composed at all times, but the moment his hands were stained with blood, he had visions of a dagger and of the ghosts of his victims, and Lady Macbeth had to find excuses for his strange behaviour in the presence of the guests. We are in eager search of an essential self, but it seems well nigh impossible to meet with success. We find that the psychical experiences are too inconstant to be the self, and yet it is these happy or unhappy experiences that appear to constitute the self, so that if we remove these, we remove the self as well or even if any residue is left, it merely amounts to a non-entity not worth recognising. We here find ourselves up against a fatal dilemma which Bradley expresses thus—"If you can take an essence which can change, it is not an essence at all; while if you stand on anything more narrow, the self has disappeared." To quote Bradley again, "Evidently any self

which we can find is some concrete form of unity of psychical existence and whoever wishes to introduce it as something apart or beyond clearly does not rest his case upon observation."

Closer investigation leads to an even more desperate situation where we can draw no hard and fast line of distinction between the self and not-self. At any moment of our existence, there seem to be present the self and the not-self. But from this, no hasty conclusion can be drawn that the self and the not-self are absolutely different one from the other. The self passes into the not-self and *vice-versa*, a circumstance by no means encouraging to those eager in pursuit of an essential self closed by a wall from all the changing psychical phenomena which with certainty are placed in the category of not-self. The sound that was so disturbing to a person gets to be less of a nuisance as the person concerned gets used to it, and though continuing with the same tonal intensity, it finally passes out of the focus of his attention, gliding unobserved from the not-self to the self. The self in the same way can pass over to the not-self. Thus the feeling of pain which forms part of our inmost self is felt as a disturbing factor that should be eradicated. Of course it may be that not all of the self can thus pass into the not-self, and not all of the not-self can pass into the self. Granting this, it still remains that when we abstract from the self all that does not seem essential to it, we seem to be left with what is best described in Bradley's terms as a "a wretched fraction" and "poor atom" and a "bare remnant" that is not worth having.

We meet with a similar difficulty when we approach the problem of personal identity and this needs careful consideration. We do not think of a man as made up of a number of momentary selves but as one individual that remains

the same through all the varying experiences of his lifetime. 'A' who is born now will be the same individual ten years hence or even in his old age. What we mean is that through the varying stages of life, we have one individual, when recollecting experiences of years ago, a man says, "I did this." On close examination, do we find that such personal identity is real? If so in what does it consist? We may speedily dismiss the idea that personal identity consists in having the same body, for apart from the objection that the body changes as time goes on, it is a very crude conception. Neither can memory serve as a satisfactory basis of personal identity. The events relating to long periods of our life are forgotten, so that memory being full of limitations at its best fails to serve the purpose. Continuity of psychical experiences cannot serve the purpose for the reason that in sleep this continuity is snapped. Moreover, besides continuity, there is need of qualitative sameness, and this too is not to be had in the stream of psychical experiences, each of which is different from the other. We may make another attempt and say that the various interests of a person go to build up his personal identity. It is very obvious that this suggestion must be rejected as our interests are never the same all through life. The suggestion that perhaps the self is encased in a monad rouses our hope, but there is only disappointment here as in the above instances. Granting that the self is a monad, then, this factor either changes or does not change. If it changes, then where is the permanence that is essential for personal identity. If the monad stands aloof from the flow of psychical states, and thus maintains its permanence, why then we may as well have the self dwelling in the stars or the hills for all its indifference to what is happening in the human organism.

We have met with failure both in our attempt to conceive of the sense in which the soul exists and in our effort to understand personal identity. And yet we know that the soul and

personal identity in some sense exist, and hence we must somehow have failed to arrive at the true conception. As Bradley says:—"That selves exist, and are identical in some sense is indubitable." But with all our diligence, we have failed to understand the self and its identity. Our attempts to conceive of them have turned out to be full of contradictions.

Our failure to conceive of the self and its identity makes us wonder whether we should not retrace our steps. Instead of regarding the self as an independent and self-subsisting factor, as we have done so far, we should rather consider it as a part of a bigger whole, which therefore should not be looked upon as independent and self-subsisting. Our attempt thus far to understand the self may be compared to the effort to understand the root of a plant without any relation whatever to the whole of the plant. The certainty as to the thinker may be based not on an atomic self but on an infinite consciousness of which thinker, thought and thinking are appearances. Our mistake thus far has been in attempting to conceive of the self as an independent factor out of all relation to the Infinite consciousness of which it is an aspect. Hence our conceptions of the self have resulted in contradictions.

For the Siddhānta the soul is not atomic, but infinite and all-pervasive. If, on the other hand, we find the soul confined within limits, it is because of *Āṇava Mala*, and all human effort is to be directed to ridding the soul of this impurity which acts as a drag on the soul preventing it from being all-pervasive.

The Saiva Siddhāntin, in giving convincing proofs of the existence of the soul, went much further than his rivals who denied the existence of the soul, and in differentiating the soul from other factors of the human organism, he outstripped all other alien schools who identified the soul with gross factors. While then he is free from the defects of materialism and of Spiritual Atomism, yet he is only half

way to the truth that the Self is one and infinite. Not merely does he hold to the difficult and contradictory notion of a plurality of infinite souls, but he holds also to the notion of an objective world over against them. For Descartes who thus sundered the self from the not-self, Representationism and Occasionalism were necessary consequences. The epistemological consequences for the Siddhānta are not dissimilar, but will have to be noticed separately.

The Sankhya Doctrine of Guṇa.

S. N. Roy.

The Guṇa doctrine has a history of its own. The word Guṇa literally means either quality or rope. Bhikṣu says that guṇa serves the purpose of a rope by which the animal-like puruṣa is bound. Puruṣa is in bondage to Prakṛti, being overpowered by the three Guṇas.

The beginnings of the doctrine are found in the Upaniṣads. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, reference has been made to the three colours of Agni, Ap, and Pṛthvī, namely red, white and black. In the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad these colours have been said to be the qualities of Ajā, the unborn Prakṛti. It is probable that Rajas, Sattva and Tamas have been associated with Red, White and Black, because the colours are respectively the symbols of Love or Anger, Purity and Ignorance.

Other interpretations have been subsequently offered.

According to one view Guṇas are attributes of things. Sound, touch and colour are qualities of Ether, Air, Light, etc. respectively. This is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. All things are qualified by the three Guṇas. Sattva makes them light, Rajas mobile and Tamas inert.

There is another view according to which Guṇas are mental qualities—pleasure, pain, aversion, intelligence, desire, ignorance, etc.

The word Guṇa has sometimes been used to mean the whole range of subjective and objective existence.

The properties of the three Guṇas have also been enumerated differently. Some say Sattva has ten, others hold that it has one; similarly to Rajas have been ascribed sometimes nine and sometimes two qualities, and to Tamas eight qualities in one account and three qualities in another.

It has been pointed out further that Guṇas exist in the Prakṛti which is their Sāmyāvasthā and they mutually determine each other. Out of the instable equilibrium things evolve.

Īśvara Krishna describes Sattva as pleasure-essence, Rajas as pain-essence and Tamas as indifference-essence. According to Vāchaspati Sattva is self-luminousness, Rajas is energy and Tamas is restraint. Gāuḍapāda gives a purely physical interpretation of the Guṇas. According to him Guṇas are like atoms. This explanation at once reminds one of Vaiśeṣika trasareṇu. The Mahābhārata also takes the Guṇas as reals in that they are regarded as constitutive of Prakṛti, the source of the physical world.

Another interesting point to which Gāuḍapāda draws our attention is that each thing may be looked at from three different standpoints, Pleasure, Pain and Aversion. This view leads one to think that the systematic Sāṃkhya Philosophy is a Philosophy of Value and has tried to evaluate things from the standpoint of Pleasure, Pain and Aversion.

Is Indian Philosophy Practical ?

P. R. DAMLE.

A charge that is generally levelled against the Indian Philosophy is that it is through and through practical. Man is the central truth and Philosophy is subservient to his interest. Man hankers after eternal bliss and Philosophy has to find out ways and means through which he can attain it. Hence the predominance of Ethics and Theology in the realm of Indian Philosophy. In direct opposition to this stands the Philosophy of the Westerners. It is a seeker after truth for the sake of truth itself. It does not mind if it will suit the interest

of anybody or not ; but it actually does suit it inasmuch as man is not an alien element but forms a part and parcel of the truth itself. The writer is not inclined to accept this slur on Indian Philosophy so easily. He wants to say that the Absolute or the Brahman of the Hindus is not a phantom, leading man away from the real path of truth, but truth itself, and is the object of both Religion and Ethics. From the side of Ethics He is the embodiment of perfect goodness and justice, and from the standpoint of religion, He is beauty and love incarnate. He satisfies the deepest emotional cravings of the human heart on the one hand, and on the other holds the balance of justice. It is a mere jugglery of vocabulary which makes this differentiation between the Philosophy of the West and that of the East. Indian Philosophy is as metaphysical and intellectual as Western Philosophy. The only difference is that the one is subjective and the other is objective in its standpoint—but equally endeavouring, at the same time, to find out the real nature of that ultimate reality in and through which the Universe exists. The causes of this difference are not far to seek. Indians are generally contemplative in their nature and look to the inner aspect of everything that comes within the fold of their experience. So we can account for the early rise of the science of Psychology among the Hindus. The Westerners are predominantly active and so they take the external aspect of anything they come across. Thus Physics, Biology, Geometry form the preparatory ground of the Philosophical study in the Western countries. But the chasm between these two standpoints—subjective and objective—should not be unnecessarily enlarged. The subject and the object are equally necessary in a concrete experience. Only the difference lies on the stress that is given on this or that side of experience. The existence of the treatises 'on Metaphysics, together with the absence of any definite statement on the part of the Philosophers that renun-

ciation and ethical training are the only gateway to salvation, goes a great way to show that Ethics and Theology may form a part but not the whole of Indian Philosophy.

Lastly he deplores the slavish attitude of some of the modern Indian thinkers who are very keen about giving a western colouring to the original Indian thoughts. The result is that Philosophy is losing its natural flow and is gradually getting stagnant. The bruise which has been tormenting the Indian heart is not due so much to political helplessness as to abject intellectual and moral subjugation at the feet of the Westerners.

An Examination of the Jaina account of the Kulakaras.

H. S. Bhattacharyya

The writer has here undertaken to give an account of the Jaina conception of the Kalpa-Briksha and the Kula-Karas. For them, so far as he could understand it, this Kalpa-Briksha had its existence at the very beginning of the cycle of creation, and was the perennial source of bliss to the then living beings. But this Briksha, in the usual course of time, had its end, and consequently men, deprived of this blissful stage, fell into utter sorrow, subjected as they were to the currents and cross-currents of love, hatred, disease, death etc...the limitations of the empirical world. Incidentally he draws a parallel with the forbidden tree of the Jews, but he also does not forget to mention the difference that exists between the two. The Kalpa-Briksha yielded whatever men wanted and so it was a source of bliss, whereas the fruit of the forbidden tree, when once eaten by Adam and Eve, the original parents of the human race, brought about the downfall not only of the pair

but of the whole human race. According to the Jewish viewpoint, knowledge is the origin of all miseries, and so it was tabooed in the garden of Eden—the realm of eternal peace. What was wanted there, was child-like simplicity. But it seems paradoxical that knowledge or wisdom, which is an attribute of God Himself and which, we all admit, is blessedness in itself should be treated with such ruthless contempt. The writer tries to find a way out of this riddle and he says that the Mythology of the Jews does not here mean knowledge or wisdom proper, but rather the awakening of intellect which obscures wisdom or inner vision and brings in finitude and division in the world along with all other short-comings, which follow in its train.

Next he tries to peep into the deeper significance of the Kulakaras. They show how from the pre-historic age, when society, if there was any, was a mere mechanical accumulation of many discordant and warring human beings, harmonious social structure could evolve. At the disappearance of the Kalpa-brikhsa, men fell in utter helplessness. Nature herself, with all her mysteries, which were meaningless or rather awe-inspiring, seemed to have frowned at them. These Kulakaras, at this juncture, showed the means as to how they could better adapt themselves to the changed circumstances, and thus survive the odds and difficulties that beset them on the way to that ultimate consummation, where, in an ideal form of society, the interest of the one will coalesce but not collide with the interest of the many.

Sankara.

R. A. Sankara Narayana.

The writer here tries to give us a short sketch of the commentary of Sankara on Gouḍapāda-Kārikās which are but the exposition of the verses of the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad. The Rishi of this Upaniṣad, with the help of the three stages of human consciousness namely, waking, dream and deep sleep, elucidates the nature of the ultimate reality—the Brahman, which is the sustainer of all that exists. In the wakeful stage, man is endowed with sense and intellect, and is fully conscious of a non ego which stands opposed to the ego, the 'I'. This 'I' or the ego can never be doubted, because it is the presupposition of all doubts. The doubter cannot be himself doubted. So the existence of the soul is self-proved. In the dream stage also both the subject and the object exist but the object exists in a different form. It is no longer material but rather a direct representation of it, and is supplied by memory. In dreamless sleep both these factors vanish, of course not in nothingness but in a self-luminous, all-embracing pure consciousness—the Brahman. It is the sustainer of all things. But the question is as to how duality or multiplicity could arise out of this non-dual and pure substratum. Sankara explains this multiplicity with the help of Māyā—Nescience. The world has got no ultimate reality but only vyavahārika sattā. It is not also unreal, but has got a reality in its own way. Brahman itself, under the spell of Māyā becomes Īśvara and it is with this God or Saguna Brahman that this empirical world has got its concern. And so it can aptly be said that this world is the creation of Īśvara but not of Brahman. Man too, in his essence is identical with Brahman; but when he is endowed with sense and intellect, he becomes a Jīva and comes within the fold of Māyā. He is then a subject in the domain of Īśvara.

Hindu Ethics

N. Subrahmanya Aiyar

Ethics is the science of conduct and, in the narrower sense, of good conduct of men. So far as the Hindu Ethics is concerned, it makes its boundaries broader so as to include within it not only the conduct of man—good or bad, but that of everything of the Universe, not excepting even the inanimate objects, which also contain within them the germs of life in potential forms. They have also got their own *Dharma*, and if they fail to act within themselves or with others in a proper manner disintegration sets in and they are soon disunited and die. So Ethics gives laws and regulations not only for the guidance of man but for all others as well. These laws have got no external agency but they exist in and through the objects themselves. They guide the Universe and themselves belong to it. So everybody is his own master—the shaper of his own destiny. No other being is to be praised or blamed for his upheaval or downfall.

Next comes the question of the conservation of energy. Nothing is lost but kept somewhere, in some form, in the great reservoir of the Universe. So the soul along with his *Karmas* and the dismembered particles of the body do not vanish into nothingness with the death of the body. Those particles of matter go back to their respective stocks in subtle forms. The soul, guided by the tendencies of the *karmas*, reoccupies a different body which is better suited to reap the harvest of his own *karma seed* which he so willingly sowed in his previous birth. Hence life and death, birth and re-birth, go to form the very nucleus of the cyclic order of the world. Considered from this point of view, Ethics concerns man, not only in his present life, but in his lives to come and the lives he passed through. In short, it is related with the very inner core of the human beings or rather with that of the Universe at large. As such,

the help of Ethics is to be sought for, in the domestic, national and political and all other spheres as well. It teaches how a man and a woman of a family should behave with each other and should equally be dutiful to their children. It tightens the family ties and makes the chain a pleasing bondage. In place of the dog-like attack of one nation upon another, Ethics teaches how they can understand one another, and how a settlement, acceptable to all alike, may arise out of these international complexities which keep the nations separated from one another. Each nation will stand at ease within its own limit and will contribute jointly to the common interest of world peace. Here the writer refers to the League of Nations the question of the freedom of trade, etc, which simply divide but do not unite the nations. Lastly, he refers to the problems of caste-system, inter-dining, inter-marriage, etc. among the Hindus. He thinks that just as particular parts or limbs of an organism are meant for particular purposes—one cannot fulfil the function of another,—so also each caste forms a limb of society as an organic whole, and has its definite mission to fulfil. Any endeavour to interchange the functions of the limbs is sure to bring chaos in the society,

Kant's Ideal of Reason and the Brahman of Sankara.

P. T. Raju.

Although there is no identity between Kant's Ideals of Reason and Saṅkara's Brahman, it can be shown that had Kant consistently developed his thought on his own principles he would have arrived at an ideal of Reason corresponding to the Brahman of Saṅkara.

In his treatment of the transcendental ideal Kant asserts that they are required to define the standards to which the activities of the understanding must conform in a perfectly

unified experience. The rules of the understanding apply to phenomena and the principle of Reason to the rules of the understanding. Kant does not say as Saṅkara does, that the phenomenal world has no metaphysical stability. He merely asserts that it points to something higher.

Kant in his Critique, by means of the application of the transcendental method, affirms the noumenon and the three Ideas as the limiting concept of the understanding and the Ideal of Reason. The Ideal of Reason for Kant is the unconditioned or the totality of conditions.

Kant is justified in saying that the unconditioned is only an ideal of Reason. For, thought's object is judgment which is made possible by the distinction between the subject and the predicate. To effect their complete unification thought looks up to the ideal, the unconditioned. If the unconditioned becomes an object of thought, it will cease to be unconditioned. The unconditioned can only yield itself to intellectual intuition. But finite mind is deprived of such integral experience.

Kant's great failure however lies in not being able to arrive at the ultimate unity of the three Ideas. But it must at the same time be admitted that the conception of unity was not totally absent from his mind. In fact, he observes in the Critique that such unity is not unthinkable.

Another defect of Kant is that he has not proved that the Ideal of Reason could be no other than the noumena and that noumena are one. The solution of the problem which he took up in the Critique requires that he should identify them.

There are passages however in the *Opus Postumum* which show that Kant, in the later period of his life, realised that the noumena would be no other than the self in its transcendental aspect. Had Kant stuck to this truth and worked it out his idealism would not have been difficult to accept. In that case he would have very little differed from Vedānta which makes Universal spirit foundational.

"On the Problem of Error."

Shyam Swaroop Jalota, M. A.,

An inexact valuation of the contents of experience may be called an error. We never come across any conscious human experience in which either the *subject* or the *object* is wholly absent. We may roughly analyse the total subjective-objective situation into five sets of conditions—origination, transmission, reception, apprehension and reaction. Attempts to localise error have discovered it in the functioning of *one* superior condition analysed in the actual experience. A thorough analysis would find erroneous elements because of the mal-functioning not of one but of all the above-said sets of conditions.

The genesis of the concept of error in infants and children is practical. Example from speech: the *expression* is always inexact, and the *impression* is more so. The total situation is always an 'impression-expression' situation; and it always involves error. Yet, when we analyse the total situation into the problem of impression and the problem of expression, we cannot *locate* error in either of them. Error is essentially a judgment by the Present on the anticipations of the total Past. We have to go back, and go deeply into the situation if our judgments are to have any working certainty.

The Problem of Language.

Sudhir Kumar Bose.

Introduction: The problem of language may be divided into (i) the philosophy of language which is concerned with the relation of language to the question of knowledge and reality, and (ii) the science of language which studies language in its causal and genetic aspects.

Philosophy of language : On the question of origin and status of language the philosophers split into two camps ; (1) The naturalistic philosophy of language upheld by Watson, Russell, DeLaguna, Ogden, Richards and all those standing for behaviourism, pragmatism or positivism. (2) The idealistic philosophy of language advocated by Spranger, Cassirer, Vossler and others affiliated to the school of Kultur philosophy. The first group thinks that "language is a purely naturalistic product created by environmental pressure," while the second group ascribes transcendental validity to meanings conveyed by words and sentences.

Science of language : Modern writers have taken proper cognizance of the physical side of language which used to be overlooked formerly. In the use of language words form the first plank, and words, whether written or spoken, are physical occurrences. Speech consists in uttering different types of sounds in definite conventional orders.

The belief that all languages have a number of simple roots gave rise to a number of theories as to the origin of language amongst the 19th century philologists. But recent studies tend to prove that the roots are neither phonetically nor ideationally simple. Extensive investigations in experimental phonetics in recent times have thrown new light on the physical characteristics of voice, but the results have been of little help to gain insight into the origin of language.

An important contribution towards the understanding of the question how language is learned has been made by the Behaviourist. The principle of 'Conditioned Reflex' has been used with great advantage in explaining the *meaning* of words. Meanings are acquired by the growing individual in the course of his learning to respond to his environment.

Language and thinking : Is thought possible without language ? This question has been answered in the affirmative as well as in the negative. One school thinks that in early

days thought used systems other than language. Another school denies the possibility of thought in absence of language and holds that thought and language have grown together. These two contrary views may be somewhat reconciled by supposing that thinking of the period prior to the growth of verbal activity was chiefly guided by what has been called "organic intelligence" and was of a different kind from our present-day thinking.

A little over a decade ago Watson entered into a polemic with some of the noted British psychologists over the question whether thinking is merely the action of language mechanism. The criticism of opponents calls for modification of Watsonian view in certain respects but, in the opinion of the present writer, Watson's fundamental position remains unassailable.

Principles of Testimony

B. Kuppuswamy.

Testimony is an important means of knowledge. The reasons for depending on Testimony as a means of knowledge are the following. Firstly, the range of observation of any person is limited. Secondly, there are too many things in the world to be observed by one man. Lastly, in any department of knowledge progress is impossible without taking the results previously arrived at, for granted.

A testimony has the following components in it. These are psychological, logical and lingual.

(i) Psychological—The person who conveys the information must be veracious, disposed to speak the truth.

But it is not enough if he is merely veracious ; he must be competent, especially so, when the matter is technical.

We have to ascertain that he is without any bias, emotions, sentiments, and complexes.

(ii) As regards the logical element, we shall have to take into consideration the consistency of the several statements in the testimony. There should be consistency with objective reality.

Information should also be such that it is consistent with our previous knowledge. But any and every knowledge does not deserve to be agreed to. The truth of any information should also be judged by *convergence*. If people of different interests and trainings all agree about certain points, then they can be safely taken as referring to facts.

(iii) Finally, as regards the language of the information it can be laid down that the expression chosen must be simple, clear and unambiguous.

The common good

Charu Chandra Sinha.

The common good is a good which is incapable of being an object of rivalry. A thing is a common good when it equally satisfies all. But persons being different from one another, differently stationed, the conception of the same thing satisfying all is absurd.

That which is commonly thought right is sometimes regarded as the common good. But this seems to be a false idea when it is seen that a right thing may not be desired and enjoyed by all in the same manner. Right is not compatible with universal satisfaction.

A good is either private or universal. From one consideration both the goods may be regarded as excluding rivalry. A private good is the good of a particular person. A particular person being limited to himself, being *one away* from other individuals, his interest, because it is his, cannot clash with that of any others from whom he is excluded. A universal good is that which satisfies the essential man, the common

essence of a man that he shares with others. In so far as the good satisfies that universal element in man it cannot be an object of rivalry.

But such private and universal goods are mere abstractions. The particular and the universal are indissolubly connected in a man, they have no existence distinct from one another.

What is real is the individual which is a concrete particular and a concrete universal. Hence there can be no private or universal good but good that is individual.

If the individual good is to be common, it must be able to satisfy the many individuals who are each one of them a meeting-point of difference and identity. Now if they are many it is not possible to think of a good satisfying the nature of every one of them without giving up the idea of difference and of the unique relation between difference and identity in each one. If these ideas are satisfied the meaning of individuality and maniness disappears.

The conception of a common good makes it external. If a good is to satisfy all it must not be exclusively inside any one. But the separateness between the good and the moral agent takes away from the meaning of good. If they are separate, how can there be any moral obligation felt by the self towards the good ?

The true self and the good must be identical, and the true self being one, unique good shall also be one and unique. The good must therefore be conceived as individual and not as common.

An Introduction to Vedanta Systems.

H. N. Raghavendrachar.

The term Vedanta means several things. It means first the end of the Veda, secondly the heart or essence of the Vedic teaching and lastly that which decides the true meaning of the Vedic teachings that are apparently contradictory in character.

What is the central teaching for which the whole Veda stands? Such teaching must be extricated from apparent contradictions. To do this a separate system has been evolved to thresh the essential out of the non-essential. Such a system is Vedanta.

Several attempts at such systematisation have been made. Bādarayana's attempt seems to be the very first of them. In his Brahma Sutra he has systematised the thoughts of the Veda. The Sutras consist of pithy statements that are very comprehensive in their outlook. They are called Vedanta Sutra because they embody the systematisation of the Vedic thought.

The Brahma Sutras are 564 in number. They refer to a date later than when Sankhya or Nyaya, Jaina and Buddhistic philosophies came into being. Prof. Keith holds that the date cannot be later than 200 A. D.

The Sutras consist of four chapters. The first explains that the whole Veda deals with Brahman. The second chapter removes the difficulties in viewing Brahman as the ground of all. In this connection rival systems are refuted. The third chapter is devoted to how Brahman is realised and liberation obtained.

The Sutra consists of very brief statements which with their condensation of meanings made it very difficult to arrive at a final teaching. This gave rise to many commentaries.

Among those that appeared as systematisers of the Vedic thoughts by way of commenting on the Brahma Sutras, Sankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, and Madhvacharya are the most important. They appeared one after another. Sankaracharya called his system Advaita Vedanta, Ramanujacharya Visistadvaita Vedanta and Madhvacharya Dvaita Vedanta.

Generally there is a misconception as to the real significance of the terms Advaita, Visistadvaita and Dvaita. The term Advaita is taken to mean unity in diversity, Visistadvaita of qualified monism and Dvaita duality. But these terms betray absence of correct understanding. They are not as different from one another as they are taken to be.

The three systems start from the same point. Their starting point is Brahman which is the ground of all and which is the reality. As far as this goes the three systems may be described as *Brahmadvaitism*.

They differ from one another on the question of the relation between Brahman and the world. According to Sankara the world has no reality of its own. Brahman is the only reality. The world is superimposed upon Brahman just as the silver as appearance is imposed on the shell. Apart from Brahman nothing is real, is the thesis of Sankara and he calls it rightly Advaita.

According to Ramanuja Brahman is to the world what soul is to the body. The world is because Brahman is in it. The world is not a superimposition, an illusion but it has not also any self-sufficient existence beyond Brahman.

Madhvacharya does not agree with either Sankara or Ramanuja. Even if the world is regarded as a superimposition some amount of reality must have to be granted to it. If it is nothing there is no sense in saying that it is a superimposition. To say that the world is the body to Brahman is simply

to indulge in metaphor. The world is our starting-point, its reality is undeniable. But it has a dependent existence. It is dependent upon Brahman who is *causa sui*. Brahman is the necessary presupposition of the world.

These Acharyyas were no mere theologians; they were philosophers in that they have developed each a distinctive system of thought on upanishadic tradition.

The Climax of Freedom.

By R. R. Natu

Freedom can only be negatively defined as 'absence of constraint'—specially constraint from an external or alien source. Theists have generally defined spiritual freedom as emancipation from bodily control, although, it is difficult to see why God-created matter should bound the human Soul. Freedom has been advocated on moral grounds to make man responsible for moral evil.

Pantheism and Absolutism which leave little or no place to the finite reality should believe neither in freedom nor in determinism. But inconsistently enough, to the finite is left the freedom to achieve its oneness with the absolute.

Naturalism believing in causality and uniformity of nature has extended determinism to all fields—Chemistry, Biology, Psychology; it ignores the profound differences of these different fields of activity. But at least it can repel only chance variation but to prove that things are dependent is not to prove that they are determinate in the naturalistic sense. Determination does not absolutely close the door to freedom; even the attempt to prove determinism in nature is an act of freedom and the mental process that judges are not identical in kind. We cannot explain why the creative activity of the world ground should leave freedom to our portion of

reality but life and mind are qualitatively different from physical forces and are subject to teleological control. Spiritual activity is self-determined. If we adopt the law of continuity we may even imagine freedom in lower spheres and an enjoyment of it in the living world where act of adaptation reveals its existence.

In man the conflict between the ideal and the real and the choice of an alternative that satisfies the ideal self are evidences of the highest kind of freedom. To attain the capacity of passionless action as ascribed to sages in India is the real climax of human freedom, for here the animal nature is left far behind and motives of self-interest are suppressed.

We may very well conceive that the whole process of the world is designed to bring about this consummation and to that extent it itself is real as well as free.

Russell's Sense-data

By Lekh Raj Puri

Russell has made a distinction between Physical Object on the one hand and Sensation and Sense-data on the other. The physical object is never directly presented and has to be inferred from certain appearances or phenomena which he calls sense-data, while sensation is the experience of being aware of these appearances. It is doubtful if in addition to objective existence and subjective apprehension there is a *tertium quid* like sense-datum which belongs to neither. The sense-data belong to the self and we can only guess that there is a reality corresponding to the subjective states : but the sense-data do not form an independent realm hovering between Reality and Subjectivity.

Vacaspati's Criticism of Sphota.

By

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastry,

Maṇḍana's advocacy of sphota consistently with advaita : Vācaspati though inheriting other doctrines of Maṇḍana does not take this over, but criticises it in the *Tattvabhināṣa* and the *Bhūmatī*. This is not consistent with his general position. Maṇḍana's view : sphota revealed gradually and in sequence by different sounds which involve different kinds of effort and manifest the words of a sentence or the letters of a word. The sentence or word is integral, not integrated. Imperfect manifestations yet instrumental to the apprehension of the truth ; analogy of a partial and a whole number ; analogy of face and its reflections.

Vācaspati's criticism : (1) Is the sphota different from particular dhvani? If not, it should be manifested in full by each particular dhvani ; if different, manifestation need not be effected or coloured by dhvani. *Answer* : for Maṇḍana, sphota is different, yet non-different, like whole from part. (2) The cognition of the letters being unsublated, why should they be treated as illusory ? *Answer* : sublation comes not superficially, but on analysis ; jivatva too unsublated superficially ; letters cannot be independently and absolutely real even for Vācaspati, the advaitin. (3) Non difference is imposed on the differents. *Question* : why this departure from the general advaita position that difference is imposed on non-difference ? (4) No anyonyāśraya as between eka-padatva and eka-vijñāna-viśayatā or ekārthadhi-hetutā. *Answer* : when a number of letters are pronounced, what determines the apprehension of a single word ? If it be the singleness of the apprehension or the object, how is that singleness apprehended ? Logical difficulty not avoided by alleged psychological fact. In the alleged fact, is only one word pronounced by A ? If so, does B react ? If not,

how can C infer B's understanding of the word-sense ? The psychology is simplified and false. (5) Oneness need not conflict with diversity ; e. g., trees and forest. *Answer* : tree-cognition independent of forest-cognition. That the letter is cognition as such independently of the word is not proved. (6) No letters alone recalled, but letters in sequence. *Answer* : sequence imposed on letters by the speaker unable to pronounce all simultaneously ; not inherent in the letters, except as and when constituting a word. Sequence is purpose-dependent ; purpose another name for the sense, configuration, pattern, form, gestalt or *sphoṭa* that is realised. Sense is revealed in sounds ; sounds do not constitute the sense.

Vākya sphoṭa : both Maṇḍana and Vācaspati reject Pra-bhākara's view that sense resides only in the *kāyānvita*. According to both, the sense of words understood even in the relations of existents. Vācaspati cites Kumārila's verse about word-senses being but inevitable intermediaries to the sentence-sense ; it is not certain despite the *Kalpataru* whether he subscribes to the further view of Kumārila that the sentence-sense is secondarily implied. If he does, it will be but another lamentable lapse from the proper trend of *advaita*.

The Philosophy of Saint Satagopa.

By

R. Ramanujachari.

Introductory. In all the annals of our religious history there is no figure of the importance of Satagopa. Satagopa the most important of the Tamil Vaisnavite saints. Materials for a biography are miserably scanty and some of these not scientific history as we understand it. Hagiographers assign an impossible date. In spite of the diverse attempts of eager explorers during the last thirty years, it has not been possible to ascertain his date.

His Works. Was a mystic rather than a philosopher. Hymns represent the substance of characteristic religious experiences. Having intuitively perceived God, he threw open the doors of wisdom to all without any distinction of caste, creed or sex, by the novel experiment of giving divine mysteries in Tamil, the speech of the common folk. *Tiruvāsīriyam*, *Tiruviruttam*, *Tiruvandāl*, and *Tiruvaimoli*. Of these the last is the most important. It is regarded as equal in authority to the Vedas. In interpreting abstruse Vedānta Sūtras and reconciling different portions of the Vedānta, Rāmānuja was guided by the sublime truths taught by Saṭagopa's religious experiences as set forth in his works.

God. The supreme personality, one without a peer; the embodiment of every perfection. The material and efficient cause of the world. Not merely a transcendent being above and beyond the whole series of individuals, but also immanent. Internal ruler. The soul of all the worlds. Identified with Nārāyaṇa.

Jiva. It is of the essence of knowledge (cidrūpa) and has knowledge for its quality (caitanyagūṇaka). It is *jñāna* and *jñātā*. It is of the nature of bliss and is eternal. Its essential nature does not change. Has God for its soul. Subservient to the will of the Lord.

Matter. The world of matter not an unsubstantial figment of deluded fancy but real and eternal. Prakṛiti is subject to change; its changes are controlled by God. It is the seat of three guṇas. The world is our beautiful enemy to be hated before it may be loved.

Supreme object of life. The good life not a life of ratiocination, but a life of service to God and god-lovers (Bhāgavatabhakti). Not necessarily a life in a different world. Desire for worldly and heavenly joys, *ātmanubhava* (Kaivalya), ahaṁkāra and mama-kāra are the chief obstacles that stand in the way of moksha. True ideal of renunciation is set forth.

Prapatti. *Bhakti* and *prapatti* are the two ways recommended. Of these *prapatti* is the easiest and the works of Saṭagopa may be treated as a treatise on *prapatti*. Grace is no substitute for will. Grace descends from on high upon those who allure it, invite it by daily effort, prepare themselves to welcome it and sustain it when it has come by new efforts.

Causality and Vedanta.

By

C. T. Srinivasan.

Does the cosmos indicate the plan and the method of future development? Does causality really signify anything more than a way of human reckoning in the final? To arrive at the first cause in the sense of its being the prior condition, is as impossible as to arrive at the first hour of existence. The several antecedent conditions are found to be one with the present, and the imaginary breaks in the continuity are only different views of one great event that is beginningless. The Vedic proof of the unreality of the world does not erase it from existence. The disappearance is therefore purely metaphysical not even mental. We are not concerned with the psychological cases. The world continues (to appear) as long as we are awake. The cause of it must be included within that beginningless continuity. But no cause is got at!

Cause in the sense of motive or purpose constitutes the philosophic field. In this sense it is subjective, for we cannot detect any motive in the object. As motive or purpose is individual, it is reasonable to seek the cause in the subject. It is impossible to think of a cause for this waking world, because the actual motive is absent with the mind in a previous state. No state is previous or subsequent to another state where, as we know per Vedic Method, there is no common time to connect them. It is illogical to think of a cause for subject-

object existence. We are driven therefore to the conclusion that cause is only an individual possibility: neither an objective factor nor a transcendental power in any form. But individual existence is not purposeless or aimless.

If cause means the basis of all this show, the question is not illogical, for then every bit of creation can be traced to it. To make it real, we have to posit a Creator! It is in this sense Essence, the Vedānta Sūtras speak of Brahman as cause or the basis of this whole existence, and prove it to be identical with our Real Self. Cause in any other meaning fails in itself. The true nature of cause is clearly dealt with by Saṅkara in his Adhyāsa Bhāṣya. Adhyāsa is not the cause of the appearance of the world but is the cause of mistaking it as the real. Adhyāsa helps to continue the mistaken notions of differences and distinctions. But the consciousness of duality or manifoldness is always one and secondless. In this light only knowledge can be of any use, for individual's knowledge can get rid of all individual illusions

The Hindu Doctrine of Anuman and its application to Vedānta Metaphysics.

By

J. C. Banerjee.

1. What is the ground of Inference? Marks of causation; ascertainment of Vyāpti—the Buddhists' method of Pañcākarāṇi; its refutation by the Naiyāyikas—the method of Anvaya-Vyatireka.

The Cārvāka theory. The five steps of the Inference according to the Naiyāyikas. What is *Liṅga parāmarsha*? *Vyāpti Jhāna* by itself is not sufficient to be the *kāraṇa* of *anumiti*; it is *Vyāptisamskāra Udyoga*.

Three forms of invariable relation Kevalānvayī, Kevala-Vyatirekī, Anvaya-Vyatireki—Vedantists' objection to this.

II. Application of Inference to Vedānta Metaphysics.

The Knowledge-Situation & Metaphysics.

By

P. R. Damle.

Since the time of Kant, the theory of knowledge has been considered a necessary preliminary to metaphysics.

It is, however, unnecessary and wrong to make it a preliminary to metaphysical study.

Considered in the formal manner in which it is and must be considered as a preparatory inquiry, it reveals three alternatives all equally unsatisfactory.

The object of knowledge is independent of the knower. The difficulty of this view is to establish knowledge at any stage—to bridge the gulf which has been made unbridgeable almost by definition. (All realists)

The object is mental: mind-dependent. The difficulty here is to preserve the necessary distinction between subject and object. How can mind be itself subject and object at the same time? (Kant—Hegel—Green)

(c) The object is a product of the relation of knower to known. Not mind as knower—nor independent, but as knower, knowing etc. (Bradley, Bosanquet)

This merely repeats the problem set, in the terms of the solution.

The problem of knowledge therefore, considered formally is insoluble. Thinkers who have accepted one of these solutions as satisfactory and proceeded to their metaphysical enquiry have been dogmatic.

The proper way out is not to enter on such a fruitless, impossible, because formal, inquiry at the beginning.

In Metaphysics as in the other sciences the only purpose is to know the object of knowledge and we can and must approach the object directly as in practical life or other sciences.

Metaphysics is distinguished from other studies by its greater concreteness and inclusiveness. It gives material to

formal sciences like Logic or Epistemology and is no more dependent on them than Physics or any other science is.

The difficulties felt to be insoluble on purely Epistemological grounds as to the relation of knower and known in knowledge are soluble in metaphysics. Neither the Materialist nor the Spiritualist has the problem which faces the advocates of the several views in Epistemology as detailed above.

Prof. Stout and the external physical world.

By

Birendranath Mazumdar, M. A., Dacca.

In his recent Gifford Lectures Stout makes an attempt to explain the transition from *Sensa* to Physical Object by suggesting that there is a continuity of existence between the two. But in his treatment of this subject he draws a distinction between the way in which *Sensa* are known and the way in which Physical Object is apprehended—the former being direct and the latter indirect. These two are rather contradictory and Stout's analogy between Physical Object and Memory does not solve the difficulty. Any distinction drawn between *Sensa* and Reality is bound to land one in some kind of agnosticism.

Fatalism.

By

H. M. Bhattacharya.

A general statement of the problem : its influence on life. The metaphysical dogma behind it ; its empirical analysis. Fatalism and natural order. Fatalism, Determinism. Indeterminism and Freedom. Its relation to the Moral Situation.

Scientific Study of Religion.

By

Umesh Chandra Bhattacharjee.

In this paper, attention is drawn to the danger of Scientific Study of Religion. Science as such has had its quarrels with Religion. But although these tussels resulted in some mutilations of the old religious dogmas and beliefs; yet the fundamental Religious Consciousness was left more or less intact. And in consequence of this, it has been possible for Natural Theology to rear its fabric on the conclusions of Science.

But Science has now extended its scope and has included Religion itself along with other Departments of phenomena within its scope. And of the various Scientific Studies of Religion, the psychology of it seems to be its most sinister enemy. Because such study, going as it does to the very root of its origin, tends to undermine Religion altogether.

Religion, however, may still be saved in its essentials, only if it can show that it is not untrue and that it is the highest morality.

Life after Death.

By

A. Minakshisundaram Aiyar.

After death the body undergoes physical and chemical changes, but the change of forms perceived in what we call death is different from the change of form perceived in what we call growth. There is continuity in the latter.

Man is not a machine or robot. Even the inorganic is more than mechanical. The universe is made up of apparent contradictions. Freedom and subjection to laws both live. The phase of freedom is expressed best in man. If man is more than a machine, it cannot be declared that with the destruction of the machine everything is destroyed.

The mind is not the effect of the actuality of the brain. They are on different planes. The mind is not a function of the brain, since function is structure in activity. There are, however, correspondences between mental activities and activities of the brain. But the correspondence is confined to the elements of a perception. Perception, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, Self-consciousness and Individuality have no cerebral analogies. The mind is like a player on a musical instrument called the brain.

There is evidence that a mind can communicate with another mind even without the medium of the body.

Mental activity is outside the scope of the law of conservation of energy. Nothing can be destroyed. The mind must continue to exist as Mind. It can grow but cannot be destroyed.

There is evidence that after the death of the body, the mind appears again associated with another body, as capacities and tendencies of an individual. Rebirth is the only explanation for congenital tendencies, though it is mysterious how the choice of body is made. This is not more mysterious than the relationship of mind and body. Heredity is no rival theory. It is a statement of the facts of reproduction and conservation. Reproduction of mind is unthinkable.

Heredity is not inconsistent with individual growth. It is not a fact that tendencies of the child are all traceable to the tendencies of the parents except those which are associated with conditions of physical structure.

The hypothesis of rebirth explains intention. It is consistent with the experiences of *Yogis* to whom previous lives are facts and not theories.

The hypothesis is also demanded by the fact that the universe is a cosmos and an organic whole. The theory is in harmony with the moral and beautiful side of Nature.

The theory also explains why the virtuous suffer and the vicious prosper, to the extent that natural laws entail rewards and punishments.

The hypothesis is not inconsistent with known facts and theories, and at the present day, it is the only hypothesis that explains numerous phenomena which require explanation.

The Evolution of the idea of soul.

By

B. Kuppuswamy.

The fear of the leader, the interpretation of dreams, the tendency to materialise are maintained as the bases for the evolution of the notion of soul in the primitive mind.

In the primitive society, due to hunting, leadership evolved. The leader was propitiated, as he had immense capacities of doing good as well as evil. In dreams, as every desire is satisfied which was incapable of satisfaction in waking life, and as the primitives believe in the reality of dream experiences as well as waking experiences, they regard the individual as having greater capacity when asleep than when awake—the leader consequently having greater power. As a person dead appears similar to a person sleeping, death is merely regarded as prolonged sleep, the person having gone away from the body never to return. So he is regarded as entirely free from the limitations of the body and consequently he assumes a more terrible aspect than when alive. The tendency to materialise is suggested as the reason to hold that the leader continues to exist even after death. Hence the notion that soul exists in the leaders, which was later on attributed to every person in the group.

Attention.

By

Jitendra Kumar Chakravarty.

Difficulties in dealing with the problem. Is it identical with consciousness ? or is it a peculiar state of consciousness or a kind of force ?

Neglected alike by the English Associationist as well as by the idealist. In the present connection the problem discussed mainly from the philosophical side.

It belongs to the mental order. The distinction between attention and inattention hardly admissible.

The Resultant Theory indicates the possibility of such a division. The shortcomings of the Resultant Theory.

The claim of Force Theory considered. No conclusive evidence available.

The limits of Psychology as a Natural Science. The interests of life and personality not adequately dealt with.

Attention and personality closely allied. They indicate at once the clash between spirit and nature, and shows the way to reconciliation.

The possibility of applying psycho-analysis to General Psychology.

By

Prof. J. K. Sirkar, G. B. S. Gollege, Muzaffarpur.

The unconscious experience as the basic concept of psycho-analysis—distinction between unconscious setting or complex and conscious setting.

The different uses of the term 'complex' in Sully, Titchener and Morton Prince.

(a) Its wider meaning in Hart, Tansley.

(b) Its narrower meaning in Jung, Rivers, Shand and McDougall.

The attempts of the wider view to bridge the gulf between the conscious and the unconscious—the narrower view leading to their separation—criticism of the latter—the psychological system of psychoanalysis used as a method—general criticism of the conception of the unconscious mental process or unshared experience by Self-psychology (Calkins).

Attempts made to build up the psychological system of psycho-analysis—percept taken as a conscious complex, (according to Hart's wider view of complex).

Suggestion :—Perception to be regarded as the product of Assimilation (called 'Fusion' by Rivers)—Assimilation as one of the forms of the inhibiting or controlling mechanism of mind—Repression being another form—distinction between Assimilation and Repression.—Release of thought from its materials as involved in sense-perception—two forms of release, viz., release of thought from its elements and release of elements from thought—the substituting mechanism of the mind—comparison and agreement between the suggested view and the views of Stout, McDougall and Binet.

Wundt's Doctrine of Creative Synthesis.

By

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The gradual development of the conception in Wundt's mind as it appears in his successive writings is indicated as also its filiation to contemporary thought. Its influence on subsequent psychology and philosophy is also shown.

Sakti-Vada.

By

K, Narayanswami Iyer.

Both Maya-Vādins and Śakti-Vādins assert that there is no consciousness of objects in the Supreme. According to Śaṅkara, Māyā is an inexplicable principle which is neither real nor unreal. Śaktivāda considers Māyā to be a peculiar śakti of Brahman. Creation is real and there is a direct causal nexus between Siva (as cit śakti and Māyā śakti) and the Universe.

The emanation (ābhāsa) doctrine of Śaktivāda outlines an evolution of consciousness (cit Śakti) associated with Māyā Śakti into certain forms.

The scheme of evolution according to Śaktivāda is as follows. Parasamvit, which is beyond all tattvas, is Niṣkala. Siva and Siva-Śakti is the aspect of Supreme Brahman from which change comes. Siva and Śakti-tattvas are counted separately, though Śakti-tattva is merely the negative aspect of Siva-tattva. These two tattvas constitute Saguṇa Brahman, whereas Parasamvit is Nirguṇa Brahman. The first-evolved tattva is Sadāśiva or Sadākhyatattva. Māyāśakti is the sense of difference and the Kañcukas are limitations of natural perfection of supreme consciousness. The result of Māyā and its Kañcukas is the production of puruṣa and prakṛti tattvas.

To the Śākta, Spirit and Matter are fundamental substance and its Power. These twin principles are called Puruṣa and Prakṛti by Sāṅkhyas ; Brahma and Māyā by Advaitins and Siva and Śakti by the Śaktivādins.

In Śaktivāda concrete experience has two aspects—the quiescent background (Siva) and the evolving power (Śakti). This whole (Siva-Śakti) is taken as real.

The Śākta is a worshipper of God in Mother-form as supreme power which creates, sustains and withdraws the Universe.

Sarvamukti—(A Symposium.)

By

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

Salvation or mukti is life eternal and has nothing to do with continuance in endless time. We cannot give an adequate account of mukti since it transcends the limitations with which human life is bound up. So the question of the nature of salvation, whether it is individual or universal, has no relevance or meaning when applied to life eternal, which is altogether a different kind of life.

The question acquires a sense when we attempt to describe the state of salvation from the standpoint of the empirical world. Admitting this very serious limitation, we may try to understand, from the empirical level, the nature of salvation.

The question whether it is individual or universal has significance only on the basis of the plurality of individual souls on the empiric plane. If in this universe we have only one soul, then salvation of that soul means the redemption of the whole universe. Universal salvation and individual salvation are identical on the *ekajīvavāda*.

Though some later advaitins adopt this position Saṅkara is opposed to it. If all the different souls are only one jīva, then when for the first time any soul attains liberation, bondage should have terminated for all which is not the case. He says :¹ “*ekenācādimuktena prthivyādi pravilayah kṛta iti idānīm prthivyādisūnyam jagad abhaviṣyat*”. From the empirical standpoint a plurality of individuals is assumed by Saṅkara and many of his followers, though not all. On this view what exactly does mokṣa or salvation connote ? It does not involve the destruction of the world. It implies the disappearance of a false view of the world.

*Koyam prapañca pravilayo nāma ? Kim agniprātapa-samparkāt ghṛtakāṭhinya pravilaya iva prapañca pravilayaḥ kartavyaḥ ? Aho vid ekasminścandre timirakrtānekacandraprapañcavat avidyākrto brahmani nāmarupa-prapañco vidyayā pravitāpitavyaḥ iti.*²

Saṅkara admits that the world appearance persists for the jīvanmukta or the Sthitaprajña of the Bhagavadgītā. The jīvanmukta, though he realises mokṣa or brahmabhāva, still lives in the world. The appearance of multiplicity is not suppressed. It is with him as with a patient suffering from *timira* that, though he knows there is only one moon, he sees two. Only it does not deceive the freed soul even as the mirage does not tempt one who has detected its unreal character. Freedom consists in the attainment of a universality of spirit or sarvātmabhāva. Embodiment continues after the rise of the saving knowledge. Though the spirit is released, the body persists. While the individual has attained inner harmony and freedom, the world-appearance still persists and engages his energies. Full freedom demands the destruction of the world-appearance as well. Saṅkara's view of the jīvanmukta condition makes out that inner perfection and work in the finite universe can go together.

It is usually thought that at death, the soul attains final liberation or videhamukti. It is not easy to reconcile this view with the other statement Saṅkara makes that Apāntaratamas, Bhṛgu and Nārada even after death work for the saving of the world.³ These are said to be "*samadhigatasa-kalavedārthāḥ.*" Saṅkara writes "*Teṣāṃ apāntaratamāḥ prabhṛitīnām vedapravartanādisu lokasthitihetuṣvadhikāreṣu niyuktānām adhikāratantratvātsthiteḥ ; athāsau bhagavān savitā sahasrayugaparyantam jagato adhikāram*

2. III. 2.21.

3. III. 3.32.

caritvā tadavasāne udayāstamayavarjitam kaivalyam anubhavati.

The continuance of Apāntaratamas and others depends on the offices which they fill for the sake of the world. As the sun, who after having for thousands of yugas performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, so Apāntaratamas and others continue as individuals, although they possess complete knowledge which is the cause of release and obtain release only when their offices come to an end.

“Evam apāntaratamah prabhrtayopīśvarāḥ paramēśvarena teṣu teṣu adhikāreṣu niyuktāḥ santah satyapi samyagdarśane kaivalyahetau akṣīṇakarmāṇo yāvad adhikāram avatiṣṭhante, tad avasāne ca upavrijiyanta iti.

So long as their offices last their karmas cannot be said to be exhausted. Saṅkara here admits that samyagdarśana, though it is the cause of release, does not bring about final release and the liberated individuals are expected to contribute to lokasthiti or world maintenance. Their karma can never be fully exhausted, so long as the world demands their services.

This view is not to be confused with kramamukti or gradual release in the traditional sense of the term. Those who are devoted to Kāryabrahmā or Hiranyagarbha as distinct from Parabrahman attain liberation only when the office of Brahmā terminates.⁴ Saṅkara is discussing not gradual release but release consequent on brahmajñāna which is attainable here and now; and for even such released souls, persistence of individuality is held not only as possible by Saṅkara but as necessary in the interests of what is called

4. Brahmanā saba te sarve samprāpte pratisanchre parasyānte kṛtātmānah praviśanti param padam.

lokasthiti. In other words, the world will persist as long as there are souls subject to bondage. It terminates only when all are released, i. e., absolute salvation is possible with world redemption.

Such a view of Saṅkara's philosophy is by no means new. Appayya Dikṣita, for example, takes his stand on those passages in Saṅkara where the jīva is said to be of the nature of Iśvara and not Brahman and holds that the liberated individuals attain communion with Iśvara and not union with Brahman.

Pārameśvaram eva hi sārīrasya pāramārthikam svarūpam (III. 4.8). See also 1.3, 19, and so he contends that Saṅkara supports the view of mokṣa as attaining the nature of Iśvara. "*Bhāṣyakāropi atispaṣṭam muktasya saguṇeśvarabhāva-pattim āha*".⁵ He also suggests that when all the jīvas attain liberation, the world with the liberated souls and Iśvara lapse into the Absolute where there is neither subject nor object, neither world nor God. But so long as some souls are unredeemed, even the liberated are in the world which is governed by Iśvara, though filled by the spirit of Oneness of all and fulfil their redemptive functions.

That the individual does not become identical with Brahman but only with Iśvara comes out from what is called the theory of reflection or the *bīmbapratibīmbavāda*. When a face is reflected in a number of mirrors, the destruction of a particular mirror means only its lapse into the reflecting face and not the face in itself. It is only when all reflection ceases, i. e. when all mirrors are destroyed that the reflecting face disappears and the face in itself appears. The full release or the attainment of Brahman is possible only when all avidyās are destroyed. Until then, release means only identity with *alīśvar*.

If such a view is adopted, two conditions are essential for final salvation, (1) inward perfection attained by intuition of self (2) outer perfection possibly only with the liberation of all. The liberated souls which obtain the first condition continue to work for the second and will attain final release when the world as such is redeemed. To be saved in the former sense is to see the self all in all, to see all things in the self and to live in the self with all things. To be perfect is to be oneself and all else. It is to be the universe. It is to give oneself so that all might be saved. Commenting on the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad text—*Sarvam evāviśanti* (III.2.15) Sāṅkara says : "He who has reached the all-penetrating Ātman enters into the all." Kumārila in his Tantravārttika quotes Buddha as saying "Let all the sins of the world fall on me and let the world be saved".⁶

Is such a world-redemption possible ? Is it necessary ? That it is possible is undoubted. If one can be saved, there is no reason why every one cannot be saved. Is it necessary ? I believe it is. If Brahman dwells in all and constitutes the reality of the world, if he is revealed in each and all of the infinite number of individuals, if separate existence is really non-existence, an appearance only, our falling short of our eternal stature is due to *aviveka* or non-discrimination, then the aim of the world process is the sublation of the non-real. Bondage is unreal. Bondage (*bandha*) which is terminated by knowledge is unreal (*apāramāṛthika*)⁷. In my Hibbert Lectures, I have set forth this view on independent grounds and here I am offering these reflections to indicate that Sāṅkara may be interpreted in support of such a view. These observations are offered as a basis for further discussion in this gathering.

6. Kalikaluṣakṛtāni yāni loke mayi nipatantu vimucyātām tu lokah.

7. Brahmajñānanivartyasya bandhasya ajñānātmakatvam
sūtreṇaiva sūcitam. (*Vivaraṇaḥprameyasāṅgraha*. p. 8.)

Radhakrishnan's Theory of Universal Salvation—ii

By

Saileswar Sen

In arguing for his theory of universal salvation in *An idealist view of life* Radhakrishnan uses the word 'universal' not only in a distributive, but also in a collective sense.

He uses it in a distributive sense when he says: 'If¹ every soul is precious to God, universal salvation is a certainty. If some souls are lost, God's omnipotence becomes problematic, God's love and power is, however, not the only ground on which this part of his theory rests. There is man's spiritual nature, for 'no being', says he, 'is wholly evil or impenetrable by good. None can for long resist the influence of spirit.' Again, 'All' individuals are destined to gain life eternal, for as a Hindu text says, we are the children of immortality (*amṛtasya putrah*).'

If X's salvation is to occur (scil, as an event) in the reality in which X's sin occurs, and if god's love and power together with X's spiritual nature is the law of that reality, I venture to maintain that the occurrence of X's salvation is not more derivable from that law than the occurrence of X's sin. If it is said that salvation is not the negation of sin, but the culmination of a process whereby sin transforms itself into good, the question arises: Is the nature of the good in which the transforming process culminates identical with the nature of the reality in which that process occurs? If so, the good is not an event in that reality. If not, that is to say, if its nature is different from the nature of that reality, the question arises: What is the nature of its difference?

To say that its difference is of the same nature as the difference of the attribute from the substance is to reduce that reality to the position of an 'unknown somewhat' which is not more capable of becoming the support of evil transformed into good than of good transformed into evil.

Again, if its difference is of the same nature as the difference of the part from the whole, it contributes, whilst perfecting itself, to the perfection of the whole, in which case there is no warrant for positing the whole in all its perfection and then deriving therefrom the perfection of the part.

Again, if its difference is of the same nature as the difference of the mode from the stuff, the question arises: Is the stuff different from the efficient cause of the mode? If so, the occurrence of the mode is not derivable merely from the stuff. If not, the stuff is dynamic, and not static. In *An Idealist View of Life* there are occasional indications that Radhakrishnan is groping for a theory similar to that upheld by Tsanoff, a Neo Hegelian, according to whom reality is dynamic and as such it is perfectibility, and not perfection. 'The core of reality', says Tsanoff in *The Nature of Evil*,³ 'is this eternal perfectibility: the heavens declare it; evolution, cosmic, biologic, or human-social discloses it; man's logical, aesthetic, and moral activity reveals its sublime range. Man's idea of God is his gesture towards the dizzy utmost of value, the infinite reach and endless span of it'. But if salvation consists in the culmination of perfectibility, and if reality is perfectibility, and not perfection, how is salvation attainable in that reality? Robinson, in endorsing Tsanoff's theory, says: 'But⁴ all selves have intrinsic value and the destiny of all selves is communion with the infinitely perfect essence of all reality, the unified totality of all intrinsic value—God. He is engaged in the redemptive process of bringing spiritual personal-

3. p. 399.

4. *An Introduction to Living Philosophy* p. 136.

ities to self-consciousness and to God-consciousness, and of unifying all such personalities in Himself'. But if God is the unified totality of all persons, how is it that He is engaged in unifying them into a totality? Again, is not 'self-consciousness' or 'God-consciousness' only another name for comprehending that reality is eternal perfectibility? If so, and if salvation consists in the culmination of perfectibility, is not the quest for salvation an endless one? As Tennyson's Ulysses says:

Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'

Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades

For ever and for ever when I move.

It is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of Taylor's theory that in salvation there is 'progress *in* fruition'. Radhakrishnan does not accept it; and although I find myself in agreement with him in this particular, I am not, however, prevented from saying that a theory of dynamic reality is far from consistent with a theory, according to which salvation consists in the culmination of perfectibility.

Let me now come to the second part of Radhakrishnan's theory, namely, the salvation of the human race. 'Coherence⁵ with the individual', says he, 'and harmony with the environment are both essentials for salvation. If we establish harmony within ourselves, overcome the struggle between the flesh and the spirit, we fulfil the first requirement. But harmony with the environment is not possible so long as there are unredeemed elements in it. We are not truly saved until the warring elements of our nature and the rivalries of individuals are both subdued into the unity of life and spiritual fellowship. Perfect freedom is impossible in an imperfect world, and so those who have secured a vision of spirit, work in the world so long as there is wrong to be set right, error to be corrected and ugliness to be banished from life. The indivi-

dual who achieves unity within himself sets other men forward in desiring the same good. In a true sense the ideal individual and the perfect community arise together'.

Radhakrishnan assumes that the human race consists of a given number of individuals, and then argues that if a is saved b and c are saved ! a is saved ; ergo b and c are saved (together with a) that is to say the human race is saved. To shew his chain of arguments more fully, if a is saved, there is harmony within a ; if so, there is harmony of a with b and c ; if so, there is harmony within b and c ; if so b and c are saved (together with a) ; but a is saved ; ergo b and c are saved (together with a), that is to say, the human race is saved. But why is a 's salvation inevitable ? I have already shewn that Radhakrishnan's reply is wrong. Even though it is not, the second part of his theory that salvation is inevitable for the human race remains unproved, for it is based on the assumption that the human race consists of a given number of individuals, in support of which no evidence is, however, forthcoming.

The situation that arises in consequence of universal salvation is described by Radhakrishnan thus : 'There' must come a time when all individuals will become sons of God and be received into the glory of immortality. When the world is redeemed, the end of the plot is reached. Earth and heaven would be no more ; the timeless and transcendent alone remains'. In short Radhakrishnan's world-salvation is only another name for world-destruction. But fortunately or unfortunately for the world, the self-contradiction in which he is involved by viewing the destruction of the world, that is to say, of the temporal order, to be an event in that order falsifies the prediction he delivers from his idealistic platform.

Universal Salvation—iii.

By

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri

The problem of salvation may be approached in at least two ways, that of God's nature and His relationship to man or that of man's own essential nature. The former method of approach is adopted by Radhakrishnan in his *Hibbert Lectures*, largely in view of the cultural background of his audience. And Dr. Sen's reply is confined to this mode of approach. The other starting-point, however, which is that of the advaitin, also leads to the same conclusion of universal salvation; and it is this that was the starting-point of Radhakrishnan's exposition of Sarvamukti at the eighth session of the Philosophical Congress. We have to state therefore, at the very outset, that Dr. Sen's reply is rather one-sided and fails to do full justice to the problem or the solution.

The advaitin's position is that Pure Consciousness is the sole real; that human beings, since they are of the nature of consciousness, are identical with this sole real; that error, imperfection and sin are all appearances due to beginningless but not endless nescience; that nescience is destructible by knowledge, that knowledge is not an adventitious attribute of spirit but is of the very nature of Spirit or Consciousness that, though temporarily unattained as it were (like the forgotten ornament round one's own neck) and later attained as it were, it is really eternally attained; and that when the eternally attained knowledge is realised (in the same way as the realisation of the already present ornament) that is release. On this view, then, release is dependent on man's nature as Spirit, not on man's dependence on the love, grace or omnipotence of God. This dependence is not denied altogether; for so long as man does not realise his own full

stature, it is God that has to help him develop his latent powers, acquire an inclination for advaita doctrine, help him to pursue it steadily and so on. But despite all this seeming help from outside, as to the time and mode of release, in the stages prior to realisation, when realisation comes it is not as gift from without nor as an annexation of what is without, but as the full manifestation of one's own essential nature. Release is the natural right of man ; and this is true whether "man" be taken distributively or collectively. The worst sinner, so long as it is conceded that he is an intelligent being i. e. , that there is Caitanya in him, cannot be denied release ultimately though the travail and the purification will necessarily take longer time in his case. The souls who are more perfect do not idly mark time. They attain release of a sort earlier. They become *jīvanmuktas*, according to one school of thought, and are placed in positions of authority for the purpose of guiding souls in the lower stages of perfection. When all souls have been made perfect, they all become God. On another view, the earlier released souls become God, but not Brahman ; they remain identical with God until final release of all souls, and then the souls merge in Brahman. Whether they continue to retain some individuality as *jīvanmuktas* or become identical with God (*Īśvara*), their state is one not of bare enjoyment, but of responsibility for the guidance and governance of less advanced souls. This second view is explained by Appayya Dikṣita in consonance with the hypothesis that the *jīvas* are reflections of *Īśvara*. When any one *jīva* is released, that reflection becomes one with the prototype. But until all mirrors (that is to say, nesciences) are destroyed, there will always be the possibility of reflection; the released soul will continue to be the prototype, not that which is above prototype and reflection ; but when all nesciences are destroyed there is no further possibility of reflection and there is merger in Pure Brahman. It is

comparatively immaterial which of these views we adopt for the doctrine of universal salvation. But we shall have to say presently that the latter has some advantages over the former.

"If salvation is inevitable for every man," asks Dr. Sen, "how is sin possible?" It is admitted that sin and error exist. It is also admitted that they are inexplicable. To say that God is imperfect would be to admit the existence of sin from the beginning; and it is no *explanation* of sin to say that it existed from the beginning. If, on the other hand, God be admitted to be perfect, the difficulty of explaining sin is common to both disputants; it is no less inexplicable on the hypothesis of damnation, universal or partial. The end of sin, however conceived, does not help to explain its beginning (if there was one) or explain away its present. Even radical empiricism can only say with James that for that view the problem is not why evil exists, but how it can be got rid of. And such a pragmatic passing over of the problem is not closed to the Advaitin. He too can and does say "I cannot tell you how there is sin. I can tell you the way out of it; for you are identical with the Supreme Self that is above all sin; your release is therefore assured, though how you came to imagine yourself in bondage is a problem I cannot and do not care to solve." For such a position, the whole of Dr. Sen's clever dialectic is so much irrelevance.

Dr. Sen next sets out and criticises a brilliant passage from the Hibbert Lectures. That passage would appear to fulfil two purposes,—describe the condition of the *jivan-mukta* and prove the need for universal salvation. With the former aspect of it we ourselves are not quite satisfied. It is said, quite rightly, that since perfect freedom requires both coherence within and harmony without, the attainment of the former alone (which presumably is all that individual

souls of the highest grade of perfection may attain to) does not constitute full release. "We are not *truly saved* until the warring elements of our nature and the rivalries of individuals are *both* subdued into the unity of life and spiritual fellowship" (*italics ours*). If such souls are not truly saved, can they in any sense be said to be released, called *muktas*? Would it not be more correct to say that their release is imminent? The particular passage in question does not speak of these as *muktas*, but what we find unsatisfactory is the apparent splitting up of what is really a single requirement into two; it is not as though harmony within could be achieved in the absence of harmony without; by cutting oneself away from worldly cares etc, a high degree of the former could be attained, no doubt; but in its fullest sense and to its fullest extent it is not possible so long as there is possibility of disruption from without. Either harmony without must also be established, or such perfection must have been reached that there is no distinction of within and without and no possibility of external disruption. If internal harmony were really possible despite discord without, if external harmony were a second and an additional requirement, the need for the latter would not be intelligible at all. Coherence within and harmony without are two phases of a single ideal, not two distinct requirements; it is possible to stress one or the other at different times, but it is never possible to separate them; it is this implied separation (we believe that it is nothing more than an unconscious implication) that we find unsatisfactory in the passage cited. But taken as a proof of universal salvation we have no quarrel with it. Salvation means at least absolute contentment and joy. How could these be possible for any one—God or man—so long as there is a single unredeemed soul suffering albeit the consequences of its own karma? To rejoice in its own perfection, to close its eyes to the woes of brother souls lost

and wandering in the wilderness of nescience,—that would be smugness and self-sufficiency, which, happily, are not the last words of Indian Philosophy. Dr. Sen objects to Radhakrishnan's proof on two grounds. It is not established that salvation is inevitable for any individual. Even if it were, the proof proceeds on the assumption that "the human race consists of a fixed and definite number of men" The first of these objections we have already met in showing that according to the advaitin release is inevitable for man, taken individually or collectively. This is not the place for a fuller exposition or justification of the non-dualist doctrine ; But we have endeavoured to indicate that the difficulty raised by Dr. Sen about the possibility of sin is not peculiar to this system. The second objection we confess ourselves unable to understand. The human race no doubt does not consist of a definite number of men, but it is not infinite in any true sense of 'infinite' ; all that Dr. Sen can deduce from his premise is that we cannot point to any definite time when the perfect release of one and all will be achieved ; this however, is not the same as saying that there will *never* be the release of all. Further, if the Hindu dogma of non-origination of souls be accepted (and we see no reason for not accepting it), the indefiniteness of the human race reduces itself to the fact that we have not counted and may not be able to count with ease. There can be no perpetual influx of new souls, though the same souls may return repeatedly in various bodies until they have been trained in proper ways to march upward. The number of souls at any time will not be more than that it is now ; to admit the possibility of their increase is to admit the influx of unacquired karma. This being the case, we fail to see the point of the difficulty raised by Dr. Sen.

The last point of criticism is that Radhakrishnan is involved in self-contradiction 'by viewing the destruction of the world, that is to say of the temporal order, as though it were

an event in that order.' The objection is on the face of it serious. It is not of much help to contend that Radhakrishnan is more a poet than a philosopher when he says 'There must come a time when all individuals will become sons of God,' for the difficulty is more fundamental. Release is either escape from the temporal order or it is not. We are not concerned with the latter possibility; all conceptions of release, worth the name, treat it as an order of timelessness or at least as a temporal order very different from ours. In either case, we rise above our temporal order, and the rising is conceived as an event in that order. On the face of it, this sounds absurd. But we fail to see how the apparent absurdity can be avoided on any scheme of release except one which treats it as an indefinite persistence in our own temporal order. The latter cannot be acceptable to any one who is aware of the essentially imperfect and phenomenal character of time. We seem condemned therefore either to deny the possibility of release or swallow the absurdity. But is the absurdity so great after all? It is not *prima facie* inconceivable that the phenomenal sublates the phenomenal; on the analogy of poison eliminating poison, time also may be taken to eliminate time leaving nothing but timelessness. Again, is there not a confusion of standpoints when we envisage the alleged absurdity? Time, we say, seems to come to an end in time. But for whom? Is it not for us whose vision is still temporal? In the vision of the released soul, time was not, is not and will not be; the release is eternal; it did not come into being in time. From our point of view, of course, release (whether prior to or concomitant with physical decease) is an event in time. But what looks absurd for our vision, which is known to be temporal and imperfect, need not in itself be absurd. To apply it to the present problem, the end of the temporal order would appear as an event in time if there were still left any to cognise in and

through that order. But when *ex hypothesi* there are no longer any such cognisers, because of universal release, there can be no absurdity, since there will be no finite beings to whose vision alone this absurdity can appear. The self-contradiction which Dr. Sen brings up as a charge is, then, no more than an apparent phase of the self-transcendence which is characteristic of all release.

Sarvamukti—IV.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR.

Dr. Sir Radhakrishnan has expressed his views on the subject in three places: (1) in his eulogistic introduction contributed to the Calcutta University edition of *Vedānta Paribhāṣha* brought out recently by Prof. Anantakrishna Sastri (2) in the second volume of his *Indian Philosophy* (2nd edition) (3) and in the section on 'Salvation' in his Hibbert Lectures. Though it appears from his speech to-day that he has slightly modified his views, yet the same fundamental contention runs throughout the whole speech, viz., that the released soul, even according to Saṃkara, attains, not identity with *Brahman* immediately, but some kind of *Īśvarahood* which implies possession of *Īśvara's* powers and attributes. *Sarvamukti*, according to this view, would be the possibility of all souls attaining *Īśvarahood*, and only when all souls are released in this way, *i. e.*, become *Īśvaras*, does there occur final release which would be the merger of all souls in *Brahman*. This is the *nature* of *mukti*, according to Dr. Radhakrishnan and he has clinched the whole position neatly by quoting approvingly Appaiyya Dikṣita's exulting comment upon Saṃkara: "Bhāṣyakāro atispaṣṭam muktasya saguneswara bhāvāpattum āha," which means that "Saṃkara very clearly admits that the released soul attains the nature of *Saguna Brahman*." And Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri has boldly expressed the whole fact by maintaining that the released soul attains, not merely *some kind* of *Īśvarahood*, but identity with *Parameswara* in all respects, *t. e.*, becomes *Parameswara* Himself. Dr. Radhakrishnan further holds that these released souls constitute a kingdom of God in which they will spend their lives, not by eternally contemplating on the Lord (which would be a kind of spiritual

anaemia) but by actively and incessantly working for the spiritual uplift of unredeemed souls.

This is indeed in many ways an attractive idea and Appaiyya Dikṣita, the champion of Advaita, has developed it at great length in several of his works, especially *Siddhāntaśaṅkṣa* and *Sivādvaitanirṇaya*. He attempts to establish his position both on general philosophical grounds and by appealing to a number of passages in Saṃkara's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-Sūtras*, thereby making it appear that his view of *mukti* is the orthodox view of Advaita. The characteristic point in this view is that even *nirguṇavidyā*, the meditation upon *nirguṇabrahman* or true enlightenment results immediately, not in identity with *nirguṇabrahman*, but in identity with *Īśvara* or the highest Lord. I wish to argue to-day that such a position is thoroughly unwarranted by the strict logic of Advaita and in doing so I shall confine myself mainly to examining Appaiyya's general philosophical grounds.

Appaiyya's *siddhānta* reduces itself ultimately to *ekēśhvaravāda*, for the distinction between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, depending as it does upon the clastic *upādhi*, is not radical or fundamental, and with increasing expansion, the *jīva* loses its *jīvahood* and becomes *Īśvara*. And since a multiplicity of *Īśwaras* is inconceivable, there would remain only one *Īśvara* as the real alongside of *Brahman*. But it should be seen that *Īśwarahood* of this kind cannot be latent in the *jīva*, for *Īśwarahood* implies *sarvajnatva* omniscience. It is the perfection of *vr̥tti-jñāna* and such *vr̥tti-jñāna* cannot remain compatible with the *avidyā* of the individual *jīva*. The *swarūpa jñāna* of *Brahman*, which is pure consciousness or *chinmātram*, may be compatible with *avidyā* and that is the reason why it is sometimes maintained that *Brahman* is both the *locus* and the object—the *āśraya* as well as the *viśaya* of *avidyā*. But perfected *vr̥tti-jñāna* is *virodhi*

—opposed to—*avidya* and latent omniscience in the *jiva* is a patent contradiction in terms.

Futher Appaiyya's *siddhanta* presupposes that *jiva* suffers under two kinds of *āvaraṇa* : (1) the *āvaraṇa* by means of which *Īśvarabhāva* is *tirohita* in the *jiva*, and (2) that by virtue of which the *Brahmabhāva* is *tirohita*. And with the dawn of enlightenment, we must suppose that the *āvaraṇa* covering the *Īśvarabhāva* falls away and the *jiva* manifests itself as *Īśvara*. But this *Īśvarahood* would itself be another *āvaraṇa* covering the *Brahmabhāva* and only when all souls have attained this *Īśvarahood*—when *Sarvamukti* has occurred— does this second *āvaraṇa* fall off of itself. Now neither in Saṃkara nor in any other classical writer on Advaita is there even the slightest hint of this double *āvaraṇa* overshadowing the *jiva*, at least in the case of those who possess the higher knowledge relating to *nirguṇabrahman*. If it be said that the second *āvaraṇa* begins to appear only when enlightenment has done its work in dispelling *avidya*, we must reply that if *avidya* has been dispelled, there is no reason why empirical experience relating to *Īśvarabhāva* should still persist, for *Īśvara* in Advaita is only a *vyāvahārika* conception. Hence it must be a strange kind of knowledge indeed which, even after bringing about *akhandacharamasākṣātkāra* to the individual, would still make *avidya* persist for the released soul in the form of *Īśvarabhāva*. We must hence conclude that according to Appaiyya, even the followers of *nirguṇavidya* cannot have their nescience totally destroyed after release in which case they would be in the same plight as those who practise *saguṇopāsana*.

Appaiyya makes an unsuccessful attempt to meet this argument. *Īśvaraika* as noted above implies the possession of lordly powers and of attributes like *Satyakāmatva*, *satyasamkalpatva*, freeness from sin, from death, from old

age, grief, decay etc. Since these powers and attributes are all *avidya-janya* born of nescience, our question was, how can the released soul attain a state which is still within the bounds of nescience? Appaiyya replies by saying that these characteristics are not born of nescience, for if they were, *Isavra*, who is clearly beyond the pale of *avidya*, could not possess them, and yet he does possess them. And if we should say that it is from the standpoint of the bound souls that these characteristics appear in *Isvara*, we may admit as much in the case of the released soul also. Now these are statements absolutely unsupported by the great Saṃkara. That the qualities and powers under discussion are nothing if not *avidya*-born is unequivocally admitted by Saṃkara in his commentery on the B. S. (III. iii. 39 and IV. iii. 14). In the latter passage especially Saṃkara explicitly states that where a text teaches Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name and form and so on, it is the lower Brahman that must be understood as having been referred to, and that "passages..... which the text exhibits in proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman show that the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds, a fruit falling within the sphere of Saṃsāra, nescience having not as yet been discarded".¹ As for the statement that both *Isvara* and the released souls appear to possess the powers etc. from the standpoint of *Drashtṛapurushas* and their *avidya*, this is an excellent instance of the eternal confusion of standpoints which is the besetting sin of Advaita². Dr. Radhakrishnan also adopts the same dual standpoint when he writes, regarding the soul's

1. S. B. Thibaut's translation, 2nd. Vol. 401—402.

2. The confusion referred to is that between *pāramārthikā* and *Vyāvahārikā*; *Māya* e. g. is said to be *anirvachanīya* because it is *asat* from the *pāramārthikā*, but *sat* from the *prātibhāsikā* standpoint. On this whole subject, see the writer's paper on "Rāmānuja's Criticism of the *Māyāvāda*" published in the *Congress proc.* for 1927.

state after release, that "According to Saṃkara, he who has spiritual insight obtains oneness with Brahman though the state can be described by us only as sameness with God" (Indian Philosophy, vol. II second edition, PP. 643—4). I want to ask : why bother ourselves with what mokṣa *looks* like to others ? Mokṣa is believed to be a state wherein all looks and appearances are transcended—it is a state that *is*, not one that appears. What *is* it then—Brahmatwa or Īśwaratwa ? Moreover it is impossible for bound souls to imagine what the released state looks like ; if such an imagined picture were relevant in connection with the description of release, then an unreleased soul may as well regard the released state as one of eternal fire and brimstone—would this too be a possible description of release ? It is entirely irrelevant then to talk of the avidya of the Drashtṛāpuruṣas as the cause of the appearance of powers and attributes³. in Īswara and the released souls.

It may be said that if a released soul can continue as a Jīvanmukta for some time without being immediately identified with Brahman, he may as well continue to exist as Īśwara for some time more before being absorbed in Brahman. And Dr. Radhakrishnan has admitted as much by saying that what he is talking about is not the *krama-mukti* of the Saṃnopāsakas but the kind of mukti which Apāntaratamas, Vaśiṣṭha, Bhṛgu, Nārada etc., all possessing the complete knowledge of Brahman sufficient for release—are said to have attained, which may be said to be something akin to Jīvanmukti. Now there appears to be a slight confusion here between Īśwarahood as such and Jīvanmukti or the Mukti of Savitar or Apāntaratamas. This latter is not the attain-

3. It must be noted that this is not a question of the distinction between reality and existence or reality and appearance since mokṣa, *ex hypothesi*, is free from all appearance. If mokṣa can also get enmeshed in appearance, where is freedom ?

ment of *Iśvarabhāva* but something lower than that. For *Samkara* clearly states that "the highest Lord has entrusted certain offices" to them.⁴ If so the quotation from *Appaiyya* which Dr. Radhakrishnan has cited is clearly out of place, for what *Appaiyya* means by release is absolute identity with *Iśvara*. Further, *Apāntaratamas* and others, it is made clear by *Samkara*, enjoy their present state on account of *prārabdha karma* which remains to be enjoyed out⁵ and so in this respect may be compared with *Jivanmuktas*. But neither state can be identified with *Iśvarahood* as such, for surely *Iśvara* does not enjoy his present status on account of His lingering *Prārabdha*? In any case there does not seem to be much difference between the *krama-mukti* of the *Saṅgopāsakas* and the kind of *Mukti* advocated above for the released soul, according to the latter, first becomes something like *Iśvara*, then fully *Iśvara* and then *Brahman*. What else is this but *krama-mukti* of the usual sort.

In fact those who advocate this view ought to reflect upon the inexplicable disparity that they thus postulate between means and end. How can *nirguṇavidya* lead to identity with *saguṇa Brahman*? If this is possible why should not *saguṇopāsana* immediately result in merger with *nirguṇa-brahman*? As matters stand, the *saguṇopāsaka* gets what he bargained for; it is the expert in *nirguṇavidya*—he who possesses an intuition of the impartible absolute—that having practised a higher *vidya*, obtains a lower result. Such a possibility would clearly refute the *Sruti* text; "tam yatha yathopāsate, tathaivabhaveti"—"in whatever form one

4. S. B. Thibaut's translation, 2nd Vol., p. 236. 2. P. 2. *ante*.

5. ".....so *Apāntaratamas* and other lords.....last.....as long as their office lasts, their works not yet being exhausted" "For gradually exhausting the aggregate of works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to enable them to discharge their offices." *Ibid*, p. 236.

meditates upon *Brahman*, that form he attains." If Appaiyya and his followers be right, then the expert in nirguṇavidyā will never attain identity with nirguṇabrahman, for as Dr. Radhakrishnan justly observes, samsāra according to orthodox Advaita is *ananta*, unending, with the result that there will always be bound souls in the world and if so the released soul must eternally remain one with Iswara only.

II.

Adverting now to Appaiyya's appeal to Sankara for support of his view of mukti, I must observe that lack of time prevents me from going over the several passages cited by Appaiyya in his favour, but the net result of my examination of these passages has been to convince me that in every case in which Saṃkara appears to be talking of some kind of identity or equality with *Iswara* he is speaking about *sagunopāsana*, meditation upon the lower *Brahman* or *Brahman* with attributes, and surely in the case of *sagunavidyā*, nobody denies that the result would be some kind of equality with Parameswara. It must clearly be remembered that Saṃkara has a very high place for Sagunabrahman and Sagunopasana, but all this, he thinks, relates only to lower knowledge while the real truth consists in knowing the undifferentenced, unrelated impartible Brahman. And my quarrel with Appaiyya is not because he admits Sagunamukti, but because he says that even the *higher* knowledge of Brahman as devoid of attributes leads immediately only to identity with Iswara. This is what I cannot find support for in Saṃkara's writings. Referring, e. g., to the passage in Saṃkara⁶ which has elicited such an hilarious outburst from Appaiyya,⁷ we find that although the passage under consideration itself says nothing about the question whether it refers to Sagunopasana or Nirguna-vidyā,

6. S. B. I. iii. 14-19.

7. "Bhāṣyakāro atispaṣtam.....āha," p. 2, *ante*.

from various other passages we are able to determine that Saṃkara, in this as in all other passages where lordships and other powers and qualities are mentioned, intends to refer only to the fruit of meditation on the qualified Brahman. Two such passages have already been referred to, viz., III. iii. 39 and IV. iii. 14. In the latter passage especially, Saṃkara writes: "And where the soul's going is spoken of in a chapter treating of Brahman (and he here refers to various Upanishadic passages), such attributes as 'Vāmani' i. e., Leader of blessings, and 'Satyakama,' having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul can go."⁸ In IV. iv. 11 again, Saṃkara says: "Lordly power is valid only for the qualified state" and if it is anywhere mentioned in connection with Nirgunavidya, it is "only in order to glorify the knowledge of the (unqualified) plenitude, and it therefore presents itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge."⁹

In fact so far from supporting Appaiyya's contention, Saṃkara in many places explicitly says that knowledge of Brahman immediately leads to identity with Brahman. "Brahmavid Brahmaivabhavati"—the knower of Brahman becomes even Brahman. "Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman." Especially III. iii. 30—32, IV. ii. 13 and IV. iii. 10 may be consulted where the question of the validity or the applicability of *archirūdimārga* is discussed. Saṃkara concludes by saying that going etc. is only for the sagunopasakas and for the knower of nirgunabrahman, "there is delay only so long as he is not delivered from the body, then he will become one with Brahman" (Kh. up. VI. 4. 2). His commentary on IV. IV. 5—7 and 10—12 is also very instructive in this connection.

8. S. B. Thibaut, Vol. II., p. 400.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 412.

To sum up this part of the discussion. Saṃkara knows only of two kinds of *mukti* : (1) the attainment of Brahmanhood by those who practise nirguṇavidya (2) the attainment of equality with Iswara, especially in the matter of enjoyments, by those who practise sagunopāsana. He does not know of any such third variety as nirgunavidya leading to sagunaikya which Appaiyya and his followers, ancient and modern, seem to uphold¹⁰.

III

We now come to the treatment of the subject in later Advaita, and here we find that the whole question turns partly upon the relation between Jiva, Iswara and Brahman, and partly upon the unity or plurality of Jivas. Appaiyya maintains one variety of bahujivavāda according to which Iswara is *bimba* (Brahman itself in the act of witnessing its own reflection) and the jiva is a pratibimba, i. e., reflection of this Iswara in avidya. Plurality of reflections leads to plurality of Jivas so that when a soul is released through Jñāna, it can get only identity with Iswara and not with Brahman. For where a single face (Iswara) is reflected in many mirrors, the destruction of any one mirror causes that reflection (according to Appaiyya) to be absorbed in the original, but so long as there are other reflections (unredeemed souls), the face cannot get rid of its character as the original image (*bimba*) which means that the released soul would be one with Iswara only. When all souls are thus released, however, (*sarvamukti*), Iswara ceases to be a *bimba* and sinks back into Brahman when all souls, together with Iswara, would get final release in Brahman. Now there are two difficulties in this theory. Firstly professors of physics

10. This is clearly brought out by Ānandagiri also in his gloss on Sankara's bhāṣya : "Samprati chaturthe pāde" he writes, "paravidyā-phalaikadeśo brahmabhāvāvirbhāvah, saguṇavidyāphalamcha sarve-swaratulyabhogatvam avadhārayiṣyate".

tell us that when a mirror reflecting a certain image is destroyed, there is no meaning in saying that the particular reflection would be 'absorbed' in the original image ; whatever reality the reflection possessed as such is simply destroyed, annihilated, with the destruction of the reflecting medium. Secondly since saṃsāra is said to be an unending, eternal process¹¹, Iswara will forever continue to reflect Himself in avidya ; i. e, there will always continue to be bound souls in the world in which case we cannot say that sarvamukti—the mukti of all people—is a possibility.

But as against this theory of Bahujivavāda, there is the more famous Ekajivavāda, according to which nescience is one and indivisible and Brahman appearing through nescience is the immanent principle of Jiva, the èkajiva, the only jiva since there is no differentiation in Avidya. The rest of the whole phenomenal world is merely the result of the self-projection of this Eka-jiva, unreal in itself and existing only so long as the subject exists. However, the theory recognises the possibility of the Ekajiva attaining true knowledge and thereby release and when that occurs, the whole of the phenomenal world—including Iśwara who is also the figment of the Ekajiva's fancy—will simply disappear. Prakāśānanda, author of *Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvali*, and Sureśwara, author of *Vārttika*, are the champions of this theory which would thus prove a veritable rock upon which the ship of Appaiyya's Advaita would be shattered to pieces. I believe this to be the only tenable theory resulting from a rigorous working out of the logic of Advaita, however unpleasant its solipsism may appear to Advaitins.¹² Release in this case would simply be the merger of the

11. P. 12, ante.

12. "Brahmaiva swāvidyayā samsarati, swavidyā muchyate" says Saṃkara in his commentary on Br. up. Svetās. Up. IV. 5. also seems to support this view.

reflection in Brahman, or talking in the language of physics, the destruction of the reflection as such and leaving Brahman as the only reality. It may be that the Eka-jiva has not been released as yet and that accounts for the continuance of the phenomenal order of existence.

But Ekajivavada of this extreme type is not the only counter-theory possible against Appaiyya's position. There are varieties of Bahujivavāda which are equally inimical to it. Appaiyya himself discusses them in his famous *Siddhāntatasa-samgraha*. *Prakatarthavivarana*, *Tattwaviveka*, *Panchadaśi Samkṣepa Sārīraka*, *Chitrādīpa*, *Brahmānanda*, *Ḍṛgdrśyaviveka*, *Vedāntasāra*, *Advaitachintakaustubha*—in all the systems of thought represented by these works both *Iśvara* and the *Jiva* are *Pratibimb*as, reflections of Brahman, however much the schools might differ in their respective views regarding the nature of the reflecting medium etc. And where *Iśvara* Himself, as much as the *Jiva*, is a reflection, surely release for the latter cannot consist in merger in *Iśvara* but in Brahman; for as Appaiyya himself points out, the merger of a reflection in its original is intelligible, but its merger in another reflection is simply absurd. Otherwise why not *Iśvara* Himself merge in a *Jiva*-reflection and the released get back again into the *Samsara*-state?

Thus by a close examination—both deductive and inductive—conducted on the basis of Advaita itself, we find that the position which Dr. Sir Radhakrishnan has adopted for himself regarding the nature of Advaitic Mukti—the position that the immediate fruit of release even for those who have acquired the higher knowledge of *Nirguṇabrahman* is the attainment of *Iśvarabhāva* with powers attributes like unto *Iśvara*—is entirely untenable. Likewise is the other contention that these released souls—*Iśvaras* all of them—engage themselves in the delectable and highly edifying task of helping in the redemption of other souls less fortunate than

themselves till the final dissolution of the whole cosmic process. The basis for this splendid spirituo-social philosophy is very slender indeed in Saṃkara. The only Sūtra referred to by Dr. Radhakrishnan in support of this view is S. B. III. iii. 32 (Yāvadadhikāramavasthithiradhikārikāṇām). But as we have already seen, the Sūtra as well Saṃkara's commentary thereon make it clear that the office-bearers continue to serve the world only so long as their office lasts which (according to Saṃkara) is only so long as their Prārabdha Karma lasts ! No motive of world-redemption, this, but only a means of one's *Karma*-reduction !

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